WAR 01-25-2020-to-01-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(402) 01-11-2020-to-01-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(403) 01-18-2020-to-01-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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In a lawless stretch of Mexico, child soldiers as young as 6 are being drafted to fight crime
  • By Kate Linthicum Los Angeles Times (TNS)
  • Jan 23, 2020 Updated Jan 23, 2020
MEXICO CITY — In a lawless stretch of western Mexico, children as young as 6 years old are taking up arms against organized crime.

On Wednesday, 19 children were inducted into a vigilante group that for years has been battling drug gangs in restive Guerrero state. Local journalists published photographs and videos of the induction ceremony — in which uniformed, rifle-wielding children performed military-style exercises — that drew outrage across Mexico, with human rights officials condemning it as child abuse.

But the leader of the vigilante group said in a phone interview Thursday that a dramatic spike in violence in the region and an absence of government intervention have left the community no choice but to arm even its children.

“They must be prepared,” said Bernardino Sanchez Luna, the founder of the vigilante group known as the CRAC-PF. “If they are afraid, the criminals will kill them like little chickens.”

Two of the children who were trained were 6 years old, he said. The oldest members of the group were 15.

Over the last decade, dozens of self-defense groups have emerged in Guerrero. They say they are defending themselves from local criminal gangs that control drug smuggling routes and extort businesses in the region. Critics say the vigilantes are often themselves involved in criminal activity.

Sanchez said his group, which patrols the mountainous region east of the city of Chilpancingo, decided to begin training children in self-defense after the Jan. 17 killing of a group of indigenous musicians in the town of Chilapa.

The 10 musicians were returning from a performance in two vans when assailants attacked them, according to state prosecutors. The musicians were stabbed and their vehicles and bodies set on fire.

In a news conference Wednesday, Guerrero’s attorney general said the state is pursuing six suspects who belong to a criminal group called Los Ardillos, which means squirrels. The group has been accused of other attacks in the region.

After the musicians were killed, local residents reacted angrily, blocking roads and demanding that government authorities intervene. They were particularly upset about the death of the youngest band member, who was 15 years old, Sanchez said.

When it comes to violence in the region, “nobody, not even a child, is off-limits,” he said.
Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador was elected in 2018 on a platform that he said would combat crime by giving poor Mexicans better economic opportunities.
That strategy, which he dubbed “hugs, not bullets,” has so far been unsuccessful, with the country recording a record 33,341 homicides last year.

Asked about the child soldiers in Guerrero, Lopez Obrador refrained from condemning the practice and returned to his security strategy, which he said will make it so young people don’t have to take up arms.

“I insist, we’re going to move forward,” he said at his daily news conference on Thursday. “We have to give options to children, to young people, to keep them away from weapons, keep them away from the violence, and that’s what’s being done.”

Human rights officials across the country were quicker to voice their concern about the recruitment of young vigilante soldiers.

“We strongly reject the involvement of minors in security tasks that put their development, physical integrity and life at risk,” Ramón Navarrete Magdaleno, president of the Guerrero Human Rights Commission, told journalists.

Sanchez responded by saying human rights officials should not criticize self-defense groups that are only trying to protect children.

“They say we’re violating the children’s rights,” Sanchez said. “But it’s the criminals who are doing that.”

He said the children are being trained to use their weapons responsibly.

Before the induction ceremony this week, he and other vigilante leaders spoke to the youths.

“Having a weapon is a lot of responsibility,” he said he told them. “You should only use you gun to defend your life.”

Some analysts speculated whether the recruitment of child soldiers was a tactic used by the vigilantes to bring attention to violence in the region.

“I don’t think they’re serious about getting 6 year olds to defend the town and even to defend themselves,” said Chris Kyle, an anthropologist and expert on Guerrero based at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. “This may just be a play to get media attention.”

———
©2020 Los Angeles Times
Visit the Los Angeles Times at www.latimes.com
Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
 
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Housecarl

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The US can’t deal with China while it’s mired in the Middle East

24 Jan 2020 | Brahma Chellaney

‘Great nations do not fight endless wars’, US President Donald Trump declared in his 2019 State of the Union speech. He had a point: military entanglements in the Middle East have contributed to the relative decline of American power and facilitated China’s muscular rise. And yet, less than a year after that speech, Trump ordered the assassination of Iran’s most powerful military commander, Qassem Soleimani, bringing the United States to the precipice of yet another war. Such is the power of America’s addiction to interfering in the chronically volatile Middle East.

The US no longer has vital interests at stake in the Middle East. Shale oil and gas have made the US energy-independent, so safeguarding Middle Eastern oil supplies is no longer a strategic imperative. In fact, the US has been supplanting Iran as an important source of crude oil and petroleum products for India, the world’s third-largest oil consumer after America and China. Moreover, Israel, which has become the region’s leading military power (and its only nuclear-armed state), no longer depends on vigilant US protection.

The US does, however, have a vital interest in resisting China’s efforts to challenge international norms, including through territorial and maritime revisionism. That is why Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, promised a ‘pivot to Asia’ early in his presidency.
But Obama failed to follow through on his plans to shift America’s foreign-policy focus from the Middle East. On the contrary, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate staged military campaigns everywhere from Syria and Iraq to Somalia and Yemen. In Libya, his administration sowed chaos by overthrowing strongman Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In Egypt, Obama hailed President Hosni Mubarak’s 2011 ouster.

Yet in 2013, when the military toppled Mubarak’s democratically elected successor, Mohamed Morsi, Obama opted for non-intervention, refusing to acknowledge it as a coup, and suspended US aid only briefly. This reflected the Obama administration’s habit of selective non-intervention—the approach that encouraged China, America’s main long-term rival, to become more aggressive in pursuit of its claims in the South China Sea, including building and militarising seven artificial islands.

Trump was supposed to change this. He has repeatedly derided US military interventions in the Middle East as a colossal waste of money, claiming the US has spent $7 trillion since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. (Brown University’s costs of war project puts the figure at $6.4 trillion.) ‘We have nothing—nothing except death and destruction. It’s a horrible thing’, Trump said in 2018.

Furthermore, the Trump administration’s national security strategy recognises China as a ‘strategic competitor’—a label that it subsequently replaced with the far blunter ‘enemy’. And it has laid out a strategy for curbing Chinese aggression and creating a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific region stretching ‘from Bollywood to Hollywood’.

Yet, as is so often the case, Trump’s actions have directly contradicted his words. Despite his anti-war rhetoric, Trump appointed war-mongering aides like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who has been described as a ‘hawk brimming with bravado and ambition’, and former national security adviser John Bolton, who in 2015 wrote an op-ed titled ‘To stop Iran’s bomb, bomb Iran.’

Perhaps it should be no surprise, then, that Trump has pursued a needlessly antagonistic approach to Iran. The escalation began early in his presidency, when he withdrew the US from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (which Iran had not violated), reimposed sanctions, and pressured America’s allies to follow suit. Furthermore, since last May, Trump has deployed 16,500 additional troops to the Middle East and sent an aircraft-carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf, instead of the South China Sea. The assassination of Soleimani was part of this pattern.

Like virtually all of America’s past interventions in the Middle East, its Iran policy has been spectacularly counterproductive. Iran has announced that it will disregard the nuclear agreement’s uranium-enrichment limits. Trump’s sanctions have increased the oil-import bill of US allies like India and deepened Iran’s ties with China, which has continued to import Iranian oil through private companies and invest billions of dollars in Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sectors.

Beyond Iran, Trump has failed to extricate the US from Afghanistan, Syria or Yemen. His administration has continued to support the Saudi-led bombing campaign against Yemen’s Houthi rebels with US military raids and sorties. As a result, Yemen is enduring the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

Trump did order troops to leave Syria last October, but with so little strategic planning that the Kurds—America’s most loyal ally in the fight against the Islamic State terror group—were left exposed to an attack from Turkey. This, together with his effort to strike a Faustian bargain with the Afghan Taliban (which is responsible for the world’s deadliest terrorist attacks), threatens to reverse his sole achievement in the Middle East: dramatically diminishing IS’s territorial holdings.

Making matters worse, after ordering the Syrian drawdown, Trump approved a military mission to secure the country’s oil fields. The enduring oil fixation also led Trump last April to endorse Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, just as Haftar began laying siege to the capital, Tripoli.

The Trump administration is unlikely to change course anytime soon. In fact, it has now redefined the Indo-Pacific region as extending ‘from California to Kilimanjaro’, thus specifically including the Persian Gulf. With this change, the Trump administration is attempting to uphold the pretence that its interventions in the Middle East serve US foreign-policy goals, even when they undermine them.

As long as the US remains mired in ‘endless wars’ in the Middle East, it will be unable to address in a meaningful way the threat China poses. Trump was supposed to know this. And yet, his administration’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific seems likely to lose credibility, while the cycle of self-defeating American interventionism in the Middle East appears set to continue.

Author
Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi–based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Asian juggernaut, Water: Asia’s new battleground and Water, peace, and war: confronting the global water crisis. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2020. Image: US Department of Defense.
 

Housecarl

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Journal

IRGC Threat in the Middle East: How Safe Are Americans in Turkey?
by Mahmut Cengiz | Sat, 01/25/2020 - 9:11am | 0 comments

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force General Qassim Soleimani had been killed in a drone strike by the United States on January 3, 2019, ostensibly because he was plotting imminent attacks on Americans in the Middle East.[1] It sent reverberations across the Middle East and around the word. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the Iranian government, and the IRGC responded with outrage, vowing to take revenge against the United States. The IRGC carried out the threat when it fired missiles at American military bases in Iraq. The group claimed that it had killed at least 80 American soldiers. U.S. President Donald Trump disputed the claim, saying that no Americans or Iraqis lost their lives in the missile attacks.[2] The Iranian people, based on a search of Twitter posts about the killing of Soleimani, also have spoken. The Iranian people, as seen in a research based on tweeter accounts, are strongly in favor of their government’s retaliatory attack on the United States.[3]
For Americans living in or visiting the Middle East—including Turkey, which hosts a U.S. military base—safety is a valid concern. The killing of Soleimani simply exacerbated the security situation in the region. The country has become increasingly authoritarian, relations between Turkey and the United States remain tense, the Turkish media continue to write and broadcast news reports that smear Americans, and the IRGC’s influence in Turkey is rising. Amid such volatility, how safe are Americans in Turkey?
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, which led to the overthrow of the last monarch of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran created the IRGC and expanded the organization’s power over political and economic realms. The Quds Force, a unit in IRGC, has been responsible for the organization’s military operations abroad. The current Iranian regime adheres to a policy of forward defense, meaning that Iran will protect the country starting from outside of its borders when necessary by exporting terrorism, meddling in the internal affairs of its neighboring countries, and forming franchises of Quds Forces. Turkey is one of the countries where the IRGC has a strong influence. Since its establishment of an IRGC franchise group in Turkey known as the Salam Tawhid Quds Force (STQF), the IRGC has taken advantage of being among the so-called untouchables[4] and has expanded its influence in Turkey. This article examines IRGC activities starting from the 1990s and analyzes how the IRGC is capable of committing terrorist attacks or targeting any Americans in Turkey.
IRGC Activities in Turkey
According to an American intelligence officer in 2005, the Quds Force divided the world into eight regions in terms of its operations (see Figure 1): Western countries (including the former Eastern Bloc); Former Soviet Union; Iraq; Afghanistan, Pakistan, India; Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan; Turkey; North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula.[5] Only Turkey and Iraq are targeted as individual countries rather than as a group of countries. It makes sense that the Quds Force separated and gave more attention to Iraq, given the tension in Iran and Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s tenure and the religious leadership rivalries between Iranian and Iraqi Shia leaders. It makes no sense, however, Turkey is singled out as a targeted country. For example, Turkey could have pursued traces of the Iranian Quds Force in the 1990s while investigating murder cases that appeared to be linked to the Quds Force, but it did not do so. Turkish officials, however, never sought an answer to why the Quds Force thought Turkey should be targeted separately. Today it would not be wrong to conclude that the IRGC is more active and influential in the Turkish bureaucracy and political arena than any American can imagine. The evidence includes police investigations that were conducted until late 2013. Some of the suspects in these investigations still hold high positions in Turkey’s government and are responsible for putting all of the investigators in jail and intimidating others who might be thinking about initiating a probe that targets the IRGC in Turkey.

1

Figure 1: Eight directorates (regions) of Quds Force operations.[6]
The STQF’s terrorist activities in Turkey cover two periods: 1990 through 2000 and 2011 to the present. The first period was marked by violence, the assassination of secular academics and journalists (e.g., Ugur Mumcu, Bahriye Ucok, Muammer Aksoy, and Ahmet Taner Kislali), and increased Iranian influence over the Turkish government.[7] Court documents from 2000 show that the goal of the STQF is to establish a new regime similar to the Shia-based one in Iran by creating sectarian divisions within Turkey,[8] that the STQF is controlled by Iran, that the group’s members frequently visited Iran for political and military training, and that they were provided with weapons and deployed for attacks against citizens of the United States, Israel, Iraq, and the United Kingdom.[9]
Salam Tawhid Quds Force (STQF) Investigation
A new period of STQF activity in Turkey came to light in 2011 when an informant (see Figure 2) for the Turkish government complained about her husband, Huseyin Avni Yazicioglu, being linked to Iranian intelligence officials.
2

Figure 2: The informant’s statement in the police report launching the STQF investigation.[10]
The informant stated that her husband was spying on Iran and that he had organized activities aimed at spreading the influence of Shiism in Turkey. The husband had a prior conviction for anti-secular activities and was a member of an Iranian group responsible for carrying out clandestine activities such as photographing a Turkish nuclear research center and producing satellite images of the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. The husband also was linked to Iran’s intelligence unit.[11] The informant’s statement prompted the prosecutor in Istanbul to launch an investigation in 2011.[12]
The Turkish investigation uncovered a huge group of STQF consisting of 241 suspects, and 56 of them were Iranians. The group was under the command of a small Quds Force cell. Two of the members were Hakki Selcuk Sanli, the founder of the group, and Faruk Koca, former deputy of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP). Both men received intelligence and religious training in Iran. Koca also worked with Yazicioglu at a nonprofit organization in the 1990s. After Koca was elected as an AKP deputy in the Turkish parliament, the Quds Force cell had a chance to be closer to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[13] Koca also owned the house that Erdogan rented during his early years as the country’s prime minister—the same house in which the police found a bugging device.
Another cell member was Sayed Ali Akbar Mir Vekili, a general in the Quds Force. He was in charge of Quds Force activities in Turkey.[14] According to one reliable European source, Mir Vekili was responsible for the killing of more than 100 NATO soldiers, mostly Americans, in Iraq.[15] Mir Vekili had very close ties to Hakan Fidan, the current head of Turkey’s intelligence unit. Fidan acted like a member of the cell and had close ties to IRGC members from when he was younger.[16] According to the police indictment, Sanli and Koca were tasked with connecting Mir Vekili and Fidan. The cell members were meeting clandestinely at Ankara’s S’LO Cafe, a business owned by Koca.[17] The four men operated clandestinely and used code names during phone conversations. While Koca was using Furkan as a code name, Fidan used Emin/Metin, and Mir Vekili used Hamit/Huseyin as their code names.[18] Mir Vekili met clandestinely with the other cell members after the S’LO Cafe meeting and communicated with them by pay phones (see Figure 3).
3

Figure 3: Confidentiality was maintained among Quds Force cell members. In the photograph on the left, Sayed Ali Akbar Mir Vekili can be seen a short distance behind Selcuk Sanli before their meeting at the S’LO Cafe. In the photograph on the right, Mir Vekili can be seen using a pay phone to call one of the cell members.[19]
According to the police investigation, the cell members were careful about not being followed by the police. For example, one of the group’s members who met with the STQF’s another Quds Force general Naser Ghafari changed buses and bus stops eight times to spy and provide the general with a clandestine file. Police video recorded the meeting (see Figure 4).[20]
4

Figure 4: The clandestine rendezvous of STQF members in Istanbul.[21]
In another instance, Turkish STQF members attempted to observe and prepare reports on the U.S. Consulate, the Israeli Consulate, and the Nuclear Research Center in Istanbul.[22] Those observations led the STQF in 2011 to target the Israeli Consulate in Istanbul for an attack. The STQF members placed a bomb on a bicycle and detonated it at a location very close to the Israeli Consulate. One civilian was killed, and eight others were wounded. The police investigation verified the involvement of militants linked to the STQF. For example, one of the suspects, Abdulhamit Celik, received military training in Iran in the 1990s and provided the explosives to Iranian militant Rizazade Metin.[23] The police took a photograph of Celik as he met with Sanli and Mir Vekili.[24] Celik and Sanli had identical criminal records in Turkey that date to their arrest in 1996 for the murder of two opponents of the Iranian regime. Both men were released from jail in 2004 when Erdogan granted them amnesty.[25]
Funding for the STQF was provided by the IRGC. Turkish investigators discovered that members of the STQF used a hawala money-laundering system (i.e., an alternative remittance system, or informal banking arrangement that bypasses traditional financial institutions) to finance the group’s activities. Investigators found that several exchange offices in Istanbul were linked to Iranian exchange offices that served as conduits for the laundered money. If the Turkish government had not interfered with the investigation, the trail may well have led to the discovery of sources of money for the STQF in Turkey.[26]
The government’s interference included efforts to cover up the investigation of the STQF despite an abundance of solid evidence against the group. When information about the investigation was leaked, the government attempted to tamper with the facts and the evidence obtained during the investigation. For example, pro-government news outlets allegedly reported that Gulenist police officers (i.e., followers of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen) had wiretapped 7,000 people, including politicians, businessmen, and celebrities. The police, however, actually had wiretapped only 241 suspects. Erdogan and now former Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdag issued explanations that undermined the evidence and blamed the police officers involved in the investigation.[27] In a backhanded swipe at the police, Bozdag commented that three people came together and saluted each other, saying, “Selamun aleykum (Peace be upon you),” after which the police filed papers to designate the trio as a criminal organization.[28] The designation came after two large corruption investigations in December 2013 implicated Erdogan’s family, and an investigation of government’s role in transferring weapons to al Qaeda groups in February 2014. Enraged about the three investigations, the government fired, tortured, and jailed the officers involved in the uncompleted Quds Force investigation. The police treated the judge and the prosecutor involved the IRGC investigation chief as ferocious terrorists (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). The message from the police was clear: Those who dared to investigate the IRGC and intimidate other investigators would be severely punished. Members of the IRGC in Turkey, therefore, became what the author refers to as the “untouchables.”
5

Figure 5: The presiding judge (left) in the IRGC investigation and the prosecutor (right) in charge of the case are arrested like terrorists.
6

Figure 6: The Turkish police chief who headed the IRGC investigation in handcuffs after being arrested.
The government’s harsh response most likely stems from outrage that the police chief, the judge, and the prosecutor involved in the investigation had the audacity to name as a suspect in the case the country’s head of intelligence. The Turkish people, however, need clarification from the intelligence chief himself about why he was linked to Mir Vekili, the general who led a Quds Force cell in Turkey that operated clandestinely and who met with the perpetrators of terrorist attacks.
The Zarrab Investigation
A Turkish police investigation of the IRGC’s financial operation in the country eventually led to the investigation of Reza Zarrab, a dual Iranian-Turkish national and gold trader who played a central role in helping the Iranian government evade U.S. sanctions (aimed at thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions) by enlisting the help of Turkish banks transfer gold to Iran starting in 2013, erupted into a corruption scandal on December 17, 2013, when it became known that Erdogan’s AKP government and high-level bureaucrats had been implicated in the illegal activity. Investigators had proved that Zarrab was the facilitator and money launderer tasked with circulating Iranian currency and opening escrow accounts in Turkish state banks in return for giving millions of dollars in bribes to Turkish ministers and bureaucrats.[29]
The IRGC’s involvement in the money-laundering operation is not surprising, given the organization’s long history of financial connections to Iran and Khamenei. In 2011, the IRGC controlled between 25 percent and 40 percent of the Iranian economy in 2011, marking a stark increase from the 5 percent it controlled in 1989.[30] In 2005, Khamenei issued an executive order in 2005 to transfer 80 percent of Iranian economic enterprises to the control of the supreme leader and the IRGC.[31] Since then, any business dealings with Iran meant doing business with the IRGC and the country’s supreme leader.[32] The IRGC is heavily involved in legal and illegal sectors of the economy, ranging from high-technology, social-housing projects, and chain stores to telecommunications and oil and gas.[33] In the illegal arena, the IRGC is active in the Iranian underground economy. The organization engages in low-level smuggling of alcohol and other contraband as well as high-level smuggling of oil. The IRGC’s smuggling activities generate an estimated $12 billion each year.[34]

Continued.....
 

