WAR 05-04-2024-to-05-10-2024__THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · May 4, 2024

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Middle East Sits On 'Atomic' Volcano; Can Iran & Israel Curb Their Voracious Appetite To Finish Each Other?

Proxies of major world powers are playing a game that could see the destruction of the world in a nuclear holocaust. It is time sense prevailed, and Iran and Israel curb their voracious appetite to finish each other. Rampage ‘No Match’ To BrahMos; Why Indo-Russian ALCM Packs The Greatest Punch...

www.eurasiantimes.com

Middle East Sits On ‘Atomic’ Volcano; Can Iran & Israel Curb Their Voracious Appetite To Finish Each Other?

By KN Pandita - May 4, 2024

Proxies of major world powers are playing a game that could see the destruction of the world in a nuclear holocaust. It is time sense prevailed, and Iran and Israel curb their voracious appetite to finish each other.

Of the many irritants in the US-Iran relations, the one that has often exacerbated tension between the two is Iran’s irresistible fervor for acquiring nuclear capability. Iran has never accepted the bombast of the so-called Islamic bomb produced by Pakistan because Tehran was aware that by “Islamic bomb,” Pakistan meant “Saudi bomb.”

In simpler words, given the long-standing enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran decided to go nuclear at any cost. Iran’s hostility towards Israel is rooted in regional politics, not religion.

Israel destroyed nuclear installations in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime. Likewise, Israel has also subjected Iran’s nuclear program to attacks on multiple occasions, including eliminating key scientists linked to the program.

But at the same time, neither Israel nor the US saw any harm to their political interests by Pakistan attaining nuclear capability through covert means. Why was it so? The EurAsian Times has discussed this in one of its earlier articles.

With the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and five world powers in July 2015, it was expected that the Iranian nuclear juggernaut would be finally stopped.

That did not happen because the Trump administration withdrew the US from the agreement, and Iran declared that it was now free to enrich uranium to the level of making a nuclear bomb. Though the EU tried to reopen negotiations, it did not work.

IAEA’s Warning

With the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas and the failure of stakeholders to enforce restraint on both sides, the entire region of the Middle East and the world at large is now faced with the threat of nuclear disaster if good sense eludes the actors on the Middle East chessboard of diplomacy.

The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said Iran was just weeks, rather than months, away from obtaining enough enriched uranium to develop a nuclear bomb. This has to be taken as the most authoritative statement on the current status of Iran’s progress in nuclear technology.

In a report published earlier, Grossi said: “This does not mean that Iran possesses or will possess a nuclear weapon in that period.”

He added that although uranium enrichment to levels close to weapons-grade levels constitutes a cause for concern, that does not mean that Iran has or would have a nuclear weapon in that space of time.

He explained that “a functional nuclear warhead requires many other things independently from the production of the fissile material,” noting that Iran’s goals remain a “matter of speculation.”

Commenting on the development, The Times of Israel of April 23 wrote that according to Grossi, Iran’s nuclear goals were a matter of “speculation” though he criticized the country for its enrichment activity that “raises eyebrows” and its opaque dealings with UN nuclear inspectors, who are not being given the level of access to facilities, that he believed they need.

More Reflections

Grossi’s remarks came amid a recent flare-up in tension between Israel and Iran. After Iran fired a barrage of hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel in response to the alleged killing of IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) commanders in Syria, there was international apprehension that Israel could retaliate with a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The retaliation did come, but the bombs were dropped a short distance from the nuclear facility in Isfahan. Grossi said that attacking nuclear facilities was an absolute no-go.

Iran’s Denial

Iran denies that its uranium enrichment has reached the level at which manufacturing the nuclear bomb becomes a reality. Even so, Israel and the West believe the country had an active nuclear weapons program until at least 2003.

Iran’s supreme religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who has the last say on Iran’s nuclear program, issued a fatwa or religious decree in the early 2000s banning the development of a nuclear weapons program until at least 2005.

However, in February last year, Grossi said that Iran continues to enrich uranium at rates of up to 60 percent purity, which is far beyond the needs for commercial use and is a short technical step away from weapons-grade 90 percent. Iran, however, claims its nuclear program is only for peaceful means.

Political Angle

Amidst the raging controversy about Iran’s nuclear program, the entire issue is steadily assuming a definite political dimension.

“The West is trying to distract attention from the situation in the Gaza Strip” with allegations about Iran’s nuclear ambition,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, reported Anadolu Agency.

He asserted that their desire and “goal is to switch the world community’s attention from what is happening in the Gaza Strip where a humanitarian disaster is unfolding and many rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council are already talking about genocide,” he said in an interview with three Russian radio stations.

