WAR 12-14-2019-to-12-20-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(396)11-23-2019-to-11-29-2019___*THE***WINDS****of****WAR
TimeBomb 2000

(397) 11-30-2019-to-12-06-2019___*THE***WINDS****of****WAR
TimeBomb 2000

(398) 12-07-2019-to-12-13-2019___*THE***WINDS****of****WAR

WAR - 12-07-2019-to-12-13-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(395) 11-16-2019-to-11-22-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?563807-11-16-2019-to-11-22-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (396)11-23-2019-to-11-29-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****...

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Boeing Declines to Bid for ICBM, Leaving Northrop the Sole Contestant

As bidding deadline passes, Air Force must decide whether to accept a sole-source situation.

www.defenseone.com

Boeing Declines to Bid for ICBM, Leaving Northrop the Sole Contestant

• 
  By Marcus Weisgerber Global Business Editor Read bio

December 13, 2019

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As bidding deadline passes, Air Force must decide whether to accept a sole-source situation.

Boeing declined to submit a bid to build new nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles for the U.S. Air Force, leaving Northrop Grumman as the only bidder in the anticipated $85 billion contest.
The move comes nearly five months after Boeing executives complained that the competition was tilted toward Northrop. The executives tried but ultimately failed to persuade the Air Force to change the bidding parameters for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, or GBSD, program.
Related: Northrop Announces Suppliers For New ICBM. Boeing is Not on the List
Related: Consider a National-Team Approach to the Next ICBM
Related: Who Needs ICBMs?
“Boeing is disappointed we were unable to submit a bid to the GBSD solicitation,” Elizabeth Silva, a company spokeswoman, said in a statement on Friday afternoon. “We have been proud and honored to contribute to the ICBM mission for more than 60 years. Boeing continues to support a change in acquisition strategy that would bring the best of industry to this national priority and demonstrate value for the American taxpayer.”
Air Force officials have repeatedly refused to discuss Boeing’s stance, saying they wanted to “preserve the integrity of the competitive process.” On Friday, an Air Force spokeswoman declined to comment, but said the service would issue a statement later this afternoon.
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In October, Ellen Lord, the defense undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, said the GBSD contract would be structured to keep costs under control.
“[W]hat we did on that competition is we put in language so that we have visibility, transparency in cost and pricing,” Lord said during an Oct. 18 briefing at the Pentagon. “So we will be able to determine the value, if you will, of what’s being delivered.”
In recent months, Air Force officials and industry executives seemed to question Boeing’s claims it would not bid, viewing it as a bluff. Boeing and its surrogates have been pushing for the Air Force to step in and create what it has called a “national team” of suppliers for the new ICBM.
Northrop Grumman submitted a bid, Nathan Drevna, a company spokesman, said Friday. Northrop has largely remained silent throughout the solicitation except for announcing its suppliers in September.
Air Force officials have said they need to keep the project on track in order to have replacements ready when today’s Minuteman III ICBMs reach the end of their design life in the 2030s.
Last week at a conference in California, Gen. Timothy Ray, the head of Air Force Global Strike Command who oversees nuclear forces, said the service must “get-[GBSD]-into-the-silo-on-time,” Jim McAleese, who runs the McAleese and Associates consulting firm wrote in a Dec. 9 note to investors.
Any changes to the bidding paraments or changes now after the fact would likely delay the fielding of the ICBMs.
The Air Force hired Boeing and Northrop to start building components for the new ICBMs in 2017. Since then, Northrop acquired Orbital ATK, one of two U.S. suppliers of solid rocket motors needed to power an ICBM. Aerojet Rocketdyne, the other supplier, is also on Northrop’s team. Boeing says it had teamed with Orbital before to Northrop buying the firm.
Federal investigators are currently probing whether Northrop is abiding by an arrangement that requires it to sell rocket motors to competitors.

• Marcus Weisgerber is the global business editor for Defense One, where he writes about the intersection of business and national security. He has been covering defense and national security issues for more than a decade, previously as Pentagon correspondent for Defense News and chief editor of ... Full bio

 

[Housecarl]

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AP Exclusive: China tightens up on info after Xinjiang leaks

People in touch with state employees in China say the government in the far west region of Xinjiang is destroying documents and taking other steps to tighten control on information.

apnews.com

AP Exclusive: China tightens up on info after Xinjiang leaks
By The Associated Press
today

The Xinjiang regional government in China’s far west is deleting data, destroying documents, tightening controls on information and has held high-level meetings in response to leaks of classified papers on its mass detention camps for Uighurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities, according to four people in contact with government employees there.

Top officials deliberated how to respond to the leaks in meetings at the Chinese Communist Party’s regional headquarters in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, some of the people said. They spoke on condition of anonymity because of fears of retribution against themselves, family members and the government workers.

The meetings began days after The New York Times published last month a cache of internal speeches on Xinjiang by top leaders including Chinese President Xi Jinping. They continued after the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists worked with news organizations around the world including The Associated Press to publish secret guidelines for operating detention centers and instructions on how to use technology to target people.

The Chinese government has long struggled with its 11-million-strong Uighur population, an ethnic Turkic minority native to Xinjiang, and in recent years has detained 1 million or more Uighurs and other minorities in the camps.

Xinjiang officials and the Chinese foreign ministry have not directly denied the authenticity of the documents, though Urumqi Communist Party chief Xu Hairong called reports on the leaks “malicious smears and distortions.”

The Xinjiang government did not respond to a fax for comment on the arrests, the tightened restrictions on information and other measures responding to the leaks. The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not have an immediate comment.

Xinjiang’s government had already mandated stricter controls on information in October, before the news reports, according to three of the people, all Uighurs outside Xinjiang.

They include orders for community-level officials to burn paper forms containing sensitive personal details on residents in their area such as their detention status, and for various state offices to throw away computers, tighten management of classified information, and ensure all information related to the camps is now stored on databases disconnected from the internet in special, restricted-access rooms to bar hackers, the Uighurs said.

“They became much more serious about the transfer of information,” one said.
Publication of the classified documents prompted the central government in Beijing to put more pressure on Xinjiang officials, several of the Uighurs said.

Restrictions on information appear to be tightening further. Some university teachers and district-level workers in Urumqi have been ordered to clean out sensitive data on their computers, phones and cloud storage, and to delete work-related social media groups, according to one Uighur with direct knowledge of the situation.

In other cases, the state appears to be confiscating evidence of detentions. Another Uighur who had been detained in Xinjiang years before said his ex-wife called him two weeks ago and begged him to send his release papers to her, saying eight officers had come to her home to search for the papers, then threatened she’d be jailed for life if she couldn’t produce the papers.

“It’s an old matter, and they’ve know I’ve been abroad for a long time,” he said. “The fact that they suddenly want this now must mean the pressure on them is very high.”

Some government workers have been rounded up as the state investigates the source of the leaks. In one case an entire family in civil service was arrested. Abduweli Ayup, a Uighur linguist in exile, said his wife’s relatives in Xinjiang – including her parents, siblings, and in-laws – were detained shortly after the leaks were published, although Ayup said they had no relation to the leaks as far as he was aware. Some people in touch with relatives outside China were also investigated and seized, Ayup said.
It is unknown how many have been detained since the leaks.

Earlier this week, a Uighur woman in the Netherlands told a Dutch daily, de Volkskrant, that she was the source of the documents published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. The woman, Asiye Abdulaheb, said that after she posted one page on social media in June, Chinese state agents sent her death threats and tried to recruit her ex-husband to spy on her.

The leaked documents lay out the Chinese government’s deliberate strategy to lock up ethnic minorities even before they commit a crime, and to rewire their thoughts and the language they speak. They reveal that facilities Beijing calls “vocational training schools” are forced ideological and behavioral re-education centers run in secret.

The papers also show how Beijing is pioneering a new form of social control using data and artificial intelligence. Drawing on data collected by mass surveillance technology, computers issued the names of tens of thousands of people for interrogation or detention in just one week.

The leaks come at a delicate time in relations between Washington and Beijing, amid ongoing negotiations to end a trade war and U.S. concerns about the situation in Hong Kong, a semi-autonomous Chinese territory where police have clashed with pro-democracy protesters.

Last week, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the Uighur Human Rights Policy Act, aimed at pressuring China over the mass detentions in Xinjiang. Beijing swiftly denounced the bill as foreign meddling. State media reported that the Chinese government was considering retaliatory measures including visa bans on U.S. officials.

 

[Housecarl]

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North Korea says new tests will help it counter US threats

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said it successfully performed another “crucial test” at its long-range rocket launch site that will further strengthen its nuclear deterrent.

apnews.com

North Korea conducts another test at long-range rocket site
By KIM TONG-HYUNG
today

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said Saturday that it successfully performed another “crucial test” at its long-range rocket launch site that will further strengthen its nuclear deterrent.
The test — the second at the facility in a week, according to North Korea’s Academy of Defense Science — possibly involved technologies to improve intercontinental ballistic missiles that could potentially reach the continental United States.
In a separate statement, Pak Jong Chon, chief of the Korean People’s Army’s general staff, asserted that North Korea has built up “tremendous power” and that the findings from the recent tests would be used to develop new weapons to allow the country to “definitely and reliably” counter U.S. nuclear threats.




The North in recent weeks has been dialing up pressure to coax major concessions from the Trump administration as it approaches an end-of-year deadline set by leader Kim Jong Un to salvage faltering nuclear negotiations.
The Academy of Defense Science did not specify what was tested on Friday. Just days earlier, the North said it conducted a “very important test” at the site on the country’s northwestern coast, prompting speculation that it involved a new engine for either an ICBM or a space launch vehicle.
The testing activity and defiant statements suggest that the North is preparing to do something to provoke the United States if Washington doesn’t back down and make concessions to ease sanctions and pressure on Pyongyang in deadlocked nuclear negotiations.
An unnamed spokesman for the academy said scientists received warm congratulations from members of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee who attended the test, which lasted from 10:41 to 10:48 p.m. Friday at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground, where the North has conducted satellite launches and liquid-fuel missile engine tests in recent years.
The spokesman said the successful outcome of the latest test, in addition to the one on Dec. 7, “will be applied to further bolster up the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” referring to North Korea’s formal name.
“Genuine peace can be safeguarded and our development and future be guaranteed only when the balance of power is completely ensured. We have stored up a tremendous power,” Pak said in a statement carried by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency.
“We should be ready to cope with political and military provocations of the hostile forces and be familiar with both dialogue and confrontation,” Pak said. “Our army is fully ready to thoroughly carry out any decision of the supreme leader with action. ... U.S. and other hostile forces will spend the year-end in peace only when they hold off any words and deeds rattling us.”




Kim Dong-yub, a former South Korean military officer and currently an analyst from Seoul’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, said the North mentioning its nuclear deterrent makes it clear it tested a new engine for an ICBM, not a satellite-launch vehicle. Kim said it was notable that North Korea announced the specific length of the test, which he said possibly signals a larger liquid-fuel ICBM engine.
North Korea’s current ICBMs, including the Hwasong-15, are built with first stages that are powered by a pair of engines that experts say are modeled after Russian designs. When the North first tested the engine in 2016, it said the test lasted for 200 seconds and demonstrated a thrust of 80 tons-force.
The North Korean statement came a day before Stephen Biegun, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, was to arrive in South Korea for discussions with South Korean officials over the nuclear diplomacy. It was unclear whether Biegun would attempt contact with North Korean officials at the inter-Korean border, which has often been used as a diplomatic venue, or whether such an effort would be successful.
During a provocative run of weapons tests in 2017, Kim Jong Un conducted three flight tests of ICBMs that demonstrated potential range to reach deep into the U.S. mainland, raising tensions and triggering verbal warfare with President Donald Trump as they exchanged crude insults and threats of nuclear annihilation.
Experts say that the North would need further tests to establish the missile’s performance and reliability, such as improving its accuracy and ensuring that the warheads survive the harsh conditions of atmospheric reentry.
Relations between Kim and Trump became cozier in 2018 after Kim initiated diplomacy that led to their first summit in June that year in Singapore, where they issued a vague statement on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, without describing when or how it would occur.
But negotiations faltered after the United States rejected North Korean demands for broad sanctions relief in exchange for a partial surrender of the North’s nuclear capabilities at Kim’s second summit with Trump in Vietnam in February.
Trump and Kim met for a third time in June at the border between North and South Korea and agreed to resume talks. But an October working-level meeting in Sweden broke down over what the North Koreans described as the Americans’ “old stance and attitude.”
Kim, who unilaterally suspended nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests last year during talks with Washington and Seoul, has said North Korea could seek a “new path” if the United States persists with sanctions and pressure against the North.
North Korea has also conducted 13 rounds of ballistic missile and rocket artillery tests since May, and has hinted at lifting its moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests if the Trump administration fails to make substantial concessions before the new year.
Some experts doubt that Kim would revive the tensions of 2017 by restarting nuclear and ICBM tests, which would cross a metaphorical “red line” and risk shattering his hard-won diplomacy with Washington. They say Kim is likely to pressure Trump with military activities that pose less of a direct threat to the U.S. and by bolstering a united front with Beijing and Moscow. Both are the North’s allies and have called for the U.N. Security Council to consider easing sanctions on Pyongyang to help nuclear negotiations move forward.
Saturday’s news of the test came after U.S. Ambassador Kelly Craft criticized the North’s ballistic testing activity during a U.N. Security Council meeting on Wednesday, saying that the tests were “deeply counterproductive” and risk closing the door on prospects for negotiating peace.
She also cited North Korean hints of “a resumption of serious provocations,” which she said would mean they could launch space vehicles using long-range ballistic missile technology or test ICBMs, “which are designed to attack the continental United States with nuclear weapons.”
While Craft said that the Trump administration is “prepared to be flexible” and take concrete, parallel steps toward an agreement on resuming talks, North Korea described her comments as a “hostile provocation” and warned that Washington may have squandered its chance at salvaging the fragile nuclear diplomacy.

 

[Housecarl]

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Insider Attack Kills At Least Nine Afghan Troops

At least one member of an Afghan militia has shot dead nine of his fellow militiamen in what the Interior Ministry is calling an insider attack.

www.rferl.org

Afghanistan
Insider Attack Kills At Least Nine Afghan Troops
December 14, 2019 09:12 GMT

• By RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan

At least one member of an Afghan militia has shot dead nine of his fellow militiamen in what the Interior Ministry is calling an insider attack.

However, local sources and the Taliban said the number of those killed on December 14 was at least 24. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the attack was actually a coordinated militant assault on the checkpoint where the shooting took place.

Details were sketchy and investigators were still looking into the attack in central Ghazni Province's Karabagh district, Defense Ministry deputy spokesman Fawad Aman said. The number of attackers was also not immediately clear.

Afghan militias are under the command of the country's National Security Forces, which suffer near daily Taliban attacks.

The Taliban reportedly controls or holds sway over half the country.

In the past two years, dozens of Afghan security forces have been killed by the Taliban in such attacks in various districts of Ghazni, according to officials.

U.S. and NATO troops have been the main target of insider attacks, but Afghan security forces have also been targeted.

Two U.S. troops were killed by an Afghan soldier in the southern Kandahar Province in July. The perpetrator was wounded and arrested.

Also in Kandahar, two months later, three U.S. military personnel were wounded when a member of the Afghan Civil Order Police opened fire on a military convoy.

U.S. peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has held several days of meetings with Taliban representatives in Qatar since December 7. The Taliban maintains a political office in Qatar.

It was his first such direct contact between Khalilzad and the militant group since President Donald Trump halted negotiations three months ago following a deadly wave of Taliban attacks, including a Kabul suicide bombing that killed an American soldier.

With reporting by AP, dpa, and Tolo News

 

[Housecarl]

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U.S. To Publish New Central Asia Strategy Amid Russian, Chinese Competition, Afghan Threat

The Trump administration plans to publish a new U.S. strategy for Central Asia as China and Russia fight for influence in the energy-rich region and militants from Afghanistan threaten to destabilize it, a senior State Department official has said.

www.rferl.org

News
U.S. To Publish New Central Asia Strategy Amid Russian, Chinese Competition, Afghan Threat
December 14, 2019 07:25 GMT

• By Todd Prince

WASHINGTON -- The Trump administration plans to publish a new U.S. strategy for Central Asia as China and Russia fight for influence in the energy-rich region and militants from Afghanistan threaten to destabilize it, a senior State Department official has said.

The United States has "intensified" its bilateral diplomatic engagements with the five Central Asian countries this year, the State Department official said during a background briefing on December 13, following a meeting the day before with Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi.

A U.S. delegation traveled to Kyrgyzstan in July for the first time in four years while the State Department hosted Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov in November. The State Department will host Tajik and Uzbek government delegations for annual consultations in the spring, he said.

"This regional and bilateral engagement reflects the objectives and priorities embedded in the Trump administration's new Central Asia strategy, which we hope to brief publicly soon. The strategy will highlight our commitment to deepening our political, economic, and military engagement with Central Asia," the senior State Department official said.

The increase in U.S. diplomatic contacts comes as China's economic and political influence in Central Asia grows and it seeks to strong-arm those countries to return asylum seekers from Xinjiang, a major concern for the Trump administration. The greater interest also comes as the United States seeks to exit its 18-year war in Afghanistan, which borders several of the countries.

China is pumping billions of dollars into Central Asian infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, which some U.S. officials and analysts have said is burdening the countries with debt loads that they cannot pay back. Russia continues to maintain significant influence over the former Soviet states as well.

The desire of Central Asian states to pursue closer relations with the United States and the West may be driven "by a feeling of pressure from these other larger neighbors and a desire to have a counterweight," the State Department official said. That pressure is also pushing the five countries to promote more projects that enhance their connectivity and economic ties, he said.

"There's a recognition on the part of these countries that they are stronger -- and more independent -- if they're able to kind of cooperate and trade and do business more effectively with one another," the State Department official said.

Uyghurs Detention
The senior State Department official said Washington was concerned about China using its economic leverage over the Central Asian states to force them to return Chinese citizens of Uyghur ethnicity seeking asylum.

UN experts and activists say at least 1 million Uyghurs, and members of other largely Muslim minority groups, have been detained in camps in the Xinjiang region, which borders Central Asia. Beijing insists the detention sites are "vocational centers" aimed at training and skills development.