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Continued.....

When Turkish police arrested Zarrab and the sons of two cabinet ministers (Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan and Interior Minister Muammer Guler at the time) on December 17, Erdogan put pressure on the judiciary. The ministers’ sons were released about two months later, and the government shut down the case. When Zarrab traveled to the United States in March 2016, however, FBI agents arrested him on charges similar to the accusations made by Turkish prosecutors. Zarrab’s trials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ended with Zarrab pleading guilty to the charges against him. In stark contrast to the Turkish government, which fired, punished, and jailed the investigators after accusing them of using fabricated evidence, the U.S. prosecutors valued and used in court the evidence and wiretappings the Turkish police had collected during their investigation of Zarrab.[35] It was this compelling evidence that prompted Zarrab to plead guilty in U.S. court.
Evidence of the IRGC’s involvement with Zarrab came from a document uncovered during an investigation of the STQF in 2011. The document proved that Mir Vekili and his team had conducted a study on corruption in Turkey, discovered corrupt activity, and prepared a report for the IRGC. Then Zarrab was assigned to Turkey to implement the gold-funneling and money-laundering schemes to help Iran skirt U.S. sanctions on the country.[36]
Police Investigations in Igdir Province
In 2011 and 2012, Turkish police investigated the spying activities of the IRGC in Igdir province, located along Turkey’s border with Armenia, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region, and Iran. The province is evenly populated by Turkish Shia citizens and Kurdish citizens. The police investigations revealed that Iran has considerable influence over Shias in Turkey, including those living in Igdir. Iran provides the Turkish Shias with financing for their religious activities and offers religious training in Qom province in Iran. In Igdir, all of the Shia mosques and their mollas’ salaries have been paid by Iranians. The mollas have tried to unify the Shia community in Turkey by appealing to a long-standing hatred of Sunnis. Several mollas in Igdir have arranged weekly ceremonies to smear historical Sunni leaders. One of the Igdir province governors prepared a report in 2012 about the strong authority Iran exerts over Shia mosques and mollas in the province and suggested the possibility of a link between these mosques and the Turkish government. The governor’s memo, however, was leaked. The mollas responded to the allegations by provoking the Shias to demonstrate against the governor. The governor was labeled as a terrorist, even though he had served the city well and was extremely successful at developing its infrastructure[37]
Igdir province also was the site of two other police investigations:[38] In the first investigation, the police found that IRGC members tried to gather information on military and government buildings in the eastern part of Turkey by exploiting smugglers and local residents who needed to complete transactions at Iranian customs posts but would otherwise have trouble doing so. Offers to facilitate unimpeded entry into Iran enabled the IRGC members to establish close relationships with smugglers. In exchange for safe passage, the smugglers agreed to take photographs of government buildings in Igdir province. The police investigation also revealed that Iranian officials had contacted the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) members to obtain information about military checkpoints on the Turkish side of the Iranian border.[39]
In the second incident, Turkish police pretended to be mut’ah[40] agents as part of a human-trafficking investigation. While doing so, the police discovered links between Iranian spies and the traffickers. Roughly 100 of the Iranian spies were women scattered across Turkey with the goal of establishing connections with high-level politicians and bureaucrats through a tactic known as a honey trap. The tactic which involves one person enticing another person into a false relationship in an effort to get the trapped person to reveal information the trapper wants but might be unable to get otherwise. The honey trappers thus engaged in a sexual relationship with the trapped person to whom they were assigned and worked to glean information from their targets. One of these Iranian spies was detained in Igdir province. The spy was part of a honey-trapper team that operated in Ankara. They came to Turkey to visit with Turkish Alawites and connect them to mollas in Iran.[41] A similar police investigation conducted in Istanbul confirmed the presence of a group of women who operated under the direction of Naser Ghafiri, a member of the IRGC.[42]
The July 15 Coup Attempt and the IRGC
It is not unusual to hear about conspiracy theories in the Middle East, in part because of state-sponsored and state-supported terrorism incidents in the region. Officials in states where terrorism incidents have occurred, typically deny any role in sponsoring or supporting terrorists. Those denials make it impossible for the police to trace the links among state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East.
The author has examined the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Turkey in a series of articles in the Small Wars Journal. According to the author’s articles, the July 15 coup attempt involved confrontations between a small group of so-called amateurish plotters (SAPs) and a larger group of counter-coup plotters (CCPs). The SAPs were ultranationalist, secular, Gulenist, Kurdish, and other opposition groups who believed in the power of the coup to overthrow the Erdogan government. They were poorly organized and did not have a plan for how to carry out the coup. Their actions were akin to suicide. The CCPs, by contrast, included the current head of intelligence and former military commanders who knew what the SAPs were planning to do but did not prevent them from acting. The CCPs knowingly enabled the confrontations to occur, believing that the government would benefit from the aftermath by creating a pretext for Erdogan to crack down on his opponents. The plan worked as CCPs had hoped. Erdogan’s response to the failed coup was to shut down more than 300 media outlets, jail hundreds of journalists, purge more than 200,000 public servants from the government bureaucracy, and detain more than 600,000 people.
After the coup attempt, Turkish cabinet ministers and the Turkish media blamed the United States for supporting the coup plotters; however, the author’s Small Wars Journal article published in July 2019 stated that the evidence showing Russian involvement is much stronger than it is for U.S. involvement. The author also discussed how Vatan Party (Patriotic Party) leader Dogu Perincek, a CCP and the mastermind behind the military purges, visited Iran several times and briefed the Iranian government and press about the coup attempt and the purges. As the author wrote in the July 2019 article, Perincek said to Iranian press, “Turkey is cleaning the connections of NATO and America from Turkish military. The purged military officers are all Americanist.”[43] In January 2020, one of the suspects in the Turkish STQF investigation said that Qassim Soleimani, a general in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and commander of its Quds Force (until his death on January 3, 2020), knew about the July 15 coup attempt and played a critical role in trying to prevent it. Erdogan knew about Soleimani’s active role in thwarting the coup attempt.[44] Given the tense atmosphere in Iran today and the influence the IRGC exerts on Turkish bureaucrats and politicians, it has been difficult to find evidence that corroborates what the Turkish STQF suspect meant by his. It would not be surprising, however, to find odd link between Turkish intelligence officials and IRGC members—if the Turkish people have a chance in the future to learn more about the unanswered questions and the darker aspects of the coup attempt.
The Capacity of the Police
The AKP government in its early years protected itself from the risks of shadowy elitists, who executed periodic coups or coup attempts, by implementing the requirements for membership in the European Union. This period gave the AKP an opportunity to strengthen the country’s democratic foundations. One step toward that goal was to send hundreds of police chiefs to Western countries to learn how to modernize the police organization in Turkey. The effort paid off, starting in 2007. Turkish National Police has become one of the most professional and well-trained units in the Middle East, seizing vast amounts of illegal drugs, arresting infamous mafia bosses, and fighting against jihadist organizations. Western countries enjoyed cooperating effectively with new modernized Turkish police organization—until the December 17 and 25 corruption scandals in 2013 implicated Erdogan and his inner circle. These investigations proved that Erdogan and his ministers took millions of dollars in bribes from Zarrab, the Iranian money facilitator, and uncovered illegal activities in cooperation with al Qaeda affiliated Saudi businessman Yasin al Qadi, who opened business in Turkey. He was accused of being an al Qaida financier and subsequently was banned from flying into Turkey. The travel ban, however, did not stop Qadi from finding a way to enter the country illegally.
The fallout from the corruption investigations was devastating for Turkey’s police officers. Erdogan began to purge the police force, starting with the officers who had earned their graduate degrees from Western countries, accusing them all of being terrorists. Erdogan’s accusations clearly were contrived, given the officers’ response to having lost their jobs and thrown in jail. The purged police officers committed no acts of violence (as one would expect from terrorists), no misdemeanor offenses, and no crimes of any sort. Erdogan’s AKP government recruited more than 30,000 new police officers, none of whom receive more than brief, cursory training for the job. One of the new officers was self-radicalized, had ties to the al Qaeda franchise in Syria known as al Nusra Front, and was responsible for the murder of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey. It is difficult to gauge the professionalism of the new police officers but, given their lack of experience with investigating organized crime and terrorism, one could reasonably conclude that Erdogan’s new police force lacks quality.
It should be noted that the Iranian IRGC enjoyed operating in Turkey after the purge of the country’s police officers. The Erdogan government turned a blind eye to crime and corruption, choosing not to initiate any investigations of Iranian spies, IRGC members, or Hezbollah militants. Evidence exists that the IRGC opened many companies in Turkey so the organization could transfer money to Hezbollah in Latin America. At the same time, Hezbollah militants have used Turkish banks to launder cocaine money. It now appears that the IRGC has the capacity to murder any of its targets in Turkey. Several opponents of the Iranian regime, for example, have been killed over the past few years in Turkey. The last murder occurred in Istanbul in 2019. Mesut Mevlevi, who was trying to uncover evidence of IRGC corruption, was killed in Istanbul in November 2019.[45]
Conclusion
The IRGC and its military wing, the Quds Force, have been two of the top security issues in the Middle East for several years. The Quds Force, for example, is involved in the conflicts in Syria and Yemen, maintains close relationships with terrorist groups in the Middle East and, in 2019, and was designated a terrorist group by the United States. The IRGC, meanwhile, has stepped up its efforts to target Americans and achieved its goal of increasing tensions in the region. Soleimani, the organization’s leader, was killed this year by a U.S. drone strike. The IRGC was outraged and vowed to take revenge, including activities that threaten Americans in the Middle East. Of greatest concern for the United States in light of these threats is the security of its embassies, military bases, and citizens in the Middle East.
Turkey is one of the countries in the region where the IRGC has the capacity to threaten Americans. A review of past investigations of the IRGC and the suspects involved clearly shows the extent of the IRGC’s influence in Turkey. Turkish investigations of the IRGC, for example, found Quds Force cells that consisted of not only Turkish bureaucrats, journalists, and politicians but also Quds Force generals. One of these cells was involved in targeting the Israeli Consulate and was prepared to attack the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Suspected members of the STQF within the Turkish government punished the investigators by putting them in jail. The action was intended to be a warning to other investigators about the folly of daring again to launch an investigation of the IRGC. The message apparently has been heard and heeded. Attempted investigations of the IRGC’s Quds Force in 2011 and 2012 resulted in severe punishment for the Turkish investigators—another implicit warning that the IRGC is an organization of “untouchables” free to continue killing opponents of the Iranian regime and Turkish secular academics and journalists. The group was not bluffing. As recently as November 2019, an Iranian journalist who had launched a probe of corruption within the IRGC was killed by members of the organization.

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The Turkish government’s response was to remain silent and look the other way. Government officials with suspected ties to the IRGC have not been ousted from their positions, the government remains reluctant to investigate Quds Force members in Turkey, the IRGC’s influence in Turkey continues to grow, and the IRGC’s reputation as a group of “untouchables” has been solidified.
The question remains: How safe are Americans in Turkey? The answer, from this author’s perspective, is not at all.
End Notes
[1] William Cummings, “What You Need to Know about Rising Tensions between the U.S. and Iran after Soleimani death,” USA Today. Accessed on January 13, 2019, from What you need to know about rising tensions between the U.S. and Iran after Soleimani death.
[2] “Read Trump’s Speech Following Iran Missile Attack,” Politico. Accessed on January 12, 2019, from Read Trump's speech following Iran missile attack.
[3] Layla M. Hashemi and Steven L. Wilson, “If Any Iranians Supported Soleimani’s Killing, It Would’ve Been Dissidents on Twitter. The Opposite Happened,” Washington Post. Accessed on January 9, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli...support-soleimanis-killing-opposite-happened/.
[4] Anyone who investigated or researched IRGC in Turkey until late 2013 has been put in jail and placed in solitary confinement. Turkey has conducted no investigations of the IRGC since 2014.
[5] David Dionisi J. American Hiroshima: The Reasons Why and a Call to Strengthen America's Democracy. Trafford Publishing, 2005. [What is the “J.”? Did you mean “Jr.”?]
[6] Dionisi, p. 8
[7] Emre Ercis, Kara Kutu Selam Tevhid Kudus Ordusu (Istanbul: Istiklal Matbaacilik, 2015), p. 37.
[8] Ibid., p. 23.
[9] Ibid., p. 25.
[10] “Selam Tevhid Orgutu Nedir,” Haberler. Accessed on January 9, 2020, from Selam Tevhid Örgütü Nedir?.
[11] Ercis, 2012, pp. 46-53.
[12] Ibid., p. 14.
[13] Ercis, 2015, p. 15.
[14] Ibid., p. 94.
[15] Interview with a European researcher by Mahmut Cengiz, personal interview via Skype, January 2020.
[16] Ibid., p. 15.
[17] Ibid., p. 81.
[18] Ibid., pp. 15-16.
[19] “Selam Tevhid Orgutu Nedir,” Son Dakika Haberi. Accessed on January 12, 2020, from https://img.sondakika.com/haber/541/selam-tevhid-orgutu-nedir-6313541_1952_m.jpg
[20] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

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[21] “Selam Tevhid Orgutu Nedir,” Haberler. Accessed on April 9, 2018, from Selam Tevhid Örgütü Nedir?.
[22] Ibid., pp. 66-67.
[23] Ibid., pp. 73 and 77.
[24] Ibid., p. 79.
[25] Ibid., p. 78.
[26] Mahmut Cengiz and Michael Roth, The Illicit Economy in Turkey: Criminals, Terrorists and How the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Markets, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, p. 180.
[27] Ibid., pp. 179 and 180.
[28] Ibid., p. 180.
[29] Cengiz and Mitchel 2019, pp. 131 and 132.
[30] Emmanuel Ottolenghi, The Pasdaran Inside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpses (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2011), p. 43.
[31] National Council of Resistance of Iran, The Rise of the Revolutionary Guards’ Financial Empire, p. 7.
[32] Ibid., p. 11.
[33] Ali Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled How the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2013), p. 165.
[34] Ibid., p. 190.
[35] Cengiz and Mitchel, 2019, pp. 131 and 132.
[36] Interview with a former police officer, who was in the team investigating STQF, by Mahmut Cengiz, personal interview via Skype, January 2020.
[37] The author’s investigation experience in 2011 and 2012.
[38] The author led two investigations.
[39] Mahmut Cengiz, Turkiye’de Organize Suc Gercegi ve Terrorun Finansmani (Ankara: Seckin Yayinevi, 2015). The author of the article led this investigation. When he wanted to present the details of this investigation at an international conference in Antalya in 2012, one Iranian delegation participating in the conference and asked high-level officials to cancel the author’s presentation.
[40] “Mut’ah” refers to a temporary marriage that unifies a man and a woman as husband and wife in Shiism. This type of marriage was exploited in Turkey. Iranian mut’ah agents used this marriage to get the consent of the man before having a sexual relationship with the woman.
[41] “Iranli Ajanlar Bize Para Teklif Etti,” YouTube. Accessed on January 5, 2020, from
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVYKhK6roo4
.
[42] Ercis, 2015, p. 89.
[43] “Doğu Perinçek İran basınına konuştu,” YouTube. Accessed on March, 2019, from
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p163Xcd6v0A
.
[44] “İranlı Kasım Süleymani, 15 Temmuz darbe girişiminin engellenmesinde büyük rol oynadı' iddiası,” Euroenews. Accessed on January 11, 2019, from Kasım Süleymani 15 Temmuz'da darbeyi engelledi iddiası.
[45] “İran ajanı cinayetinin şifresi paylaştığı mesajda,” Milliyet. Accessed on January 2, 2019, from İran ajanı cinayetinin şifresi paylaştığı mesajda.

Categories: Iran - Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps - Turkey
About the Author(s)
Mahmut Cengiz

Dr. Mahmut Cengiz is an Assistant Professor and Research Faculty with Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government. Dr. Cengiz has international field experience where he has delivered capacity building and training assistance to international partners in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. He also has been involved in the research projects for the Brookings Institute, European Union, and various U.S. agencies.
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Essays
The Neo-Ballistic Middle East

Fall 2019

Over the past forty years, Iran has written the book on Lebanization and using non-state actors in interstate warfare

By Karim El-Baz

Historically, state actors were the only entities capable of developing, procuring, maintaining, and operating ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile is one that follows a ballistic (arching) trajectory to deliver one or more warheads to a specific target. The first efficient use of ballistic missiles dates back to the thirteenth century, when the Ming Dynasty in China utilized a simpler form of a winged rocket that followed a ballistic trajectory to hit enemy formations. Toward the end of the Second World War, the Nazi German Luftwaffe air force was almost destroyed and, hence, rendered incapable of delivering payloads to Allied cities. Consequently, Nazi Germany resorted to its V1 and V2 ballistic missile program to deliver the payloads to Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands late in the war.
In the Middle East, Egypt and Israel were the first countries to pursue ballistic missile capabilities as early as the 1950s. On October 22, 1973, the Middle East witnessed the first operational use of a Scud missile, when Egypt launched three Scud-B missiles against Israel. Two missiles were fired at the Israeli formations that penetrated the Deversoir Gap to the west of the Suez Canal, and the third missile at the Israeli Command Center in El-Arish, the capital and largest city of North Sinai. A few years later, the Middle East witnessed a more extensive use of ballistic missiles during the Iran–Iraq War. All these examples share one thing in common—the state was the sole operator of ballistic missiles. Arms control experts tend to agree with this argument, as only state actors have the infrastructure, expertise, and resources to develop and/or operate ballistic missiles. I claim this argument as the orthodox ballistic perspective. However, many non-state actors in the twenty-first century Middle East have defied this theory due to the proliferation of ballistic systems and technologies. We can identify this phenomenon as the neo-ballistic era. Today, non-state actors, more specifically Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, have become capable of operating ballistic missiles. This essay does not discuss how non-state actors became operators of such ballistic missiles which, like any other weapons systems, are a means not an end. The most relevant question is what purpose these systems serve in the hands of non-state actors. After analyzing the missiles used by Hezbollah and the Houthis, the Missiles Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies as well as the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance confirmed that both Hezbollah the Houthis share one common supplier of their ballistic missile stock—Iran.
The question then becomes why Iran, as a state actor, would share its ballistic technology with non-state actors. Iran has pursued two strategies through supplying non-state actors with ballistic capabilities: Lebanization and using non-state actors in interstate warfare.
Iran’s Lebanization Strategy
Lebanization is a strategy in which an external state capitalizes on the political turmoil that might result from a coup d’état, revolution, social unrest or civil war, as was the case in 1982 Lebanon, and sponsors a specific player who shares the same sect, ethnicity, ideology or even a political agenda. The sponsor country’s primary objective would then be to provide its player with the sufficient means to at least challenge all the other players (and by default their sponsors), within the targeted state. As a sponsor, this strategy effectively puts your player in a solid position to be a fait accompli political participant in any post-turmoil arrangement. Eventually, through this player, the sponsor country can exert sustainable influence over the targeted state.
Still, providing the player with ballistic missiles seems irrelevant; after all, the player would definitely need firepower such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), assault rifles, grenades, mines, and logistical support (ammunition, spare parts, means of communication, fuel, medical supplies) more than a delivery system such as ballistic missiles to challenge the other players in a civil war. In fact, the player would be ill-advised if he fires a ballistic missile against the other players in the targeted country as such an act could decrease popular support for the player, and people would never forgive or forget players who would use ballistic missiles against their own compatriots.
Why, then, would a sponsor provide their player with ballistic systems? As a sponsor, you might want to account for other regional sponsors who could intervene either indirectly (through sponsoring other players and preserving their deniability) or directly (through joint military operations alongside their players). Yet, both indirect and direct intervention could drastically tilt the balance of power in a way that does not work in favor of your player. Here, the true role of ballistic missiles emerges as an efficient means for your player to directly challenge adversarial sponsors in the region by inflicting damage to their territories. It is unlikely for your player to invade the other sponsor states because non-state actors normally do not possess the sufficient military hardware required for successful invasions such as main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, a navy and an air force. On the other hand, ballistic missiles can be enough of a nuisance to force other sponsors to accept your player as a political participant. In other words, ballistic missiles can serve as a means of intimidation to grant your player access to any political arrangements that may come about in the post-conflict phase.
The first act of Lebanization took place in Lebanon in 1985, hence the name of the phenomenon, with the creation of Hezbollah in the midst of the then-raging civil war. Iran, a state that was still living on the momentum of the Islamic Revolution, saw the turmoil in Lebanon as a chance to extend its influence over a territory upon which it had no previous leverage. As a sponsor, Iran provided its player Hezbollah with the sufficient means to overcome and dominate the south and even challenge other internal players such as the South Lebanon Army and its sponsor, Israel. A flow of arms, ammunition, logistics, and even personnel from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards flowed through Syria to help Hezbollah consolidate its growing influence in Lebanon. The first rockets Hezbollah received from Iran were the famous Soviet Katyusha rockets, which were inexpensive, usable on any chassis, easily concealed, and most importantly could be mounted on any civilian truck. This mobility enabled Hezbollah to fire a volley and quickly withdraw into an area of concealment.
These primitive Katyushas were the most advanced weaponry Iran could offer Hezbollah in the 1980s because its ballistic capabilities were limited to older versions of Soviet-made Scuds, Frogs, and SS-21 Scarabs which were desperately needed in the war against Iraq. Still, the conventional capabilities delivered at that time were sufficient for Hezbollah to dominate the south. Israel perceived an unchecked player with rocket artillery capabilities on its northern borders as a considerable threat, especially after Hezbollah refused to abide by the 1989 Taif Agreement to disarm after the end of the Lebanese Civil War. Israel launched Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996 to neutralize Hezbollah’s threat. Yet, due to the international community’s intervention, Israel was unable to fulfill its strategic objectives. After the two operations, Iran realized how vulnerable its player truly was in terms of its ability to inflict damage on Israel and began to boost Hezbollah’s retaliatory capabilities to increase its survivability.