He went on to say that despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s confirmation that Iran possesses no nuclear weapons, Israel persists in accusing Iran of their use. Iran is the country most inspected by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he asserted.

Trans-Regional Escalation

Warnings of immense destruction likely to happen in the wake of the escalation of the Iran-Israel clash are pouring from many quarters. The general inference is that the world is upset with the rigidity gripping both sides.

Meanwhile, commentators are debating who would be on whose side in case of a full-fledged flare-up in the Middle East. Iran is reported to be making some moves that carry destruction in their womb. Reports of a high-level delegation from North Korea visiting Tehran have been recently made public.

The recent trip raised speculation that, along with economic cooperation, North Korea could deepen military ties with Iran. North Korea and Iran are known to be critical providers of weapons to Russia to support its Ukraine invasion/special military operations.

Also, North Korea and Pakistan’s relations have been historically strong, right from when the late Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan, carried the missile production formula in the pocket of her overcoat when on a visit to Pyongyang.

Recently, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was on a three-day visit to Islamabad, where he was reported to have discussed the ongoing situation in the Middle East and sought the support of Pakistan.

The grapevine has it that for quite some time, talks have been going on secretly between Tehran and Islamabad, which veer around Pakistan lending support to Iran in nuclear technology. Some observers have gone on to say that the cash-starved Pakistan has no qualms of conscience in selling nuclear technology to Iran.

As long as theocratic Iran remains a proxy of China and Russia and Israel of the US and her European allies, peace and normalization in the Middle East may remain a distant dream.

Prof. KN Pandita (Padma Shri) is the former director of the Center of Central Asian Studies at Kashmir University.
This article contains the author’s personal views. EurAsian Times is not responsible for the authors’ OPED.
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Russia’s allegiance may be shifting in Sudan

Russia is a known supporter of the Rapid Support Force (RSF), a Sudanese rebel group that have been accused of

www.military.africa

Russia’s allegiance may be shifting in Sudan

It may appear that Russia and its proxy, the Wagner Group, have been courting both sides of the conflict to remain in the good graces of whoever comes out on top, while Sudan’s rival generals fight to become the country’s chief military power.

by Military Africa

May 4, 2024

in FEATURED, Security

Reading Time: 3 mins read

Russia is a known supporter of the Rapid Support Force (RSF), a Sudanese rebel group that have been accused of human right violations. Russia’s PMC Wagner group have been providing weapons and training to the RSF, however, this may soon change as Russia and Sudan discusses collaboration.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov visited Sudan in April in a signal of support for the Sudanese army which is locked in a year-long war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Bogdanov, also a special representative for the Middle East and Africa, met Sudanese army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in the Red Sea City of Port Sudan, a base for the army and government officials since the RSF took over large parts of the capital Khartoum early in the conflict.

Bogdanov said his visit could lead to increased cooperation and expressed support for “the existing legitimacy in the country represented by the Sovereign Council”, according to a statement from the council, which is headed by Burhan.

In Sudan, there is uncertainty regarding Russia’s allegiances amidst the conflict between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Russian Deputy Foreign Minister visited Sudan to signal support for the army, meeting with Sudanese army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The visit aimed to enhance cooperation and support the existing legitimacy represented by the Sovereign Council. Russia’s ties with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Daglo raise concerns, especially after allegations of Russian involvement in illicit gold mining and disinformation in Sudan. Additionally, Russia has shown interest in a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast and recently began diesel deliveries to Sudan.

It may appear that Russia and its proxy, the Wagner Group, have been courting both sides of the conflict to remain in the good graces of whoever comes out on top, while Sudan’s rival generals fight to become the country’s chief military power.

Russia’s plan to establish a naval base in Sudan, which would have given it access to the strategic Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, has been put on hold indefinitely due to the ongoing political instability in the African country.

The agreement to create the naval facility was signed in 2019 by former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as part of a broader military cooperation deal that included arms sales and training. The base, which would have hosted up to 300 Russian personnel and four warships, was intended to serve as a logistics hub for the Russian Navy, allowing it to operate large vessels and nuclear submarines in the region.

Although, The Rapid Support Force (RSF) in Sudan has denied any links to the Wagner group, a Russian private military company (PMC) that has been accused of operating in several conflict zones around the world. The denial comes amid reports that the Wagner group has been operating in Sudan, allegedly providing security for gold mines in the Darfur region.

The RSF, which was formed in 2013, is a paramilitary force that is part of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The force has been accused of committing human rights abuses against civilians in the Darfur region and other parts of the country. The RSF has denied these accusations and has maintained that it is committed to maintaining internal security and combating terrorism in Sudan.