"The officials in these countries have, generally speaking, not been publicly critical of what's going on in Xinjiang. But at the same time, there are certainly a number of people in their population who are aware of what's going on and are concerned. These governments are just trying to navigate a very difficult position vis-a-vis their relationship with their neighbors and their obligations," he said.

The State Department official said the United States was tracking the cases of Uyghur asylum seekers and has no knowledge of Kazakhstan having forcibly returned any individuals. However, a couple of cases are still pending in the country's courts, he said.

"We're waiting to see how the judicial process plays out, and meanwhile continuing to remind Kazakhstan of its international obligations," he said.

Afghanistan Threat
The official said the United States was working with the Central Asian states to reintegrate Afghanistan -- where U.S. troops have been fighting militants since 2001 -- into the region.

However, he said the embattled country remained a source of instability for the region and that the Central Asian states needed to step up their border security to prevent threats.

"I think the main concern that we have -- and certainly the countries of the region have -- is, of course, their border with Afghanistan. And there is certainly concern about the flow of terrorist fighters from Afghanistan, and there's concern that instability in Afghanistan could adversely affect the stability of the countries of the region," he said.

The official said a November attack on the border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan appears to have been the work of terrorists connected with Islamic State. However, he said it was still unclear if the attackers came from Afghanistan or Tajikistan.

The senior administration official also said the Central Asian states had made progress on repatriating hundreds of citizens from Syria and Iraq. Kazakhstan, he said, had returned more than 600 citizens, including dozens of fighters.

The United States assisted with the transportation of some of the citizens back to Central Asia as well as with rehabilitation and reintegration, he said.

• 
  Todd Prince
  Todd Prince is a senior correspondent in Washington, D.C., for RFE/RL.

 

[Zagdid]

The Chinese Navy Is Building An Incredible Number Of Warships

A single photo from a Shanghai shipyard captures the vast scale of this construction. While the U.S. Navy launches a handful of AEGIS destroyers each year, this photo shows nine newly constructed Chinese warships.

www.forbes.com

Dec 15, 2019, 07:50am H I Sutton Contributor

While the U.S. Navy launches a handful of AEGIS destroyers each year, this single image shows 9 newly constructed Chinese warships. China’s Navy, known as the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), is modernizing at an impressive rate. And on a vast scale. A key ingredient is the construction of a fleet of large destroyers, amphibious warships and aircraft carriers. The below photo, snapped from an airplane window on December 13, and shared on social media, captures the vast scale of this construction.

Nearest the camera, a line of four newly constructed destroyers catch the sunlight. Two are Type-052D air-defense destroyers, generally equivalent to the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke Class AEGIS destroyers. These displace 7,500 tons and can carry 64 large missiles including long range surface to air missiles (SAMs) and cruise missiles. The other two are larger Type-055 Class ships. These are also described as air-defense destroyers but are verging on cruisers in terms of size and fit. These are about twice the displacement and carry over 100 large missiles.

Behind them is the shipyard with its mass of construction halls and cranes. In the basin where the newest ships are docked after launch are another four destroyers. Again there are both Type-052D and Type-055 ships. Together with another Type-055 under construction on the left of the image, this brings the total number of large destroyers visible to 9. To put that into context, the Royal Navy’s entire destroyer fleet is just 6 ships. And this yard is just part of a much bigger construction program.

There are also some hovercraft which will be carried aboard the PLAN’s expanding fleet of amphibious warships. They will be used for transporting tanks and supplies from ship to shore. These are generally similar to the U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).

At the side of the basin, in a dry dock, is a massive Yuan Wang Class satellite and/or missile tracking ship. These are the sort of ships which look like an ocean liner but with a series of gigantic satellite dishes pointing skyward. When completed this could be used to support missile tests.

But the most impressive vessel is hidden in the background haze, barely discernible to the untrained eye. Beneath several massive gantry cranes in a purpose-built construction area is China’s next generation aircraft carrier. China already has two carriers in service but this new carrier is expected to be significantly different. Known as the Type-003, it is believed to have electromagnetic catapults like the latest U.S. Navy Ford Class carrier. It is not expected to be launched for some time.

Other developments are not visible in the photo. It is the same shipyard where China’s mysterious sailless submarine has been constructed. Although that submarine is not clearly apparent in the photograph, it may be present in the basin.

This image paints an interesting picture of Chinese naval modernization. Yet the biggest takeaway is that this shipyard is not alone. There are many yards across China which are similarly impressive. The Chinese Navy of today, and the future, is beyond all recognition of the Chinese Navy of the past. The world naval balance is shifting.

 

[Housecarl]

LIBYA Spiraling Out Of Control [Original post from May 2014]

WAR - LIBYA Spiraling Out Of Control [Original post from May 2014]

EndGameWW3 Retweeted Babak Taghvaee @BabakTaghvaee According to @warnesyworld , #Libya National Air Force will soon receive the six surplus CH-4B armed drones of Royal #Jordan Air Force (#RJAF). Their delivery will be a great help to #LNA during the battle for liberation of #Tripoli and...

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China’s Bet on Assad: The Lucrative and Risky Business of Postwar Reconstruction - Modern War Institute

Of the foreign powers involved in the Syrian conflict over its nearly nine years, a new figure has emerged, one with formidable credibility and capital: China. The People’s Republic has […]

mwi.usma.edu

China’s Bet on Assad: The Lucrative and Risky Business of Postwar Reconstruction

Lucille Greer | December 13, 2019

Of the foreign powers involved in the Syrian conflict over its nearly nine years, a new figure has emerged, one with formidable credibility and capital: China. The People’s Republic has taken an interest in the profits that can be earned from reconstructing the war-torn country. But will China decide it is worth it to become ensnared in Middle East politics or run afoul of American sanctions in order to get more deeply involved in Syria?

Since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, the Syrian Civil War has claimed almost half a million lives and injured many more. It has also cost $120 billion in material destruction to roads, homes, and other infrastructure, according to a report from the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.

The conflict is not over, but it is highly unlikely that the government of President Bashar al-Assad will abdicate power as analysts once predicted. While the regime reclaims territory, reconstruction is on the agenda as Assad tries to assure his remaining war-battered citizens that a return to the status quo is better than continued struggle. The trouble is Syria just does not have the funds to support its own reconstruction.

This creates a clear commercial opportunity for China, which is a leading proponent of development through infrastructure construction. Post-war reconstruction in Syria is a natural fit into China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Syria is a geostrategic crossroads for China’s BRI designs in the Middle East, a region with links to African, Central Asian, and European markets. Assad’s political and media advisor, Bouthaina Shaaban, said earlier this year that “the Silk Road is not a silk road if it does not pass through Syria, Iraq, and Iran.” The Chinese company Touchstone is already constructing a railroad from Jordan’s southern port in Aqaba to Syria in anticipation of a more active economy after the war.

China’s usual doctrine of political caution does not prevent it from building partnerships based on commercial benefit, which includes postwar reconstruction in Syria. The potential to profit from rebuilding in Syria is tremendous, assuming it can navigate the endemic corruption of the Assad regime. It certainly wouldn’t be the first time China made lucrative partnerships with corrupt governments. Syria needs cash without strings attached, and China is hedging its bet that Syria will in the long term be profitable.

In a conversation with the author, the Syrian ambassador to China, Imad Moustapha, said that of the Assad government’s traditional allies—which also include Russia, Iran, and India—China is by far the most qualified to take on the task. China’s relationship with Syria prior to the conflict was fraught, due in part to Syria’s close ties during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, China’s rival. China and Syria were not on each other’s radar. China was preoccupied by domestic developments, like the Cultural Revolution or later economic development, and the Assad regime was focused on its own reinforcement at home and entanglement in regional politics in Israel and Lebanon.

While the Assad government made stabs at connecting with China in the early 2000s, only in the past ten years have relations grown stronger. This is mostly because China chose Syria as a country where it can challenge the United States in the United Nations with little actual commitment. China could thwart the West and promote its non-interference rhetoric, while Syria could enjoy the largesse of a major world power in a time when it had few friends. Conveniently for China, Russia, with its more assertive Middle East policy, ends up taking most of the international criticism for partnering with the Assad government while China skates by unscathed.

Also conveniently, China’s other business partners in the Arab world that oppose the Assad regime haven’t been put off by China’s cozy relationship with the Assad government. As the Assad government’s removal seems more unlikely with each passing year, governments in the region that once condemned the regime are beginning to explore rapprochement with it.

With this shift, China’s business interests in Syria would increasingly not be out of place with China’s other Arab partners in the Middle East. This plays well into one of the pillars of China’s approach to the region: befriending all sides in a conflict. China, through an apolitical and commercial approach, maintains productive relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, Israel and Palestine, and now Syria and its various opponents.

Reconstruction has already begun. The vice chairman of the China-Arab Exchange Association, Qin Yong, was an outspoken advocate for Chinese reconstruction in Assad’s Syria in a conversation with the author. He has led multiple business delegations to Syria to promote the work of Chinese companies in reconstruction. Even Vice President Wang Qishan has stated that China is ready to play a role in reconstruction during a recent meeting with a delegation of the Ba’ath Party.

On the Syrian side, Ambassador Moustapha has credited China as the only country that can rebuild Syria. He has added that Chinese companies will receive favored treatment from Damascus. In a discussion with the author, Moustapha claimed that the work of Chinese reconstruction is already underway. Chinese and Syrian companies are partnering, with signings of MOUs and permanent displays of Chinese products. In November, the Syrian Cham Wings Airlines, which had previously flown to Shanghai, began indirect flights to Shenzhen twice a week to accommodate increased traffic.

Syria is a piece in China’s larger BRI strategy, but China’s ambitions hit a snag when it comes to the Middle East. China’s engagement in the region is relatively restrained. This is due to China’s guiding philosophy in the region: The Middle East is a political tar pit, one that China is all too happy to watch its competitors become mired in. Any meaningful engagement carries the risk of entangling China in the region’s intractable politics and multiple conflicts, perhaps costing lives.

Chinese citizens coming home in body bags never plays well domestically. The deaths of two Chinese peacekeepers in South Sudan in 2016 and two Chinese missionaries in Pakistan in 2017 caused an uproar that officials have not forgotten. Reconstruction in Syria presents China with the same threat.

The other potential snag for China is the threat of US secondary sanctions. In a conversation with the author, an anonymous Western official stated that if China funded projects in Assad-controlled territory, the United States would notice. Under pressure from the United States, particularly in the larger context of the trade war, China would likely adjust its strategy toward Syria. China values its relationship with the United States far more than its ability to play world power in the Middle East. While Middle East policy is an indicator of global reach, China would not trade its ties to Western markets for what profits can be made in Syrian reconstruction.

Pressure from the United States halted Israeli arms sales to China in 1999 and 2005 and nuclear trade between China and Iran in the 1990s. The US-China relationship is already troubled enough without piling on business in Syria, which is not a strategic priority. It has neither military bases or the legacy of a Cold War partnership like Russia has. Syria needs China far more than China needs Syria, if it does at all.

China is assiduously attempting to turn Syria into a win-win situation, as Chinese leaders love to say. But the pitfalls of reconstruction may test the bounds of their cautious, commercial approach.

Lucille Greer is a Schwarzman Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. Her research project examines China’s navigation of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the new geopolitics of the Middle East. She has lived and conducted research in China and the Arab world. Follow her on Twitter: @Lucille_Greer_.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

U.S. Secretly Expelled Chinese Officials Suspected of Spying After Breach of Military Base

U.S. Secretly Expelled Chinese Officials Suspected of Spying After Breach of Military Base

Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes

2 hrs ago

WASHINGTON — The American government secretly expelled two Chinese Embassy officials this fall after they drove on to a sensitive military base in Virginia, according to people with knowledge of the episode. The expulsions appear to be the first of Chinese diplomats suspected of espionage in more than 30 years.

American officials believe at least one of the Chinese officials was an intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover, said six people with knowledge of the expulsions. The group, which included the officials’ wives, evaded military personnel pursuing them and stopped only after fire trucks blocked their path.

The episode in September, which neither Washington nor Beijing made public, has intensified concerns in the Trump administration that China is expanding its spying efforts in the United States as the two nations are increasingly locked in a global strategic and economic rivalry. American intelligence officials say China poses a greater espionage threat than any other country.

In recent months, Chinese officials with diplomatic passports have become bolder about showing up unannounced at research or government facilities, American officials said, with the infiltration of the military base only the most remarkable instance.

The expulsions, apparently the first since the United States forced out two Chinese Embassy employees with diplomatic cover in 1987, show the American government is now taking a harder line against suspected espionage by China, officials said.

Recent episodes of suspected spying add to the broader tensions between the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies and biggest strategic rivals. That conflict is heightened by a trade war that President Trump started in July 2018 and that shows only tentative signs of abating.

On Oct. 16, weeks after the intrusion at the base, the State Department announced sharp restrictions on the activities of Chinese diplomats, requiring them to provide notice before meeting with local or state officials or visiting educational and research institutions.

At the time, a senior State Department official told reporters that the rule, which applied to all Chinese Missions in the United States and its territories, was a response to Chinese regulations imposed years ago requiring American diplomats to seek permission to travel outside their host cities or to visit certain institutions.

The Chinese Embassy said in October that the new rules were “in violation of the Vienna Convention.”

Two American officials said last week that those restrictions had been under consideration for a while because of growing calls in the American government for reciprocity, but episodes like the one at the base accelerated the rollout.

The base intrusion took place in late September on a sensitive installation near Norfolk, Va. The base includes Special Operations forces, said the people with knowledge of the incident. Several bases in the area have such units, including one with the headquarters of the Navy’s elite SEAL Team Six.

The Chinese officials and their wives drove up to a checkpoint for entry to the base, said people briefed on the episode. A guard, realizing that they did not have permission to enter, told them to go through the gate, turn around and exit the base, which is common procedure in such situations.
But the Chinese officials instead continued on to the base, according to those familiar with the incident. After the fire trucks blocked them, the Chinese officials indicated that they had not understood the guard’s English instructions, and had simply gotten lost, according to people briefed on the matter.

American officials said they were skeptical that the intruders made an innocent error and dismissed the idea that their English was insufficient to understand the initial order to leave.

It is not clear what they were trying to do on the base, but some American officials said they believed it was to test the security at the installation, according to a person briefed on the matter. Had the Chinese officials made it onto the base without being stopped, the embassy could have dispatched a more senior intelligence officer to enter the base, the theory goes.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry and Chinese Embassy in Washington did not reply to requests for comment about the episode. Two associates of Chinese Embassy officials said they were told that the expelled officials were on a sightseeing tour when they accidentally drove onto the base.

The State Department, which is responsible for relations with the Chinese Embassy and its diplomats, and the F.B.I., which oversees counterintelligence in the United States, declined to comment.

Chinese Embassy officials complained to State Department officials about the expulsions and asked in a meeting whether the agency was retaliating for an official Chinese propaganda campaign in August against an American diplomat, Julie Eadeh. At the time, state-run news organizations accused Ms. Eadeh, a political counselor in Hong Kong, of being a “black hand” behind the territory’s pro-democracy protests, and personal details about her were posted online. A State Department spokeswoman called China a “thuggish regime.”

So far, China has not retaliated by expelling American diplomats or intelligence officers from the embassy in Beijing, perhaps a sign that Chinese officials understand their colleagues overstepped by trying to enter the base. One person who was briefed on reactions in the Chinese Embassy in Washington said he was told employees there were surprised that their colleagues had tried something so brazen.

In 2016, Chinese officers in Chengdu abducted an American Consulate official they believed to be a C.I.A. officer, interrogated him and forced him to make a confession. Colleagues retrieved him the next day and evacuated him from the country. American officials threatened to expel suspected Chinese agents in the United States, but apparently did not do so.

China is detaining a Canadian diplomat on leave, Michael Kovrig, on espionage charges, though American officials say he is being held hostage because Canada arrested a prominent Chinese technology company executive at the request of American officials seeking her prosecution in a sanctions evasion case.

For decades, counterintelligence officials have tried to pinpoint embassy or consulate employees with diplomatic cover who are spies and assign officers to follow some of them. Now there is growing urgency to do that by both Washington and Beijing.

Evan S. Medeiros, a senior Asia director at the National Security Council under President Barack Obama, said he was unaware of any expulsions of Chinese diplomats or spies with diplomatic cover during Mr. Obama’s time in office.

If it is rare for the Americans to expel Chinese spies or other embassy employees who have diplomatic cover, Mr. Medeiros said, “it’s probably because for much of the first 40 years, Chinese intelligence was not very aggressive.”

“But that changed about 10 years ago,” he added. “Chinese intelligence became more sophisticated and more aggressive, both in human and electronic forms.”

For instance, Chinese intelligence officers use LinkedIn to recruit current or former employees of foreign governments.

This year, a Chinese student was sentenced to a year in prison for photographing an American defense intelligence installation near Key West, Fla., in September 2018. The student, Zhao Qianli, walked to where the fence circling the base ended at the ocean, then stepped around the fence and onto the beach. From there, he walked onto the base and took photographs, including of an area with satellite dishes and antennae.

When he was arrested, Mr. Zhao spoke in broken English and, like the officials stopped on the Virginia base, claimed he was lost.

Chinese citizens have been caught not just wandering on to government installations but also improperly entering university laboratories and even crossing farmland to pilfer specially bred seeds.

In 2016, a Chinese man, Mo Hailong, pleaded guilty to trying to steal corn seeds from American agribusiness firms and give them to a Chinese company. Before he was caught, Mr. Mo successfully stole seeds developed by the American companies and sent them back to China, according to court records. He was sentenced to three years in prison.

The F.B.I. and the National Institutes of Health are trying to root out scientists in the United States who they say are stealing biomedical research for other nations, China in particular. The F.B.I. has also warned research institutions about risks posed by Chinese students and scholars.

Some university officials say the campaign unfairly targets Chinese citizens or ethnic Chinese and smacks of a new Red Scare.

Last month, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, a former C.I.A. officer, was sentenced to 19 years in prison, one of several former American intelligence officials sentenced this year for spying for Beijing.

His work with Chinese intelligence coincided with the demolition of the C.I.A.’s network of informants in China — one of the biggest counterintelligence coups against the United States in decades. From 2010 to 2012, Chinese officers killed at least a dozen informants and imprisoned others. One man and his pregnant wife were shot in 2011 in a ministry’s courtyard, and the execution was shown on closed-circuit television, according to a new book on Chinese espionage.