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In the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah started using more efficient rocket artillery systems such as the M-302 A/B and the Iranian MLRS Fajr-3, which provided the organization with greater firepower and range than the Katyushas used earlier. Two incidents during the 2006 war illustrate the effectiveness of this strategy. The first was the firing of a C-802 (Iranian Variant: Noor) anti-ship cruise missile (provided by Iran) at an Israeli Sa’ar-5 naval Corvette (INS Hanit). The missile caused significant damage to the corvette’s propulsion system as well as its helicopter deck, forcing Israel to the pull the corvette back to dry dock. The use of the C-802 alerted Israel that Hezbollah’s threat was strategic rather than tactical. Why? Because Israel realized its perception of Hezbollah as a poorly armed terrorist organization was flawed, and that it should consider the group a threat similar to one posed by a regular military.
The second incident was Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s threat to target Tel Aviv toward the end of the war. This threat revealed that Hezbollah had procured by that time a system whose range was at least one hundred kilometers. It is believed that this threat was a message to Israel that Hezbollah had procured the Zelzal 1/2, which some still classify as a short-range ballistic missile despite its military classification as an artillery rocket system.
el-baz-new-infograph-1024x1024.jpg

Thus, Nassrallah’s threat to strike Tel Aviv also served the strategic purpose of forcing Israel to reassess Hezbollah’s capabilities. Furthermore, the threat to strike a key Israeli city increased Hezbollah’s popularity in Lebanon as the only Lebanese militant actor capable of striking its adversary’s main population centers. Israel was not the only party to reassess its threat perceptions; Iran realized that the survival of its player, and by extension its influence in Lebanon, now depended on providing a more lethal and accurate means of retaliation. Hezbollah received far more lethal systems that included the GPS-guided M-600 also known as Fateh-110 (surface-to-surface missile) with an approximate range of 250 kilometers, and some reports suggest that Hezbollah also received Scud B/C systems that could deliver a 500 kilogram payload with a range that varies between 300 to 550 kilometers. It is also important to mention that the optimal purpose of deploying these systems with Hezbollah was not to defeat Israel militarily. Hezbollah does not have sufficient military capabilities, even with its new ballistic hardware, to defeat a regular army, especially one as well organized as the Israeli military. However, these ballistic capabilities have succeeded in at least deterring further Israeli attacks on Hezbollah; as a result, the missiles have become a means to ensure Hezbollah’s survival in Lebanon and, by extension, Iran’s continued influence there.
Once again, Iran’s successful Lebanization strategy of creating and maintaining an unchallenged player in Lebanon was replicated in the Yemeni Civil War. Once again, Iran decided to sponsor a player, this time the Houthis, who share a similar political agenda and branch of Islam. In seeking to enhance its influence, Iran employed a strategy aimed at ensuring the survival of the Houthis against other Yemeni players such as President Mansour Hadi’s military (backed by Saudi Arabia) and the Southern Transitional Council (backed by the UAE), and regional sponsors represented in the Saudi-led Arab Coalition.
To counter the other domestic factions allied against its player, Iran provided the Houthis with personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force as well as small arms, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and even air defense systems.
Yet, to counter regional sponsors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Iran provided the Houthis with unmanned drones (UAVs) and ballistic missile systems including the military personnel who could operate this advanced weaponry because the Houthis had no ballistic experience or expertise prior to the civil war in Yemen. The Houthi movement has continuously claimed that the ballistic missiles used against other sponsors, in this case Saudi Arabia, are indigenous systems. Prior to the war, Yemen indeed had a ballistic inventory which included Soviet and North Korean-made Scuds and a number of SS-21 Scarabs, yet most of these were destroyed by Saudi-led coalition aerial bombardment. The missiles which survived the attacks were later deployed by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia. However, Yemen had no indigenous ballistic missile program, which would have required years of expertise and testing, and above all financial resources (which are definitely scarce at times of civil war) to produce an indigenous missile.
Furthermore, the similarity between Houthi and Iranian ballistic missiles is indicative of who is really supplying the Houthis. The Houthis initially introduced their Qaher1/2 surface-to-surface missile as a product of their indigenous missile program. It was later discovered that the Qaher 1/2 is a former Yemeni S-75 Dvina (a Soviet-made high-altitude surface-to-air missile) that was transformed into a surface-to-surface missile using the same technology that Iran used to convert its S-75 Dvina (CSS-8) to the Iranian surface-to-surface Tondar-69.
In fact, most, if not all of the Houthi ballistic missiles have their Iranian identical equivalent: the Houthi unguided artillery rocket Zelzal 3 is identical to the Iranian Zelzal 3; the Houthi anti-ship cruise missile Mandab 1 is identical to the Iranian Noor; the Houthi GPS-guided Badr 1 surfaceto-surface rocket is identical to the Iranian Fateh 110 Rocket; the Houthi Burkan 1 short range ballistic missile is identical to the Iranian Shehab 1 missile; the Houthi Burkan 2/2H short range ballistic missile is identical to the Iranian Qiam 1; and even the Houthi-celebrated kamikaze UAV Qasif 1 is identical to the Iranian UAV Ababil.
Why would Iran supply these systems to the Houthis? As in the Israel versus Hezbollah scenario, the Saudi military is a well-equipped force using some of the most advanced Western-made weapons systems, while the Houthis lack the minimal means necessary to launch an invasion against Saudi Arabia. Ballistic missiles provide the Houthis with power, but power is not just defined in military terms; it has political dimensions which could influence the ability to conduct a favorable negotiation. Targeting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles puts the Houthis in an excellent position to negotiate not firing these systems. These negotiations form the core goal of the Houthi ballistic strategy—to ensure the group’s status as a political participant in post-war Yemen and, by extension, maintain sustainable Iranian influence over the country.
Some might confuse proxy warfare with the concept of Lebanization. Both terms imply the use of non-state actors as proxies or players who act on behalf of another dominant actor. But the two terms are also distinctly different. The proxy warfare environment is characterized by a hierarchical relationship between a dominant agent and a proxy where the latter is unquestionably obeying the orders of the former. However, this relationship is subject to change or termination if the proxy accomplished the main goals that brought it in line with the dominant actor, or if the proxy grows strong enough to stand on its own.
In Lebanization, the relationship between sponsor and player is equitable; the player has the liberty to unilaterally act with or without prior coordination or consultation with the sponsor. The relationship between sponsor and player is also not restricted to a power relation or timely objectives, but rather based on serving common goals. This takes us to the second neo-ballistic strategic outcome—using non-state actors in interstate warfare.
Using Non-State Actors in Interstate Warfare
Classic U.S. military strategy in the Middle East has been coalition building, which is dependent on bringing together as many state actors as possible against a targeted state. Simultaneously this targeted state is isolated through sanctioning, thus weakening it over time. However, after almost forty years of sanctions, Iran has adapted to survive by (among other measures) replicating the U.S. coalition-building strategy, yet this time by connecting itself to non-state actors.
Iran has realized the leveraged power of connecting itself to non-state actors as a substitute for the state-to-state relation. It has established itself in Lebanon through Hezbollah, in Yemen through the Houthis, in Gaza through Hamas, and in Iraq through the Popular Mobilization Units and Iraqi Hezbollah by capitalizing on the power vacuum in these states in favor of its interests.
This network has compensated to a certain extent Iran’s strategic isolation in the region. As discussed above, Iran has provided its network of non-state actors with ballistic missile capabilities, but the question is how do these tactics fit into Iran’s overall regional strategy. A straightforward answer is provided by Iranian officials who have stated their intentions to use their network of non-state actors or “the axis of resistance” for deterrence purposes. In other words, this network will be used as a launch platform to target U.S. and Israeli interests in case either of those countries resorts to military confrontation with the Islamic Republic. However, providing these non-state actors with ballistic systems has also served Iran’s strategy to counter the United States and its regional rivals in other ways that are far more important. These include:
Increasing the utility of Iran’s short-range rockets and missiles
If Iran is to fire a missile/rocket from an Iranian coastal location against Saudi Arabia or other southern Gulf states, this system’s range would have to be at least 150 kilometers. This renders all Iranian missile/rocket systems with a range of less than 150 kilometers militarily obsolete except for use against an invasion force that comes within range. Furthermore, most of the Iranian missile/rocket arsenal is comprised of short-range missile/rockets such as the Fajr 1 (range: 8 kilometers), Falaq 1 (range: 10 kilometers), Fajr 3 (range: 43 kilometers), Fajr 5 (range: 80 kilometers), and Nazat (range: 130 kilometers). Consequently, Iran needs to deploy these short-range systems closer to the targeted states to increase the strategic value of these systems. Iran has also been keen on improving the guidance systems of these missiles/rockets to increase their efficiency and lethality.
Inflicting damage while maintaining deniability
Iran will risk direct confrontation with other regional powers only as a last resort because it suffered dearly from such experiences during the Iran–Iraq War, and due to its conventional military inferiority. Alternatively, using a sponsored player gives Iran three advantages: it can inflict damage on a targeted state, preserve a state of deniability after inflicting damage, and reduce the risk of retaliation on its own soil.
Increasing the IRGC’s combat experience
There is a difference between military training and combat experience. The former includes learning from the experience of others, as well as exercising in a safe environment, whereas the latter involves lessons no training can teach such as situation awareness and the chaos quite often found in the battlefield. In the latter, the enemy is not as passive.
The full duress of warfare and combat stress experienced by the IRGC in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon has increased their knowledge of war, including their ability to launch ballistic missiles while under attack. After all, combat-tested personnel will be extremely valuable if Iran ever needs to defend its mainland against an invasion.
Real-time testing of ballistic missile systems
Testing new missile systems at home usually produces an exaggerated image of success, especially when the test is witnessed by the political leadership. This can lead to a strategic miscalculation of self-capabilities, hence the need for real-time testing. Operating these systems against a targeted state provides Tehran with more accurate data to evaluate the damage (lethality of the payload) and accuracy (quality of the guidance set) for each system. Gathering this data is quite valuable for Iran to improve its ballistic systems capabilities.
Testing enemy countermeasures
Any missile or rocket fired at Israel or Saudi Arabia through its sponsored players provides Iran with an opportunity to test their adversaries’ countermeasures in the region. Two of the systems that Iran is keen on testing and by extension evading are the Israeli Iron Dome (air defense systems designed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells), and the Saudi-Operated MIM-104 Patriot PAC 2/3 (a U.S. air defense system designed to intercept enemy aircraft and ballistic missiles). Testing these countermeasures gives Iran an opportunity to analyze its performance, and seek upgrades to evade them in future confrontations.
Testing the retaliatory behavior of the targeted state
Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, “If you know the enemy, and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” It is important for Iran to anticipate the targeted state’s retaliatory behavior if attacked by a ballistic missile. Retaliatory behavior refers to the political decisions made by the targeted state to address a ballistic missile attack; the psychological impact of the ballistic missile attacks on the public and the government; and most importantly, the military options and tactics used by the targeted state to retaliate. When a sponsored player fires a ballistic missile against a targeted state, this action gives Iran a chance to analyze the behavior of this targeted state and, by extension, puts Iran at least one step ahead of the targeted state if a full-fledged war between states should break out.
Boosting the morale of the Iranian public
After forty years of sanctions and isolation, Iran has suffered from strategic loneliness and a widespread sense of vulnerability. Having a network of allies, even if they are non-state actors, can be utilized by the Iranian regime to boost the morale of the public particularly if these allies are inflicting damage on Iran’s regional rivals using Iranian-made ballistic missiles.
In the age of a neo-ballistic Middle East, non-state actors equipped with ballistic missile capabilities can play a strategic role in shaping the spheres of influence and the balance of power in the region. The phenomena of Lebanization and using non-state actors in interstate warfare do share a number of commonalities, yet are distinct. Lebanization as a strategy aims at increasing the survivability of a sponsored player within a targeted state during periods of political turmoil as a means of increasing the sponsor’s influence. Using non-state actors in interstate warfare, however, aims at increasing and enhancing the sponsor’s strategic options within the theater of operations. What is perhaps most worrying is that both strategies have contributed to the proliferation of ballistic missiles in an already unstable region. The real question is not why and how non-state actors have procured ballistic capabilities, but how to disarm them from these capabilities without setting the entire region on fire.



Karim El-Baz is a researcher and PhD student in the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is also the civil-military relations expert at MENACS, a project-based network under the auspices of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and is a researcher at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group.
 

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20 Mali soldiers killed at army camp attacked by gunmen
By BABA AHMED
today

BAMAKO, Mali (AP) — Gunmen attacked an army camp in Mali near the border with Mauritania, killing 20 soldiers Sunday, the government and armed forces said.
The camp in Sokolo in the Segou region remains under the control of Mali’s military, the armed forces said in a statement on Twitter.

Mali’s government said there was significant material damage in the attack, and that reinforcements have been dispatched. Aerial reconnaissance is underway to track down the gunmen, it said in a statement condemning the attack.

Souleymane Maiga, a resident of Sokolo, said the attackers temporarily had taken control of the camp.

“The army camp was attacked this morning by gunmen,” he said. “The attackers temporarily took control of the camp and destroyed everything before leaving. Many of the soldiers who were in the camp took refuge in the village.”

The attack wasn’t claimed but bears the hallmarks of jihadi groups linked to al-Qaida that are based in the Wagadu forest, located about 50 kilometers (30 miles) from the attacked village.
 

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Iran make bold nuclear claim that the country can enrich uranium at any percentage
ReutersNews Corp Australia Network
January 25, 2020 9:39AM

Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation has suggested that the country can “enrich uranium at any percentage” if authorities decide to.
“At the moment, if (Iranian authorities) make the decision, the Atomic Energy Organisation, as the executor, will be able to enrich uranium at any percentage,” Ali Asghar Zarean said in a report posted on the organisation’s website this morning.
IR-8 centrifuges at Natanz nuclear power plant, some 300 kilometres south of capital Tehran.
IR-8 centrifuges at Natanz nuclear power plant, some 300 kilometres south of capital Tehran. Credit: AFP
The remark comes the same month as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that there is “ no limit” to the amount of the country’s nuclear enrichment and also the same month that Iran said it would no longer abide by limits on how many centrifuges it can use to enrich uranium.
Enriched uranium is the key ingredient for nuclear weapons, which require about 90 per cent enrichment to produce.
The nuclear deal, which the United States left in 2018, capped the permitted concentration of uranium-235 at 3.67 per cent, which Iran surpassed over the summer, increasing the concentration to over 4.5 per cent.
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani chairing a cabinet meeting in Tehran.
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani chairing a cabinet meeting in Tehran. Credit: AFP
Iran said earlier this month it would scrap limitations on enriching uranium, taking a further step back from commitments to a 2015 nuclear deal with six major powers.
However the nation pledged to continue co-operating with the UN nuclear watchdog.
Since Iran took the latest step in reducing commitments to the accord, the country’s stock of uranium produced has passed 1200kg and it will quickly be added to the stock of enriched uranium, Mr Zarean said.
US President Donald Trump took America out of the Iran nuclear deal.
US President Donald Trump took America out of the Iran nuclear deal. Credit: AFP
Washington withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions to throttle Iran’s oil exports as part of a “maximum pressure” policy.
The US says it aims to force Tehran to agree to a broader deal that puts stricter limits on its nuclear work, curbs a ballistic missile program and ends regional proxy wars.
Iran says it will not negotiate while sanctions remain in place.
Tehran has steadily been reducing its compliance with the deal, which prompted Britain, France and Germany to formally accuse it in mid-January of violating the terms and activating a dispute mechanism in the deal, which could eventually lead to the reimposition of UN sanctions.
Iran denies any intent to acquire nuclear weapons and says its breaches of the deal would be reversed if Washington lifts sanctions.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....It would be interesting to see this further broken out in number of units and categories besides just revenues....

Posted for fair use.....

World News
January 26, 2020 / 3:13 PM / Updated a day ago
China has world's second-largest arms industry, think tank estimates


3 Min Read

STOCKHOLM (Reuters) - Newly available data suggests that China is the world’s second-biggest arms producer, behind the United States and ahead of Russia, a leading conflict and armaments think-tank said on Monday.

FILE PHOTO: A military vehicle carrying a WZ-8 supersonic reconnaissance drone travels past Tiananmen Square during military parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People's Republic of China, on its National Day in Beijing, China October 1, 2019. REUTERS/Jason Lee/File Photo

A lack of transparency means the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has excluded China from its annual global rankings of arms makers, but it said credible financial information had become available for four major companies.

The data, covering the period from 2015 to 2017, allowed it to compile what it called the most comprehensive picture of Chinese companies’ weapons production to date.

“With the increase of available data on these companies, it is now possible to develop reasonably reliable estimates of the scale of the Chinese arms industry,” the institute said.
The four companies had combined estimated arms sales of $54.1 billion for 2017, it said, which would put them among the top 20 arms producers in the world.

“Three of the companies would be ranked in the top 10.”

Total U.S. arms sales in 2017 were $226.6 billion, and in Russia, $37.7 billion, according to the think tank’s Top 100 list for that year.

Aircraft and avionics group Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) would rank as the sixth largest arms producer, with estimated 2017 sales of $20.1, while land systems-focused China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) would place eighth with an estimated $17.2 billion in sales, the institute said.

The other two companies it looked at, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) and China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC), had estimated sales of $12.2 billion and $4.6 billion, respectively, a spokesperson for the institute said.

China’s foreign and defense ministries did not respond to faxed requests for comment during a public holiday. Calls to AVIC, NORINCO and CSGC went unanswered and China Electronics Technology Group (CETC) declined to comment.