The Wagner group, on the other hand, is a private military company that has been linked to the Russian government. The company has been accused of operating in several conflict zones around the world, including Syria, Libya, and the Central African Republic. The group has been accused of committing human rights abuses and has been subject to international sanctions.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a resolution demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities in Sudan. The resolution, known as 2724, was adopted with an overwhelming majority, signaling the international community’s grave concern over the ongoing conflict that has led to a severe humanitarian crisis.

The UNSC’s resolution comes at a critical time, coinciding with the commencement of Ramadan, a period traditionally marked by fasting, prayer, and reflection. The resolution’s timing underscores the urgency of peace and stability in the region, especially during a month that holds significant spiritual importance for the Muslim community.

Housecarl · May 4, 2024

Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.......

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/05/04/the_marine_corps_that_should_have_been_1029510.html

The Marine Corps That Should Have Been

By Gary Anderson
May 04, 2024

Say what one wants about the Israeli incursion into Gaza, but not a single rocket or missile has been fired from what is left of it since the start of fighting. Compare this with the relative ineffectiveness of American efforts stop Yemen's Houthis from slinging missiles at shipping in the Red Sea. The difference is simply geography. The Israelis simply have to cross fencing and concrete barriers to directly confront their attackers, the Palestinians of Hamas.

If U.S. wanted to launch such a large scale punitive operation against the Houthis, it would have to be done from the sea with a large scale amphibious assault. An amphibious assault of this scale, requiring sea borne tanks, assault engineers and bridging capabilities that have been divested by the U.S. Marine Corps. Instead, the Marine Corps is building a defensive force built around anti-ship missiles designed primarily to contain the Chinese Navy.

This defensive force is a stark departure from former Marine Corps Commandant Al Gray’s vision to modernize the Marine Corps for future wars.

Back in the 1980s, General Gray had a vision for what he called Over the Horizon (OTH) operations using tilt rotor aircraft, long range helicopters, more capable long-range amphibious vehicles, and air cushioned landing craft. Gray realized that advanced defensive weapons would make traditional linear amphibious operations launched just offshore problematical, but OTH would enable landing in column in places that the enemy did not expect. Gray had the Marine Corps experiment with these capabilities. Throughout the nineties, numerous war games and field experiments took place to explore the physical and intellectual challenges. OTH gradually evolved into Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and a whole new philosophy of littoral campaigning.

In traditional amphibious operations a relatively small portion of potential landing sites in the world's littorals were open to the kind of linear landings done at Normandy and Iwo Jima. It was relatively easy for a defender to determine which beaches were vulnerable to amphibious landings. OMFTS were designed to open over seventy percent of littorals by landing in column across remote locations such as boat ramps and small coves with access to paths inland. This made the defense against OMTFS far more difficult.

To achieve OMFTS, we planned to use a grid of small micro-robotic ground scouts located at key road intersections, choke points, and bridges. The robotic sensors would give the landing force a map to exploit the gaps in enemy defenses as well as be able to designate targets at enemy strong points and call-in accurate fire on them. We called this advanced reconnaissance and scouting system the Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Target Acquisition (RSTA) Grid. Platforms such as the V-22 Osprey and heavy lift helicopters such as the CH-53E could give a vertical over-the-horizon dimension to this "expanding torrent" of operational capability with the RSTA Grid identifying safe landing zones.

OMFTS and RSTA would only require small assault force initially that would not need an "iron mountain" of logistical supplies on the beach before moving inland. Just-in-time logistics would keep the initial landing force moving until more traditional beaches and ports could be opened by attacking them from the rear. During the initial operation, fire support would come from precision strike until more conventional artillery could come ashore.

One key element that made OMFTS different from traditional amphibious operations and more compatible with the existing Marine Corps' maneuver warfare approaches, was flexibility. Once the line of departure was crossed in traditional operations, the force was committed; it was "do or die for old Semper Fi." We saw OMFTS as giving us the ability to launch several probes. The most promising would become the main effort. The rest could be withdrawn or remain for a while as deception to confuse opposing forces. Worst case, the operation could be scrapped enabling us to choose a more promising set of operational targets without causing a Gallipoli-like debacle.

This amphibious blitzkrieg would be led by relatively small, fast moving task-organizations comprised of elements from infantry and armored battalions. However, more traditional infantry, armored, and artillery units would be needed to defend the eventual force beachhead, assist army follow-on forces in sustained operations ashore, and potential counterinsurgency operations.

All these years of planning never led to the radically reduced Marine Corps that we have today. By 2020, there should have been newer and better tanks, artillery, and amphibious vehicles as part of ongoing Marine Corps modernization, but I came to believe that OMFTS could initially be accomplished with existing Navy LCACs, Ospreys, and CH-53Es. The Advanced Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAAV) was a failure, but I think most of us came to believe that its absence would not be an operational "showstopper".