Many in the C.I.A. feared China had a mole in the agency, and some officers suspected Mr. Lee, though prosecutors did not tie him to the network’s collapse.

For three decades, China did have a mole in the C.I.A., Larry Wu-Tai Chin, considered among the most successful enemy agents to have penetrated the United States. He was arrested in 1985 and convicted the next year, then suffocated himself with a trash bag in his jail cell.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

China's Xi vows support for Hong Kong leader during 'most difficult' time

Hong Kong protests flare ahead of Xi meeting with city leader
By Donny Kwok
2 hrs ago

HONG KONG (Reuters) - Hong Kong police fired tear gas in late night street clashes with anti-government protesters, ahead of a potentially pivotal meeting between Hong Kong's leader and China's president in Beijing on Monday.

Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, in the Chinese capital for a regular duty visit, is set to meet Xi Jinping amid speculation the visit could yield fresh directives on the city's political crisis, including a possible cabinet reshuffle.

The two had previously met in Shanghai in early November when Xi expressed "high trust" in Lam despite the turmoil.

Lam, however, appeared to play down the prospects of a cabinet reshuffle before she left, saying the first task was to curb violence and restore order, while seeking to engage in more dialogue with the public.

Hong Kong has been embroiled in its worst political crisis in decades since June with anti-government protests posing a populist challenge to China's Xi. The unrest has also complicated ties between China and the United States at a time of heightened tensions, including over trade.

Late on Sunday, groups of masked youths - angered by what they see as Chinese meddling in freedoms promised to Hong Kong when the former British colony returned to Chinese rule in 1997 - blocked roads around Mong Kok district, prompting police to fire multiple rounds of tear gas and baton charge crowds.

It was the first time in nearly two weeks that tear gas had been deployed by police.

Fires were lit and traffic lights smashed, while one student reporter for Baptist University was hit in the face by a police projectile and had to be hospitalized, local television footage showed.

Small bands of protesters marched through several malls, blocking entrances, smashing glass, and chanting slogans including "fight for freedom". Many shops in affected malls closed early after battalions of riot police stormed in, pepper spraying crowds and making multiple arrests.

In the evening, several hundred protesters held a vigil for a protester who fell to his death outside a luxury mall six months ago. They laid white flowers and sang songs to commemorate Leung Ling-kit, known as "raincoat man" for what he wore at the time.

Despite the protesters' demands and anti-China rhetoric, China maintains it is committed to the "one country, two systems" formula granting Hong Kong a large degree of autonomy and freedoms denied other cities in the mainland.

(Writing by James Pomfret; Editing by Lincoln Feast.)

 

[jward]

Turkey Gives NATO The Middle Finger, Threatens To Shutter Critical Military Bases Over Sanction Threats by Tyler Durden Mon, 12/16/2019 - 07:006​ .zerohedge.com/geopolitical/turkey-gives-nato-middle-finger-threatens-shutter-critical-military-bases-over Posted for fair use​

French President Emmanuel Macron complained during the NATO summit in London earlier this month about Turkey's decision to buy a Russian missile-defense system and its invasion of Syria, musing about how Turkey could justify its continued membership in the alliance if it counties to flout its interests at every turn. These comments, only the latest round of complaints about Turkey's behavior toward its Western NATO allies, inspired speculation about whether NATO could formally expel Turkey. But aside from whatever legal complications might lie in wait, we posit that there's another more fundamental reason why NATO likely won't be able to expel Turkey. Because Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would likely quit first. The Brief: EU on Libya-Turkey maritime border That's right: Although Trump and Erdogan have tried to maintain at least the veneer of a personally amicable relationship, and though Trump has at times defied his own senior NatSec officials to offer a major sop to Erdogan (like when Trump pulled US troops out and stepped aside to allow the Turkish invasion, the the horror of Europe), Erdogan's increasingly tight relationship with Russia - a relationship built on defense and energy ties - is becoming impossible for many western leaders to countenance. Congressional hawks like Lindsey Graham (for the Republicans) and Chris Van Hollen (on the Democratic side) have already successfully pushed Trump to "announce" more sanctions against Turkey via Twitter. And they might be able to finally push him to follow through, too. In response to this and myriad other slights both perceived and real, Erdogan made it clear on Monday that he's had about enough of this harassment from his supposed "allies" in the West. Because when it comes to Trump cards, Erdogan still has one to play. According to Bloomberg, Erdogan warned that he could shutter two of the most important NATO bases in the world if more sanctions are imposed. In the minds of US NatSec officials, Erdogan's threat is an extremely low blow. An early-warning radar at Turkey's Kurecik air base is a critical component of NATO's early-warning defense system against ballistic missile attacks. And the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey is critical to tactical air strikes and drone attacks throughout the region. "If it is necessary to shut it down, we would shut down Incirlik," Erdogan told AHaber television on Sunday. "If it is necessary to shut it down, we would shut down Kurecik, too." [...] "If they put measures such as sanctions in force, then we would respond based on reciprocity," Erdogan said. "It is very important for both sides that the U.S. should not take irreparable steps in our relations." Additionally, Erdogan warned the US not to recognize the Turkish genocide of Armenians in the early part of the 20th century, an issue that has long been important for Erdogan. Until now, the US and NATO military presence in Turkey has been held sacred, even as the relationship between the two countries became increasingly bitter over the past two years. Those aren't the only two bases in Turkey: the US has for decades heavily leaned on Turkey as critical to its policing of the Middle East. NEVER MISS THE NEWS THAT MATTERS MOST ZEROHEDGE DIRECTLY TO YOUR INBOX Receive a daily recap featuring a curated list of must-read stories. Bottom line: It's Turkey's party, and it can buy missiles from Russia if it wants to. After all, placating Russia is important for an energy importer like Turkey. Russian energy subsidies can be a huge economic boon for an economy - just look at Belarus. Plus, now that Erdogan has cemented his control over the levers of power in Turkey, even if his decision to re-run the mayoral elections in Istanbul didn't turn out quite as well as he had probably hoped. He's eager to establish Turkey as a regional power, and bending to the US on this would make him look week. Of course, for the US, Erdogan's demands present a difficult dilemma: The US and NATO need Turkey to host its bases, but they're worried that, if the S-400 system becomes fully operational (expected in April), many worry the Russian system could be used to collect intelligence on the stealth capabilities of the F-5 fighter jet. Now, will President Trump risk calling Erdogan's bluff? That remains to be seen.

 

[danielboon]

Montenegro signs $35 million deal to buy Israeli weapons system
Defense Ministry official says deal ‘reflects the value of Israeli defense innovation in addressing issues that our strategic partners and allies may face’
By TOI STAFF Today, 11:15 am


Montenegro Defense Minister Pedrag Boskovic (L) and Israeli Defense Ministry General Director Maj. Gen. (Res.) Udi Adam, sign a defense deal, December 15, 2019 (Defense Ministry)
Elbit Systems Ltd., Israel’s largest non-government-owned defense company, will provide Montenegro with a weapons system in a deal worth $35 million that was signed by the two countries on Sunday.
According to the agreement, Elbit Systems will supply Remote Control Weapon Stations (RCWS), which will be integrated into US-manufactured joint light tactical vehicles.
The agreement includes the system and spare parts, as well as training and guidance for the Montenegrin military and defense ministry.

According to a statement released by Israel’s Defense Ministry, Montenegro will procure the Elbit 12.7mm RCWS, which is a lightweight, low-silhouette, dual-axis and stabilized mechanism that can be mounted externally on armored vehicles. The weapon can be fired while in transit and from within the vehicle.

Illustrative — Elbit’s RCWS on a vehicle (Courtesy)
The government-to-government deal was signed by the International Defense Cooperation Directorate of the Israel Ministry of Defense (SIBAT) and the Montenegro Ministry of Defense.
SIBAT director Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Yair Kulas welcomed the deal and said it was a sign that Israeli technology can help the country’s allies.
“This agreement reflects the value of Israeli defense innovation in addressing issues that our strategic partners and allies may face,” Kulas said.
“It also reflects the excellent and ever-expanding relations that the Ministry of Defense and the State of Israel have with our Montenegrin partners on all levels. We look forward to furthering the cooperation and exchange of know-how with our fellow Mediterranean state,” he said.
Elbit is a tech firm that develops a wide range of defense, homeland security and commercial systems that are sold globally.
The firm, whose shares are listed in Tel Aviv and on Nasdaq, operates in the fields of aerospace, land and naval systems, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems, among others.

Montenegro signs $35 million deal to buy Israeli weapons system - The Times of Israel

Defense Ministry official says deal 'reflects the value of Israeli defense innovation in addressing issues that our strategic partners and allies may face'

www.timesofisrael.com

 

[danielboon]

Turkey Gives NATO The Middle Finger, Threatens To Shutter Critical Military Bases Over Sanction Threats by Tyler Durden Mon, 12/16/2019 - 07:006​ .zerohedge.com/geopolitical/turkey-gives-nato-middle-finger-threatens-shutter-critical-military-bases-over Posted for fair use​

French President Emmanuel Macron complained during the NATO summit in London earlier this month about Turkey's decision to buy a Russian missile-defense system and its invasion of Syria, musing about how Turkey could justify its continued membership in the alliance if it counties to flout its interests at every turn. These comments, only the latest round of complaints about Turkey's behavior toward its Western NATO allies, inspired speculation about whether NATO could formally expel Turkey. But aside from whatever legal complications might lie in wait, we posit that there's another more fundamental reason why NATO likely won't be able to expel Turkey. Because Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would likely quit first. The Brief: EU on Libya-Turkey maritime border That's right: Although Trump and Erdogan have tried to maintain at least the veneer of a personally amicable relationship, and though Trump has at times defied his own senior NatSec officials to offer a major sop to Erdogan (like when Trump pulled US troops out and stepped aside to allow the Turkish invasion, the the horror of Europe), Erdogan's increasingly tight relationship with Russia - a relationship built on defense and energy ties - is becoming impossible for many western leaders to countenance. Congressional hawks like Lindsey Graham (for the Republicans) and Chris Van Hollen (on the Democratic side) have already successfully pushed Trump to "announce" more sanctions against Turkey via Twitter. And they might be able to finally push him to follow through, too. In response to this and myriad other slights both perceived and real, Erdogan made it clear on Monday that he's had about enough of this harassment from his supposed "allies" in the West. Because when it comes to Trump cards, Erdogan still has one to play. According to Bloomberg, Erdogan warned that he could shutter two of the most important NATO bases in the world if more sanctions are imposed. In the minds of US NatSec officials, Erdogan's threat is an extremely low blow. An early-warning radar at Turkey's Kurecik air base is a critical component of NATO's early-warning defense system against ballistic missile attacks. And the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey is critical to tactical air strikes and drone attacks throughout the region. Additionally, Erdogan warned the US not to recognize the Turkish genocide of Armenians in the early part of the 20th century, an issue that has long been important for Erdogan. Until now, the US and NATO military presence in Turkey has been held sacred, even as the relationship between the two countries became increasingly bitter over the past two years. Those aren't the only two bases in Turkey: the US has for decades heavily leaned on Turkey as critical to its policing of the Middle East. NEVER MISS THE NEWS THAT MATTERS MOST ZEROHEDGE DIRECTLY TO YOUR INBOX Receive a daily recap featuring a curated list of must-read stories. Bottom line: It's Turkey's party, and it can buy missiles from Russia if it wants to. After all, placating Russia is important for an energy importer like Turkey. Russian energy subsidies can be a huge economic boon for an economy - just look at Belarus. Plus, now that Erdogan has cemented his control over the levers of power in Turkey, even if his decision to re-run the mayoral elections in Istanbul didn't turn out quite as well as he had probably hoped. He's eager to establish Turkey as a regional power, and bending to the US on this would make him look week. Of course, for the US, Erdogan's demands present a difficult dilemma: The US and NATO need Turkey to host its bases, but they're worried that, if the S-400 system becomes fully operational (expected in April), many worry the Russian system could be used to collect intelligence on the stealth capabilities of the F-5 fighter jet. Now, will President Trump risk calling Erdogan's bluff? That remains to be seen.

it is amazing how blinded we are with this country

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Iraq warns against 'escalation' after strikes on US interests

Baghdad cautioned Monday against "an escalation" after a flurry of attacks on US interests in Iraq prompted Washington to warn of a "decisive" response against Iran. Tehran wields growing influence in Iraq, particularly through armed factions. Since October 28, ten rocket attacks have targeted...

news.yahoo.com

Iraq warns against 'escalation' after strikes on US interests

AFP • December 16, 2019

Baghdad (AFP) - Baghdad cautioned Monday against "an escalation" after a flurry of attacks on US interests in Iraq prompted Washington to warn of a "decisive" response against Iran.

Tehran wields growing influence in Iraq, particularly through armed factions.

Since October 28, ten rocket attacks have targeted areas where US soldiers and diplomats are stationed.

They have not been claimed, but the United States has blamed Iranian-backed Shiite paramilitary groups.

On Monday, US defence secretary Mark Esper "expressed his concern" over the strikes in a telephone call with outgoing prime minister Adel Abdel Mahdi, according to a statement from the premier's office.

In response, Abdel Mahdi "called on everyone to spare no effort to prevent an escalation that will threaten all parties", the statement added.

"Unilateral decisions will trigger negative reactions that will make it more difficult to control the situation and will threaten Iraq's security, sovereignty and independence," he said.

Abdel Mahdi, a close ally of Iran who also enjoyed cordial relations with the US, resigned in early December after the two months of unprecedented demonstrations in the capital and Shiite-majority south in which around 460 people have died.

Negotiations are under way to name his successor.

"If the Iraqi government or state weakens, this will exacerbate escalation and chaos," Abdel Mahdi told Esper, according to the statement.

Iran has gained overwhelming influence in Iraq since the 2003 US invasion brought down Saddam Hussein.

A US source recently told AFP that pro-Iran factions in Iraq were now considered a more significant threat to American soldiers than the Islamic State group (IS).

"Abdel Mahdi fears that an American response to the strikes... could turn into clashes on Iraqi soil," a senior Iraqi official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

The attacks have killed one Iraqi soldier and left others wounded as well as causing material damage in the vicinity of the US embassy in Baghdad's ultra-secure Green Zone.

The US has recently reinforced its security at the embassy, according to an Iraqi security source, who said "a convoy of 15 American vehicles each transporting armoured trucks and weapons entered the Green Zone".

Top US diplomat Mike Pompeo on Friday warned Iran's leaders "that any attacks by them, or their proxies of any identity, that harm Americans, our allies or our interests will be answered with a decisive US response".

US officials say they are considering sending 5,000 to 7,000 troops to the region to counter Iran, although Esper on Friday again denied a report that a 14,000-strong deployment was under discussion.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

US says it won’t accept North Korea-set nuclear deadline

A senior U.S. diplomat said Monday that Washington won’t accept a year-end deadline set by North Korea to make concessions in stalled nuclear talks and urged Pyongyang to return to a negotiating table immediately. “On this point, let me be absolutely clear: The United States does not have a...

news.yahoo.com

US says it won’t accept North Korea-set nuclear deadline
KIM TONG-HYUNG and HYUNG-JIN KIM
,
Associated Press • December 15, 2019

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A senior U.S. diplomat said Monday that Washington won’t accept a year-end deadline set by North Korea to make concessions in stalled nuclear talks and urged Pyongyang to return to a negotiating table immediately.

“On this point, let me be absolutely clear: The United States does not have a deadline,” Stephen Biegun, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, told reporters. “We are fully aware of the strong potential for North Korea to conduct a major provocation in the days ahead. To say the least, such an action will be most unhelpful in achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

Biegun, who was in Seoul for talks with South Korean officials, called on North Korea to sit down for talks.

“Let me speak directly to our counterparts in North Korea: It is time for us to do our jobs. Let's get this done. We are here. And you know how to reach us,” he said.

Biegun later held separate meetings with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul, Seoul’s point man on North Korea. Moon’s office said that during his visit to the presidential Blue House, Biegun said the Trump administration wouldn't give up on seeking diplomatic progress with North Korea, but it did not elaborate further.

It's unclear if North Korea will reach out to the U.S. to resolve their widening differences on how to achieve North Korean denuclearization.

Senior North Korean officials have recently said denuclearization is already off the negotiating table and have threatened to lift a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. In past months, North Korea has also conducted a slew of short-range missile and other weapons tests.

Worries about a major North Korean provocation grew after the country said Saturday that it had successfully performed an unspecified “crucial test” that will strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Experts say the North could launch a satellite-carrying rocket or an intercontinental ballistic missile if the U.S. fails to meet the year-end deadline.

Friday’s test was the second in a week at a rocket facility where North Korea has conducted missile-engine tests and launched satellites in what the U.N. called cover for testing its long-range missile technology.

North Korea’s military chief, Pak Jong Chon, asserted Saturday that the North has built up "tremendous power” and that the findings from the recent tests would be used to develop new weapons to allow the country to “definitely and reliably” counter U.S. nuclear threats.

The test-flight of an ICBM would likely completely derail diplomatic efforts as President Donald Trump has viewed the North Korean weapons test moratorium as a major foreign policy achievement.

Biegun called the latest North Korean statements “so hostile and negative and so unnecessary.” He said they don't reflect the spirit and content of the discussions the two countries have had since the North entered talks with the U.S. last year.

He said the United States has offered “any number of creative ways to proceed with feasible steps and flexibility in our negotiations to reach balanced agreements that meet the objectives of both sides.”

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

US urges Sahel countries to step up fight against jihadists

The United States criticized countries of West Africa's Sahel region at the United Nations on Monday, saying their leaders were not doing enough to ensure stability amid soaring jihadist violence. "To combat regional violence and enhance stability, we need greater commitment from regional...

news.yahoo.com

US urges Sahel countries to step up fight against jihadists

AFP • December 16, 2019

United Nations (United States) (AFP) - The United States criticized countries of West Africa's Sahel region at the United Nations on Monday, saying their leaders were not doing enough to ensure stability amid soaring jihadist violence.

"To combat regional violence and enhance stability, we need greater commitment from regional governments," Washington's deputy ambassador Cherith Norman told the Security Council.