The Sweden-based think tank has said global expenditure in 2018 hit $1.8 trillion, its highest level since the end of the Cold War, fuelled by increased spending in the United States and China.
U.S. arms sales that year were $246 billion, Russia’s were $36.2 billion and the United Kingdom had $35.1 billion in sales, it said.
Additional reporting by Roxanne Liu and Yilei Sun; editing by Philippa Fletcher
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

World News
January 27, 2020 / 10:42 AM / Updated 4 hours ago
Thousands flee northwest Syria as Assad pushes closer to Idlib city

Khalil Ashawi
3 Min Read

AZAZ, Syria (Reuters) - A renewed drive by President Bashar al-Assad to recapture rebel-held territory in Syria’s northwest sparked a fresh exodus of many thousands of civilians toward Turkey’s border on Monday amid heavy air strikes, aid workers and witnesses said.

Displaced Syrian children ride with belongings at a back of a truck, in Azaz, Syria January 24, 2020. Picture taken January 24, 2020. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
Syrian government forces backed by Russian air power have stepped up a campaign to recapture Idlib province, the last rebel stronghold where millions took refuge after fleeing other parts of Syria earlier in its nearly nine-year civil war.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a war monitor, said Assad’s forces had since Friday wrestled control of 22 towns and had cut through a strategic highway in Idlib that links the capital Damascus to Aleppo in northern Syria.
It said the Syrian army had encircled and was close to capturing Maarat al-Numan, an urban center 33 km (20 miles) south of Idlib city. This would mark a significant advance for Assad’s drive to take back all of Syria.
A rescue worker who posted a video from Maarat al-Numan said the city had been devastated by an assault of barrel bombs, missiles and shelling in recent days that had laid waste to scores of homes and vital infrastructure.
“Marat al-Numan is completely destroyed and its population has been displaced and is living in uncertainty,” said the civil defense force worker, who did not identify himself.

Moscow and Damascus say they are fighting jihadist militants that have stepped up attacks on civilians in Aleppo, but rights groups and rescue workers say air strikes have demolished hospitals, schools and other civilian areas.
The renewed fighting comes despite a Jan. 12 ceasefire deal between Turkey and Russia, which back opposing sides of the conflict.
Fouad Sayed Issa, an aid worker with the Violet Organization in northern Syria, said Assad’s latest campaign has frightened Syrians in the rebel enclave who fear death or arrest if their towns are recaptured.
“Over the past few days we have seen thousands of new internally displaced persons and we are talking here at the very least about 50,000 over the past four days,” said Issa.
A witness said that thousands on Monday fled from the Idlib towns of Ariha and Saraqib, with trucks and cars seen crawling in gridlocked traffic toward areas, including the town of Azaz, close to the Turkish border.
The Observatory estimated that about 120,000 people had fled from countryside around Aleppo and Idlib over the past 12 days. Aid workers said most have moved to relatively safer parts of northern Syria near the Turkish frontier.

Turkey, which backs some rebel groups opposed to Assad, already hosts more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees and fears that millions more could soon cross the border.
(This story was refiled to add word “city” to headline.)
Reporting by Khalil Ashawi; Writing by Eric Knecht; Editing by Mark Heinrich
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

World News
January 27, 2020 / 12:01 PM / Updated 2 hours ago
Iran prepares site for satellite launch that U.S. links to ballistic missiles


2 Min Read

DUBAI (Reuters) - Iran is preparing a site for launching a satellite, a government minister said on Monday, highlighting a program the United States says is a cover for ballistic missile development.

FILE PHOTO: An Iranian flag flutters in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna, Austria September 9, 2019. REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger
“Yes, a site is being prepared for placing the Zafar satellite into orbit,” Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi tweeted.

The post included a link to a story by U.S. broadcaster National Public Radio that noted satellite imagery suggested the Islamic Republic was preparing for a space launch. Iran had at least two failed satellite launches last year.

After the Zafar satellite is placed in orbit a timeline has been finalised to launch five more, the minister said.

The United States fears long-range ballistic technology used to put satellites into orbit could also be used to launch nuclear warheads.

Tehran denies the U.S. accusation that such activity is a cover for ballistic missile development and says it has never pursued the development of nuclear weapons.

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump reimposed sanctions on Iran following Washington’s 2018 withdrawal from an international accord designed to put curbs on Iran’s nuclear program.

Trump said the nuclear deal did not go far enough and also did not include restrictions on Iran’s missile program and support for its proxies in the Middle East region.

Tensions have reached the highest level in decades between Iran and the United States after top Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad on Jan. 3, prompting Iran to retaliate with a missile attack against a U.S. base in Iraq days later.

Iran launched its first satellite Omid (Hope) in 2009 and the Rasad (Observation) satellite was sent into orbit in June 2011. Tehran said in 2012 that it had successfully put its third domestically-made satellite Navid (Promise) into orbit.

Reporting By Babak Dehghanpisheh; Editing by Grant McCool
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

World News
January 27, 2020 / 2:36 AM / Updated 2 hours ago
Violence escalates in Iraq as government pushes to end protests

Aziz El Yaakoubi, Nadine Awadalla
5 Min Read

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Gunmen shot dead two protesters in Iraq’s southern city of Nassiriya overnight and a Baghdad district became a battlefield on the third day of a drive by security forces to end months of demonstrations against the largely Iran-backed ruling elite.

Clashes over the weekend had already killed at least five protesters. Rockets also hit the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone housing government buildings.
Ambassadors of 16 countries in Baghdad including the United States, France and Britain condemned the use of live fire by Iraqi security forces and called for a credible investigation into the deaths of more than 500 protesters since October.
Related Coverage
Security sources said three people were wounded when at least one rocket landed in the U.S. embassy compound, the first time in years that an attack on the Green Zone - a regular occurrence - had hurt staff there.

The Iraqi military said five Katyusha rockets hit the Green Zone late on Sunday, without reporting casualties.

In a phone call with Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed outrage at the continued assaults by Iran’s armed groups targeting U.S. facilities in Iraq, including Sunday’s attack, State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said.

She said Sunday’s rocket attack resulted in one injury. “The Secretary underlined once again that these attacks demonstrate a wanton disregard for Iraqi sovereignty and a failure to rein in these dangerous armed groups,” Ortagus said in a statement.

“The Secretary noted that we view last night’s attack on the Embassy as an attempt to distract Iraqi and international attention away from the brutal suppression of peaceful Iraqi protesters by Iran and its proxies,” she said.

Authorities began the pushback on Saturday to try to end protests that began in the capital on Oct. 1 and in other southern cities. Demonstrators are demanding the removal of all politicians, free elections and an end to corruption.

In Nassiriya, at least 75 protesters were wounded, mainly by live bullets, in overnight clashes when security forces tried to move them away from bridges, police and health sources said.


Iraqi demonstrators burn tires to block a road during ongoing anti-government protests in Najaf, Iraq January 27, 2020. REUTERS/Alaa al-Marjani

Unknown gunmen in four pickup trucks had attacked the main protest camp there, shooting dead the two people and setting fire to demonstrators’ tents before fleeing the scene, the sources said.

Some protesters began building more permanent structures using bricks, Reuters witnesses said, while others broke into a police office on Monday and set fire to at least five police vehicles parked inside.

The leaderless movement is an unprecedented challenge to Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim-dominated and largely Iran-backed ruling elite, which emerged after a U.S.-led invasion toppled Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003.

“REVOLUTION”
Pitched battles raged in the Khilani area of central Baghdad near Tahrir Square, on Monday with protesters throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at security forces using tear gas, live rounds in the air and slingshots to push them back.

Some of the demonstrators danced on the protest frontline while others shielded themselves behind concrete blocks and trees or by using metal sheets.

“This revolution is peaceful. They use various kinds of fire against us, live ammunition, bullets and teargas canisters. I got injured in my face,” said Allawi, a hooded protester who gave only his first name.

Tuk-tuks darted through the crowd to help the wounded and carried away protesters suffering from teargas inhalation.

Slideshow (13 Images)
Demonstrations continued in other southern cities, despite repeated attempts by security forces to clear up their camps.

Nearly 500 people have been killed in the unrest, with both security forces and unidentified gunmen shooting people dead. After a lull earlier this month, demonstrations resumed; protesters have controlled three key bridges in Baghdad and maintain camps and road blocks in several cities in the south.

The government has responded with violence and piecemeal reform. The international community has condemned the violence but has not intervened to stop it.
Saturday’s push by the authorities began after populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said on Friday that he would halt the involvement of his supporters in the demonstrations.

Sadr had backed the demands of protesters for the removal of corrupt politicians and for the provision of services and jobs soon after the demonstrations began in October, but stopped short of calling on all his followers to join in.

“Everyone has come out protesting against the government,” said Hussain, a protester. “We demand that all politicians resign and get out. We don’t want Moqtada or any of them.”

Additional reporting by Humeyra Pamuk in Washington, Reporting by Aziz El Yaakoubi, Nadine Awadalla, Baghdad bureau, John Irish in Paris; Writing by Ahmed Rasheed, Editing by Philipaa Fletcher and Leslie Adler
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

IS Tries to Stage Comeback Amid Rising U.S.-Iran Tensions

By Bassem Mroue
January 28, 2020

BEIRUT (AP) — The Islamic State group’s self-styled “caliphate” across parts of Iraq and Syria seemed largely defeated last year, with the loss of its territory, the killing of its founder in a U.S. raid and an unprecedented crackdown on its social media propaganda machine.

But tensions between the United States and Iran and the resulting clash over the U.S. military presence in the region provide a comeback opportunity for the extremist group, whose remnants have been gradually building up a guerrilla campaign over the past year, experts say.

American troops in Iraq had to pause their operations against IS for nearly two weeks amid the tensions. From the other side, Iranian-backed Iraqi militiamen who once focused on fighting the militants have turned their attention to evicting U.S. troops from the Middle East.

In the meantime, Islamic State group sleeper cells intensified ambushes in Iraq and Syria in the past few weeks, killing and wounding dozens of their opponents in both countries. Activists and residents say the attacks have intensified since the U.S. killed top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in a Jan. 3 drone strike at Baghdad’s airport.

It is not clear whether the uptick is related to the repercussions that followed from the strike, and it is possible some of the attacks had been planned before Soleimani’s killing. U.S. officials deny seeing any particular increase in IS activities. “They haven’t taken advantage of it, as far as we can see,” said James Jeffrey, the State Department envoy to the international coalition fighting the Islamic State.

Mervan Qamishlo, a spokesman for Syria’s U.S.-backed Kurdish-led force, said the intensification of IS attacks began even earlier, since October, when Turkey began a military operation against Kurdish fighters in northern Syria.

Still, the militants clearly gained at least temporary breathing room as the killing of Soleimani, along with a senior Iraqi militia leader, brought Iran and the U.S. to the brink of all-out war and outraged Iraqis, who considered the strike a flagrant breach of sovereignty.

On Jan. 5, Iraq’s parliament called for the expulsion of the 5,200 U.S. troops from the country who have been there since 2014 on a mission to train Iraqi forces and assist in the fight against IS. The U.S.-led coalition then put the fight against IS on hold to focus on protecting its troops and bases. It said last week that it had resumed those operations after a 10-day halt.

“This tension will for sure help Daesh, as all forces fighting it become busy with other matters,” warned Abdullah Suleiman Ali, a Syrian researcher who focuses on jihadi groups, using the Arabic acronym for IS.

Among other things, he said Iran-U.S. tensions help give IS the opportunity to restructure as its new leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, strengthens his grip. Al-Qurayshi was announced in the post after longtime leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed by a U.S. raid in Syria in October.

“The day the American-Iranian clash began, Daesh started intensifying its attacks,” said Rami Aburrahman, who heads the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition war monitor.

On Jan. 14, IS launched a cross border attack from Syria into Iraq, killing an Iraqi officer. A day later, IS fighters attacked an Iraqi force in the central Salaheddine region, killing two soldiers and wounding five. Two days later, an Iraqi intelligence major was killed in a car bomb north of Baghdad.

One of the deadliest attacks occurred in Syria on Jan. 14, when IS fighters stole some 2,000 cattle from a village near the eastern town of Mayadeen. One of the four shepherds that own the cattle informed authorities, and a Syrian government military force was sent to the area, where they were met by IS fire.

As the forces returned to their base, IS gunmen laid an ambush, killing 11 troops and pro-government fighters as well as two shepherds.

IS published photos showing bodies of soldiers said to have been killed in the attack, along with a destroyed armored vehicle and an overturned truck.

On the same day, seven shepherds were found shot dead west of the eastern city of Deir el-Zour. On Jan. 4, 21 shepherds were found shot in the back of their heads, their hands were tied behind their backs.

Dozens of members of the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian democratic Forces have been killed over the past months in attacks claimed by IS as well.

With the painful strikes, IS is “taking advantage to boost its influence” and send a message to their supporters that they are still strong, said Omar Abu Laila, an activist from Deir el-Zour now based in Europe.

“Some civilians don’t dare leave their homes after sunset because of fear of Daesh,” Abu Laila said.

The group is also trying to restore its presence on social media and the Internet — a key component to its ability to raise financial support from abroad and recruit new fighters.

IS members and supporters have for years sown fear and projected power with the grisly videos they released on social media showing beheadings, amputations and victims burned to death or thrown from buildings.

In recent weeks, European authorities, coordinated by Europol, have shut down thousands of IS propaganda platforms and communication channels in an unprecedented crackdown. In particular, the crackdown forced IS’s news agency and other channels off the Telegram text messaging system, the group’s primary outlet since 2015.

“The Europol campaign of November had a massive impact on ISIS support networks on Telegram,” said Amarnath Amarasingam, a terrorism researcher at Queen’s University in Ontario, Canada.

Since then, the extremists have shifted to other messaging platforms including the Russia-based TamTam, Canada-based Hoop Messenger and BCM Messenger. They also tried to get back on Twitter using hacked accounts, Amarasingam said.

So far, those efforts have not been very successful as international authorities work to chase them down on those outlets as well.

“None of this is really matching the presence they had on Telegram from 2015 onwards,” Amarasingam said.


© copyright 2020 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
 

jward

passin' thru
Hmm. Must stop posting ' bout nuclear sub building projects in baths :eek:

US Army Sleuths Seek Social-Media Search Services

The Criminal Investigation Command is looking to tap into social media sites for digital evidence.

The Army’s Criminal Investigation Command conducts extensive probes into threats against the military branch and its personnel. This week, insiders unveiled their intent to glean new mission-relevant evidence through the forensic analysis of social media posts.
According to a solicitation published Thursday, CID aims to acquire access to “social media exploitation” services.
“The [software-as-a-service] solution shall be web-based with subscription [services] to support [the] organizations’ ability to quickly unlock the value of social media and big data to assess risk, respond to threats and discover actionable intelligence,” officials wrote in a statement of the work regarding the potential procurement.

As the Army’s primary investigative organization, CID said it hones in on all felony crimes that are relevant to the branch. The document notes that insiders engage in information collection for sensitive and serious violations of the law, the analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence, protective service operations, forensic laboratory support, records maintenance, logistics security, force protection and beyond.

Related: FBI Seeks Tools to Help Track Criminals and Terrorists via Social Media
Related: DHS Wants to Collect More Social-Media Records
Related: New Tech Aims to Help Societies Learn to Spot Fake News


To support its efforts, the CID wants 62 separate subscriptions—57 that are basic and five that are enhanced—to software licenses that will provide “secure and legal social media threat detection and risk mitigation.” The basic requirements listed call for a software service that provides “interactive datamining capabilities,” allows for at least 250 queries per day, and will cover at least 70 web-based international platforms including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, VK, LinkedIn, Discord, Gab, Telegram, SoundCloud, Myspace, Google+—and many more. An official told Nextgov Friday that “due to security and operational reasons,” CID presently has no plans to share further details about the exploitation service or how it will be used.
The service will be administered from the CID’s headquarters in Quantico, Virginia, but will be accessed by Army officials across the United States and abroad. Interested vendors are asked to submit their quotes by Feb. 3.
article-end.png


Posted for fair use
US Army Sleuths Seek Social-Media Search Services
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:srdot:

Posted for fair use.....

US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead

Posted on Jan.29, 2020 in Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States by Hans M. Kristensen

By William M. Arkin* and Hans M. Kristensen


The US Navy has now deployed the new W76-2 low-yield Trident submarine warhead. The first ballistic missile submarine scheduled to deploy with the new warhead was the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), which deployed from Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia during the final weeks of 2019 for a deterrent patrol in the Atlantic Ocean.

The W76-2 warhead was first announced in the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) unveiled in February 2018. There, it was described as a capability to “help counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable ‘gap’ in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities,” a reference to Russia. The justification voiced by the administration was that the United States did not have a “prompt” and useable nuclear capability that could counter – and thus deter – Russian use of its own tactical nuclear capabilities.

We estimate that one or two of the 20 missiles on the USS Tennessee and subsequent subs will be armed with the W76-2, either singly or carrying multiple warheads. Each W76-2 is estimated to have an explosive yield of about five kilotons. The remaining 18 missiles on each submarine like the Tennessee carry either the 90-kiloton W76-1 or the 455-kiloton W88. Each missile can carry up to eight warheads under current loading configurations.

The first W76-2 (known as First Production Unit, or FPU) was completed at Pantex in February 2019. At the time, NNSA said it was “on track to complete the W76-2 Initial Operational Capability warhead quantity and deliver the units to the U.S Navy by the end of Fiscal Year 2019” (30 September 2019). We estimate approximately 50 W76-2 warheads were produced, a low-cost add-on to improved W76 Mod 1 strategic Trident warheads which had just finished their own production run.

The W76-2 Mission

The NPR explicitly justified the W76-2 as a response to Russia allegedly lowering the threshold for first-use of its own tactical nuclear weapons in a limited regional conflict. Nuclear advocates argue that the Kremlin has developed an “escalate-to-deescalate” or “escalate-to-win” nuclear strategy, where it plans to use nuclear weapons if Russia failed in any conventional aggression against NATO. The existence of an actual “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine is hotly debated, though there is evidence that Russia has war gamed early nuclear use in a European conflict.

Based upon the supposed “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine, the February 2018 NPR claims that the W76-2 is needed to “help counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable ‘gap’ in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities.” The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has further explained that the “W76-2 will allow for tailored deterrence in the face of evolving threats” and gives the US “an assured ability to respond in kind to a low-yield nuclear attack.”

Consultants who were involved in producing the NPR have suggested that “[Russian President] Putin may well believe that the United States would not respond with strategic warheads that could cause significant collateral damage” and “that Moscow could conceivably engage in limited nuclear first-use without undue risk…”

There is no firm evidence that a Russian nuclear decision regarding the risk involved in nuclear escalation is dependent on the yield of a US nuclear weapon. Moreover, the United States already has a large number of weapons in its nuclear arsenal that have low-yield options – about 1,000 by our estimate. This includes nuclear cruise missiles for B-52 bombers and B61 gravity bombs for B-2 bombers and tactical fighter jets.

Yes, but – so the W76-2 advocates argue – these low-yield warheads are delivered by aircraft that may not be able to penetrate Russia’s new advanced air-defenses. But the W76-2 on a Trident ballistic missile can. Nuclear advocates also argue the United States would be constrained from employing fighter aircraft-based B61 nuclear bombs or “self-deterred” from employing more powerful strategic nuclear weapons. In addition to penetration of Russian air defenses, there is also the question of NATO alliance consultation and approval of an American nuclear strike. Only a low-yield and quick reaction ballistic-missile can restore deterrence, they say. Or so the argument goes.

All of this sounds like good old-fashioned Cold War warfighting. In the past, every tactical nuclear weapon has been justified with this line of argument, that smaller yields and “prompt” use – once achieved through forward European basing of thousands of warheads – was needed to deter. Now the low-yield W76-2 warhead gives the United States a weapon its advocates say is more useable, and thus more effective as a deterrent, really no change from previous articulations of nuclear strategy.