The real technological challenges were in the robotic sensors needed for the RSTA grid, sufficient over-the-horizon communications, some advanced naval mine clearing capabilities (with unmanned underwater systems), and some enhanced just-in-time logistics assets. None of these things were science fiction, and the technologists assured us were doable by 2020 and have been used during the current Russo-Ukrainian war.

We needed to use surrogates for war games and field experiments to simulate OMFTS.

In 1998, a small Special Purpose Marine Corps Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) conducted an over-the-horizon landing in column from the USS Germantown across a boat ramp in Okinawa using Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCACs) and long range CH 53 helicopters. Later that year, a MAGTF staff from III MEF used LAVs in a force-on-force operation against a Red Team led by students from the Expeditionary Warfare School -also employing LAVs- on the peninsulas of the Virginia Capes. The surrogate RSTA Grid allowed the Blue force to land in an unexpected location and maneuver quickly to defeat the Red Force. Other war games conducted during the period caused us to believe that OMFTS would provide wicked problems to future opponents. By the turn of the century, many of us in the developmental and experimental community believed that OMFTS could be fully implemented within two decades. Indeed, the technologies needed all exist today. What we did not envision was 9/11 and General Berger.

The root of the problem really goes back to 2001 and the 9/11 attacks. At that point, the George W. Bush administration undertook the war in Afghanistan and in 2003 invaded Iraq. The Marine Corps was forced put aside its work on the next Marine Corps to support the war effort, which lasted until 2019 when virtually all conventional units had left Afghanistan. Many serving and former marines hoped to finally get back to work on OMFTS, but the new commandant at the time, General David Berger, had another vision that the dubbed Force Design 2030. OMFTS might have evolved differently if General Berger had chosen that path; the name might even have changed, but OMFTS remains the Marine Corps that could have been, particularly for operations other than island hoping in China’s first island chain.

If it had been allowed to evolve, OMFTs would have been the perfect tool to suppress threats such as the Houthis at the source. A group of retired general officers calling themselves Chowder II have put together an alternate approach to Force Design for the Corps that they call Vision 2035; much of it is based on work done before 2001. Commandants come and go, but the Marine Corps continues to look forward. Under new leadership, Vision 2035 may again include OMFTS or something like it.

Gary Anderson was heavily involved in OMFTS design and experimentation as the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

Housecarl · May 4, 2024

Hummm.......goes to a point I've repeatedly made here on the board that the only way to deal with a "wild eyed pistol waver" is to put him down and prove that you'll do it if necessary.

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Putin and the Insanity Gambit - Geopolitical Futures

When I was in graduate school, a small group of my peers and I spent considerable time examining the circumstances under which it would be possible for

geopoliticalfutures.com

Putin and the Insanity Gambit

By
George Friedman
-
April 30, 2024
Open as PDF

When I was in graduate school, a small group of my peers and I spent considerable time examining the circumstances under which it would be possible for one nuclear power to launch a nuclear attack against another. Since none of us could get dates, we spent a lot of time on this topic, using the Cuban missile crisis as the basis of our analysis. The criteria for such an attack was that the other side’s command system had collapsed and thus the country had no way to retaliate, or that the other side was simply lying about its nuclear arsenal to begin with, or some other scenario I don’t remember. Lonely Saturday nights bled into one another.

The problem we kept running into – whether the arsenals were matched, asymmetric in number or disproportionate in capability – was that nuclear weapons would almost never be used, except perhaps if there were a situation in which one side had superb and trusted intelligence on location and the status of the enemy. There were other, stranger concepts based on mutually assured destruction. If we could eliminate the potential of the enemy to retaliate, it was a go. (There were proposals for special operations forces to penetrate enemy command points, deploy poisonous gas to kill launch crews, and so on.) But inevitably, a nuclear attack on a nuclear power would almost certainly result in mutually assured destruction or in an attack on an ally of a nuclear power, which would risk a less certain but still probable nuclear response. It’s easy to understand why, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there has never been another nuclear attack.

However, there was one scenario that had a possibility of success, which we called the insanity gambit. All other scenarios revolved around the sanity of the leadership. Initiation of a successful launch would trigger mutual destruction, and with the annihilation of the attacker’s own country, we could not find a condition in which a nation’s self-annihilation would provide greater security. No rational leader would come to a different conclusion. But this is, in essence, the strategy Russian President Vladimir Putin is toying with.