"A military response alone often fails to address the root causes of violent conflict," she said, adding that the US has provided more than $5.5 billion in aid in 2017 and 2018 to support long-term stability and security in West Africa.

Last week, hundreds of fighters attacked an army camp in Niger, leaving 71 people dead in the deadliest attack on the country's military since Islamist extremist violence began to spill over from neighboring Mali in 2015.

At the United Nations, Norman singled out Mali for criticism, noting the lack of progress in the country despite a peace agreement concluded in Algeria in 2015.

"We remain concerned that the government of Mali and the signatory armed groups have made little progress implementing the accord," she said.

"All communities in West Africa and the Sahel should enjoy inclusive, representative governance. This includes access to essential services and resources, and accountability for leaders who fail to meet these needs," Norman added.

Gathered on Sunday at an extraordinary summit called in the Nigerien capital Niamey, leaders of the G5 Sahel bloc composed of Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania called for more international aid to stem the jihadists.

"To fight terrorism, we need not fewer allies, but more allies," said Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou, whose country will join the Security Council in January for a two-year term.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Conflict and Competition: Limited Nuclear Warfare and the New Face of Deterrence — Global Security Review

Nuclear multipolarity and increased interstate competition are resulting in an increasing number of competing nuclear-armed states.

globalsecurityreview.com

Conflict and Competition: Limited Nuclear Warfare and the New Face of Deterrence

By Gerald Brown On Dec 16, 2019

“Nuclear weapons seem to be in almost everybody’s bad book, but the fact is that they are a powerful force for peace. Deterrence is most likely to hold when the costs and risks of going to war are unambiguously stark. The more horrible the prospect of war, the less likely war is. Deterrence is also more robust when conquest is more difficult. Potential aggressor states are given pause by the patent futility of attempts at expansion.”

John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic, August 1990


Since the detonation of Little Boy and Fat Man ended the war in the Pacific, nuclear weapons have occupied an increasingly critical place in international politics. The weapons captured both awe and terror across the globe, sending policymakers and scholars scrambling to discover how to properly manage and exploit this new power. Through no small effort, the world has not only seen an era without the further use of these weapons in war but one without great power conflict—a precarious period of relative peace through deterrence.

However, to pretend that such peace was born automatically is folly. Such logic runs counter to humanity’s history of conflict and warfare. The current international landscape is changing greatly; as the world slides towards a multipolar world and return to great power politics, it must re-address the notion of nuclear conflict and deterrence in the modern world if peace is to be maintained. The use of nuclear weapons has become increasingly likely in the modern-era due to two primary reasons:

1. Nuclear multipolarity and state competition, resulting in an increasing number of competing, nuclear-armed states with historical tensions, leading to instances of escalation and the security dilemma between multiple actors.
2. Nuclear modernization and proliferation, including the development of low-yield, counterforce nuclear weapons that can be utilized without threatening a state’s survival in a limited nuclear conflict, particularly when parity is not present at all levels of nuclear escalation.

The possibility of escalation to a limited nuclear conflict at the tactical level, utilizing low-yield, counterforce nuclear weaponry is a plausible reality. Low-yield, counterforce nuclear weapons can be utilized in a limited fashion against an adversary’s military forces without threatening the survival of either state—particularly when there is a significant disparity between the nuclear capabilities of the states involved.

Mearsheimer states that within the social sciences, “those who venture to predict… should, therefore, proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes.”[1] Within political sciences, the sheer number of unpredictable variables makes any prediction anything but certain. It is, therefore, more prudent to analyze the changing landscape of the international nuclear system and identify the challenges and risks that threaten to upend the relative peace that has been maintained for the last 70 years. To preserve and enhance peace within the international system, it is critical to evaluate these potential risks in an unbiased manner while exploring all plausible possibilities. The scope of this piece is primarily limited to intentional inter-state nuclear conflict, and will not address threats such as accidental war, nuclear terrorism, or other related matters.

Competition Between Nuclear States

The structure of the international system has been one of conflict and anarchy for the entirety of human history. The world has never known an era without warfare; states compete to maximize their security and ensure their survival against one another. But in the modern era, this competition may have far more dire consequences. States now yield weapons with unimaginable destructive capabilities and are capable of delivering them at unprecedented speeds. While these weapons almost certainly cause states to act more cautiously, it does not undermine the competitive nature of international relations; states will still compete and seek primacy over one another, securing their own interests and security. While possessing nuclear weapons may raise the risk of failure and serve as a strong deterrent to other states, the weapons by themselves are not enough to prevent this competition between states. In some cases, they may go as far as to instigate it as states seek to ensure their security against another’s nuclear capabilities.

To properly evaluate this concept, a baseline in neorealist theory should be established. Neorealism holds five relevant truths. First, the international system is one of anarchy, with states as the primary actors, competing against each other without a higher ruling authority. Of these states, great power states are the most critical and relevant actors. Second, states will inherently possess some military capability to secure their power and security, a capability that can be both defensive and offensive. Third, a state can never be truly certain about another’s intentions; if a rival state is building troops or weaponry, one can never be certain whether it is intended to be offensive or defensive, despite what they may claim. Fourth, a state’s basic drive is for survival and sovereignty. Fifth, states are rational actors who seek to survive and ensure their security within this anarchic system.[2]

The primary difference between nuclear weapons and other weapons of war is not their destructive power, but the ability to inflict this damage at unprecedented speeds, and to inflict it against an adversaries’ homeland without having to first engage their military and defensive forces.[3] If a state utilizes its nuclear arsenal against an opponent’s cities, the opposing side’s conventional forces and defenses are irrelevant. A state can be losing a conflict and decide to destroy the opposition with a speed unprecedented in history by escalating to nuclear conflict, completely bypassing the military and defenses of the opposing state.[4] Hence, the basis of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is one of mutual vulnerability, with both states accepting that the other could cause immense damage to their own at any time if they utilize nuclear weapons, and thus deciding to avoid it. This has been the backbone of nuclear weapons policy since World War II. The idea is that nuclear weapons ultimately mitigate conflict and escalate the cost of nuclear war to one that is far too high to pay, “war becomes less likely as the cost of war rises in relation to possible gains.” The fear of a retaliatory response deters the aggressor from initiating nuclear conflict in the first place. Wars occurring between nuclear states are likely to be limited in scale for fear of pushing one past the nuclear brink—if they occur at all. The cost of a miscalculation that leads to nuclear conflict is a far greater risk than the same miscalculation with a conventional army.[5]

However, the idea that actors would accept this vulnerability runs contrary to previous assertions made within the theory of neorealism. If it is accepted that states seek to preserve their sovereignty and security, parity seems to be an unlikely position for a state to find acceptable. The security dilemma highlights some of these challenges; when a rival state rises to the point where it can threaten another’s security, this state will bolster its own military strength and try to prevent any threat to its own security and sovereignty. Sometimes this may escalate into an arms race and ultimately into conflict.[6] In this instance, accepting that another state can eliminate your own with the press of a button fails to be acceptable. The very existence of these weapons is incredibly threatening to other states, and a state will act in whatever way necessary to mitigate that threat and ensure their own security. This concept has led to cases of nuclear proliferation in the past. For example, Pakistan built nuclear weapons in response to India’s nuclear test, and North Korea built nuclear weapons to ensure their regime’s survival and security against powers like the United States.[7]

Policymakers attempted to fix this problem during the Cold War with a secure second-strike capability. It was argued that if a state could still retaliate after suffering a fatal nuclear blow and deal the same fate to the aggressor, it would deter against preemptive strikes and force states to accept this mutual vulnerability and forego competition. As such, states sought to ensure their retaliatory capabilities through a combination of “hardening, concealment, and redundancy.”[8] Stationary weapons silos and shelters were hardened to improve survivability, submarine-based systems stayed concealed and mobile, and a massive number of nuclear weapons were produced and globally dispersed.[9]

However, this system was never truly accepted. If states had accepted this mutual vulnerability, the massive spending on modernization would fail to make sense. Even when these states claimed to accept MAD, their actions said otherwise. While the second-strike theory may have enhanced deterrence, it certainly did not stop states from competing to gain the nuclear edge over each other. Gavin asserts that even when quantitative parity was accepted between the two states, they still sought a qualitative edge over the other to secure nuclear primacy.[10]

The United States still pursued the ability to win a nuclear war with the USSR instead of accepting the status quo as expected and sought to be able to defeat the USSR’s second-strike capability. The U.S. engaged in programs to modernize its nuclear weapons, invest in missile defense technologies, nuclear submarine tracking, command and control technologies, as well as sought geopolitical advantage. Both states actively pursued the ability to outperform and outgun the other, to gain the edge and retain the capability to win a nuclear war.[11] The basic competition of realism did not change with the introduction of nuclear weapons. While states acted more cautiously, they still competed to secure their advantage and their security within the international system.

As time moves forward, the security imposed by this has become increasingly fragile. Even during the Cold War, the U.S. possessed a remarkable intelligence capability that would have been able to effectively find and target both stationary and mobile Soviet nuclear weapons. Long and Green authored an exquisite piece discussing now-declassified information that demonstrated our intelligence capabilities to track down enemy missiles with efficiency and precision via improvements in acoustics, ocean surveillance, and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) technologies, capabilities that have significantly improved to this day.[12] Improvements in the targeting, accuracy, and reprogramming of weapons have further improved U.S. capabilities to destroy hardened targets. Elimination of fratricide from multiple strikes via these improvements has also allowed the U.S. to target and strike a hardened silo multiple times within a few seconds of each other. Lieber and Press claim that a strike against 200 Soviet silos utilizing two weapons per target in 1985 would have left approximately 42 silos still standing, while a similar strike today would destroy all 200.[13] Second-strike capabilities have become increasingly vulnerable in the modern age.

This isn’t to say that nuclear weapons have no deterrent effect—the lack of nuclear conflict during the Cold War certainly can stand testament to that. Instead, the point is that this deterrent is not as simple of a system as was thought, or perhaps wished; states will still compete, go to war, and may even engage in a nuclear conflict. The security dilemma was never truly mitigated and is still alive and well within the international system. But nuclear weapons can raise the cost associated with conflict and cause states to act more cautiously. Attempting to destroy a state’s entire second-strike capability is a major act and not one to be taken lightly. While a state may decide to attempt this if it was prudent to ensure its own security, it would certainly be an extreme situation in which few would likely be willing to bear. While states still engage in this strategic competition and attempt to gain the upper edge in a nuclear exchange, escalation to this level still seems incredibly unlikely due to the costs of failure.

Further, it is worth considering that the defending state may panic and retaliate upon the signal of the enemy launch, fearing for the security of its own second-strike capability. During the Cold War, policymakers steered away from these reactions, relying on the survivability of their second-strike systems to dissuade the benefits of preemption and secure deterrence. If faced with this situation in the modern era, knowing these systems may not be as secure as they once were, it would be difficult to judge what an actual reaction would be. This uncertainty may actually improve the traditional deterrence model, as states are fearful that their adversary will be pushed into a “use it or lose it” mentality. But this traditional view is primarily applied to a preemptive, large-scale strike against another state. Limited nuclear warfare may be a far more realistic scenario to consider. Limited nuclear warfare could be conducted in a manner that does not threaten a state’s immediate survival, and hence would not warrant an all-out nuclear response in retaliation. The concern of these attacks escalating to this level of large-scale nuclear conflict is a real one, but the initial use of a nuclear weapon at this limited level is a far more palatable option for governments to utilize.

Nuclear Proliferation and Multipolarity

Nuclear weapon use in a limited manner may be a serious threat, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the changing state of the world into a multipolar nuclear order may encourage this. Despite tensions between the U.S. and USSR, they were ultimately able to manage this competition in a bipolar nuclear world; this competition for advantage and security ended with the eventual collapse of the USSR. The security dilemma ran its course without the use of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. rose to become the hegemon of a unipolar world. However, in a multipolar nuclear world, the challenges faced previously are significantly exacerbated. Currently, the nine known nuclear-weapon states are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.[14] Strategies that worked in a bipolar world may not be as effective in the modern landscape, thus preventing the failure of deterrence—and the subsequent use of a nuclear weapon—may be more challenging than before.

The most recent nuclear state, North Korea, is one of the most troubling in the current group of nuclear states. North Korea is one of the world’s poorest states, facing harsh sanctions and isolation from much of the international community. Yet, despite the hardships, poverty, and poor economy of this autocratic state, it managed to defy the nonproliferation regime and create a fully operational nuclear arsenal.[15] Pyongyang is not bashful about its willingness to use its weaponry either, stating that it will use its weapons to “reduce the U.S. mainland to ashes and darkness.”[16] Such a clear security threat may increase proliferation elsewhere in response. Allison calls this the “nuclear cascade,” and suggests that if a state as weak and isolated as North Korea can defy the non-proliferation regime, other states are likely to follow suit.[17] If the United States is incapable of preventing such a clear security threat, why would Tokyo and Seoul rely on Washington to defend them in the face of a nuclear threat? Japan already has the capability to build nuclear weapons, possessing well-developed uranium enrichment and missile programs that could allow Japan to rapidly create a credible nuclear weapons program to defend itself and its national interests without the United States. According to The Council on Foreign Relations, there are thirty states that have the technological ability to quickly build nuclear weapons.[18]

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While Pyongyang claims offensive intentions, it is incredibly unlikely to attempt to use its nuclear forces offensively against the United States. Doing so would be an act of suicide, the disparity between U.S. and North Korean forces is far too great. Instead, these weapons were more than likely obtained for defensive purposes. Pyongyang may not be able to destroy the United States, but it can ensure its own sovereignty. Forcibly trying to topple the Kim regime could escalate into the use of nuclear force if Pyongyang got desperate, and a strike designed to eradicate their nuclear weapons would again invoke this “use it or lose it” mentality. While Pyongyang may not be able to destroy the U.S. with its capabilities, it can undeniably cause immense harm to the US. It could cause even greater harm to smaller, closer countries such as U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Knowledge of this is a strong deterrent against U.S. intervention, allowing Pyongyang to carry on less cautiously without fearing foreign intervention. The creation of this deterrent may have effectively ensured the sovereignty of the Kim regime for the time being, and they are unlikely to relinquish this guarantee. The establishment of this deterrent highlights some of the challenges in the modern nuclear era. North Korea’s outright defiance of the nonproliferation regime sends a signal that other states can build a nuclear capability as well and that such a force may be an effective way to guarantee their sovereignty against the Western world.[19]

Proliferation to autocratic states is a cause for concern, primarily because they are considerably less stable than democratic states and may be more willing to utilize a nuclear weapon. The inherently volatile nature of these regimes poses a significant challenge. North Korea has a very poor and impoverished populace, held under authoritarian rule. Regimes such as these are not known for their longevity and stability. The threat of regime change and revolt from within is a realistic consideration with autocratic states. If this occurred, it could result in the loss of a nuclear weapon, or their domestic use to quell a rebellion.[20] It could also escalate into conflict as Chinese and U.S. forces both seek to secure their nuclear assets and end up in conflict with each other. China would certainly not accept U.S. forces along the Yalu river, and both would want to immediately seek to ensure the stability of Pyongyang’s nuclear assets.

Autocratic states could also safely assume that Western powers would prefer it if they were a democratic government friendly to the West. With the international liberal orders push for global democracy, autocratic rulers are likely to fear Western interference. After Pyongyang’s recent success, a nuclear weapons capability may appear to be an effective way to prevent Western interference and ensure its sovereignty.

With smaller autocratic states, the constant external and internal threats to the stability of their regimes breed paranoia and volatility. Leading government officials tend to be promoted based on loyalty rather than competence, and disagreement or discontent with the dictator may be punished harshly, stifling progress and ingenuity. These regimes also tend to have strong military leadership directing the country. Pakistan is notable in this regard, where the military maintains significant control over the government and has a history of instigating a military coup when they dislike civilian leadership. Pakistan has had four separate military coups since its creation, with military dictators constantly consolidating their power into the executive branch.[21] Military leadership is far more likely to see nuclear weapons use as a viable option, which increases the instability of nuclear autocratic regimes even further. Civilian leadership has arguably been a key factor in preventing nuclear use thus far. Military officers often possess a different mindset and attitude on the subject than civilian leadership due to their career path. During the Cold War, there were numerous instances where the Joint Chiefs of Staff were far more willing to utilize nuclear weapons in a preventive war and were reined in by U.S. civilian leadership.[22]

Throughout the Cold War, there were numerous false alarms; equipment detected missile launches that did not exist, drills were confused for real launches, and communication cut-offs and the “fog of war” nearly led to nuclear use.[23] If faced with similar threats, it is less likely that an autocratic state will respond in such a level-headed manner. With shorter-range nuclear weapons, this could be exacerbated. These states are less likely to have a robust, survivable nuclear arsenal. If a state’s nuclear arsenal is threatened, it is likely to take action to ensure its survival or use. Without having the same geographic separation that the U.S. and USSR did, several states today rely on shorter-range weapons, like short-range missiles and multi-role fighter/bomber aircraft. Whether these weapons systems carry nuclear or conventional payloads may be unknown; being forced to make a rapid decision to respond to a potential threat may push a state over the edge to ensure its security.[24]

Particularly concerning, at least in regard to stability, is the smaller size and the heightened vulnerability of many arsenals compared to other states. The multipolar nuclear order lacks the same levels of parity both quantitatively and qualitatively that were present in the Cold War. The number of weapons between states varies significantly. While exact numbers are typically classified, experts have estimated a range varying from approximately 20 warheads in North Korea, to around 6,000 for both the U.S. and Russia.[25] Destroying all the nuclear weapons in North Korea is significantly easier to do than performing the same action against the U.S. or Russia, and this may be especially true with an even newer autocratic state that develops a brand-new nuclear capability. The parity dilemma further extends to conventional capabilities. A state with inferior conventional capabilities such as North Korea compared to the U.S. or Pakistan compared to India, may feel pressured into utilizing, or at least threatening, to use its nuclear capabilities to make up for its inferiority. If a nuclear-armed state lacks an effective conventional response option and is faced with a crisis that threatens its security, it may decide to escalate with a limited nuclear strike to preserve its integrity and security.