The authors of the NPR also saw the dilemma of suggesting a more usable weapon. They thus explained that the W76-2 was “not intended to enable, nor does it enable, ‘nuclear war-fighting.’ Nor will it lower the nuclear threshold.” In other words, while Russian low-yield nuclear weapons lower the threshold making nuclear use more likely, U.S. low-yield weapons instead “raise the nuclear threshold” and make nuclear use less likely. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood even told reporters that the W76-2 would be “very stabilizing” and in no way supports U.S. early use of nuclear weapons, even though the Nuclear Posture Review explicitly stated the warhead was needed for “prompt response” strike options against Russian early use of nuclear weapons.

“Prompt response” means that strategic Trident submarines in a W76-2 scenario would be used as tactical nuclear weapons, potentially in a first use scenario or immediately after Russia escalated, thus forming the United States’ own “escalate-to-deescalate” capability. The United States has refused to rule out first use of nuclear weapons.
The USS Tennessee (SSBN-734) in drydock at Kings Bay submarine base in September 2019 shortly before it returned to active duty and loaded with Trident D5 missiles carrying the new low-yield W76-2 warhead. (Photo: U.S. Navy)
Since the United States ceased allocating some of its missile submarines to NATO command in the late-1980s, U.S. planners have been reluctant to allocate strategic ballistic missiles to limited theater tasks. Instead, NATO’s possession of dual-capable aircraft and increasingly U.S. long-range bombers on Bomber Assurance and Deterrence Operations (BAAD) – now Bomber Task Force operations – have been seen as the most appropriate way to slow down regional escalation scenarios. The prompt W76-2 mission changes this strategy.

In the case of the W76-2, carried onboard a submarine otherwise part of the strategic nuclear force, amidst a war Russia would have to determine that a tactical launch of one or a few low-yield Tridents was not, in fact, the opening phase of a much larger escalation to strategic nuclear war. Thus, it seems inconceivable that any President would approve employment of the W76-2 against Russia; deployment on the Trident submarine might actually self-deter.

Though almost all of the discussion about the new W76-2 has focused on Russia scenarios, it is much more likely that the new low-yield weapon is intended to facilitate first-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea or Iran. The National Security Strategy and the NPR both describe a role for nuclear weapons against “non-nuclear strategic attacks, and large-scale conventional aggression.” And the NPR explicitly says the W76-2 is intended to “expand the range of credible U.S. options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack.” Indeed, nuclear planning against Iran is reportedly accelerating, B-2 bomber attacks are currently the force allocated but the new W76-2 is likely to be incorporated into U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) war planning.

Cheap, Quick, Simple, But Poorly Understood

In justifying the W76-2 since the February 2018 NPR, DOD has emphasized that production and deployment could be done fast, was simple to do, and wouldn’t cost very much. But the warhead emerged well before the Trump administration. The Project Atom report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2015 included recommendations for a broad range of low-yield weapons, including on long-range ballistic missiles. And shortly after the election of President Trump, the Defense Science Board’s defense priority recommendations for the new administration included “lower yield, primary-only options.” (This refers to the fact that the W76-2 is essentially little different than the strategic W76-1, “turning off” the thermonuclear secondary and thus facilitating rapid production.)

Initially, the military interest in a new weapon seemed limited. When then STRATCOM commander General John E. Hyten (now Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was asked during Congressional hearings in March 2017 about the military need for lower-yield nuclear weapons, he didn’t answer with a yes or no but explained the U.S. arsenal already had a wide range of yields:

Rep. Garamendi: The Defense Science Board, in their seven defense priorities for the new administration, recommended expanding our nuclear options, including deploying low yield weapons on strategic delivery systems. Is there a military requirement for these new weapons?
Gen. Hyten: So Congressman, that’s a great conversation to tomorrow when I can tell you the details [in closed classified session], but from a — from a big picture perspective in — in a public hearing, I can tell you that our force structure now actually has a number of capabilities that provide the president of the United States a variety of options to respond to any numbers of threats.

Later that month, in an interview at the Military Reporters and Editors Conference, Hyten elaborated further that the United States already had very flexible military capabilities to respond to Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons:

John Donnelly (Congressional Quarterly Roll Call): The Defense Science Board, among others, has advocated development of new options for maneuvering lower yield nuclear warheads instead of just air delivered, talking basically about ICBM, SLBM. The thinking, I think, is that given the Russian escalate to win, if you like, or escalate to deescalate doctrine, the United States needs to have more options. What do you think about, that is my question. Especially in light of the fact that there are those who are concerned that this further institutionalizes the idea that you can fight and maybe even win a limited nuclear war.
Gen. Hyten: …we’re going to look at that in the Nuclear Posture Review over the next six months. I think it’s a valid question to ask, but I’ll just tell you what I’ve said in public up until this point, and as we go into the Nuclear Posture Review.
…in the past and where I am right now is that I’ll just say that the plans that we have right now, one of the things that surprised me most when I took command on November 3 was the flexible options that are in all the plans today. So we actually have very flexible options in our plans. So if something bad happens in the world and there’s a response and I’m on the phone with the Secretary of Defense and the President and the entire staff, which is the Attorney General, Secretary of State and everybody, I actually have a series of very flexible options from conventional all the way up to large-scale nuke that I can advise the President on to give him options on what he would want to do.
So I’m very comfortable today with the flexibility of our response options. Whether the President of the United States and his team believes that that gives him enough flexibility is his call. So we’ll look at that in the Nuclear Posture Review. But I’ve said publicly in the past that our plans now are very flexible.
And the reason I was surprised when I got to STRATCOM about the flexibility, is because the last time I executed or was involved in the execution of the nuclear plan was about 20 years ago and there was no flexibility in the plan. It was big, it was huge, it was massively destructive. … We now have conventional responses all the way up to the nuclear responses, and I think that’s a very healthy thing. So I’m comfortable with where we are today, but we’ll look at it in the Nuclear Posture Review again.

During the Trump NPR process, however, the tone changed. Almost one year to the day after Hyten said he was comfortable with the existing capabilities, he told lawmakers he needed a low-yield warhead after all: “I strongly agree with the need for a low-yield nuclear weapon. That capability is a deterrence weapon to respond to the threat that Russia, in particular, is portraying.”

While nuclear advocates were quick to take advantage of the new administration to get approval for new nuclear weapons they said were needed to now respond to Russia’s supposed “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy, efforts to engage Moscow to discuss nuclear strategy and their impact on nuclear arsenals are harder to find. See, for example, this written correspondence between Representative Susan Davis and General Hyten:

Rep. Davis: Have you ever had a discussion with Russia about their nuclear posture, and in particular an escalate-to-de-escalate (E2D) strategy, which the Nuclear Posture Review claims is part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine? How did they respond? Do you view this doctrine as offensive or defensive in nature?
Gen. Hyten: I would like to have such a discussion, but I have never had a conversation with Russia about their nuclear posture.

During the Fiscal Year 2019 budget debate, Democrats argued strongly against the new low-yield W76-2, and opposition increased on Capitol Hill after the 2018 mid-term elections gave Democrats control of the House of Representatives. But given the relatively low cost of the W76-2, and the fact that it was conveyed as merely an “add-on” to an already hot W76 production line, little progress was made by opponents. Reluctantly accepting production of the warhead in the FY 2019 defense budget, opponents again in August 2019 tried to block funding in the FY 2020 defense budget arguing the new warhead “is a dangerous, costly, unnecessary, and redundant addition to the U.S. nuclear arsenal,” and that it “would reduce the threshold for nuclear use and make nuclear escalation more likely.” When the Republican Senate majority refused to accept the House’s sense, Democrats caved.

Just a few months later, the first W76-2 warheads sailed into the Atlantic Ocean onboard the USS Tennessee.

* William M. Arkin is a journalist and consultant to FAS


This publication was made possible by generous contributions from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

The Three Elephants of European Security

Johanna Möhring

January 28, 2020
Commentary

On the face of it, European security is taken seriously these days. Everything from Russian aggression, to migratory pressures, to terrorist attacks has jolted Western European leaders out of their post-Cold War complacency. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, as well as Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House, further concentrated European minds. As a result, political leaders have reconfirmed NATO as prime provider and guarantor of security in Europe, underpinned by reinforced U.S. engagement and allied commitment to live up to promises of defense investment given in the recent past. The European Union, after merely dabbling in it for years, has leaned into the area of defense with a flurry of activities and new formats meant to encourage European production of defense and security goods complementary to those provided by NATO, also with the aim of strengthening Europe’s defense industry. NATO-E.U. cooperation, for a long time a bugbear, is flourishing.

So, can the “all clear” be sounded in Europe? Unfortunately not. To understand why, Europeans and Americans need to address three elephants crowding the room of European security — some familiar, some less so. As so often with indoor pachyderms, they irritate, as they confront us with our inability to address them and our tendency to tiptoe around them. The three European security elephants will resonate differently depending on which side of the Atlantic you reside. But they need to be seen, and tackled, together.

The First: A Creaking European Security Architecture

In a speech at Panthéon-Assas University in Paris in September 2018, Nicolas Roche, a senior diplomat at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, described the sovereignty of European states as resting on six pillars underpinning a security and defense architecture unique in the world: the U.S. external security guarantee in the framework of NATO, both nuclear and conventional; the arms control regime covering Europe; confidence-building multilateral agreements, such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Open Skies treaties; the 1975 “Helsinki Principles,” enshrining among others sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states; the construction of a European defense identity within the European Union and NATO; and lastly, bi- or “minilateral” relations, such as the Lancaster House Treaties between France and the United Kingdom or the European Intervention Initiative. Worryingly, some of those pillars have questionable structural integrity, to say the least. (While there is no recording or text of the speech, I confirmed Roche’s remarks with him recently via email.)

Take the most important pillar of European security, NATO, which just turned 70. The current occupant of the White House is doing his best to sow doubts regarding American engagement, instead exhorting allies to pay up or lose American support. As a consequence, recent NATO summits have transformed into contortionist circus acts around Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (which frames an armed attack against one member state, in Europe or North America, to be an armed attack against all), with the collective political and diplomatic personnel of Europe (and Canada) losing much sleep and dignity. Yes, actions speak louder than words, and the American military presence has been reinforced in Europe. But the budget lines for the European Deterrence Initiative are not perennial, and funds are being slashed to finance the building of walls. There are also plans to make American allies pay more for troops stationed on their territory.

Conventional wisdom dictates that America will be there in the event of armed confrontation involving its NATO partners, and that in any case, attacks on Europe will most likely be non-military in nature. But such analysis is not entirely comforting, especially in the light of American efforts to balance China, which will inevitably call for a prioritization of East Asia over Europe.

How about confidence-building measures and arms control? Both Russia and the United States accuse each other of violating the Open Skies Treaty, and the American president has signaled his intention of withdrawal. In October 2018, the United States declared that it was leaving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, pointing to blatant violations by Russia (in the line of sight: Russian SSC-8 missiles). Russia responded by pulling out too. The United States tested a new ground-launched cruise missile in August 2019.

The intermediate-range Russian missiles in question, part of Russian defense/offense strategic operations, dampen the enthusiasm to intervene in the north, east, and southeast of the NATO alliance’s territory in Europe in case of a crisis, which might or might not fall under Art. 5. They mark a crisis of NATO’s two-pronged approach toward Russia, consisting of combining effective deterrence with readiness for dialogue. To re-up NATO’s deterrence game, billions of dollars will need to be invested in modern equipment, infrastructure, and rapid deployment capacity of sizable troop contingents in Europe, and painful dossiers pertaining to nuclear strategy will need to be reopened, including the thorny question of stationing U.S. intermediate-range missiles on European soil. Nothing has been done so far to alert European publics to these dramatic changes in their security environment and the need to significantly increase defense spending and posture.

The European default response, to propagate multilateral solutions, such as Germany’s most recent attempts to kick-start global arms control and disarmament talks, might be logically correct given that Russian and U.S. willingness to walk away from the INF Treaty seems to be (also) tangled up with Chinese developments in the missile development department. But such approaches struggle to gain traction in the current geopolitical environment, where old-style power politics seem to be once again back in fashion, and military power, and the willingness to use it, is a currency again. Europeans seem to be rather unwilling and unable to come to terms with such an unpleasant reality.

The Second: European Militaries Under Pressure

As unwilling as Europeans may be to contemplate such a possibility, there are credible signs that they could be approaching the end of the shelf life of their military model, which is based on publicly (read: deficit-/ debt-) financed troops and equipment, with soldiering both a unique profession and a unique social tie to the nation-state. This disruptive development, which confronts the United States as well, is driven by economic, financial, technological, and social factors.

Having a military is expensive. European governments have to justify military spending as it competes with other expenditures, a hard sell in societies comfortably used to peacetime, with a budget “cake” that seems to be getting ever smaller. While letting your finance ministry dictate military strategy might be suboptimal, this is what is happening in most European capitals. And even if there were more money to spend, this would most likely not be sufficient, because of two phenomena: spiraling costs and defense inflation.

Another sign that something is afoot is the apparent inability to successfully design, produce, or even just purchase (complex) weapons systems in Europe. For decades, politicians and civil servants have not exercised related specific skills, such as writing detailed industry briefs informed by strategic thinking, or controlling and managing spending on procurement — a recipe for wasteful spending (the desperate state of German procurement being an albeit glaring example). Behind this phenomenon looms massive ongoing technological change, and the ever complex question as to how civilian and military organizations handle innovation.

Or perhaps even more telling, take the state of permanent reform spanning the last 30 years: Since the end of the Cold War, European armed forces have resembled a never-finished construction site. After having to stomach a massive reduction in numbers and conventional armaments (and for those with a socialist past, having to become part of a democratic system), European armies were transformed into agents of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, only to be assigned to expeditionary warfare thereafter. Along the way, many switched from a system of conscription to a professional force. Currently, at least some European countries are once again pondering how to spar with a peer adversary. Some are reintroducing conscription, experimenting with home defense forces, or both.

It seems that instead of taking the time to learn from past military engagements (the most recent failure to grapple with the adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan being a case in point), Europeans simply move on, trying time and again to build a military to meet a certain strategic challenge or to match a specific threat, neglecting specific capacities and capabilities in the process. This is simply unsustainable, as it proves to be too costly and too disruptive.

What about the prevailing mood in European armed forces? Few soldiers, apart from the lone retiring general here and there, publicly air grievances, given that they hail from institutions that attach premium value to discipline and service. But the pressure on military personnel — paid only modestly, often not equipped properly, constantly asked to do more with less, resenting societal indifference as well as lack of political leadership — is substantial. One cannot assume that people are and will be willing to serve under such circumstances.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

But the most important factor hastening the demise of the European military model is European failure to think strategically. A clear understanding of what military power can actually achieve in today’s world, however, is lacking. Such an understanding would allow European countries to triangulate their military power with political goals they hope to advance. When it comes to concepts of military power, Europeans have been purely reactive — to American expectations, and to institutional frameworks in which military cooperation takes place in Europe.

The Third: The Shackles of Institutions

It is rather startling that a group of advanced industrialized countries should not be able to muster enough resources, including political will, to advance toward strategic autonomy, whether such a term might mean taking over more responsibility for their own security, prudently hedging against unforeseen developments, or advancing toward real emancipation from their American protectors. But there is no denying that both in terms of money and will, the defense of Europe continues to be thought under a star-spangled banner — the one with 50, not the one with 12 stars. What should give pause is that defense investment is resisted even in the NATO framework.

Why is this the case? Defense and security cooperation is a child of necessity, animated by deeper geopolitical trends and driven by efficiency and legitimacy considerations. Some ongoing collaborations are pragmatic and results-oriented, but cooperation remains driven by the institutional logics of different cooperation formats, rather than by what role the military should play as part of a European security strategy. Behind this phenomenon lie differing and diverging interests and concepts of military power among Europe’s most powerful countries, which have shaped the existing and emerging institutional frameworks in which European defense cooperation takes place.

Three countries — France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — are able, by their political and diplomatic weight, their national doctrines, as well as their economic resources, to significantly influence the question of future European security and defense capabilities. Of course, others, such as the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, and Spain, are important partners in the military field. While each of the “big three” tries to impose its own preferences and visions in the field of security and defense cooperation, none is able to prevail.

At a Franco-British-German study day/scenario exercise on defense cooperation in Europe organized last year at Panthéon-Assas University in Paris with the support of NATO, representatives of national ministries and think tanks were kind enough to play their respective countries. A few things stood out: first, the perception of time, and, second, in a related manner, a certain complacency of European countries regarding U.S. commitment guaranteeing permanent and sustainable security in Europe. The discussions on European strategic autonomy were very much in line with a conversation that has already lasted for three decades, with the expressed certainty of being able to move at a pace comfortable for the most hesitant. This appeared in contrast to a disruptive geopolitical reality and a faltering European security architecture. Lastly, the study day confirmed how much institutions define the thinking and action regarding European security, as well as the very different place they occupy in the strategies of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

Judging from past experience, there is the danger that current European defense cooperation efforts do not so much contribute to the creation or the reinforcement of autonomous European military capacities as to the production of symbolic political capital: proof of reactivity and sign of European unity for some, skillful staging of activity to cover up for the lack of credible investment to others. Perhaps most damningly, these defense cooperation efforts could allow Germany, France, and the United Kingdom to avoid their present rendezvous with history: Germany remains fixated on past horrors, unwilling to think in terms of military power, while France and the United Kingdom cling to visions of past grandeur. In that sense, all three fail their European partners who depend on them to decisively engage.

You Can’t Ignore the Elephants in the Room

When it comes to the first elephant, Europe’s security architecture, Europeans can and should do their best to be useful allies in the framework of NATO, and to continue to work on its fifth and sixth pillars, namely the construction of a European defense identity, as well as on bi- or “minilateral” relations. This includes taking very hard looks at European-only defense and operational capabilities, and thinking about the unthinkable: European security without the certainty of an automatic American security guarantee. Continuously educating especially Western European electorates on the investments needed for the provision of security in Europe is crucial. Freedom is not free.

The second elephant, the approaching end-of-shelf-life of a deficit-/debt-financed professional military force, requires debate over public services states provide, and over civic engagement in the provision of security. As the military component of a European security strategy, armed forces need to fulfill roughly three tasks: deterrence, conventional and nuclear; joint policing/stabilizing of Europe’s rims; and lastly, a maritime element to secure global trade routes. Not least because of the blurring between external and internal security, and nonviolent ways to engage in conflict, more and more security-related tasks implicate the civilian sector and depend on society’s engagement and participation. A modular approach based on core military capacities, to be assembled with add-ons and scaled up or down into needed capabilities, might represent a suitable alternative. It could also comprise a form of national service. The challenge would be to keep “kinetic” capacities and military spirit alive, all the while opening up to harness society’s resources. Such a modular model would bring together a varied community of people, military and civilian, all invested in defending what they hold dear.

Lastly, riding the defense cooperation elephant, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have a special responsibility as they perform the job of anchor nations for specific cooperation efforts, be it within NATO, the European Union, or outside those institutions. Each of them will have to move out of their comfort zone when it comes to their cooperation style: France will be tested on the art of learning together with others, rather than trying to dominate, which will be a significant factor in determining the success of its European Intervention Initiative. Germany needs to grasp the responsibility that comes with interlocking defense cooperation, as neighboring countries that have abandoned key military capabilities now rely on it. The United Kingdom will have to move beyond its instinctive preference for ad hoc or bilateral cooperation to more durably engage with its partners.

Scrutinizing the three elephants in the room of European security — a security architecture underpinning the sovereignty of European countries that is faltering, a fundamentally challenged military, and defense cooperation at pains to keep up with the pace of geopolitical change e — is an uncomfortable exercise. With the trans-Atlantic relationship remaining at the heart of European defense, and cornerstone of the European project, Americans and Europeans have no choice but to think and act together as the three pachyderms relentlessly question the future of European security.