He has on several occasions said that Ukraine’s continued resistance to Russia, and American and European support for Ukraine’s defense, risks nuclear war. A nuclear attack on Ukraine would possibly trigger a U.S. response, while an attack on the United States – technically within the realm of possibility according to his statements – would certainly result in a massive attack on Russia. To be clear, the U.S. is not going to initiate nuclear war over Ukraine. Under normal circumstances, neither would Russia – unless the pressure of war drives Putin insane, making him willing to engage in mutually assured destruction. Since Russia is not insane, it follows that Putin is not planning to initiate nuclear war. But if Moscow can convince its adversaries that the situation has forced them to mutual suicide, the U.S. and its allies may change their policies to be more accommodating to Russia’s needs, however unlikely the threat may be. Bringing nuclear war – and, implicitly, Russian sanity – into the equation might change the outcome of the war. The U.S. is unlikely to initiate a preemptive strike against the insanity gambit of a sane nation. After all, Washington also has second strike capabilities.

To make this work, Putin has to convince other countries that he is prepared for nuclear war. In the process, he will also have to convince his countrymen, which only further undermines the strategy. The insanity gambit works only if it is so convincing that it frightens a leader’s own colleagues. It is a gambit born of desperation, useful only in graduate school for lonely men to ponder.

Housecarl · May 9, 2024

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Russia hints at lowering threshold for using nuclear weapons - Washington Examiner

Russian officials hinted at making a formal change to their nuclear doctrine, in an apparent bid to deter Western support for Ukraine.

www.washingtonexaminer.com

Russia hints at lowering threshold for using nuclear weapons

By Joel Gehrke

May 9, 2024 4:56 pm

Russia is “constantly” analyzing the threshold for using nuclear weapons, according to a top foreign ministry official.

“At the moment, nothing has changed in this regard, but the situation itself is changing,” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said Thursday, per a state media translation. “As a result, the way basic documents in this field relate to the needs of maintaining our security is constantly analyzed.”

Ryabkov acknowledged the possibility of lowering the bar for nuclear weapons usage just days after Russian defense officials announced a military drill involving those weapons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has used nuclear saber-rattling as a method to constrain Western assistance to Ukraine over the last two years.

“Russia will do utmost to avoid a global confrontation, but it will not allow itself to be threatened,” Putin said Thursday during an event marking the anniversary of the Allies’ victory over Nazi Germany during the Second World War. “Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.”

The efficacy of Russia’s nuclear threats has eroded over the last two years as Western governments gradually have stepped up the quality and quantity of the military equipment they send to Ukraine. And some NATO allies are chafing at the idea of deferring to Putin’s nuclear threats given the negative consequences for Ukraine and the trans-Atlantic alliance if the war ends with a Russian victory.

If we just thought about the Russian response, then we could not send anything,” Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte told the Financial Times this week. “Every second week, you hear that somebody will be nuked.”

Simonyte and some other NATO members have begun to speak of upgrading their support for Ukraine in part due to a growing anxiety that the protracted lapse in U.S. aid to Ukraine has raised the specter of a crisis on the battlefield.

“If the Russians were to break through the front lines, if there were a Ukrainian request, which is not the case today, we would legitimately have to ask ourselves this question,” French President Emmanuel Macron told the Economist in a recent interview. “It would be wrong in terms of credibility and deterrence vis-a-vis the Russians to rule it out. I note, by the way, that the aggressiveness of the Russian response to what I said showed that this was having the desired effect, which was to say: Don’t think that we will stop here if you don’t stop.”

Russian officials responded by announcing snap drills involving their so-called low-yield nuclear forces. Those military exercises involve the weapons that Western officials perceive as most likely to be used if the Kremlin decides to use nuclear weapons in an offensive military campaign.

“We warn our opponents that their course towards escalation will, of course, prompt the need for us to take steps that actually mean enhancing deterrence measures,” Ryabkov said. “The drills of practicing the skills of employing nonstrategic nuclear weapons are an element of these efforts.”

Housecarl · May 9, 2024

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Minsk Confirms Deployment of Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

Executive Summary: At the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in April, Belarusian officials confirmed that Russian tactical nuclear weapons had been deployed in Belarus. The new military doctrine of Belarus declares the role of Russian TNWs as an essential component of preventive deterrence...

jamestown.org

Minsk Confirms Deployment of Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 72

By: Alexander Taranov

May 9, 2024 04:52 PM Age: 2 hours

Executive Summary:

At the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in April, Belarusian officials confirmed that Russian tactical nuclear weapons had been deployed in Belarus.
The new military doctrine of Belarus declares the role of Russian TNWs as an essential component of preventive deterrence against unfriendly states.
The Belarusian military-political leadership does not have a complete picture of the protocols and procedures for the use of Russian TNWs, and much may depend on personal consultations between Lukashenka and Putin.