The primary barriers to the use of nuclear weapons in the Cold War were the second-strike capability and the threat of mutual destruction. But as has been discussed, this second-strike may not have been as effective as previously thought and is particularly less effective in the modern age. Such disparity between arsenal sizes eliminates many other concerns with a nuclear first strike. The chances of eliminating a second-strike capability are significantly higher in many circumstances, and the abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty has made the idea of intercepting any surviving nuclear weapons much more likely. While ballistic missile defense is a fickle and inconsistent technology, the prospect of defending against a few surviving second-strike weapons is much more realistic than trying to defend against a general nuclear war.[26] The disparity between military strength has led to conflict through all history, and this has not changed with nuclear weapons. If a state thinks it can successfully engage and win in a conflict that would bring great benefit and little harm to itself, the threat of this occurring is great. As Thucydides cited the Athenians telling the Melians during the Peloponnesian War, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Faced with this fact, the receiving state may very well utilize its weapons as discussed to prevent the loss of its second-strike. The knowledge of this possibility enhances deterrence, but with great disparity, it may not be enough. If the aggressor feels that it can effectively defend against such a limited strike, or that it would be able to conduct the strike prior to the launch of enemy weapons, it may decide to do so. The varying distances between states and shorter-range weapons that can be utilized in the modern era make a difference as well. Nuclear rivals like Pakistan and India can strike each other much quicker than the U.S. and USSR could strike each other in the Cold War. This gives even less reaction time to make such a large decision and increases the chance that a disabling first strike could be pulled off.

The security dilemma is notable to mention here as well; the U.S. and Russia currently enjoy a considerable nuclear advantage over all other states. But another state building their nuclear deterrent or conventional forces, and hence threatening another’s superiority as happenstance, is likely to escalate into an instance of the security dilemma. In a multipolar world, this is especially relevant. Competition between two states is much simpler to manage, but when reacting to one state, a state may create escalation between several states simultaneously.[27] The recent abolition of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty serves as a useful example. The U.S. and Russia found this to be an acceptable state for several years; however, China’s rising conventional and nuclear power, including the development of intermediate-range weapons, may have threatened this. Russia, considering China’s proximity and fearing for its own security, hence develops intermediate-range weapons of its own to match this threat, pushing the U.S. to respond in kind as well.

Bracken expands on this concept, explaining how decisions targeted towards one state could affect several, and the challenges this brings to nuclear strategy.[28] In his example, the U.S. deploys a precise conventional missile capability designed to penetrate and destroy North Korean and Iranian nuclear infrastructure on its submarines, a move being considered at the time Bracken wrote The Second Nuclear Age. However, this capability has been condemned by China, for fear that it will have the added effect of threatening their own nuclear deterrent. China responds to these deployments by remodeling its deterrent and deploys a more mobile nuclear force that is harder for the U.S. to track and destroy. In turn, this agitates India and threatens their security, so they decide to respond to the increased Chinese nuclear threat by improving their own nuclear forces.

Any development to India’s nuclear doctrine or weapons program will surely affect Pakistan, and will surely escalate the already strenuous tensions between the states. The result is a cascading, delicate dynamic that is significantly more complex than the comparatively simple bipolar relationship deterrence theory was founded under. The security dilemma and realist competition between states aren’t so easily managed in a multipolar world and may very well escalate out of control. When a proper second-strike capability is not always present or a nuclear strike is unlikely to threaten the survival of a state and will serve its interests, the threat of such acts occurring is heightened. The multipolar nature of the world and challenges presented by the fog of war may make nuclear escalation in a crisis significantly more likely.

Multipolar competition has become all too apparent in the modern-day. Both China and Russia have been increasing their military might and seeking to expand their influence, challenging U.S. hegemony. The return to great power politics makes the more precarious state of the multipolar nuclear order more dangerous. Some comfort can be taken in the notion that the ideas and strategies that deterred strategic nuclear warfare in the past are still in place. A strategic strike against a nuclear powers’ cities would be counterproductive and almost certainly result in likewise retaliation, an unacceptable consequence and a strong deterrent in the majority of situations. But this strategy does not prevent a state’s aggression and expansion elsewhere. While the U.S. may be committed to its strategy of extended deterrence, the bulk of its warfighting capability rests on its conventional power.

While it may claim otherwise, a nuclear strike against an ally under the U.S. nuclear umbrella by a great power state is unlikely to be met with nuclear force, lest this escalates into strategic nuclear warfare between the two nations. The United States is unlikely to engage in a strategic nuclear war with another state to defend an ally’s security unless U.S. national security and the U.S. homeland is directly threatened. What is more likely to prevent a state from using a strategic strike against non-nuclear adversaries’ cities is the lack of necessity. There are few situations in which this is useful, as most goals can be accomplished nearly as easily with conventional forces. They certainly exist, the nuclear use in Japan highlights this, but if a state has a conventional option that is nearly as effective it would likely take it. While a strategic strike against a nuclear-armed adversaries’ cities is still unlikely, there are two more realistic options that should be considered: a counterforce strike against an adversaries’ nuclear forces, or a counterforce strike against an adversaries’ conventional military forces.

Tactical Nuclear Conflict

Nuclear weapons cannot be lumped together in one class. The way they are used and the style of weapon are important distinctions. Reaching as far back as 1965, Kahn made these assertions in On Escalation, describing different levels of escalation in nuclear conflict instead of the presumed jump to all-out nuclear war. He asserted that nuclear conflict could be fought at a variety of different levels, escalating and de-escalating between them depending on the circumstances. One of the most important distinctions in the modern day is that of counterforce and countervalue weapons. Counterforce would be used at the tactical level, against a state’s conventional or nuclear military forces. Countervalue is what is thought of more traditionally in a nuclear conflict, a higher-yield attack used on the strategic level, against a state’s cities, industry, and personnel. The attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of this sort, strategic attacks designed to coerce the state of Japan into surrendering, knowing they could not retaliate.

The mushroom cloud of the Tsar Bomba hydrogen bomb.

While the conditions and necessity for a state to conduct a strategic strike may still be unlikely, a more recent trend in nuclear weaponry may be a far more realistic and pressing threat. During the Cold War, states focused on creating the largest, most awe-inspiring and outright terrifying arsenals they could, and fielding the largest, deadliest weapons that they could create. The USSR went as far as to create and test the largest nuclear weapon ever to exist, the Tsar Bomba, a multi-stage hydrogen bomb with a yield of 50 megatons. For perspective, this weapon possessed approximately 1,570 times the explosive power of the nuclear weapons detonated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.[29] Such a massive weapon is terrifying, but also altogether unnecessary, and was unlikely to be used. Much of what was produced in the Cold War was an unbelievable threat. Instead, the modern nuclear age may see more utility in moving the exact opposite direction, fielding low-yield, precision, tactical nuclear weapons.

One of the primary concerns with tactical nuclear weapons is they create a far more realistic threat, blurring the line between conventional and nuclear conflict.[30] Strategic nuclear weapons used against an opponent’s cities are unlikely to be used. At the minimum, this would invite great harm against each other’s respective states, certainly enough pain that one would seek to avoid it. Few gains are worth the risk of losing one’s major cities and infrastructure. Tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons may avert this obstacle, however. If these weapons are utilized against an adversaries’ conventional forces, and outside of an adversaries’ homeland, it is unlikely to cause massive nuclear retaliation; neither the aggressing nor defending states’ survival is ever threatened in this scenario. These weapons may have the added capability to target and destroy enemy forces and defenses more efficiently, more accurately, and without the heavy number of civilian casualties that may be present in a traditional nuclear strike. If a state can vastly improve its warfighting capability without the threat to its survival that higher-yield, strategic weapons created, it could be expected to take advantage of these weapons.[31]

The most likely threat for nuclear weapons use would be a state escalating to tactical nuclear use against an adversaries’ conventional forces, attempting to coerce them into backing down, ensure victory, or deter foreign intervention.[32] For example, if China decided to retake Taiwan, it may be able to do so conventionally, but such a crisis has the potential to incite an American military response in defense of Taipei and have considerable Chinese casualties. If U.S. forces responded, Beijing may believe tactical nuclear strikes against those forces would be an effective means of creating military superiority against a conventionally superior force and that low-yield weapons could be utilized without threatening China’s survival. Such a measure would be incredibly unlikely to incite a nuclear response against China’s homeland, for fear of a similar response.

In a different, albeit unlikely scenario, tactical nuclear strikes against Taiwanese defenses in an initial strike may have the added effect of deterring an American response in the first place, raising the threshold for American intervention. In this scenario, Beijing would be operating under the impression that the U.S. would be sent a message that coming to Taipei’s defense would not only mean great power war but nuclear conflict, as well. Without facing a threat to its own homeland, it would be far less likely to incur that risk. The use of a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear weapons state will almost certainly not result in nuclear use against the aggressor.

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Similar situations could be seen by attacking a military base outside of a state’s homeland. The idea of such a strike occurring outside of ones’ homeland, on forward-deployed forces is critical. Yield differences mean nothing if the attack is directed at a state’s homeland, directly threatening its security. Escalation to this point is almost certain to result in strategic level escalation. An adversary cannot accurately guess the yield level of an opposing weapon in flight. While lower yield weapons are more useful for tactical level warfare, the target is the more important distinction.

A state must be able to fight at both the tactical and strategic levels. If the aggressing state escalates to the tactical nuclear level, and the responding state is unable to respond at that level, it will be faced with two options: concede and yield or escalate to the strategic level. The latter of these creates a threat to their own security via reciprocation at the strategic level—and hence is an unlikely choice.[33] The possible exception to this would be if the aggressing state is unable to retaliate at the strategic level themselves. As such, a significant disparity between great power states at the tactical level may be a cause for concern. Strategic capabilities do not need to be vast to create an unacceptable level of harm to a state, all that’s needed to deter at the strategic level is a small, survivable arsenal. Certainly, a single nuclear strike on an American city is an unacceptable consequence, and it would take a very extreme situation for a state to be willing to risk that. Defending a foreign state such as Taiwan that will not impact the survivability of the United States is not such a situation.

If a significant disparity at the tactical nuclear level exists, a state may be able to prevent foreign intervention when engaging in expansive conflict. If China maintained a far superior tactical nuclear capability than the U.S., and even a minimal strategic second-strike capability as described, it is very likely that it could escalate to the tactical nuclear level in an attempt to force the U.S. to de-escalate. With the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons against Taiwanese defenses, it is possible it could prevent U.S. intervention altogether if its capabilities were vastly superior at the tactical level of escalation. Taiwan is certainly not the only example; wherever a significant tactical nuclear disparity exists and state aggression against non-nuclear states cannot be deterred, the U.S. policy of extended deterrence will not hold any merit. The same could be seen with any state’s expansion, such as Russia reclaiming the Baltics, or China moving to use force seize territory claimed by both India and itself. If a state can utilize tactical nuclear weapons and would benefit more than it would risk, there is a possibility of it doing so.

A U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (Photo: U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Donald R. Allen)

Unfortunately, this is not a mere theoretical threat. The most recent Nuclear Posture Review identified significant expansion and modernization of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, while the U.S. has expanded only incrementally. Since 2010, the F-35A multirole fighter jet is the only new nuclear delivery system produced by the U.S., whereas Russia has developed a combined total of 14 new delivery systems across the nuclear-triad and China has fielded nine new ground and sea-based delivery systems. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review further mentioned Russia’s vast expansion of tactical weapons systems that can hold either a conventional or nuclear payload.[34] These types of weapons systems are not held accountable under the START treaty. As of 2016, the only weapon in the U.S. arsenal designed for non-strategic purposes was the B61 gravity bomb, an air-based tactical nuclear weapons system, of which the U.S. maintains an inventory of approximately 500. These weapons have a max payload of about 50 kilotons, which may still be far too high to effectively target conventional forces and provide an effective tactical-level deterrent.[35] The U.S. does not have tactical nuclear weapons on any other level of the nuclear-triad, a gap which the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review addressed and called to fix.[36] While the U.S. has slowed down its nuclear programs and the development of tactical nuclear weapons, other countries have not followed this lead, and instead have been exploiting it as a weakness. Retired Vice Admiral Robert Monroe claims that Russia is around 20 years ahead of the U.S. in terms of its low-yield nuclear weapons capabilities.[37]

Source: 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

There may be an upside though. Tactical nuclear weaponry, a far more believable threat, may be used to enhance deterrence if used properly.[38] Decisions to aggressively expand and enter into war are made by calculating that a state can win the encounter and the benefits outweighing the costs.[39] If Russia is to invade the Baltics, it must find that it has a high chance of success. Either it has the capability to defeat NATO defenses and responding forces via tactical nuclear conflict or be confident NATO will not come to their defense, whether this is from initial tactical-nuclear escalation or for other reasons. Strategic weaponry may work to deter a threat from an attack on a state’s homeland, but it remains too unbelievable of a threat to deter another nuclear state from expansion elsewhere. The proxy wars and conflicts against non-nuclear states since the end of World War II provide a solid historical precedent for this. Tactical nuclear weapons may be a more believable threat and be able to deter where strategic weapons could not. If the U.S. announces its commitment to defend Taipei and has an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons at relative parity to China’s, then China is less likely to try to take Taiwan by force in the first place. The same goes for any other theoretical expansive military action taken by a nuclear state armed with a robust tactical nuclear capability.[40]

While the aggressing state’s survival is no longer threatened, the cost of war is heavily escalated and chances of success much lower. Tactical nuclear weapons will cause immense and swift destruction to conventional forces on both sides, a risk that is unlikely to be taken. With relative parity, these weapons greatly raise the threshold of military action and may make the risk of conflict even less prevalent if this parity is maintained amongst great powers. This is still not absolute, as even with tactical nuclear parity, the willingness to commit to such an act must be believable. The defense of another state without a direct impact on one’s own homeland may not be believable, and the aggressor may call the bluff. However, not knowing for sure and having the commitment of extended deterrence will cast enough doubt in the majority of situations, as the cost of being wrong would be immense. The best way to prevent such a threat from materializing is to credibly be prepared to fight at all levels if it does.[41] While this may not guarantee that these weapons will not be used and remain deterred, the lack of parity will almost certainly invite their use if it will give another state superiority over the United States. If a state can topple a stronger conventional force and achieve its goals with nuclear force, without threatening its survival, it will do so. With the competitive and fragile nature of a multipolar nuclear order, it will be of the utmost importance to be able to manage escalation at all levels of nuclear escalation.

Conclusion

In the modern nuclear age, the use of these weapons is increasingly likely, particularly if doing so will give a state a significant advantage over another. Deterrence has merit, but it undoubtedly lies in the presence of a realistic, credible threat, across all levels of the threat spectrum that mitigate this potential advantage. Nuclear multipolarity and increased interstate competition are resulting in an increasing number of competing, nuclear-armed states with historical tensions, leading to instances of escalation and the development of the security dilemma between multiple actors. Nuclear modernization and proliferation are prompting states to develop low-yield, counterforce nuclear weapons which can be utilized without threatening a state’s survival in a limited nuclear conflict—particularly when parity is not present at all levels of nuclear escalation.

Undeniably, the use of another nuclear weapon, either tactically or strategically, is a travesty that all states must try to avert. At the same time, the destructive power of these weapons does not fundamentally alter the landscape of relations between states. If this power is to be kept in check, this idea must be acknowledged and understood. If a state can get away with using these weapons to advance its position, it almost certainly will do so. Large disparities at different levels of nuclear escalation should be avoided if possible, particularly amongst great powers. While developing more destructive and lethal weapons may seem counterproductive to ensuring peace, doing so may not only be in the interest of sustained U.S. hegemony but to prevent the potential use of nuclear weapons and improve international stability.


[1] Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

[2] Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter): 10.

[3] Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press. 18-26.

[4] Wallander, Celeste A. 2013. “Mutually Assured Stability: Establishing US-Russia Security Relations for a New Century.” Atlantic Council. July 29, 2013. Mutually Assured Stability: Establishing US-Russia Security Relations for a New Century - Atlantic Council.

[5] Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2013. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 3-40.

[6] Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. 2001. Contending Theories of International Relations. Boston: Addison Wesley Longman. 64.

[7] Bracken, Paul J. 2013. The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. 162-211.

[8] Leiber, Keir A., and Press, Daryl G. 2018. “The New Era of Nuclear Arsenal Vulnerability.” Physics and Society 47, no. 1 (January): 2-6. The New Era of Nuclear Arsenal Vulnerability.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Gavin, Francis J. 2019. “Rethinking the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy.” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (January). https://tnsr.org/2019/01/rethinking-the-bomb-nuclear-weapons-and-american-grand-strategy/.

[11] Jervis, Robert. 2009. “The Dustbin of History: Mutual Assured Destruction.” Foreign Policy. November 9, 2009. The Dustbin of History: Mutual Assured Destruction.

[12] Long, Austin, and Brendan R. Green. 2015. “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1-2: 38-73. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150.

[13] Leiber, Keir A., and Press, Daryl G. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce.” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring): 21-27.

[14] Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2018. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Federation of American Scientists. Accessed February 20, 2019. https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.

[15] Sagan, Scott D. 2018. “Armed and Dangerous.” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December): 35-43. Armed and Dangerous.

[16] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington DC. 32. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/.../2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

[17] Allison, Graham. 2010. “Nuclear Disorder.” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February): 74-85. Nuclear Disorder.

[18] The Council on Foreign Relations. 2012. “The Global Nonproliferation Regime.” May 21, 2012. The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.

[19] Sagan, 2018.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Oberst, Robert C., Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, Ashok Kapur, Mahendra Lawoti, Syedur Rahman, and Ahrar Ahmad. 2014. Government and Politics in South Asia. Boulder: Westview Press.

[22] Sagan and Waltz, 2013. 48-63.

[23] Sagan, 2018.

[24] Cimbala, Stephen J. 2015. “Deterrence in a Multipolar World.” Air and Space Power Journal 29, no. 4 (July/August): 54-60.

[25] Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2018.

[26] Colby, Elbridge. 2018. “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War.” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December): 25-32. If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War.

[27] Bracken, 2014. 93-126.

[28] Ibid

[29] Atomic Heritage Foundation. 2014. “Tsar Bomba.” Accessed February 20, 2019. Tsar Bomba.

[30] Doyle, James E. 2017. “Mini-Nukes: Still a Bad Choice for the United States.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 17, 2017. Mini-nukes: Still a bad choice for the United States - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

[31] Colby, 2018.