Johanna Möhring is Senior Fellow at The Institute for Statecraft in London, and Chercheure associée at the Centre Thucydide, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas. Her research interests cover the nature of power in the 21st century, and security and defense cooperation in Europe.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Navy Missile Sub Has Begun Its First Patrol Armed With Controversial Low Yield Nukes
Proponents argue that the warheads give the United States added deterrent flexibility, but critics warn they lower the threshold for using nukes.
By Joseph Trevithick
January 29, 2020
The U.S. Navy has reportedly sent an Ohio class ballistic missile submarine on patrol for the first time carrying Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles armed with the new and controversial low-yield W76-2 nuclear warhead. This news comes nearly a year after the United States announced it had produced the first of these warheads. Proponents say the warheads are necessary to give the U.S. government added flexibility to respond to certain crises, including limited nuclear strikes, but critics contend that they raise the likelihood of the United States employing nuclear weapons, to begin with.
The Federation of American Scientists first reported the deployment on Jan. 20, 2020. The Ohio class ballistic missile submarine USS Tennessee left its homeport at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia in late December 2019 for a deterrent patrol armed with an unknown number of Trident IIs carrying W76-2s.




U.S. Ballistic Missile Sub Fired An Impressive Four Trident II Missiles In Just Three DaysBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Four Big Need To Know Takeaways From The Long Awaited US Nuclear Posture ReviewBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Navy Plans For 'Large Payload Subs' Based On New Columbia Class To Take On SSGN Role And MoreBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
U.S. To Spend Hundreds Of Millions To Replace A $5 Part In Revamped Nuclear WeaponsBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Pentagon's New Nuclear Strategy Is Unsustainable And A Handout To Defense IndustryBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
"We estimate that one or two of the 20 [Trident II] missiles on the USS Tennessee and subsequent subs will be armed with the W76-2, either singly or carrying multiple warheads. Each W76-2 is estimated to have an explosive yield of about five kilotons," according to the Federation of American Scientists. "The remaining 18 missiles on each submarine like the Tennessee carry either the 90-kiloton W76-1 or the 455-kiloton W88. Each missile can carry up to eight warheads under current loading configurations."

So, the W76-2, with its estimated yield of five kilotons, has a yield 18 times smaller than the existing W76-1 and is more than 90 times smaller than the W88. NUKEMAP, a map tool that nuclear weapons historian Alex Wellerstein, presently a professor at Stevens Institute of Technology in New Jersey, first put online in 2012, estimates that a W76-2 that detonates on the ground would create a fireball just over 490 feet wide, wherein anything would be incinerated, and cause varying levels of damage to anything within a circle around ground zero just under one and a half miles in diameter. By comparison, the W88's fireball would be just under 2,330 feet wide and there would be degrees of damage across an area around 18 miles in diameter. The spread of deadly radiation and fallout would also be factors within these areas, as well as beyond, depending on prevailing weather patterns.


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NUKEMAP
A comparison of how Washington, D.C. might be impacted by the detonation of, from left to right, a W88, a W76-1, and a W76-2, as a generic example, according to NUKEMAP's models. The gray outer circle is the maximum extent of light damage, such as broken windows. The yellow circle, clearly visible in the cases of the W88 and W76-1, is the extent of thermal raditation, which can cause third degree burns. The other colored bands cover more extensive damage and the spread of radiation, as well as the immediate fireball, outlined in red.
President Donald Trump's Administration codified plans to develop a low-yield warhead for the Trident II missile in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the division of the Department of Energy directly responsible for overseeing America's nuclear stockpile, announced it had built the first W76-2 at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas in February 2019. At that time it said that it planned to deliver the first of these warheads to the Navy by the end of the fiscal year, which wrapped up on Sept. 30, 2019.


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NNSA
The official logo for the W76-2 warhead program. Mk 4A refers to the re-entry vehicle that carries the warhead.
The exact configuration of the W76-2 is classified, but it is known to be a derivative of the W76-1, which was itself a product of a life-extension program for the original W76 warheads that NNSA also completed last year. The W76 and W76-1 are understood to be two-stage thermonuclear weapons and previous reports have posited that the new W76-2 may simply eliminate the second stage to produce a significantly lower yield. This would also help explain the speed at which NNSA could develop and field the warhead.


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NNSA
An official infographic on the W76-1, which also uses the Mk 4A re-entry vehicle.
"We estimate approximately 50 W76-2 warheads were produced, a low-cost add-on to improved W76 Mod 1 strategic Trident warheads which had just finished their own production run," the Federation of American Scientists said in their report. At present, the Navy plans to eventually deploy Trident II missiles armed with the new warheads on its future Columbia class ballistic missile submarines, which are scheduled to begin sailing deterrent patrols in 2031.


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USN
An artist's conception of the first-in-class USS Columbia.
The Trump Administration and other proponents of the low-yield warhead have argued that there is a need for a more "flexible" deterrent option to respond to more limited nuclear strikes, including those involving an opponent employing tactical nuclear weapons in a battlefield context. The concern is that the U.S. government could be too worried about employing larger yield nuclear weapons to respond in kind to these strikes, creating a deterrence "gap" that opponents might be able to exploit.
This development was driven in no small part by Russia's purported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. Experts continue to disagree over whether or not this policy actually exists.
Concerns about advanced and novel Russian strategic weapons developments, as well as those in China, have prompted steady increases in U.S. government spending on modernizing deterrent capabilities in recent years, in general. On Jan. 28, 2020, Senator Jim Inhofe, a Republican from Oklahoma and the present the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the Trump Administration plans to seek another $20 billion for such efforts in the 2021 Fiscal Year, a 20 percent increase over the previous fiscal year's budget, according to Defense News. Existing modernization plans related to America's nuclear arsenal are already slated to cost at least $1.2 trillion over the next 30 years, spending that The War Zone has previously pointed out is very likely unsustainable over that period.
On the other side, critics of the lower-yield W76-2 warn that it is inherently more "usable" and risks lowering the threshold for deciding to employ nuclear weapons. They also point out that the U.S. military already has various nuclear weapons with so-called "dial-a-yield" capabilities that allow for lower yields and the force does not need a new warhead to meet these requirements.
Beyond that, there is no indication that America's potential opponents would be able to discriminate between the launch of a Trident II missile armed with W76-2 warheads and one with larger yield W76-1s or W88s. With just minutes to decide how to react, those adversaries could feel forced to respond as if they were under imminent threat of a full-scale nuclear strike from the United States, rather than a limited one, for fear of losing the ability to retaliate.


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USN
The Ohio class ballistic missile submarine USS Rhode Island fires a Trident II missile, with no warheads of any kind fitted, during a test in 2019.
A recent push by some members of Congress to cancel or curtail the W76-2 program as part of negotiations over the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act, for the 2021 Fiscal Year, ultimately collapsed. Opposition to the low-yield warhead remains and there may be additional legislative efforts aimed at removing it from America's nuclear arsenal in the future.
In the meantime, however, the Navy's Ohio class ballistic missile submarines look set to sail their routine deterrent patrols carrying Trident II missiles carrying the new, lower-yield warheads.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
 

jward

passin' thru
A Preventable Disaster Killed Six Marines. After Our Story, Congress Has Questions for Military Leaders.

A ProPublica investigation showed senior military leaders were worried about how prepared American sailors and Marines were for combat.


by Robert Faturechi
Jan. 28, 4:29 p.m. EST



ProPublica is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up to receive our biggest stories as soon as they’re published.


Members of the House Armed Services Committee announced Tuesday that they would be holding a hearing next month at which Navy and Marine Corps leaders will be questioned about just how ready U.S. forces in the Pacific are for combat.

The announcement comes a month after a ProPublica investigation into a midair crash between two Marine Corps aircraft during a training exercise off the coast of Japan that killed six Marines.

The Marine Corps investigation into the December 2018 tragedy that was released to the public largely blamed the squadron itself, painting the Marines as reckless aviators who flouted safety protocols.

But ProPublica revealed, through internal documents withheld from the public, that the squadron involved in the deadly accident had for months warned senior leaders that it was dangerously undertrained, undermanned and short of functioning aircraft.
Fighter Attack Squadron 242’s records showed its pilots were not capable of completing most of their basic missions if war broke out. They were knowingly given faulty equipment by the Marine Corps that possibly contributed to the death toll, and they were sent out on the dangerous mission over the sea without proper notifications having been made for a search-and-rescue operation to be at the ready in the event of an accident.

A second, secret investigation placed blame on senior leaders — and made alarming assessments about how unprepared the Marine Corps forces in the Pacific were.

The families of the dead Marines, five who died in a refueling tanker and another who died after floating hurt and undiscovered for more than nine hours in the Pacific, were never given the conclusions of the secret investigation.


Read More



Faulty Equipment, Lapsed Training, Repeated Warnings: How a Preventable Disaster Killed Six Marines
Marine commanders did not act on dozens of pleas for additional manpower, machinery and time.

The problems in the Marine Corps’ aviation forces mirror those ProPublica found in the Navy’s surface fleet. In 2017, two Navy destroyers were involved in fatal accidents months apart, and the Navy was quick to portray them as largely the result of negligence by sailors on the two ships. ProPublica’s reconstructions of the accidents, however, showed that uniformed and civilian Navy leaders at the highest levels had been alerted for years that the sailors and ships of the 7th Fleet were in crisis: undertrained, overtaxed and starved of the time and parts required to operate the country’s most versatile warships.

The House Armed Services Committee hearing, scheduled for Feb. 5, will include Vice Adm. Richard Brown, commander of naval surface forces, and Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder, deputy commandant for Marine Corps aviation.

In the last month, the Marine Corps has announced plans to improve its forces in the Pacific.

Gen. David H. Berger, the commandant of the Marine Corps, distributed a memo encouraging his commanders to identify the “highest quality” Marines “for duty in the Pacific.”

“In the coming years,” Berger wrote, “I need each of you to make this a point of emphasis.”


Read More



Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by its Own Navy
Investigation finds officials ignored warnings for years before one of the deadliest crashes in decades.



Years of Warnings, Then Death and Disaster
How the Navy failed its sailors

The Marine Corps also announced that it would be equipping squadrons this year with water-activated strobe lights that would help search-and-rescue forces locate aviators who eject over the sea. ProPublica found that the location beacons issued to the aviators involved in the 2018 crash malfunctioned in the water, delaying rescue. Documents showed the Marine Corps knew the beacons were faulty but failed to replace them.

A Marine Corps spokesperson said distributing that new equipment has been in the works for years.

An internal Marine Corps memo about ProPublica’s investigation into the crash seemed to indicate that the problems exposed in the article were more widespread.

“Many of the concerns expressed in the article mirror those expressed internally by other Marine aviation units,” the memo stated.

A Marine Corps spokesperson told ProPublica that that assessment “was not based on any internal interviews or formal command assessments” but rather “an assessment of open-source social media comments following the release of the ProPublica article.”

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm....

Posted for fair use.....

US awaits Iraq's okay to deploy Patriots to protect troops
Issued on: 30/01/2020 - 20:44Modified: 30/01/2020 - 20:42

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Washington (AFP)

The United States is awaiting a green light from the Iraqi government to deploy Patriot missile defense systems to protect US troops from Iranian missile attacks, Pentagon chief Mark Esper said Thursday.

Iran launched 11 missiles at a US air base at Ain al-Assad and another at a base in Erbil on January 8 in retaliation for the killing days earlier of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in a US drone strike in Baghdad.

No US troops were killed but dozens suffered traumatic brain injuries from the explosions, and Washington wants to deploy Patriot missiles to better protect the bases, which house some of the 5,200 US military personnel deployed in Iraq.

The Patriot systems are composed of high performance radars and interceptor missiles capable of destroying incoming ballistic missiles in flight.

Questioned Thursday about the delay in deploying the system, Esper told reporters the Iraqi government, which apparently is divided over the US military presence in the country, has yet to give it the go-ahead.

"We need the permission of the Iraqis," he said. "That's one issue. There may be others with regard to placement and things like that."

General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that a Patriot battalion is a relatively large organization, and the mechanics of deploying one to Iraq "will have to be worked out. And that is, in fact, ongoing."

Iraq denounced Soleimani's killing as an assault on its sovereignty, and charged that the international coalition in Iraq had overstepped its mandate.

The US-led coalition was formed in 2014 to fight the Islamic State group, which at the time had seized control of a third of Iraq's territory and large swaths of Syria. The coalition includes troops from 76 countries.

On January 5, the Iraqi parliament voted in favor of the withdrawal of US forces from the country. Coalition operations have been suspended since then.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

More than 30 civilians killed in attacks in eastern DR Congo

Issued on: 30/01/2020 - 17:16Modified: 30/01/2020 - 17:17

A survivor of a previous attack near Beni, Democratic Republic of Congo that was attributed to the armed group ADF is pictured on December 3, 2019.

A survivor of a previous attack near Beni, Democratic Republic of Congo that was attributed to the armed group ADF is pictured on December 3, 2019. © Bienvenu-Marie Bakumanya/AFP

Text by: NEWS WIRES

Thirty-six people have been killed in a suspected militia attack in the eastern DR Congo region of Beni, where hundreds have died in violence since November, a local official said Wednesday.

Congolese troops have been carrying out a military operation on an armed group in the east of the country -- long plagued by various militias -- and militiamen have responded with a series of massacres against civilians.

"They were all hacked to death. This brings (the toll) to 36 bodies," local Beni governor Donat Kibwana told AFP, updating casualties from Tuesday's attack.

Officials had earlier reported 15 fatalities.

Two people with skull fractures caused by machetes have been admitted to the hospital in Oicha for surgery, an AFP reporter there said.

The main attack took place late Tuesday in Manzingi, a village 20 kilometres (12 miles) northwest from Oicha, while a pastor was also killed in nearby Eringeti.

According to a toll compiled by a civil society organisation, the Kivu Security Tracker (KST), 265 people have now been killed in the Beni region since the army began its crackdown on the armed group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), on October 30.

The massacres seem to be a tactic by the ADF to frighten the population into silence, local commentators say.

The group has also disrupted operations to curb an outbreak of Ebola in North Kivu province.

Tuesday's massacre occurred to the west of the ADF's usual area of operations, which is closer to the Ugandan border.

The army offensive, unfolding in thick forest and jungle, has led to what the military say is the capture of the group's headquarters and the killing of five of its six leaders.

Brutal militia
The ADF, blamed for the deaths of more than a thousand civilians in Beni since October 2014, began as an Islamist-rooted rebel group in Uganda that opposed Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

It fell back into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in 1995 during the Congo Wars and appears to have halted raids inside Uganda. Its recruits today are people of various nationalities.

UN experts estimated the ADF in 2018 to number around 450 fighters.

A report to the UN Security Council last week said the ADF seemed to follow an extreme Islamist ideology, but there is no information on whether the group had links with international jihadist groups.

The spate of massacres has become a major challenge for President Felix Tshisekedi, who took office a year ago last Friday.

In November, angry protests erupted in the city of Beni, the region's administrative hub, as citizens accused the UN peacekeeping force in DR Congo of failing to protect them.
Tshisekedi, in his first state-of-the-nation address to Congress, last month said he had changed the army command in Beni and sent 22,000 troops to the region.
(AFP)
 

jward

passin' thru
SELF-DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARMY: WE’RE DOING IT WRONG
Jon Tishman | January 29, 2020

Self-Development in the Army: We’re Doing it Wrong

The United States Army spends a remarkable amount of money developing individuals to take on the responsibilities of a junior officer—$340,000 in the case of those who commission from the United States Military Academy. But in the years after pinning on the gold bar of a second lieutenant, the responsibility for junior officers’ development begins to fall, in part and for the first time, on their own shoulders. This is not a bad thing—self-development is a defining characteristic of effective members of any profession, including the profession of arms. But the Army must better facilitate this important practice by drastically increasing its focus on the self-development learning domain among junior officers.

Lieutenants are vital cogs in a much larger operational machine. Those serving as platoon leaders are at the nexus of translating a commander’s intent for an operation into discernable bites that are easily digestible by squad and fire-team leaders for execution on the battlefield. That translation is critical to ensuring favorable individual and leader decision-making. I argue that a wholesale revamp of the Army’s approach to self-development needs to occur in order to ensure that junior officers are able to translate their commanders’ intent into meaningful language that aids tactical decision-making and understanding of subordinates.

I had six platoon leaders and three executive officers move through my company over the span of fourteen months in command, six months of which were spent deployed to eastern Afghanistan. My perspective on this topic is based on that experience of having had direct oversight of nine lieutenants, the majority of whom are exceptional tactically (case in point: two are currently serving in the 75th Ranger Regiment). While I acknowledge the limits of such empirical observations, I do believe the Army needs to begin a conversation about what appears to be a general lack of understanding of the geopolitical environment and the type of knowledge that should be learned through self-development.

According to Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, Training and Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, the Army has three learning domains: institutional, experiential, and self-development. Institutional development occurs at professional military education courses where the service member is assessed via an Army academic evaluation report, similar in grading style to a high school report card. Experiential development occurs on the job; actually serving in the role as a platoon leader or executive officer develops the individual who is then assessed via an officer evaluation report. Both of these domains are limited, though: institutional learning focuses strictly on doctrinal education for lieutenants, while experiential learning focuses principally on tactics and general leadership. Moreover, the experiential development assessment in the Army has issues similar to those in the Air Force noted by Ned Stark, which are beyond the scope of this article, but I encourage reading the Ned Stark article as several parallels exist with the Army’s officer evaluation report system.

The third learning domain, self-development, is left completely unassessed. While the captain’s career courses now require taking the GRE (Graduate Records Examination), and this is a step in the right direction, there has been no systematic way to track an individual officer’s commitment to self-development. Though it is arguably common knowledge that officers will need a graduate degree as they progress to field-grade rank, until this GRE requirement was instituted, there was no way to track progress toward that unspoken requirement. I only had one of nine lieutenants pursuing a master’s degree while in a leadership position—which I only knew about because I asked. As of now, the Army lacks any real way to codify a leader’s self-development, and typically, that which is not evaluated is ignored.

More to the point, I have come to see a disturbing lack of basic knowledge regarding the current state of global affairs and operations. When I took command in Afghanistan, I administered a knowledge-based assessment (this is the actual assessment I used) to determine what the areas of focus for officer professional development should be. Questions like “Who is the current leader of the Taliban?” were left unanswered—while we were in Afghanistan conducting combat operations. Other questions, like “Describe the Suwalki Gap and its effect on NATO operations” or “Is Ukraine a NATO ally?” were similarly left blank or, when a single-word “yes” or “no” response was given, were clearly guessed at.
When discussing the answers to these questions during a lengthy answer review, despite the Army constantly stressing the importance of self-development in the form of senior-leader reading lists, available tuition assistance, and other self-development pathways, it was evident that few maintain rigorous attention to this domain. When I hear lieutenants talk about self-development, they most frequently mention preparation for Ranger School or Special Forces selection—physical self-development. Rarely do I hear of self-development emphasized in an intellectual sense; I have yet to hear any junior officers, during counseling on self-development, tell me that they completed a course through the Army’s distance-learning programs on calling for fire, information operations, irregular warfare, or the many other options available.

And this is where it becomes a problem: the lack of institutional focus on self-development degrades junior officers’ ability to understand, internalize, and disseminate tactical guidance and the commander’s intent within strategic and operational goals. But this can be changed. In fact, the knowledge-based assessment I administered awoke a significant hunger for learning in most lieutenants that I found quite impressive.
The Army, as a whole, lacks an objective way to assess officers’ commitment to the self-development domain—currently, there is only a subjective assessment from a senior rater (in the case of a lieutenant, the battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel) of the individual’s potential for further service. I believe that the Army needs to codify a self-development assessment and reporting system that objectively captures individuals’ ability for self-study and commitment to self-improvement.

While I am thoroughly against another web-based reporting system on top of evaluation reports (the Army’s abortive Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback comes to mind as an onerous and ineffective system), there should be some way to capture this. The Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 shows some promise; with officer evaluation support forms and a resume-building tool, it could potentially enable a senior rater to stratify his or her subordinates in this learning domain. As the self-development pathway for each branch varies greatly, I believe this program of reporting, and its requirements, should be built by the chief of each branch, in a structured self-development approach similar to the program currently used by I noncommissioned officer corps.