The new military doctrine of Belarus, which includes a provision on Russian nuclear weapons, was adopted by the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA) during its recent session on April 24 and 25 in Minsk (see EDM, May 2). The text, however, did not clarify the role and status of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). The document only declared what many already knew in advance (see EDM, March 12). According to the new doctrine, the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory is considered an essential component of deterrence for Minsk. It is also a forced reaction to the failure of Western guarantor countries to comply with the terms of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with the accession of the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Budapest Memorandum (Pravo.by, April 25). Last year, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka confirmed that he was discussing the deployment of Russian strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus with President Vladimir Putin and even started to prepare old Soviet launching pads for Topol-M mobile ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (President of Belarus, March 31, 2023; see EDM, April 4, 2023; T.me/modmilby, April 22, 2023). At the ABPA, Lukashenka and Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin confirmed the deployment of Russian TNWs in Belarus. Against the backdrop of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling during his inauguration speech, the presence of Russian nukes on Belarusian territory has elevated fears of their possible use in Ukraine and/or the wider region (Kremlin.ru, May 7).

Khrenin argued that the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons is not blackmail or intimidation but an opportunity to protect the state and ensure peace for Belarusians. According to him, Belarus was one of the first countries that voluntarily renounced the deployment of nuclear weapons in exchange for international recognition of independence and sovereignty, as well as non-use of economic coercion by outside powers. The defense minister, however, contends that the West broke its promises, and Minsk was forced to react. Khrenin emphasized that deploying TNWs is an effective response to the aggressive policy of unfriendly states and a way to prevent them from escalating the situation around Belarus. He concluded that, after receiving the TNWs, Belarus now has a full arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential aggressor (Belta, April 25).

On the sidelines of the ABPA, Lukashenka told reporters that the mechanism for using nuclear weapons is not spelled out in the new military doctrine as it is the subject of consultations between him and Putin. He confirmed, however, the existence of a document that “describes the formula for the use of both tactical missile nuclear weapons and nuclear aerial bombs that are set up under the aircraft” (TASS, April 24).

During the ABPA, Lukashenka said that he did not understand the indignation of foreign politicians over the Russian TNWs deployed on Belarusian territory. According to him, these are the same weapons the United States is actively modernizing and storing at the air bases of some European countries, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Lukashenka clarified that there is a difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. He claimed that, from the military perspective, TNWs have strike and offensive capabilities, not defensive (YouTube, April 24). Lukashenka failed to mention that, in contrast to the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, Russia has been pre-deploying TNWs to Belarus at the repair and technical bases near NATO’s eastern flank per the Soviet manuals (see EDM, April 30). This could indicate preparations for offensive operations with the use of TNWs. Lukashenka believes that NATO’s first strike would be on Belarus in the event of a military conflict with Russia. He links complaints from Western countries about the deployment of Russian TNWs as evidence of these intentions (President of Belarus, April 25).

Lukashenka believes all this indicates that the West considers Eastern Europe a potential theater of military operations, where the enemy—Russia and Belarus—has already been identified. The Belarusian ruler noted that Moscow has deployed several dozen nuclear warheads in Belarus and that Minsk is determined to oppose any aggressor and inflict unacceptable damage. He emphasized that the West should understand that their capitals are a legitimate target for tactical nuclear strikes in the event of aggression against Belarus. Lukashenka added that he had learned well and mastered the lessons of the Great Patriotic War, especially the initial stage when the Soviet Union tried to appease Nazi Germany and again hinted at the preventive capabilities of TNWs (EDM, March 13). The Russian and Belarusian militaries have already begun preparations for such a strike through command and staff exercises (see EDM, March 13, April 30).

Even so, on May 7, Lukashenka disavowed his statements about the offensive and strike capabilities of Russian TNWs. He once again repeated that the non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus are for deterrence and defense. Simultaneously, he stated that the world has never been as close to nuclear war as it is now, noting that the statements of Western politicians (including the French President Emmanuel Macron) have escalated tensions not only in Europe but throughout the world (President of Belarus, May 7).

Lukashenka also announced his intentions to discuss with Putin the joint coordination and use of Russian-Belarusian regional troops groupings equipped with TNWs. He claimed a final decision on those procedures would be made during his visit to Moscow on May 8 (TASS, May 7). Thus, despite official statements, the new military doctrine, and Lukashenka’s secret decrees on the use of TNW carriers, the Belarusian military-political leadership still do not have the whole picture.

Lukashenka’s statement came after the announcement of a surprise inspection of non-strategic nuclear weapons carriers for the Belarusian Armed Forces. According to the State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council Alexander Volfovich, this check was synchronized with the activities carried out by the Russian Armed Forces since May 6 on the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons (Belta.by May 7). The placement of Russian TNWs in Belarus demonstrates a readiness for escalation on the part of both Moscow and Minsk against the West in the case of a spilling over of hostilities from Ukraine or a NATO strike on either country.