[32] Carter, Ash. 2016. “Remarks by Secretary Carter to Troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota.” Department of Defense. September 26, 2016. Remarks by Secretary Carter to troops at Minot Air Force Base, North D.

[33] Kyl, Jon and Michael Morell. 2018. “Why America Needs Low-Yield Nuclear Warheads Now.” Washington Post, November 29, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...3e0760-f354-11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html.

[34] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018.

[35] Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2018. “United States Nuclear Forces, 2017.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 1: 48-57. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1264213.

[36] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018.

[37] Monroe, Robert. 2017. “Facing the Grave Nuclear Risk.” Washington Times, January 26, 2017. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26/america-must-resume-underground-nuclear-testing/.

[38] Kyl and Morell, 2018.

[39] Waltz, 2013. 8.

[40] Colby, 2018.

[41] Ibid.

 

[danielboon]

Reuters
MON DEC 16, 2019 / 8:40 PM EST
Pentagon chief: Need to speak with Turkish counterpart to understand Erdogan base comments
ARE WE REALLY THIS DUMB!!!

ABOARD A U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT (Reuters) - U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Monday that he needed to speak with his Turkish counterpart to understand how serious President Tayyip Erdogan was when he said he could shut down the Incirlik air base, which hosts U.S. nuclear warheads.

Erdogan's warning on Sunday that he could close Incirlik came in response to threats of U.S. sanctions and a separate U.S. Senate resolution that recognized mass killings of Armenians a century ago as genocide.

"It has not been brought up to me before. The first I heard of it was reading it in the papers as you just mentioned and so I need to talk to my defense counterpart to understand what they really mean and how serious they are," Esper told reporters.

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Turkey could also close the Kurecik radar base, Erdogan added on Sunday.

Esper said that if Turkey was serious about closing down the Kurecik base, it would have to be discussed by NATO.

"They are a sovereign nation to begin with, so they have that inherent right to house or to not house NATO bases or foreign troops," Esper said.

"But again, I think this becomes an alliance matter, your commitment to the alliance, if indeed they are serious about what they are saying."

Last week, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution that recognizes as a genocide the mass killings of Armenians a century ago, a historic move that infuriated Turkey and dealt a blow to the already problematic ties between Ankara and Washington.

The U.S. Congress has been united in its opposition to Turkey's recent policy actions. Republican senators have been incensed with Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system, which the United States says poses a threat to its F-35 fighter jets and cannot be integrated into NATO defenses.

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They have also moved to punish Turkey over its Oct. 9 incursion into Syria. A U.S. Senate committee backed legislation on Wednesday to impose sanctions on Turkey, pushing President Donald Trump to take a harder line on the issue.

"I think the issue here is once again what is Turkey's direction with regard to the NATO alliance and the actions they are taking on any number of issues," Esper said.

NATO diplomats worry that Turkey, a NATO member since 1952 and a critical ally in the Middle East, has increasingly acted unilaterally.

(Reporting by Idrees Ali; Editing by Sandra Maler)

Pentagon chief: Need to speak with Turkish counterpart to understand Erdogan base comments

U.S. Defence Secretary Mark Esper said on Monday that he needed to speak with his Turkish counterpart to understand how serious President Tayyip Erdogan was when he said he could shut down the Incirlik air base, which hosts U.S. nuclear warheads.

t.co

© 2018Reuters. All Rights Reserved.

 

[jward]

Secretary Esper Holds an In-Flight Media Availability DEC. 16, 2019 Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper ​

STAFF: -- so we'll do on the record for a little bit. Sorry about earlier, but the (inaudible) just a little bit more difficult than what we (inaudible) out of. So we'll do this and then have a (inaudible). All right, sir? Go ahead. Any comments? SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MARK T. ESPER: Thank you, Well, I think we had a very good day today. It was really emotional to have a chance to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge, both Bastogne and up in Luxembourg. And most importantly, the chance to interact with some of the veterans. So they're all remarkable -- remarkable men with great tales (inaudible) all of us had a chance to hear one of them today, so this has been a great event. I had a chance to get there early in the morning and actually walk the battleground, (inaudible) Easy Company, the (inaudible) actually positioned during the Battle of the Bulge. So it was good to get out there on the ground, and also talk to some of today's soldiers as well and get a feel for what it meant to them. And it's very -- you know, means a lot to today's soldiers too because it's a link to the past, to their heritage. So, again, great day today and it's one of those memories you take with you for a long time, so thank you all. Q: Sir, yesterday, President Erdogan said he could close down Incirlik and another base in Turkey in response to potential sanctions and the Armenian genocide bill this Congress passed. A, is that something the Turks have brought up with you? And is that something you're concerned about? SEC. ESPER: It's -- it's not been brought up to me before. It's the first I heard of it. But it's -- reading it in the papers, as you just mentioned. And so I need to talk to my defense counterparts and what's -- what they really mean and what this -- how serious they are. Q: Do you think it's them being more bluster than substance? Because he has threatened things like this in the past. SEC. ESPER: I don't know. Q: Do you think it's time to get the nuclear weapons out of Incirlik? SEC. ESPER: I make no comments regarding where the United States may have weapons. So like I said, it's -- I think the issue here is -- is, once again, what is Turkey's direction with regard to the NATO alliance, and -- and the actions they're taking on any number of issues that I've mentioned in the past, whether it's the S-400, whether it's the holding-up of NATO plans for the defense of Europe, or other things? Q: One of the two bases that Erdogan is threatening to close is a NATO base, it's not a U.S. base. So do you think -- I wanted to know, if, first, it's something that the alliance has a vision. What can you do to prevent one country to close a base? SEC. ESPER: Well, again, the first I heard of it was in the paper. And so this is something that the alliance would have to discuss, if the Turks are serious about this. I mean, they're a sovereign nation to begin with so, you know, they have that inherent right to house or to not house NATO bases or foreign troops. Again, I think this becomes an alliance matter, and their commitment to the alliance. (inaudible) they were serious about what they are saying. Q: Can I ask about North Korea? What's your assessment time, going for the rest of the year? I’ve read the reports and seen the comments coming out of the peninsula that there might be attacks, Guam attacks -- are we heading to an inflection point where it's of greater concern to you? SEC. ESPER: It -- it is a concern, their rhetoric. We have seen talk of tests. I think that they will be likely, if they will (inaudible). We have a team that -- on the peninsula right now that has reached out and is asking to meet with them, as I understand it. So again, I think you need to let the diplomatic process play itself out. And my role remains twofold: first of all, ensure that we are in a high state of readiness, and we are, working closely with our ROK partners; and then secondly, help enable the diplomats. So I -- I'm hopeful. I would like to remain optimistic that we can keep moving forward (inaudible) negotiations but -- because the alternative is not a -- not a positive one. Q: Is it reasonable to continue relying heavily on (inaudible) rather than large-scale exercises and keep that readiness long-term? SEC. ESPER: Well, there's a lot in between large -- large-scale exercises -- and it appears we have -- we do things at the tactical level, things at the operational level with our South Korean counterparts, we do it ourselves. So I -- I -- again, I don't -- I'm confident -- and we talked to the commander of Navy Command, that we are -- remain in a high state of readiness, so we just take things one day at a time as this plays out. Q: (Inaudible) surprised that the North Koreans have (inaudible)? SEC. ESPER: Well, I think as I said before, I've been watching the Korean Peninsula for maybe a quarter of a -- a quarter of a century now, so I'm familiar with their tactics, with their (inaudible). And I -- I think we need to get -- we need to get serious and sit down and have discussions about a political agreement that denuclearizes the peninsula. That's the best way forward and arguably the only way forward if we're going to do something constructive. Q: (Inaudible) expressed your concern about the (inaudible) U.S. (inaudible) what kind of (inaudible) are you going to (inaudible)? SEC. ESPER: Well, I did speak with the Iraqi prime minister. We had a very good conversation. Of course, I'd -- I'd like to speak first about the partnership between our two countries, the progress we're making and the fact that we -- what we want is a -- a strong and independent Iraq and (inaudible) Iraq's sovereignty. That said, I -- I noted my concern about the uptick in -- in attacks on the bases in Iraq, where U.S. troops, materially may be, and that we were -- we -- we have a right of self-defense. That we would ask our Iraqi partners to take proactive actions, if you will, to get that under control because it's not good for anybody. Q: Who is behind these attacks? SEC. ESPER: Well, my suspicion would be that Iran is behind these attacks, much like they're behind a lot of malign behavior throughout the region, but it's hard to pin down. So again, we need their help in terms of getting the security situation under control and stabilized, but we also still retain our right of self-defense (inaudible). Q: There's a report in the New York Times that some people at the Army-Navy game were maybe flashing some white supremacist symbols. Have you heard anything about that? Do you think white supremacy in the military is an issue at all? SEC. ESPER: I don't believe it's an issue in the military. There is no room whatsoever for anybody to have -- to be -- to be a white nationalist or to be a member of any hate group whatsoever or harbor anything like that. I know in my days as secretary of the Army, we screened -- we screened very closely and diligently the new recruits coming into the service, and if -- you're not allowed to come in if you have those leanings and if we (inaudible) while you're in, you know, you go before the UCMJ, (inaudible). That said, I -- I understand some -- (inaudible) displays were made. I also understand that both academies are investigating these and we'll see what comes out. Q: All right. Can we get you on the record on Afghanistan? A recent report that there has been some question about whether or not the (inaudible). Is that true? Do you see there being any kind of change soon? SEC. ESPER: I didn't hear the first part. Q: When it comes to Afghanistan, there was a report over the weekend -- SEC. ESPER: Right. Q: -- that there might be a withdrawal order or effort within the week. Is that the case? SEC. ESPER: Well, I can say, for quite some time now, that I think we can go to a lower number in Afghanistan because the commander believes that he can conduct the all-important counter-terrorism mission and train, advise and assist so that we ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists. So he's confident that he can go down to a lower number. I would like to go down to a lower number because I want to either bring those troops home, so they can refit and retrain for other missions or/and be redeployed to the Indo-Pacific to face off our greatest challenge in terms of the great power competition that's vis-a-vis China. So, anyways, we'll see. There -- you know, there are a couple paths to get there. I think, again, today the best solution for Afghanistan is a political agreement. But I think we could go down to a lower number with or without that political agreement. And I have -- I have issued no orders yet to do that. We'll just take this a day at a time and see how things play out in the coming weeks. This is a conversation that has to be had between me and the secretary of state. We want to consult closer with our allies, but at the end of the day it will be the commander in chief's decision. Q: Did you speak to Speaker Pelosi at all today or the congressional delegation? SEC. ESPER: I did. I had a number of good conversations with Speaker Pelosi. I -- I thanked her for the NDAA, National Defense Authorization Act being passed, at least by, you know, both chambers. It's going to be signed, I think, this week by the president. And then I, you know, of course expressed the importance of getting the appropriations bills passed as well. And she thinks we're on a good trajectory right now to get that done also, so I thanked her for that -- you know, just chit-chat about the importance of Bastogne and the Battle of the Bulge and veterans. And as we left Luxembourg, I had a chance to talk with several members of Congress to thank them for attending, showing bipartisan support for our veterans. Q: Can I ask you about Space Force in light of the NDAA? It looks like there's at least a vision there to move pretty quickly on it. How do you see that going in the first quarter or half in '20? SEC. ESPER: Yeah, it's a good question. I don't have a solid answer for you right now. I need to sit down with the chairman of the Joint Staff, the Air Force, and work through next steps. These things take some time. We were talking about setting up a service, if you will. And so we have to think through all the manning, training, equipment, all the Title X functions that go with that. But it's an exciting time. I think it's -- you know, it's an epic moment in terms of another big change for America's armed forces, akin to the Army Air Corps being pulled out of the Army in 1947. So I think it's an historic moment. Q: Do you think you could have a functional service of some kind, in some small capacity, this coming year? SEC. ESPER: Well, yes. But we have a functional service now. We still have space capabilities, all of that. So we're not going to lose any readiness there or anything like that. But it will take time to -- to set up, you know, all the key parts, the staff, everything that goes with it, and have a -- have a smooth transition. These things take time. Q: (inaudible) on Syria, what is your way ahead in Syria? What -- what do you see, in the next few months, the U.S. troops do in Syria? SEC. ESPER: Well, we're going to continue with our mission, the enduring defeat of ISIS. And we'll do that hand-in-glove with our SDF partners on the ground. I think the way ahead is to continue to grow our coalition, the Defeat-ISIS coalition. We have 81 members, a combination of mostly states and -- and other organizations. And we need to grow that and go to them for political support, for military support with more troops, and monetary support. And so I think the more we can move along those three lines of -- lines of reference -- excuse me -- the better. Q: Would you like more (inaudible) military support on the ground in Syria? SEC. ESPER: Yeah, I think the more we can multilateralism it, the better. This is not a U.S.-only mission, it isn't right now. But I think we need to multilateralism it, as I feel with many things. We should -- we should operate as coalitions as often as we can. And I think Syria is a -- is a very good place to do that. Q: So it's not multilateral enough right now? SEC. ESPER: No, I think the more we can multilateralism it, the better. I mean, we have, you know -- we have a couple dozen-plus other NATO allies, going to be 30 once the next state gets in here. So there's a lot of other countries that can contribute to that mission as well. And so I think, again, the more we can multilateralism that mission, the better. That puts less stress on the United States to -- to bear most of the load on the defeat-ISIS matter. So yeah, I think the more we can multilateralism it, the better. Q: You spoke with your French counterpart a couple days ago. SEC. ESPER: Right. Q: Did you tell her about -- or did you talk about the maritime coalition in Turkey needing (inaudible), essentially? SEC. ESPER: We talked about that previously, but we did not talk about that on our -- on our phone call, we talked about other things. Q: (inaudible)? SEC. ESPER: (inaudible) right now. Q: You've (inaudible)? Q: We've heard in the last week or so, a number of your senior folks starting to leave, Randy Schriver, et cetera. SEC. ESPER: Yeah. Q: When you came in, there were a lot of vacancies. You filled a lot of those. SEC. ESPER: Yeah. Q: It seems like you might be getting a new wave of those -- SEC. ESPER: Yeah. Q: -- based on the timeline, or people just having done this for a while. To what degree is that a concern for you? And how much energy do you think you need to put into bringing in new expertise (inaudible) here? SEC. ESPER: Yeah, that's a great question. And, you know, many of you have been around here for a while. I've been in D.C. for 25 years now, so I know how things -- how the rhythm works. So you're right. When I came in, we had a lot of spots empty on the -- on the senior end, in terms of the two service secretaries, the deputy secretary of defense, the CFO, et cetera. Those are all either filled or will soon be filled, so I felt pretty good about that. When I looked at our roster, I went through the entire list, and not only what do we have filled, but also what was there -- what were their plans. And so I've known for some time that Randy was going to leave. I've known Randy for many years. He and I also, actually taught together, a graduate course on China. And so he and I have been friends for a long time. He has a wonderful time, and he's been at it hard from the beginning. So I knew he was probably going to leave. I tried to hold onto him, but, you know, he has a lot of demands on his life. And Jimmy Stewart has done an exceptional job as acting secretary of defense, so he stepped in to do one role and was (inaudible), but the point, number one, he's just done an exceptional job. So we're going to lose -- we'll lose those two. We have a replacement in place already for -- for Jimmy Stewart. You'll probably see another couple of -- some more announcements are coming up soon. Again, that's a normal rotation, folks have been at it hard for two years now, two-plus years. You have this happen even last year, at my annual meeting, (inaudible) positions, get people in place as quickly as possible. If not confirmed, at least acting. And -- and and keep moving them -- you know, the Pentagon forward. Q: Knowing the importance of Asia to you, do you have anybody in mind for Randy's job? SEC. ESPER: Yeah, I'll -- I'll keep those cards close for now. Randy's hard to replace. I mean, he's a -- you know, foremost expert on Asia and he's -- like -- like myself, he served in the military, he -- he served in previous administrations, so somebody like that -- a talent like that, who has a great record in Asia, is hard to replace. STAFF: All right, guys. (CROSSTALK) Secretary Esper Holds an In-Flight Media Availability Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper spoke to members of the media about the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. www.defense.gov

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

NATO Declares Space ‘Operational Domain,’ but More Work Remains

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization recently declared that space is an “operational domain” for the alliance. Though much work remains to actualize an integrated NATO space posture, t

www.realcleardefense.com

NATO Declares Space ‘Operational Domain,’ but More Work Remains

By Bradley Bowman & Andrew Gabel
December 17, 2019

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization recently declared that space is an “operational domain” for the alliance. Though much work remains to actualize an integrated NATO space posture, the affirmation is an important benchmark as NATO scrambles to meet rapidly evolving space and counter-space threats.

Today, space-based assets are an Achilles’ heel of U.S. military operations, representing a vital enabling mechanism upon which success often depends. In addition, great power adversaries could target civilian space assets to wreak havoc on the homeland in ways that redound far beyond the military realm.

America’s enemies have taken notice. “Foreign governments are developing capabilities that threaten others’ ability to use space,” according to a 2019 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessment. “China and Russia, in particular, have taken steps to challenge the United States.”

Russia has spent decades building up its counter-space arsenal, from cutting-edge electronic warfare capabilities to probable ground-launched anti-satellite weapons. Moscow believes that “achieving supremacy in space” can enable victory in future conflicts.

China’s People’s Liberation Army apparently agrees. Beijing has also identified space superiority — and space denial — as essential planks in its modern “informatized” military strategy. Indeed, China “continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and has enacted military reforms to better integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations,” the DIA assessment read.

These threats are already materializing. Russia is suspected to be behind nearly 10,000 GPS spoofing incidents — affecting over 1,300 civilian navigation systems — according to a report by C4ADS released last June. China has also targeted America’s vulnerability in space, notoriously hacking U.S. weather systems and satellite networks in 2014, after testing an anti-satellite weapon in 2007, which generated a cloud of hazardous space debris.

Fortunately, NATO is beginning to respond. In June 2019, NATO approved a new space policy, which NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has described as an acknowledgment of NATO’s reliance upon satellites for a range of fundamental military functions. These include, for example, communications, tracking, early warning, surveillance and navigation.

Though only a “framework” for now, it is an important start.