Progression through the junior-officer ranks, second lieutenant through captain, should have some structured self-development program that ensures officers are dedicated to improvement. In its simplest form, each branch chief could identify distance-learning courses required to be considered for promotion to the next grade, which senior raters could certify as complete on evaluation reports. In addition, though labor-intensive and potentially cost-prohibitive, the branch chiefs could establish a reading and writing program to help identify superior potential in junior officers, with submission and feedback provided through writing centers. Currently, this is captured to some degree in writing assignments in institutional learning environments like basic officer leader courses and captain’s career courses, but it is not a continuously evaluated metric. As the Army develops and incorporates the new Army Talent Alignment Process, there is an opportunity to completely transform the self-development domain—and introduce new evaluation tools—to ensure the best candidate is assigned to the right job.
In the absence of any self-development domain assessment, at the company level I developed a program guide that, while far from perfect, I believe provided sufficient data points for both me the lieutenants’ senior rater to better evaluate their performance and potential. The program works on a quarterly scoring system that tracks their efforts in reading books, giving briefings to subordinates and superiors on geopolitical topics, and distance learning. Additionally, for platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, it assessed their ability to influence and direct their subordinates to participate in self-development as well and worked as a forcing function to get them deeply invested in their soldiers’ personal development.

In the program, platoon leaders are required to read one book per quarter and their comprehension was assessed during their quarterly counseling discussions. It provided an opportunity for the lieutenants to demonstrate their understanding of each book’s major themes and provided me, as their rater, with an additional opportunity to assess their communication skills. Lieutenants were required to conduct two briefings to their platoons and one briefing to me on a geopolitical topic. Again, this assessed their briefing and communication skills and provided an opportunity to assess their research skills. And finally, the lieutenants were assessed on the total amount of distance-learning hours they completed each quarter. The program had built-in solutions for field and temporary-duty time conflicts and also counted any graduate-level coursework completed. A copy of the annex included in my initial counseling with all platoon leaders and platoon sergeants is here.

While some platoon leaders were more invested in the program than others, I would still qualify it as successful as it highlighted to me the degree to which platoon leaders took ownership of their own self-development. By no means a one-size-fits all program, I highly recommend that company commanders review the program and see if it can work within their formations. Ultimately, the Army as an institution needs to enable the self-development of junior officers and ensure they are fully prepared to assume positions of greater responsibility and influence. Adding a program guide to assist in identifying top performers can only benefit the Army as it prepares for the complex operating environments of modern war.

Capt. Jon Tishman is currently assigned as a team leader in 2nd Battalion, 4th SFAB at Fort Carson. He commissioned in 2008 from the Virginia Military Institute and served in Iraq and Afghanistan with the 10th Mountain Division and 75th Ranger Regiment. Following a four-year break in service working in military equipment sales in Australia and medical robotics in New York, Jon re-joined active duty and deployed as the commander of Bravo Company, 2-23 Infantry Regiment.

posted for fair use
 
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jward

passin' thru
hmm. Not tellin' how many i got wrong or right till i see teacher's gradin' scale, score n notes ::: eek face :::
hopefully not too far afield of the usual content...



* Self-Development in the Army: We’re Doing it Wrong - Modern War Institute
Administered upon taking Command of B Co, 2-23 IN Regiment in OCT 2018
Platoon Leader Knowledge Assessment

1. Draw an inter-visibility line.
2. What is the maximum range of a MK19 and M2?
3. Who is the current leader of IS-K?
4. What event established the Caliphate of ISIS by al-Baghdadi?
5. ISIS is an evolution of what organization and who was its founder?
6. What battle in the Ukraine demonstrated the effectiveness of Russian ADA systems?
7. Russian ADA systems work in concert together as IADS, what does IADS stand for?
8. Define the AUMF that we currently operate under.
9. Who was the President of Afghanistan prior to Afshar Ghani?
10. What is the operational range of a M1126?

11. Who is the current operational commander for US Afghanistan Operations?
12. Describe the Suwalki Gap and its impact on NATO operations.
13. What significant asset is task organized to a Russian BTG that poses a significant threat to US
Infantry Battalions?
14. Who are the commanders of the 201st ANA and 202nd ANP (our partnered units)?
15. Why does the Javelin missile have two warheads?
16. Describe target acquisition and employment of a TOW missile?
17. A rater evaluates what of the rated individual?
18. A senior rater evaluates what of the rated individual?
19. What is the NDS in Afghanistan?
20. What was the code name given to the first CIA teams to enter Afghanistan following 9/11?

21. Draw the military symbol for A/2-3 AR, reinforced (Enemy).
22. Describe the hunter/killer relationship of Russian targeting tactics with UAVs.
23. Riot Control Agents cannot be used as a “method of warfare” IAW Chemical Weapons Convention,
what does “method of warfare” mean? Write an example of a method of warfare and a non-method
of warfare example of RCA use.
24. What is D3A and what does it stand for?
25. Who implements a Military Protection Order and what is its function?
26. What is the Lautenberg amendment?
27. What is “auto-slew” on Russian Active Protection Systems and how does it function?
28. Define the authorities granted by Title 10, 22, 32, and 50 of US Code.
29. Who was the first and only American targeted by the US Government directly via a drone strike in
Yemen?
30. Is Turkey a NATO ally?

31. Why does Turkey take issue with the US partnership with the YPG (Kurds)?
32. Is Georgia a NATO ally?
33. Is Ukraine a NATO ally?
34. What weapon system did the US sell to Ukraine to combat armor incursions?
35. Who is the commander of the Iranian IRGC Qods Force?
36. Who is the current commander of the Taliban?
37. What advantage do Russian made 82mm and 122mm mortar systems have with regards to US
ammo?
38. What is the doctrinal difference that split ISIS/AQ leadership?
39. Who is assessed as being groomed to lead AQ after Zawahiri?
40. Draw and label every tactical task intent graphic you know (example: Attack by Fire)

41. What was the major physical obstacle did USF put into place in Sadr City during the surge to limit the
population’s ability to support the insurgency?
42. What does SACLOS stand for in missile guidance? Give an example of a US and Russian SACLOS
missile.
43. Do Russian armor assets utilize an auto loader or a human loader? Describe the Russian magazine in
armor assets and how US forces exploit it with sabot rounds?
44. Draw restrictive and severely restrictive terrain:
45. Who is currently fighting who in Syria (name major factions and their backers)?
46. In military deception operations, who is always the target?
47. In information environment, what are the 3 domains? How does the information flow through
them? Give an example based on a Kinetic Strike against a legitimate enemy target firing at US
forces in a school.
48. Define a Maximum Engagement Line (MEL).
49. Where is China’s only overseas military base?
50. What is China’s 9-dash line?

51. How does China’s implementation of land-based anti-ship missiles in the South China Sea affect US
Naval operations in the region?
52. Why is Ranger School important?
53. What is Distance W when drawing SDZs?
54. What is the doctrinal base document for al Qaeda’s plan to establish a Caliphate?
55. What are the 4 steps of IPB?
56. What are the 8 TLPs?
57. Define what a GTAO is.
58. Who is the US Ambassador to Afghanistan?
59. What provinces does TAA E have authority over in Afghanistan?
60. What is SIGAR and how often is it reported to Congress?

61. Define prescriptive and proscriptive in terms of operational constraints.
62. What weaknesses does an SBCT have for IDF support compared to an ABCT?
63. Who leads the information operations working group (IOWG)?
64. What is the difference between a Deception In Support of Operations and MILDEC?
65. How many levels up must a MILDEC OP be coordinated?
66. What is the first priority of work?
67. What is the NSS and the NDS (hint: Strategic-level documents)?
68. Al Qaeda is subordinate (UBL pledged bayat to) to what organization?
69. What is John Doe v. Mattis?
70. US forces and US backed forces are currently operating in what area of Syria?

assessment devised, referenced, and offered, by author in article below
posted for fair use

 

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Zagdid

Veteran Member
Seems, by the test, that a Platoon leader does not need to know anything about war fighting logistics.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Dot.....

Posted for fair use.....

Trump lifts restrictions on US landmine use

  • 1 hour ago

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Thousands are still killed by landmines every year
US President Donald Trump has lifted restrictions on the deployment of anti-personnel landmines by American forces.
The decision reverses a 2014 Obama administration ban on the use of such weapons, which applied everywhere in the world except for in the defence of South Korea.
The Trump administration said Mr Obama's policy could put US troops "at a severe disadvantage".
Thousands of people are injured and killed by landmines every year.
US forces will now be free to use the weapons across the world "in exceptional circumstances", the White House said.
The US is not a signatory to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which restricts the development or use of anti-personnel land mines.
What has changed?
The Obama-era ban applied to the US military everywhere but on the Korean Peninsula. That exception was made under pressure from military planners, to protect US troops based across the de-militarized zone from the North Korean military.
Mr Obama also ordered the destruction of landmine stockpiles not made to defend South Korea. But the Trump administration has now scrapped that policy, stating that the president was "rebuilding" the US military.





Media captionLandmines: Why do they kill thousands every year?
"The Department of Defense has determined that restrictions imposed on American forces by the Obama administration's policy could place them at a severe disadvantage during a conflict against our adversaries," a White House statement said, adding: "The president is unwilling to accept this risk to our troops."
Mr Trump has given the all-clear for the use of "non-persistent" landmines that can be switched off remotely rather than remaining buried beneath the ground.
Why is Trump doing this?
US Defence Secretary Mark Esper said landmines were vital to its military.
"Landmines are an important tool that our forces need to have available to them in order to ensure mission success and in order to reduce risk to forces," he told a press conference.
"That said, in everything we do we also want to make sure that these instruments, in this case landmines, also take into account both the safety of employment and the safety to civilians and others after a conflict."





Media captionPrince Harry: "Landmines are an unhealed scar of war"
Rachel Stohl, an arms control expert at the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, called the decision "inexplicable".
"I have no idea if it's posturing or a reality that the US is claiming back the right to use landmines," she told the BBC. "It's inexplicable given all we know about these deadly weapons and the amount of money the United States has spent demining around the world," she added.
Ms Stohl said the decision put lives at risk and was another example of the Trump administration "defining its own rules and ignoring global standards of behaviour".
A risk to civilians despite technical wizardry?

While the Obama administration refused to join the global ban on anti-personnel landmines, it broadly sympathised with the aims of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
Senior military commanders believed the effect of these weapons - denying an area to enemy advance - could be replicated by other weapons less dangerous to civilians once a conflict was over.
Now landmines will be more widely available to US commanders, the argument being that their absence leaves them at a disadvantage in relation to likely adversaries - perhaps a reference to the fact that neither Russia or China have banned or placed any restrictions on such weapons.
The use of antipersonnel landmines by US forces will only be in exceptional circumstances, says the Pentagon, and only "non-persistent types" - ie. versions that disarm themselves after a period, will be used. But campaigners will see this as striking at the international norm outlawing these weapons, and will argue that for all the technical wizardry many mines may still fail, remaining live and risking injury to innocent civilians.
How destructive are landmines?
The use of anti-personnel landmines has been banned by 164 countries, and yet they're still being used in conflicts around the world. There are an estimated 110 million anti-personnel mines still in the ground with more being laid every year.





Media captionIraqi children are learning to stay safe around landmines
In 2017, more than 7,000 casualties were caused by mines and other explosive remnants of war, including nearly 2,800 deaths, according to the Landmine Monitor.
More than 120,000 people were killed or injured by landmines between 1999-2017, according to the same group. Nearly half the victims are children, with 84% being boys. Civilians make up 87% of casualties.
The true number is almost certainly higher due to cases going unreported.
 

jward

passin' thru
Seems, by the test, that a Platoon leader does not need to know anything about war fighting logistics.

That comes under the experiential heading or segment & is learned & addressed elsewhere. But yeah, had I more sleep, or less illness/meds, I doubt this fella's training model would have struck me as interesting :D
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Iran can obtain nuclear weapons far quicker than widely recognized

0eebda38-3146-4b30-8c45-f097dfdd30ff_16x9_788x442.jpg





By Andrea Stricker
Thursday, 30 January 2020

After infiltrating a Tehran warehouse two years ago, agents from Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, seized a massive collection of old plans, blueprints, electronic files and documents related to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Material from this hidden archive demonstrated how the Islamic Republic had achieved far more in the area of nuclear weapons development, particularly the process of weaponization, than previously thought.

The extent of its progress has worrying implications as the regime scales back its commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As Iran reduces the amount of time required for it to build nuclear weapons, US and allied governments should urgently push the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to fully characterize and account for Iran’s nuclear weapons activities.

The cache of top secret documents from Iran’s clandestine archive show the Islamic Republic had a structured, full pace effort called the Amad Plan, which sought by mid-2003 to make five nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. As international inspectors encroached in 2003, the regime decided to disperse the most damning of its illicit activities and experiments to non-civilian sites.

Materials from the archive add significantly to a previous body of evidence gathered by the IAEA and governments about covert weaponization-related experiments and processes in Iran.

The Israeli government released archival materials to private research institutes, whose assessments provide a public accounting of Iran’s weaponization prowess, and therefore, its abbreviated timeline to a nuclear weapon. Iran previously denied that it ever had a nuclear weaponization program, but the archive’s materials show these claims to be a clear exercise in disinformation.

Iran in fact had a weaponization program, which it called the Amad Plan’s “Project 110.” This included high explosives manufacture and testing; nuclear weapons design; production of a shock wave generator to initiate nuclear explosions; work on a neutron source for the warhead core; and creation of other necessary nuclear weapons components. The archive also provided locations of previously unknown sites.

Nuclear weaponization is an obscure and complicated procedure. It draws on physics, chemistry, metallurgy, engineering and other applications to assemble weapons-grade fissile material inside a warhead and create its explosive capability. To calculate how long it would take Tehran to produce a functional nuclear weapon, it is essential to evaluate the success of its weaponization efforts.

The length of time required for a country to produce just the fissile material for an atomic weapon – in this case, highly enriched uranium – has become known as its “breakout time.” However, a holistic assessment of breakout time ought to include the critical step of weaponizing this fissile material. This kind of comprehensive estimate helps governments to develop better responses and countering actions.

Prior to the nuclear deal, governments and independent experts generously estimated that Iran would need up to a year or more to make a warhead after it produced the requisite weapon-grade material.

Now, the nuclear archive’s contents make clear that Iran’s weaponization timeline may be much shorter – as little as a few months. Moreover, Iran’s recent actions have compressed the timeline for it to produce enough fissile material, from seven to 12 months to just four or five months. The weaponization clock, contrary to previous beliefs, does not add on much more.

The IAEA has never got to the bottom of Iran’s past nuclear weapons work, and the JCPOA required only a perfunctory IAEA investigation before the deal’s parties would allow it to go into effect.

Predictably, Iran stonewalled and provided incomplete or false answers to the IAEA’s queries. Even though the contents of the nuclear archive have shown that prior investigations were deficient, the IAEA has been hesitant to push for complete answers out of concern that this would further weaken the deal.

As Iran works to reduce its breakout time, governments should urge the IAEA to hasten and deepen its probe into the nuclear archive. This will entail investigating the full range of Iran’s past nuclear weapons work, including, for example, visiting the people, sites and equipment named in the archive or elsewhere. The IAEA will also need to review paper and electronic documentation in-country that may corroborate the archive and other materials. It will also be necessary to visit and inspect research institutions and restricted-access sites, as well as follow any new information where it leads.

Iran, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is subject to comprehensive safeguards. This gives the IAEA a mandate and a duty to establish the absence of work on nuclear weapons within Iran’s territory.

With the JCPOA’s future unclear and a replacement nuclear deal seemingly far off, it is more crucial than ever to account for what the regime achieved in the area of weaponization and under the Amad Plan more broadly. The risks are too great to ignore.

____________________________________________

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where she conducts research on nonproliferation, Iran, North Korea, and other security policy topics. She is an expert on nuclear weapons proliferation and illicit procurement networks. She tweets @StrickerNonpro.


Last Update: Thursday, 30 January 2020 KSA 18:17 - GMT 15:17
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

U.S. General: Iran Plotting Retaliatory Attacks on Americans in Africa
Iran is planning to mobilize loyal forces to attack U.S. interests as revenge for the Jan. 3 killing of Qassem Soleimani, officials say.
By Paul D. Shinkman, Senior Writer, National Security Jan. 30, 2020

U.S. News & World Report

More
FILE - This Thursday, Jan. 16, 2020 file photo, posters of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and deputy commander of Iran-backed militias Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, both killed in a U.S. strike earlier this month, hang on the walls at the site where they were killed in Baghdad, Iraq. The Islamic State group seemed largely defeated last year, with the loss of its territory, the killing of its founder in a U.S. raid and an unprecedented crackdown on its social media propaganda machine but tensions between the U.S. and Iran in the region provide a comeback opportunity for the extremist group. (AP Photo/Hadi Mizban, File)

This Thursday, Jan. 16, 2020 file photo, posters of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and deputy commander of Iran-backed militias Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, both killed in a U.S. drone strike on Jan. 3, hang on the walls at the site where they were killed in Baghdad, Iraq.(Hadi Mizban/AP-file)
Iran is planning attacks against Americans in Africa in retaliation for the Jan. 3 drone strike President Donald Trump ordered to kill the influential Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the top officer for U.S. operations there said Thursday.
"There's intelligence reporting that comports with that," Army Gen. Stephen Townsend, head of U.S. Africa Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday morning.
Political Cartoons on Iran
85



Townsend, who formerly oversaw the war against the Islamic State group, told the committee that Iran appears to be mobilizing its elite Quds Force – the overseas wing of its zealous Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – and Hezbollah, Lebanon's potent militant political movement that Soleimani helped establish and which still receives significant support from Tehran, to attack Americans.

The threat Iran poses has not become specific enough for Africa Command, also known as AFRICOM, to change any of its current activities, Townsend said, but he added, "we are watching and listening for that."
The news comes at a time of heightened concern for U.S. forces deployed to the Middle East and to Africa, following Iran's retalitatory Jan. 7 ballistic missile strike against U.S. bases in Iraq. The Defense Department had already bolstered its protective forces in the region – including increased Navy ship deployments and 15,000 new troops last year – as a result of the Trump administration's "maximum pressure campaign" designed to squeeze Tehran economically and diplomatically, and following Soleimani's killing, through military action.
[
SEE:
The Week in Cartoons for Jan. 27-31 ]
Townsend's assessment also follows the surprise and troubling attack earlier this month by local insurgents against a little-known U.S. air base in Manda Bay, Kenya, near the Somali border. The militants overran the base and killed three Americans, prompting Townsend's command to deploy 120 infantrymen from the 101st Airborne Division to restore security there. The base is currently under review for further security improvements.

The AFRICOM commander, who testified alongside U.S. Southern Command chief Navy Adm. Craig Faller, must address the new security concerns while also facing the prospect of sharp reductions from the roughly 5,000 U.S. forces – largely special operations troops – and 1,000 civilians and contractors currently operating in his area of responsibility as the Trump administration considers redeploying its limited resources to counter what it considers more grave threats posed by China and Russia.
"We're not going to totally withdraw forces from Africa," Defense Secretary Mark Esper told reporters in a briefing on Thursday. Such a statement would usually be obvious, though concerns remain that a president who suddenly ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria and Iraq may make a similar decision for operations on a continent that notoriously receives less attention in Washington than those in the Middle East or against global powers. U.S. military leaders have found ways to maintain smaller footprints of forces in those countries despite the president's initial orders.
[
READ:
Pentagon Increases TBI Victims in Iraq to 50 ]
The increased threats against U.S. forces in places like Somalia and Niger – the site of an ambush by an affiliate of the Islamic State group that killed four American troops in 2017 – combined with the fact that their missions are broadly based on counterterror operations and bolstering local militaries would likely come under particular scrutiny for Trump, who has prioritized domestic American interests over expensive and, at times, deadly foreign adventures.