Housecarl · May 10, 2024

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.......

France wants to extend its nuclear umbrella to Europe. But is Macron ready to trade Paris for Helsinki?

Before France can extend its nuclear umbrella to the rest of the Union, Macron first needs to answer some critical questions.

thebulletin.org

France wants to extend its nuclear umbrella to Europe. But is Macron ready to trade Paris for Helsinki?

By Carine Guerout, Jason Moyer | May 10, 2024

Europe’s reliance on US nuclear weapons has been at the heart of the transatlantic security relationship, and so has been the protection that the old continent gets from being part of the NATO alliance and its powerful Article 5. Now, the debate about nuclear deterrence for the European Union is back at the forefront, in part due to the prospects of a reticent United States under a possible second Trump presidency and a resurgent Russia increasingly threatening to use nuclear weapons.

NATO, as a nuclear alliance, relies heavily on US nuclear warheads stationed in Europe for its deterrence. The United Kingdom and France are Europe’s only nuclear powers: Although part of NATO, they maintain independent control over their own nuclear arsenals. In the past, the European Union has been reluctant—or incapable—of providing nuclear deterrence. But the uncertain security environment in Europe has recently led the Union to strengthen its previously neglected security pillar—and, with it, caused some political leaders to become more vocal about nuclear weapons.

In recent weeks, France’s President Emmanuel Macron, in his classic disrupting style, has openly called for debate in Europe over using his country’s nuclear capabilities to defend the continent. In Macron’s view the uncertainty over future US engagement in Europe is forcing the European Union to decide whether it needs a nuclear deterrent of its own—and suggests France may help with this. But it is not clear whether France would be willing—and capable—of extending its nuclear umbrella to the rest of the Union. For this to happen, France would need to address multiple issues, starting with explaining whether it would retain full decision-making over its arsenal, exploring the limitations of its current stockpile of nuclear weapons, and weighing the impact such a decision would have on NATO and its relations with the United States and its fellow EU member states.

Macron’s insistence. Since the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union in 2020‚—popularly known as “Brexit”—France has become the Union’s only country with nuclear weapons. France possesses approximately 290 nuclear weapons (the world’s fourth arsenal in terms of stockpiles warheads behind Russia, the United States, and China). Ever since French President Charles de Gaulle’s famous question ing of US nuclear assurances in 1961— which led France to develop its own nuclear deterrence force—France has historically seen itself as an independent force counterbalancing that of the United States in Europe. This spirit persists today: France still does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and remains one of the Western allies most in favor of nuclear deterrence. France’s independent deterrence strengthens NATO overall because it complicates the calculus of adversaries. Although nuclear deterrence has been a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence posture, the same cannot be said of the European Union: Many member states remain uncertain about the role of nuclear weapons in defense planning.

The debate over the nuclear readiness of the EU is not new. Traditionally, the holdout to developing a so-called “Eurobomb” has been Germany. In recent years, a growing number of German policy makers have asked the previously unthinkable question of whether it should possess its own nuclear weapons. The German public remains unconvinced, however: Even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 90 percent of Germans still reject the idea of their country developing a nuclear weapons program and it seems unlikely the German public will dramatically pivot toward a Eurobomb. Traditionally neutral EU countries such as Ireland, Malta, and Austria are not likely to be willing to support the bomb either: All three are signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), also known as the ban treaty, and would likely block any attempt to extend France’s nuclear arsenal to Europe.

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As the continent develops its security pillar—through its “strategic compass,” defense industrial strategy, and the upcoming formalized command and control structure in 2025—the supranational bloc could benefit from French leadership on nuclear deterrence. Macron first put forward the idea in 2020, calling for a “strategic dialogue” on “the role of France’s nuclear deterrent in [Europe’s] collective security.”

But this dialogue never happened. In 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, France again raised this matter with Germany, saying that the offer to talk about nuclear weapons was still on the table, arguing that the French nuclear deterrent is a way to protect European interests. In late April, during a speech on the future of European security at the Sorbonne University, Macron doubled down on the need for debating nuclear weapons in Europe, improving the continent’s missile defenses, acquiring more long-range weapons, and vowing that France would do more for Europe’s defense. But despite being quite explicit about his vision of a Europe capable of ensuring its own nuclear deterrence, Macron’s comments lacked details over the practicality—and even the feasibility—of his proposal, as well as its potential implications for the European security environment.