Today the U.S. shares space situational awareness data with its NATO allies and vice versa. Yet, there is potential for deeper collaboration in additional areas such as hosted payloads on satellites and communications. And while there is disagreement within the alliance with respect to space weaponization, this tension should not prevent the alliance from forging ahead on a number of important initiatives. Examples include general space-asset resilience (including within the electromagnetic spectrum), space-reliant communication, synchronized threat warning, command and control, and surveillance and reconnaissance. A space sensor layer, for instance, will be critical to tracking and intercepting Russian hypersonic missiles, an emerging threat against which there is currently no adequate defense.

NATO must take swift action to redress these areas of exposure. But how?

To begin with, NATO could publish a publicly available strategy document analogous to the U.S.-produced National Defense Strategy. This would provide multiyear strategic signposts and, because of its public availability, outside accountability.

As proposed by others, NATO could also run annual “Space Flag” exercises akin to the current “Red Flag” exercises, which today help hone large-scale, multinational joint air operations. “Space Flag” could likewise be used to systematically develop and refine space contingencies against red cell adversaries.

In addition, NATO could explore co-developing NATO-specific space assets from inception, tailored for NATO’s mission and permanently integrated into NATO’s command structure. The United States and Europe’s combined space experience and infrastructure is a comparative advantage vis-a-vis Russia and China. If put to proper use, it could give NATO’s space dominance efforts a significant leg up.

Finally, NATO could entertain the formation of a combined NATO-operated space assets pool, to which existing current member states could contribute existing capacity. A study conducted by the NATO-sponsored Joint Air Power Competence Centre found it “demonstrably feasible” to complete multination, multi-satellite constellations. The study suggested such an approach could emulate NATO partnerships related to the E-3A, C-17 and A-400M platforms but would be “potentially conducive to additional flexibility and innovation.”

The same report cites the Disaster Monitoring Constellation, or DMC, program — an existing multinational satellite-monitoring program used for disaster relief — as an existing example of effectively marshaling space assets. DMC’s shared capabilities “reduce cost, enable sharing, and can be upgraded and expanded to address emerging concerns.” So, too, might a NATO constellation.

Officially recognizing space as an operational domain and establishing a framework for a unified space policy are laudable steps forward for NATO — necessary to counter both present and future threats. But waking up to the threat is not enough. Now is the time for tangible and urgent collective action to secure the ultimate high ground.

Bradley Bowman is senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Andrew Gabel is a research analyst.

 

[danielboon]

EndGameWW3 Retweeted

U.S. Northern Command
@USNorthernCmd

NORAD & NORTHCOM closely track vessels of interest, including foreign military vessels such as Russian ship VICTOR LEONOV, in our area of responsibility. We're aware of Russia's naval activities, including deployment of these intelligence collection ships in the region. (1 of 2)
5:58 PM · Dec 17, 2019·
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U.S. Northern Command
@USNorthernCmd
·
41m

Replying to
@USNorthernCmd
While we won't discuss specific measures being taken, NORAD & USNORTHCOM routinely conduct air and maritime operations to ensure the defense of the United States and Canada. (2 of 2

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Turkey's Deepening Intervention In The Libyan Civil War Point's To Erdogan's Grand Ambitions

Turkey's actions raise the possibility of a troop deployment to Libya and have also prompted a major maritime territorial dispute in the Mediterranean.

www.thedrive.com

Turkey's Deepening Intervention In The Libyan Civil War Point's To Erdogan's Grand Ambitions
Turkey's actions raise the possibility of a troop deployment to Libya and have also prompted a major maritime territorial dispute in the Mediterranean.
By Joseph TrevithickDecember 16, 2019

• The War Zone

Amru Salahuddien/Picture-Alliance/DPA/AP Images
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The possibility that Turkish troops may intervene directly in Libya's simmer civil war is growing after lawmakers in Ankara approved a military cooperation deal that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed with his Libyan counterpart Prime Minister Fayez Al Sarraj last month. This reflects Turkey's apparent growing geopolitical ambitions, which have also recently prompted a crisis over maritime boundaries and resource rights in the Eastern Mediterranean and is inflaming a growing divide with traditional allies, chiefly the United States.
On Dec. 16, 2019, Turkey's parliament approved the agreement that Erdogan and Sarraj had signed on Nov. 27 in Istanbul. This deal reaffirmed the Turkish government's commitment to providing military assistance and materiel support to the internationally-recognized Government of National According (GNA) based in Tripoli. It also leaves open the possibility for the Turkish military to deploy its own "quick reaction force" in direct support of the GNA. The Turkish and Libyan leaders had met again in Turkey on Dec. 15, but there has been no official announcement of the impending arrival of Turkish troops in the North African country.




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"We will be protecting the rights of Libya and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean," Erdogan had said on Turkey's A Haber television network on Dec. 15. "We are more than ready to give whatever support necessary to Libya."

The Turkish President had also decried Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, who as "not a legitimate leader" and "representative of an illegal structure." Haftar has been leading a challenge to the GNA from his main base of operations in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi for years now. Forces aligned with his Libyan National Army (LNA), with support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia, control much of the country. You can read more about Haftar and the origins of the current Libyan conflict in this past War Zone piece.

Vladimir Astapkovich/Sputnik via AP
Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar.
On Dec. 12, 2019, Haftar had announced a new offensive aimed at taking control of Tripoli and ousting Sarraj and the GNA. The LNA had tried and failed to do the same in April.
"Today we announce the decisive battle and the advancement towards the heart of the capital to set it free ... advance now our heroes,” Haftar had declared in a televised speech carried on Saudi Arabia's Al Arabiya television network.
Haftar claims that the LNA is the country's legitimate military and that he is simply fighting terrorists and Islamist militants on behalf of the central government. At the same time, however, he has also disputed the GNA's authority, saying that they are in league with the same terrorists and militants he says he is fighting, and clearly has designs on running the country.
Turkey's growing role in Libya's civil war
Libya has been in a state of near-constant civil conflict since a NATO-led intervention enabled rebels to unseat and kill long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The GNA, which came into being following a United Nations-brokered deal in 2015, continues to enjoy the ostensible support of most of the international community, including the United States and major Western European powers, such as France.
Turkey, however, has emerged more recently as one of the GNA's most active and ardent supporters. On Dec. 13, the day after Haftar announced his new offensive and before Turkish legislators had even approved the new deal with Libya, a Boeing 747-412 cargo aircraft, which belonged to Moldovan charter service Aerotranscargo, flew from Istanbul to Misrata, a city to the East of Tripoli under GNA control.

prob Turkish drone (tktikt70) out of Tripoli, #Libya and incoming 747 freighter from Istanbul.
This, as #Haftar declares final battle for Tripoli pic.twitter.com/qwT9p0KGI4
— avi scharf (@avischarf) December 13, 2019​

Observers and experts widely believed that this plane was carrying a mix of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment bound for GNA forces. In addition, plane watchers using only tracking software spotted what might have been a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aircraft, which can be configured to carry weapons, heading toward Misrata, as well.
The LNA promptly launched an airstrike on the Misrata airport, which appeared to target a pair of hangars where arms, ammunition, and equipment could have been stored. Unconfirmed video purporting to depict the aftermath of those strikes shows a large fire at the airport.

Same player shoot again

Allegedly footage of new LNA airstrike on Misrata airport pic.twitter.com/vnPnZ8fVUe
— Harry Boone (@towersight) December 15, 2019​

airstrikes targeted two of these recently built hangars at Misrata airport last Friday night 32°18'59.7"N 15°03'46.3"E pic.twitter.com/sjIOhKBylj
— Samir (@obretix) December 15, 2019​

Also on Dec. 13, 2019, the LNA claimed to have shot down another TB2 near Tripoli.

Haftar LNA forces downed a GNA Turkish made Baykar TB2 armed UAV (Empty wingpoints) over Ain-Zara south of Tripoli Libya pic.twitter.com/vgOxlDUHUk
— Harry Boone (@towersight) December 13, 2019​

Libya has technically remained under a U.N. arms embargo, but a recent report from that international organization has found that foreign supporters of both the GNA and the LNA have flaunted it repeatedly. In May 2019, following Haftar's failed offensive to take Tripoli, the Turkish government began visibly supplying the GNA with various weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. This also notably included shipments of Bayraktar TB2s, as well as BMC Kirpi mine-protected wheeled armored vehicles.
Drones have become an increasingly important feature on both sides of the Libyan conflict. The Chinese-made Wing Loong family of unmanned aircraft, a rough analog the U.S. MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, which came by way of the United Arab Emirates along with manned IOMAX AT-802i armed crop dusters, have supported the LNA since 2016.
The importance of drones has only increased as the availability of manned aircraft to both sides, such as GNA Mirage F1s and LNA MiG-23s, has steadily dropped as they have become increasingly difficult to operate and maintain. Anti-aircraft fire has claimed a number of these jets over the years, too.






Possibility of Turkish troops on the ground

If Turkey were to deploy actual troops to Libya, it would represent a significant escalation in its participation in the conflict. Both the GNA and the LNA have employed mercenaries over the years, but the overt presence of actual foreign forces fighting on one side or another would be a marked change in the character of the fighting, in general.
However, there are indications that things have been trending in this direction in recent months. Last year, reports first began to emerge claiming that the shadowy Russian private military company Wagner, which has strong ties, if not more direct links, to Russia's intelligence services, had sent personnel to support Haftar. The rogue Libyan general has been actively courting Kremlin support for at least two years now and the U.S. government has accused actual Russian troops, in addition to the Wagner forces, of taking part in the conflict on his behalf this year.






"So this is something we’ve been talking about for some time, but it is Russian regulars and the Wagner forces that are being deployed in significant numbers on the ground and support of the LNA," U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker told reporters on Nov. 26, 2019. "We think this is incredibly destabilizing."
The United Nations has also accused Sudan's Rapid Security Forces (RSF) of deploying 1,000 personnel to Libya to support the LNA, possibly in coordination with Russian government forces or Wagner mercenaries. The RSF is best known for overseeing the notoriously brutal Janjaweed militias, accused of numerous atrocities while fighting rebels in Sudan's Darfur region. It has also been responsible for violently suppressing renewed protests against the country's new military junta that took power after it ousted long-time dictator Omar Al Bashir in April 2019 following major public demonstrations. Wagner was also linked to efforts to keep Bashir in power.
Needless to say, the possibility of Turkish troops finding themselves fighting directly against the LNA, as well as its foreign mercenaries, and any actual troops Hafter's international backers may have sent covertly, raises the real possibility that the conflict could enter an entirely new phase and have impacts well beyond Libya's borders.

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[Housecarl]

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U.S. involvement in Libya
That same kind of risk calculous may have been a factor in the U.S. military's decision to order special operations forces to evacuate from an area to the west of Tripoli via a U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft in the face of LNA advances in April. The United States has continued to operate within Libya amid the country's unrest since 2011, with the main focuses at present being containing the spread of ISIS' Libyan franchise and other terrorist groups, as well as hunting down individuals linked to the infamous attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi in 2012.






American personnel operate from a number of forward locations in the country in both GNA- and LNA-controlled territory in support of these missions and have at least appeared to try to deconflict on some level with Haftar's forces in the past. In November, the LNA admitted that it had shot down an American drone flying over Tripoli, but said it had done so accidentally. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) subsequently said that it believed a Russian-supplied air defense system was responsible for the shoot-down, thought it could not say whether Russian mercenaries were operating it at the time.
They “didn’t know it was a U.S. remotely piloted aircraft when they fired on it," U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, head of AFRICOM, told Reuters earlier in December, adding that the incident has apparently caused some strain between the U.S. military and the LNA. “But they certainly know who it belongs to now and they are refusing to return it. They say they don’t know where it is but I am not buying it."
There have been rumors that U.S. forces or diplomatic staff have withdrawn from Tripoli, via LCAC, from the same location as they were in April. Given the identical details, this may just be a mistaken re-report of the earlier news.
In addition, C-17A Globemaster III airlifters were seen on online flight tracking software appearing to fly routes to and from Benghazi for unclear reasons. U.S. Africa Command's public affairs office said that there have been no evacuations or "relocations," the term it used to describe the movement of forces near Tripoli in April, in response to recent events.

Same one, opposite direction 24 hours ago & landed in Germany... pic.twitter.com/P4SpNSkuuS
— CivMilAir ✈ (@CivMilAir) December 15, 2019​

Odd twist here: this USAF C17 is now on its second flight from Ramstein, Germany into... Libya?. Last night it flew towards Benghazi, dropped off tracking, and re-appeared two hrs later, which means it couldn't have flown much furtherCivMilAir ✈ on Twitter pic.twitter.com/Q8FhtIM1Qw
— avi scharf (@avischarf) December 15, 2019​

The U.S. State Department's press office also declined to say whether or not any of its personnel had left Libya recently. However, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli has been shuttered indefinitely since 2014 in light of the country's unstable security situation.
There have also been questions in the past about whether the United States might, despite its public pronouncements of continued support for the GNA, be looking to change tack and back Haftar instead. There were reports in April that President Donald Trump and his administration had given at least tacit approval to the LNA's offensive toward Tripoli. The U.S. government did change tack, but has continued to engage directly with Haftar and the LNA, ostensibly in an attempt to resolve the conflict.
Whether or not the West, in general, remains committed to the GNA also came up when its forces captured U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank guided missiles, along with Chinese-made guided artillery shells, purportedly from LNA units. France later claimed these that weapons belonged to its forces in the country, but that they were inoperable and had been awaiting destruction. The apparent extremely close proximity of French elements to LNA forces raised questions about whether officials in Paris were playing both sides of the conflict.






A Mediterranean maritime boundary crisis
Regardless, the conflict in Libya has already had larger international impacts when it comes to humanitarian issues and there is already evidence that the new deal between Ankara and Tripoli may have serious and broader second-order effects. Beyond the security cooperation components, the agreement between the two countries formalizes a bilateral agreement on maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Turkish government sees the arrangement as giving it sole rights to exploit natural gas resources in one particular area. Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, to varying degrees, see it as infringing both on their sovereign territory and their own exclusive economic zones, in violation of international law. It could also effectively block plans for a massive undersea Eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline that would connect Levantine countries, such as Israel and Lebanon, with Cyrpus and Greece, and, by extension, the rest of Europe.
“Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus cannot carry out excavations in the Mediterranean without the permission of Turkey,” Turkish President Erdogan said during an interview with the Turkish TRT television network in November. ”We will protect our maritime borders in accordance with international agreements, thus protecting our rights and the rights of the Turkish part of Cyprus.”

Anadolu Agency
A map of the maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean as Turkish authorities see them, including those that Turkey and Libya's GNA have now agreed to.
It's not clear if Libyan Prime Minister Sarraj agreed to these provisions to ensure the promise of Turkish military support, but the arrangement has infuriated all of the other countries that have claims in the region. Egypt staged a major maritime drill in response, which included a demonstration of its Soviet-era, Chinese-built, American-upgraded Romeo class diesel-electric submarines and their ability to launch UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Greece has expelled Libya's ambassador to the country in protest. The European Union, of which Greece and Cyprus are members, has also criticized the deal. The entire situation looks set to be, at best, a protracted legal dispute, akin broadly to challenges in international courts to China's claims to the vast majority of the South China Sea.
Aggressive Turkish foreign policy
All told, Turkey's recent decisions regarding Libya reflect its increasingly assertive and unilateral foreign policy, overall. Erdogan has already demonstrated his willingness to both ignore and outright act against the geopolitical interests of traditional Turkish allies, such as the United States, with little apparent regard for the ramifications.
This was clear when Turkey launched its intervention into northern Syria in October 2019 that was aimed primarily at U.S.-backed predominantly Kurdish local forces. That military operation was followed soon thereafter with a deal between Ankara and Moscow about patrolling that part of the country.

Russian MoD
A map that the Russian Ministry of Defense previously released, showing where it is monitoring the northern Syrian border in cooperation with Turkish forces. The dashed line on either side of the gray shaded area, which is entirely under Turkish control, is the six-mile deep buffer zone that Russian forces are patrolling now. The dashed-and-dotted line represents a "safe zone" that U.S.-backed Kurdish forces are not supposed to enter.
Ergodan had already incited the ire of the United States and had drawn criticism from other NATO allies by insisting on buying S-400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia. The U.S. government subsequently booted Turkey out of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program over operational security concerns, which you can read about more in these past War Zone pieces. Turkey has remained defiant, announcing plans to buy more S-400s and other Russian military hardware, which, in turn, looks set to result in serious U.S. sanctions and a potential arms embargo.
If the United States does take those actions, Turkey has threatened to respond by suspending American access to various bases inside the country, including Incirlik Air Base, which, at least far as is known, still hosts dozens of B61 nuclear bombs, and Site K, a radar facility that supports U.S. ballistic missile defenses in the region.
There has been a flurry of U.S. Air Force traffic to and from Incirlik in recent days, including a visit by a C-17A transport aircraft from 62nd Airlift Wing at Joint Base Lewis–McChord in Washington state. This unit has the so-called Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) mission, making it responsible for air movements of nuclear weapons, which you can read about in detail in this past War Zone story. This followed an unusual sighting of another PNAF C-17A at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands, another base where the United States keeps B61s.

Whoa. RCH550 is apparently 00-0175, a 62d AW C-17 based at McChord. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force in action?Manu Gómez on Twitter00-0175 USAF United States Air Force Boeing C-17A Globemaster III
cc @CobraBall3 @steffanwatkins
— Private Joker (@pfc_joker) December 15, 2019​

Yesterday, there was a flight from "Nuke Carrier" 10-0220, a Boeing C-17 (#RCH276) to #Volkel Air Base for a quick ~3 hour stop.

While rows of trucks prevented C-17 from being seen, 2 Apache combat helicopters (Q-09 #REDSK11 and Q-23 #REDSK12) patrolled the area.#potn #avgeek pic.twitter.com/HvRkTPt4Ye
— Gerjon | חריון (@Gerjon_) December 13, 2019​

It is unclear whether or not any of these movements indicate the withdrawal of any B61s, something the U.S. government has been reportedly considering doing since October, or other U.S. forces from Incirlik in response to recent U.S.-Turkish tensions.