In an appeal on Thursday, Townsend stressed the economic stability that accompanies a U.S. presence as well as the complex security problems that face the U.S. in Africa, particularly the recent Russian and Chinese interest in the continent and the need to prevent existing allies from turning to other partners.
He found some support from the dais. Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the committee's top Democrat, said that countries in Africa like in South America are "beset by a vicious cycle of challenges that our competitors are seeking to leverage to their benefit. Countries with weak democratic institutions and rampant corruption are being overtly wooed by Chinese and Russian investments and covertly manipulated through information operations and a flood of disinformation."
Katherine Zimmerman, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, says Townsend's command "does a lot on the continent with little," but that it will likely have to accept more responsibility with fewer resources.
[
READ:
Biden: Trump ‘Flat-Out Lied’ About Soleimani Dangers ]
"The shift of U.S. resources from Africa to support great power competition misses, as Gen. Townsend notes, that the continued U.S. engagements in Africa are great-power competition. The U.S. is losing the competition in Africa against China, Russia, al-Qaida, and the Islamic State [group]. It's not losing militarily, but in the soft-power space," Zimmerman said in an email.
China has more embassies than the U.S. on the continent and seeks to exert influence by allowing African governments to come into its debt. Russia has increased its presence in the southern Mediterranean and coastlines, Zimmerman said.

"U.S. diplomacy and development dollars would go far in securing American interests in Africa. Yet it cannot win in the soft power competition without the hard power presence because of the very real security concerns," she said.
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Scramjet-Powered Cruise Missile Emerges As New U.S. Priority
Steve Trimble Guy Norris January 30, 2020
missile
The Pentagon’s race to field a hypersonic weapon so far has favored boost-glide weapons, but priorities are shifting as appreciation grows for the relative maturity and flexibility of high-speed cruise missiles.
Credit: Raytheon

Fielding an operational scramjet-powered cruise missile has emerged as a new priority for the U.S. Defense Department’s proliferating portfolio of maneuvering hypersonic weapons.
Senior defense officials are putting together a program to develop an operational follow-on to DARPA’s Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), which currently supports competing scramjet-powered missile demonstrators designed by Lockheed Martin/Aerojet Rocketdyne and Raytheon/Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems teams.
  • Pentagon officials seek hypersonic air-breathing weapon follow-on
  • Awareness of boost-glide challenges sinks in
“We are in the process of trying to figure out what [an operational program] would look like,” says Mike White, assistant director for hypersonics in the office of the under secretary of defense for research and engineering.
As the U.S. military rushed after 2017 to respond to Russian and Chinese hypersonic advances, air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles fell to the bottom of the priority list. Funding for operational programs favored boost-glide technology over the seemingly less mature field of weapons powered by scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets).
But that assumption is being challenged. Along with the flight-test experience accumulated a decade ago by the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) X-51 scramjet vehicle, recent ground tests and simulations indicate scramjet technology is more advanced than previously understood. In September, the AFRL announced it had achieved thrust levels over 13,000 lb. with a Northrop-designed engine at speeds “above Mach 4” in a hypersonic wind tunnel. In June, Raytheon reported the maturity of its scramjet-powered HAWC demonstrator had exceeded that of its boost-glide design.
In December 2018, Michael Griffin, under secretary of defense for research and engineering, described hypersonic cruise missiles as “further out” than boost-glide weapons. But the technology advanced so quickly that another official, Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper, concluded seven months later the HAWC program would be “a nearer-term not a far-term capability.”
“We’d like to see HAWC transition to a fully operational system,” says Mark Lewis, the Defense Department’s director of research and engineering for modernization. “It’s probably the issue that our hypersonic team is spending most time on right now.”
Awareness is also growing for the technical challenges still facing medium-range boost-glide missiles in the class of DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) missile demonstrators. The Air Force’s 2017 decision to launch the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), an operational follow-on to the TBG, helped legitimize the Defense Department’s revived interest in hypersonic weapons, White says.
“I think people underestimate the importance of this decision of the Air Force [to launch ARRW] in the hypersonic community,” he says. “We’ve always been kind of stuck in the [research and development] realm. The Air Force in 2017, they were the first service that said: ‘Hey, we want hypersonic weapons.’”
But the TBG-derived ARRW represents a particularly difficult technical challenge. The design uses a higher lift-over-drag ratio wing shape, which has never been successfully tested by the U.S. government. By contrast, the axisymmetric shape of the lower lift-over-drag glider developed for the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB)—the front-end designed for the Air Force Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) and the Navy’s Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS)—has logged several successful flight tests since the late 1970s. The winged TBG’s greater maneuverability, albeit with shorter range, makes it far more challenging to design.
“It’s DARPA-hard, and TBG is hard,” Lewis says.
Ongoing studies by the Air Force’s Warfighting Integration Capability are also starting to highlight the operational benefits of cruise missiles compared to medium-range boost-glide systems. A cruise missile still requires a booster rocket to accelerate to hypersonic speed, but it does not need to carry as much oxidizer and fuel as a boost-glide rocket because it remains within the atmosphere. Air-breathing cruise missiles’ smaller size means a single aircraft, such as a Boeing B-52, can carry them in much greater numbers.
“For a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle you can get two, maybe four, on a B-52,” White says. “But you can get 15 or maybe 20 hypersonic cruise missiles [on a B-52] because the size is much smaller.So you can carry them internally in the rotary rack. There are significant advantages for the air breathers, but they offer different technical challenges.”
The smaller size and increased packaging advantages of air breathers would give the Air Force significant tactical advantage, Lewis adds. “The No. 1 question we should be asking is: ‘How do we deliver lots of these things?’ In my mind, one way to do that is to fit a lot of them in a weapons bay. Getting 15-20 per bomb bay is a lot, but if I’m [launching them from] a single mobile launcher, I’m not sure I can deliver the numbers I need. We are not interested in capability when we build two and declare it a success—that doesn’t do anything.”
The Pentagon’s hypersonic weapons portfolio emerged in a blur of bureaucratic activity between 2017 and 2018. The first step was the Air Force’s decision to launch the medium-range ARRW program in 2017 as the follow-on to TBG. Shortly afterward, the Air Force also decided to launch the longer-range HCSW. In November 2017, the Navy conducted a successful test of the proposed C-HGB, which prompted the Navy and the Army to support funding toward the operational prototypes of the IRCPS and LRHW—for submarine and ground launch, respectively.
As it stands now, the portfolio includes air-launched medium-range and long-range boost-glide systems, an intermediate-range submarine-launched missile and a long-range weapon launched from a tractor trailer. If an operational follow-on of the HAWC is approved, with Air Force and Navy concepts under consideration, new air- and surface-launched options for medium-range targets could become available.
In addition to the offensive programs, the Defense Department’s road map also includes development of a counter-hypersonic system—starting with the Missile Defense Agency’s Regional Glide-Phase Weapon System as well as multiple programs for booster development and continued funding of basic science and technology. Additional DARPA programs include the ground-launched Operational Fires, which seeks to integrate a TBG front-end on a two-stage booster stack that includes a throttled upper stage, and the Advanced Full-Range Engine, a dual-mode ramjet that could power a future hypersonic aircraft.
Such a diverse yet overlapping road map has prompted criticism. In July, the chairman of the House appropriations subcommittee on defense, Rep. Peter Visclosky (D-Ind.), warned defense officials that they “need to better define the strategy for the investment in these systems.” Visclosky’s committee proposed cutting some funding for the Army’s hypersonic program, but a joint conference committee of Congressional appropriators ultimately restored the funding and added more for other hypersonic programs.
Lewis believes the development of a multitude of hypersonic missile programs is justified.
“Too many people think hypersonics is just one thing,” Lewis says. “They think, for example, [it’s just for the long-range, conventional prompt strike mission]. But no, it’s a range of capabilities.
“Even at the tactical level it’s, for lack of a better phrase, a high-low mix,” Lewis adds. “We should probably have a mix of air breathers and boost-glide systems. They probably have different capabilities, different ranges and so on. We have F-16s and F-15s, and they have different roles, and that should be the same with tactical hypersonic systems as well.”
Trimble_Steve_sized_0.jpg

Steve Trimble
Steve covers military aviation, missiles and space for the Aviation Week Network, based in Washington DC. Born in a U.S. Air Force family, he grew up on military bases around the world and came to Washington DC in 1997 to work for Army Times Publishing Co. as a journalist. Steve helped launch the Military.com portal in 2000, then joined the editorial team for Aviation Week’s web site in 2001. He reported on the Pentagon for Aerospace Daily in 2002 and 2003.
norrisguysized.jpg

Guy Norris
Guy is a Senior Editor for Aviation Week, based in Los Angeles. Before joining Aviation Week in 2007, Guy was with Flight International, first as technical editor based in the U.K. and most recently as U.S. West Coast editor. Before joining Flight, he was London correspondent for Interavia, part of Jane's Information Group.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
ETA: Well considering that the Venezuelans "loaned" the Iranians an F-16B a few years ago (never mind access by them and other foreign nations to aircraft within Venezuela), the flight controls and aircraft structure can be "considered in the wind". The munitions and their interface with the aircraft are another thing however.....HC

Posted for fair use.....
Report
Iraqi F-16s Could Be in Jeopardy Amid Iran Tensions
Sensitive U.S. technology feared vulnerable to Iranian-backed militias after contractors evacuate Balad air base.
By Ellen Ioanes, Lara Seligman | January 30, 2020, 4:07 PM
Three Iraqi Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons

Three Iraqi Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons fly in formation during a training sortie above an undisclosed location on July 18, 2019. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Chris Drzazgowski


It was supposed to be a gesture of goodwill and a good-faith effort to give Iraq the military it needed to defend itself against regional adversaries like Iran and the Islamic State. But some U.S. and Iraqi officials say they are increasingly concerned that Iraq’s F-16 fighter jet program—supplied by the United States and, until recently, secured and maintained by foreign contractors—is vulnerable to seizure by Iranian-backed militias.
Sallyport Global, part of the Caliburn contractor conglomerate based in Reston, Virginia, provided security for the roughly 34-aircraft F-16 squadron at Balad Air Base alongside contractors from Lockheed Martin, who provided maintenance, and Iraqi personnel. But in early January, Sallyport and Lockheed Martin contractors withdrew from the base after facing indirect rocket fire from Iran-backed militias, leaving sensitive U.S. technology potentially vulnerable, U.S. and Iraqi officials tell Foreign Policy.
“Due to concerns about the safety and security of their personnel supporting Iraqi F-16 operations at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Lockheed-Martin initiated an evacuation of their personnel on 4 January, 2020,” U.S. Defense Department spokesperson Maj. Rob Lodewick confirmed to Foreign Policy, noting that the Iraqi Air Force was notified before the evacuation, which was completed on Jan. 8.
Lodewick stressed that the United States is “always concerned about the security of technologies provided to any partner nation through foreign military sales and takes appropriate measures to safeguard against unwarranted divulgence.”
Security relations between the United States and Iraq, a critical U.S. partner in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist group and efforts to counter Iranian influence in the region, have been tested in recent weeks since U.S. President Donald Trump approved a Jan. 3 drone strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi soil. Suleimani’s death sparked outrage across Iraq, prompting the Iraqi parliament to vote on a nonbinding resolution to expel U.S. troops from the country.
Tensions only increased after Iran launched a retaliatory missile strike against U.S. and coalition targets in Iraq on Jan. 7, sending U.S. forces and their Iraqi counterparts scrambling and leaving more than 50 U.S. troops with various degrees of traumatic brain injuries. Tehran has since signaled an end to direct military action, but Iraqi militia groups linked to Iran such as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) continue to conduct lower-level attacks on outposts across the country. U.S. and Iraqi forces are on high alert; the State Department has urged all nonmilitary U.S. personnel to leave the country.
Since the contractors left Balad, some officials are concerned that the weapons, technology, and components associated with the F-16s could be vulnerable. Some say it’s only a matter of time before PMF militias—Asaib Ahl al-Haq is active in the area around Balad, according to Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy—can access Balad Air Base, and quite possibly the weapons the contractors were there to protect.
One U.S. official familiar with the F-16 program told Foreign Policy the “biggest concern” is securing the F-16’s sensitive technology. “We just have absolutely no way to verify what they are looking at, what they’re carrying away,” the official said.
“Right now, at Balad, there’s nothing. There’s no U.S. personnel at all providing security,” the official told Foreign Policy. “As far as the technology, once that’s compromised, that’s compromised and there’s nothing we can do,”
“Nobody’s going to stop them,” one former Iraqi Air Force F-16 pilot told Foreign Policy.
Other American officials are more confident about the security of the systems. One U.S. military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue, said the planes and related equipment are being “well guarded” by Iraqi soldiers.
Read More

A picture taken during a press tour organized by the U.S.-led coalition shows U.S. soldiers clearing rubble at Ain al-Assad military airbase in Anbar province, Iraq, on Jan. 3.
The Iraqi Military Won’t Survive a Tug of War Between the United States and Iran
Sectarian tensions have already hobbled the force. The competition between Washington and Tehran could break it.
“We have received assurances from the Iraqi Government that they have taken steps to increase the security of U.S. divested equipment at Balad AB,” said Lodewic, the spokesperson.
For the PMF to seize the base “would require a substantial mobilization and force,” said Michael Mulroy, who served as the Pentagon’s Middle East policy chief until December 2019 and is now a national security and defense analyst with ABC News. “I wouldn’t imagine that they are very concerned about an actual assault or takeover.”
However, the former Iraqi F-16 pilot expressed concern about the reliability of the Iraqi soldiers on base, who the former pilot said aren’t being fed adequately—getting meals of only soup and rice—and don’t get adequate crew rest. Further, Iraqi soldiers on the base operate on a rotating schedule, with one week on base and one week off so they can seek employment elsewhere, causing potential operations gaps.
Even when Sallyport was providing security on-base, there were serious security infringements, a 2017 Associated Press investigation found. In addition to allegedly smuggling alcohol on base and participating in human trafficking, Sallyport security allowed nearby militias to come onto Balad and take three massive generators.
A statement from Sallyport said at the time that the contractor followed all protocols.
But officials are more worried about Iraq’s long-term ability to sustain the fleet without contractor support.
“The longer Lockheed is out, the more difficult to sustain the fleet,” said the U.S. military official. “The Iraqis can’t do it without the contract help coming back in within a few months.”
John Losinger, a Lockheed spokesman, confirmed that its personnel had departed the base “following the U.S. State Department’s alert for all American citizens to depart Iraq due to escalating tension in the region.”
For now, according to the U.S. official familiar with the program, the jets aren’t being flown regularly, which on one hand reduces the need for replacement parts but on the other hand degrades the systems.
“A lot of things on the jets degrade even faster when they’re not being used, so it’s kind of a Catch-22,” the official said.
PMF units have previously gotten hold of American-made Iraqi M1 Abrams tanks, with several different factions using them as part of the fight against the Islamic State, and the U.S. government urging Iraq to get them back per their initial sale agreement. The militias have been subsumed into the Iraqi military but still maintain their independence and are often backed by Iran.
Iraq initially purchased the F-16s in 2011 and 2012, during the Obama administration’s pullout from the country and just before a period of instability that led to the rise of the Islamic State. As Jane’s reports, the initial aircraft were delivered in 2014, with the second batch delivered last May. But the twin blows of dropping oil prices and the rise of the Islamic State left Iraq unable to pay for the squadron and other weapons entirely with national funds. So in 2016, the United States extended Iraq a $2.7 billion credit facility—essentially a soft loan for weapons and maintenance for systems including the Abrams tank and the F-16.
“We’ve always tried to put the spotlight on Iraqis. And even when we’re doing all the heavy lifting ourselves, we’ve always worked very hard to stress the Iraqi role in everything,” Knights told Foreign Policy. The F-16 sale, he said, pointed to the United States’ desire to “show how effectively we were rebuilding the Iraqi military.”
But since then, U.S. officials have grown concerned that the Iraqis are not making use of the sophisticated technology. Mulroy said during his time at the Pentagon there were discussions about potentially selling the F-16s secondhand to another party.
“They can’t afford them, they can’t maintain them,” Mulroy said. “It’s an example of: Why aren’t we having them buy things that they can actually use and won’t cost them a fortune to maintain?”
Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich, a retired Navy SEAL commander and a senior fellow for technology and national security at the Middle East Institute, critiqued U.S. policy in Iraq in a recent report, saying that the United States’ attempts to build a “mirror image” military force in Iraq has been both extraordinarily expensive and largely unsustainable.
After 10 years of supplying the Iraqi Security Forces with billions of dollars’ worth of equipment and training, the report cautions, “an irregular army of lightly equipped ISIS terrorists defeated the internationally supported and equipped ISF, murdered Iraqi leaders, and brutalized Iraqi citizens with very little resistance,” with Islamic State forces taking advantage of Iraqi assets.
The desire of the Iraqi government to maintain the mirror-image military that the United States has tried so fervently to stand up is in doubt, too, according to one former senior U.S. official.
“In the past few years, Iranian-influenced members of the Iraqi parliament have sought to reduce funding for the main line Iraqi defense forces—the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Counterterrorism Service—and increase funding to the irregular Popular Mobilization Forces,” the former senior official said.
The former senior official told Foreign Policy that the Iraqi government seems to be building a parallel, but dominant, security force like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran, pointing to the government’s reduction in recruiting and funding for the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service—which the former official described as “Iraq’s most professional and successful military service”—as a particularly glaring example of this policy.
Foreign Policy contacted Caliburn International, Sallyport’s parent company, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense multiple times for comment but did not receive responses by publication time.

Ellen Ioanes is a graduate of Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism and Davidson College. She has written for the Guardian, HuffPost India, and the Center for Public Integrity, and she was most recently the military and defense fellow at Business Insider. Twitter: @girlstothefront

Lara Seligman is a staff writer at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @laraseligman

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Housecarl

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Jihadists in central Mali pledge allegiance to new Islamic State leader
By Caleb Weiss | January 31, 2020 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7


Screen-Shot-2020-01-31-at-12.07.16-PM-1024x549.png
The Arabic-speaking jihadist (left) introducing the group the “Soldiers of the Caliphate in Mali” before pledging allegiance to Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi.
A short video uploaded online appears to show a cadre of jihadists in Mali’s central Segou Region pledging allegiance to Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi, the newly appointed leader of the Islamic State.
The video features dozens of jihadists in the area of Nampala close to Mali’s borders with Mauritania. It is important to note that the video was not released through official Islamic State channels. Though this is not unusual for Islamic State-loyal jihadists in the Sahel.
Prior to and even after being officially recognized by the Islamic State’s leadership in Iraq and Syria, the so-called “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara” released most of its propaganda and attack claims unofficially.
In today’s short clip, an Arabic-speaking figure introduces the group as “Soldiers of the Caliphate in Mali,” before leading his men in the pledge of bayah [allegiance] to Qurayshi.
It is unknown if the unit previously existed in the area and is reaffirming its loyalty or if this faction represents a splinter within the ranks of al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).
Given the lack of Islamic State activity in that area, it is possible that these men were once part of JNIM until recently.
JNIM and its constituent units have long operated near Nampala and the wider Segou Region of Mali.
Just this week, JNIM took responsibility for a major assault on a Malian base near Sokolo in the Segou Region. That area, which includes Nampala and contains the longstanding jihadist refuge Wagadou Forest, has been a hotbed of militant activity for the last several years.
If this Islamic State-loyal group does indeed represent new defections from JNIM, this would help to confirm possible reports of increased tensions between the two camps in the region.
Additionally, JNIM recently released a pamphlet addressed to its fighters and detractors who accused it of not properly enforcing Sharia and implementing hudud [punishments under Sharia]. That release was likely in response to complaints made by Islamic State-sympathetic jihadists.
As the Islamic State continues to grow in the Sahel, it is possible that it will be able to attract more fighters from al Qaeda’s camp. This will not come without consequences, however, as future brawls between the jihadist heavyweights are likely to occur.
Scenes from the video:
Screen-Shot-2020-01-31-at-12.07.33-PM-1024x542.png
Screen-Shot-2020-01-31-at-12.07.47-PM-1024x539.png
Screen-Shot-2020-01-31-at-12.08.06-PM-1024x541.png
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Caleb Weiss is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
 
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