Easier said than done. To move forward with his proposal, President Macron will need to answer at least three critical questions about the politics and logistics of a European-level nuclear weapon sharing arrangement. First, France will need to clarify whether it wants to retain full decision-making power over its nuclear arsenal. When Macron made his first comments in 2020, the idea was not about sharing the deterrent but rather that France would reserve the right to decide under what circumstances it would use its nuclear arsenal. However, with the changing global security environment—in particular, Europe’s situation since 2022—Macron is now more urgently suggesting that there is a “European dimension to France’s vital interests.” He says he wants all European countries to put their capabilities in plain view, including stationed US nuclear weapons, as a show of force and to assert the credibility of European defense. French presidents in the past have maintained strategic ambiguity by not explicitly stating what they considered were the vital interests of France. Now Macron, more than any of his predecessors, emphasizes that the security of Europe and that of France are intimately connected.

Second, it is not clear how France could realistically provide nuclear deterrence to the entire Union. French nuclear forces have limited capabilities, with a much smaller and less diversified arsenal than that of other major nuclear powers, and its nuclear deterrence has been developed for a strictly defensive purpose. France partially disarmed its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s after the Cold War, reducing its nuclear stockpiles from 600 warheads to just under 300.

This figure is pegged to France’s perception of what it needs to defend itself and its territory. Were France’s nuclear capabilities to expand to cover the entire European Union with extended deterrence, the country would need to increase its stockpiled nuclear warheads considerably. However, as part of its partial disarmament of the 1990s and embracement of a doctrine of minimum deterrence, France dismantled its land-based nuclear defenses. France also closed test sites and fissile material production facilities, which would make it difficult to expand its warhead production capabilities.

Dramatically expanding the territory under its nuclear umbrella would also stretch the credibility of France’s own nuclear deterrence. Even if the country’s air- and sea-based nuclear arsenal would not necessarily need to be deployed to neighboring countries, the French president would have to decide the circumstances in which France could foresee using its nuclear capabilities to defend one or several of its fellow EU members. As de Gaulle famously asked Kennedy whether the United States would be ready to trade New York for Paris in the event of a nuclear attack, Macron too must ask himself whether he is willing to trade Paris for Helsinki.

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In practice, the idea of a French nuclear umbrella for Europe also raises a third question for Macron: How to embed the French nuclear armament into existing European structures and how this shift would complement NATO’s capabilities in Europe. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group would be fitting for discussions of strengthening European deterrence, but France is unlikely to agree to take part in the group as it seeks to also maintain its independence in nuclear decision-making. While the United States has pressed European allies to do more to provide for their own defense, the idea of a Eurobomb would likely raise some eyebrows in Washington: Many of the closest US allies among NATO countries in Europe, such as Poland and the Baltic states, would most certainly prefer the stability offered by continuing to rely on the US nuclear deterrence and reject any attempts by France to replace—or at best, complement—US nuclear presence in Europe.

A more isolationist US administration, however, could change that calculation among these European countries and propel France’s ambitions to provide nuclear deterrence to Europe by a considerable factor. Either way, the credibility of the European Union as an actor capable of providing for its own nuclear deterrence remains low considering the slow progress of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. To get there, the Union would first have to start a more intensive nuclear dialogue.

France could also begin to win over some of its EU partners by hosting nuclear deterrence exercises, including fostering cooperation between EU member states on nuclear issues and sharing processes with one another. Such exchanges could help improve military cooperation between NATO and EU members, thereby advancing the development of a European strategic culture while working on protecting European interests. To play a stronger role in providing nuclear deterrence to Europe, France could also base part of its airborne arsenal in other EU member states, agree to share its arsenal to be carried by fighter-bombers of other European countries, or some combination of the two strategies.

A vision that needs a plan. France has a rare opportunity to extend its nuclear umbrella and assert its leadership on the continent by supplanting the US monopoly on nuclear deterrence in Europe and becoming a champion of European strategic autonomy. But as usual, the devil is in the details: To achieve this, Macron needs to clarify his plan to extend France’s nuclear capabilities to the rest of Europe. He also needs to convince the bloc to take its defense capabilities a quantum leap forward. The European Union held its first-ever military exercises only in 2023. Becoming a nuclear power would be a considerable step forward. But even with a clear plan, Macron is sure to be faced with EU member states opposed to nuclear weapons and with reluctant populations who doubt the credibility of France lending its nuclear arsenal for their defense.

Since de Gaulle, France has been building its nuclear capabilities as a credible independent source of deterrence. Were the European Union to seriously consider providing its own nuclear deterrence, it should naturally benefit from the expertise of one of its member states. French nuclear reassurance for the rest of the Union could be a major step that brings the bloc closer to its goal of becoming a geopolitical union and a stronger security actor. But for such a vision for European security to become a realistic plan, President Macron must first tell its European partners to what extent he is willing to share France’s nuclear deterrent.

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