USAF C-5M GalaxyRCH211 airborne from #Incirlik air base #Turkey pic.twitter.com/wKNl8fowHU
— Manu Gómez (@GDarkconrad) December 15, 2019​

USAF C17 Globemaster III 07-7186 departed #Incirlik air base #Turkey pic.twitter.com/AZru93xxEI
— Manu Gómez (@GDarkconrad) December 16, 2019​

US transportation Command Omni Air Camber Flight Boeing 777-2U8(ER) inbound #Incirlik Air Base from Ramstein pic.twitter.com/BbOGqsNn94
— Manu Gómez (@GDarkconrad) December 16, 2019​

Back in Libya, it's unclear how the situation might continue to evolve in the coming days and weeks. As of yesterday, the LNA offensive toward Tripoli had appeared to stall as it had in April, which eventually led to Haftar's forces withdrawing under international pressure.
If it looks as if Haftar and the LNA may finally be getting the upper hand, especially with backing from their various international partners, Turkey may feel compelled to intervene, which will only make the future of an already extremely complex conflict more uncertain and unpredictable.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

India’s New Security Order - War on the Rocks

A crisis and a crackdown have defined India’s security policy in 2019. In February, the Indian Air Force launched an airstrike into Pakistan following a

warontherocks.com

India’s New Security Order

Paul Staniland
December 17, 2019
Commentary

A crisis and a crackdown have defined India’s security policy in 2019. In February, the Indian Air Force launched an airstrike into Pakistan following a suicide bombing in Kashmir. This then led to a crisis, dogfights, and missile threats. In August, the government in New Delhi surged security forces into Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and revoked its special status, beginning months of detentions, restrictions, and claims about the beginning of a radically new politics in Kashmir. Moreover, senior politicians have articulated a new vision of how India seeks to advance its interests at home and abroad: Toughness, boldness, and skillful maneuvering amongst the world’s leading powers define this aspiration.

How should observers assess India’s new security order? And what implications, if any, does it have for the United States?

I identify three characteristics of the new order: an emphasis on risk-taking and assertiveness, the fusing of domestic and international politics, and the use of unrelenting spin to hold critics at bay. This approach carries potential benefits for the United States in bolstering its position in Asia. But it also brings a set of risks and challenges that demand clear-eyed analysis — and a willingness to debate how the United States engages with India moving forward.

Crisis and Crackdown

On Feb. 14, a Kashmiri suicide bomber killed 40 Indian paramilitary forces near the town of Pulwama in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Early on Feb. 26, the Indian Air Force used precision guided munitions to strike at a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp near Balakot in Pakistan. It’s uncertain what damage the strike achieved, ranging from Indian claims of success to claims that India entirely missed.

On the morning of Feb. 27, the Pakistan Air Force responded with a sortie across the Line of Control that divides the Indian- and Pakistani-administered parts of Jammu and Kashmir. In the ensuing combat, an Indian MiG-21 was shot down and an Indian Air Force pilot was captured by Pakistan. India asserts that it shot down a Pakistan Air Force F-16, while Pakistan has maintained it shot down another Indian jet — both claims remain, at best, shrouded in ambiguity. With an Indian pilot in Pakistani hands, the crisis looked as though it might escalate, and there are credible reports that India threatened missile strikes against Pakistan, amidst efforts at crisis management by third parties. Pakistan soon returned the captured pilot to India and the crisis abated.

The Indian Air Force strike was unprecedented. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and many Indian analysts have argued that the goal was to inflict pain on the Pakistan Army and to show that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do not necessarily prevent Indian conventional operations. In turn, Pakistan has argued that the Indian strike missed at Balakot, and that the Pakistan Air Force’s retaliation on Feb. 27 should make India think twice about any repeat of such an operation. The public ambiguity of both sides’ claims makes a confident assessment of this crisis, and its interpretations by both governments, impossible. It is clear, however, that assumptions forged during the 2002–16 period about how both India and Pakistan will act in a crisis need to be revisited.

The second major event of 2019 occurred in the summer. On Aug. 4, Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir began widespread detentions of politicians, activists, civil society leaders, suspected militant sympathizers, and various others, while phone and internet access were cut. The next day, Home Minister Amit Shah introduced a bill (which was quickly passed) to revoke the special autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir, found in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. In addition, the legislation bifurcated the state into a pair of Union Territories (with less power and autonomy than a state in the Indian political system). Modi argued that Article 370’s autonomy provisions fostered separatism and undermined development. With new elections, a break from Pakistani meddling, and the undermining of a corrupt ancien regime of local parties and political families, a more “normal” and pro-India Jammu and Kashmir could be born. Skeptics argued that meaningful autonomy had already been stripped away and that many of the justifications for the move were unpersuasive, especially given the methods used by the government.

A war of narratives broke out as detentions and other restrictions remained in place for months in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley. Reports of human rights abuses and arbitrary security force actions, as well as protests against the decision, began to trickle out, to be vehemently denied by the government. As of early December, the internet remains largely shut off in the Kashmir Valley and substantial numbers remain detained, including a number of prominent former politicians who had been openly pro-Delhi. The government’s desired endgame appears to involve moving to localized elections and spurring economic development, leading to Kashmiri acceptance of the new status quo.

Characteristics of the New Order

The Balakot airstrike and revocation of Kashmir’s special status are obviously different. Yet we can see some useful analytical similarities in Indian policy across them, especially when combined with a hugely important recent speech by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar that outlined what he called a new phase of Indian foreign policy under Modi. What are the characteristics of this new order?

First, Modi is willing to accept greater risk in using force. The period between 2002 — when India did not take military action against Pakistan following dramatic terrorist attacks in 2001–02 — and 2016 has deeply shaped the assumptions of many observers of South Asian security affairs. Though regular attacks occurred against Indian targets, New Delhi sought to avoid war and instead focused on isolating Pakistan while building up its own economic strength. The new dispensation in India views this as a failed strategy that did not impose necessary punishment on Pakistan.

Kashmir and Balakot are part of a broader effort to reshape India’s global and regional environment. Jaishankar’s November speech argued that India is pursuing a new phase of its foreign policy under Modi. In his framing, a rising India needs to settle its borders by creating a new status quo in Jammu and Kashmir that can no longer provide a pretext for Pakistani interference and pressure from the international community. The Balakot strike was aimed at preventing future Pakistani support for terrorist groups, in combination with international economic pressure from the Financial Action Task Force and cultivating traditional supporters of Pakistan like Saudi Arabia.

In order to play at the high table of global politics, India may need to pursue bold action. India’s history, Jaishankar suggests, shows that “a low-risk foreign policy is only likely to produce limited rewards.” He links this need for risk-taking to the multipolar order that is emerging with the end of America’s post-Cold War dominance. The combination of rising new powers and uncertainty about America’s global posture are creating a more fluid international environment. India must aggressively move to eliminate liabilities and impose costs on foes in order to seize the opportunities this environment presents.

Second, both the Balakot strike and the Kashmir decision have been deeply woven into electoral campaigning and domestic politics more broadly. Many view the Balakot strike as the turning point of India’s 2019 general election, which returned Modi to power in a surprising landslide. Though national security issues are often peripheral to Indian electoral politics, they took on a far more visible role in the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) 2019 pitch to voters. The party framed Modi’s decision to launch airstrikes against Pakistan as a decisive move toward ending the menace of state-sponsored terrorism. Mobilizing national security, hard-line nationalism, and anti-Pakistan sentiment on the campaign trail worked for Modi and the BJP. The campaign rhetoric often went beyond what publicly available facts could support: as Tanvi Madan presciently predicted at the time, maintaining message discipline would prove challenging.

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The BJP deployed a similar pitch in recent state elections in Haryana and Maharashtra. The outcomes were not as salutary. But at the national level, the BJP currently owns the national security issue, which can be deployed in a remarkable number of ways, from signaling Modi’s toughness to accusing opponents of siding with Pakistan to satisfying supporters who believe that India’s Hindu majority needs to proudly assert itself against the “pseudo-secularism” of the once-dominant Indian National Congress. The opposition has largely preferred to battle on the grounds of the economy.

The fusion of security policy with elections is double edged. Citizens should be involved in oversight and debate over such policies, and the involvement of the Indian public in international affairs is long overdue. Yet the combination is also susceptible to demagoguery and unintended consequences. The hyperbole around the nature and effects of the Balakot strike may create powerful pressures in the future to hit even harder after attacks in Kashmir or elsewhere, whether escalation would be wise or not.

Finally, a striking characteristic of the government and its supporters’ response to Balakot and especially Kashmir has been relentless spin and aggressive denunciations from India’s most senior political leadership, as well as allies in the media and analytical community. It is extremely difficult to discern truth in an unyielding barrage of claims.

For instance, during the Balakot crisis, Indian government sources denied that India made missile threats against Pakistan after the downing of the Indian pilot, calling them “fictitious and manufactured.” Yet a later Reuters report, followed by the Hindustan Times, made clear that this had in fact happened — and then Modi himself made an approving reference to it during the campaign, calling into question his own government’s previous denial. Shah, then the BJP party chief and now the extraordinarily powerful Home Minister, said that 250 people were killed in the Balakot strike, which has not been backed by compelling public evidence. Nirmala Sitharaman’s claim that India knew the identity of the allegedly downed Pakistani F-16 pilot similarly emerged and disappeared without sustained support. The Pakistani government has played a similar game, including allegations, without proof, of downing two Indian jets, while restricting journalists’ access to the Balakot compound.

The Kashmir move has also seen aggressive spin. As journalists first began to report on what was happening in Kashmir after the crackdown, they were met with vehement denials from the government that turned out to be inaccurate. Senior central and state government officials claimed that reporting was biased and inaccurate, often resorting to unconditional blanket denials even in the face of plausible evidence. Shah contended in late September that “the restrictions are in your mind, not in Jammu and Kashmir” while the Indian army chief, Bipin Rawat, argued that “those who feel that life has been affected are the ones whose survival depends on terrorism.” Yet, when pressed, the government also explicitly justified restrictions on security grounds.

Both Shah and Jaishankar proclaimed in mid-November that the Kashmir Valley had returned to normalcy. Within days of those claims, a fact-finding mission made up of Indian citizens claims it was barred from leaving Srinagar, and migrant laborers were killed in a terrorist attack. In early December, the lieutenant-governor of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir indicated that internet would be phased back in once things had become “more normal” — followed by Shah proclaiming that Kashmir was already “absolutely normal.” It is distinctly unclear what the right amount — and nature — of “normalcy” is intended for Kashmir.

The Indian government’s public relations strategy has extended to scathing critiques of skeptical journalists and politicians in the West. Ashok Malik, former press secretary to the President of India and now an additional secretary and policy adviser in the Ministry of External Affairs, dismissed foreign critics of the government’s Kashmir policy as “New York/London-based know-alls, fringe left activists, Pakistani state agents masquerading as aggrieved neutrals, and freelance self-determinists representing nothing but their bylines.” Indian Ambassador to the United States Harsh Vardhan Shringla has critiqued the American media’s “peddling of half-truths, untruths, factually incorrect information,” while Jaishankar has argued that American politicians are “misinformed by their media.” The Indian consul-general in New York was seen in a controversial video asking of the U.S. Congress “Why can’t they go somewhere else? You go to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, but you do not talk about that. Why do you want to come to us? They are not liking that we are asserting ourselves.” The government has made it known that it is watching the foreign media’s Kashmir coverage. The message is clear — New Delhi is playing hardball.

Implications for the United States

What does this new dynamic mean for the United States? Washington has reasons to want a more assertive and powerful India as a counterweight to Chinese influence. Even as the administration of President Donald Trump continues to clash on trade with India, it is continuing to expand military cooperation. An India that is serious about overcoming the negative trends in its military balance with China, establishes linkages to American allies and partners in Asia and beyond, pursues liberal democratic values, and continues high levels of economic growth would be a serious asset. This bundle of opportunities has driven Washington toward increasing Indian-American alignment since the early 2000s.

There is not a major strategic constituency opposed to good U.S.-India ties. There are, however, disagreements about the precise level of alignment that the United States and India should, or will, achieve. According to Ashley Tellis, “India has been a beneficiary of extraordinary American generosity for close to two decades now.” For some, including Tellis, India is in exchange already providing a valuable counterweight to China, and there is little more that the United States could reasonably expect — Delhi remains “Washington’s Best Hope in Asia.” Others argue that the United States is suffering from “India fatigue” after expending substantial effort without sufficient returns, and needs to adopt a more focused approach. Others worry about the potential for misaligned expectations.

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[Housecarl]

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One might think that India’s new order would bring clarity to this discussion. Yet in some ways it actually makes things more muddled. Strategically, it is far from clear that India’s actions in 2019 have brought major strategic gains. The Balakot strike, intended to be a bold and signature operation, quickly became bogged down in competing claims and overt politicization during the election campaign, while leading to suboptimal global headlines about the capture of an Indian pilot. In a future crisis, Modi’s fusing of domestic politics with security policy, especially Pakistan strategy, could drive dangerous escalation pressures that undermine India’s professed goal of moving beyond the regional rivalry. In the wake of the Kashmir move, there is little evidence that the population of the Kashmir Valley has had a major rethinking of its allegiance to Delhi (much evidence suggests rather the contrary), a huge and costly security presence remains, sporadic militant attacks persist, and economic development initiatives have not gone according to plan. A critical assessment argued that Delhi’s post-August 5 Kashmir policy “is proving to be a disaster.”

At a broader level, it remains to be seen if India has the power to pursue a strategy that Jaishankar argues combines “greater realism” with “hedging.” Nor is it clear what this approach means for the American desire for India to act as a counterweight to China. While there has clearly been major progress in security cooperation with the United States and its allies, especially in the maritime domain, the most important structural measures of power are military and economic. Abhijnan Rej has persuasively argued that the disjuncture between hawkish rhetoric and escalating expectations, on the one hand, and inadequate spending on and political attention to defense reform, on the other, is creating a “gap between intent and capability.” Rajesh Rajagopalan pointedly notes that Jaishankar’s strategic vision ignores India’s actual power. Rather than representing new thinking, Jaishankar’s formulation of the new order falls into the “obsessive but grossly mistaken belief” that India is a key player in an emerging multipolar order, rather than being locked into a nascent bipolar U.S.-China order. A set of analyses from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) paints an uninspiring picture of India’s military power relative to China. While identifying ways to improve the situation, they find that “the trend lines in the India-China military equation are broadly negative” and “China’s recent military modernization and reforms have, if anything, further widened the capability gap.”

The Indian economy — the central driver of its strategic rise — has entered an alarming slump, there are allegations that the government is manipulating economic data, and some fear that India is entering the so-called “middle income trap.” This is occurring in the context of what Milan Vaishnav calls “the credibility crisis afflicting India’s core institutions.” These trends may reverse. But trading on future economic growth in exchange for current strategic benefits is an uncertain game.

A second cluster of challenges arise from the BJP’s domestic political project, which is central to India’s new security order. These are irrelevant to the Trump administration, which has neither interest nor credibility in human rights or liberalism, at home or abroad. Nevertheless, a pillar of American support for India has been based on shared values, explicitly including “secular democracy.” Many worry that India is moving in the direction of — or has arrived at — illiberal democracy. Ashutosh Varshney identifies a worrisome “contradiction between electoral resilience and liberal deficits,” while Gideon Rachman decries “India’s slide into illiberalism.” Major Indian newspapers have raised serious concerns, for instance, over the recently passed Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, which explicitly favors non-Muslim refugees, calling it “unequal, unsecular,” “a poisonous bill,” and “flawed and dangerous.” The aftermath of the bill’s passing has seen protests (and, in some cases, violence) on university campuses across India, as well as in the Northeast and West Bengal. Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and even the U.S. State Department have raised concerns about India’s Kashmir policy. Voices of discontent have begun to emerge in the U.S. Congress. Government supporters are pleased that Modi’s second term is “systematically ticking off the more ‘ideological’—and, therefore, more contentious — facets of the BJP’s famed distinctiveness,” but this agenda also creates international challenges.

India is also increasingly acting within the American political system. In an enthusiastic joint rally in Houston — “Howdy Modi” — Narendra Modi openly embraced Trump, heralding the president’s “love for every American.” More murkily, a recent investigation uncovered a disinformation network targeting the United States and other Western countries that is strikingly supportive of Indian government positions. After Reps. Pramila Jayapal and Steve Watkins introduced a House resolution on Kashmir in early December, in what may or may not have been a coincidence, a curiously similar set of articles directly attacking them appeared in the Indian media. The British government recently conveyed concern over the BJP appearing to pick sides in the United Kingdom’s election.

Dealing with the New India

The “New India” of Modi, Shah, and Jaishankar is unabashed in its embrace of power politics and contemptuous of its critics. America will need an equally clear-eyed response. There is a reasonable strategic logic behind the U.S.-India relationship, but it increasingly involves complications that cannot be ignored.

Future analyses of U.S. strategy toward India need to explicitly answer a set of important, and difficult, questions.

At the most basic level, should human rights and liberalism matter to U.S. policy toward India? Views of broader Asia strategy may drive this answer. To those who see India as essential to a balancing coalition against China, the answer is likely to be no. For an Asia strategy that involves cultivating Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, domestic illiberalism is no disqualification in pursuit of emerging great-power competition. For those who see India as helpful but not essential, or who are not as concerned about the rise of China, the answer may be quite different. In this view, India is more threatened by China than is the secure, distant United States, and so America has considerable room to maneuver. For either position, it is essential to be explicit about the trade-offs that may be involved.

If liberalism and human rights do matter, what would be the indicators of a break in “shared values”? If one is alarmed by trends in Indian politics, should the United States offer anything beyond polite diplomatic rhetoric in response? History suggests that there are serious limits to pushing India (for instance, threats to sanction Amit Shah seem likely to generate backlash) — but many in the United States are skeptical of embracing the BJP’s project, which cannot be cleanly disentangled from its most high-profile security policies. If current trends in Indian politics continue, this tension will increasingly confront those who see the Modi government as part of a transnational wave of illiberalism. A similarly delicate question is what kinds of Indian government activities within American politics should be viewed as appropriate, and which would cross the line into an open electoral intervention. Lobbying and diaspora mobilization are standard practice (including by Pakistan), but coordinated campaigns of leaks aimed at members of Congress or de facto endorsement of candidates would likely be seen as distinctly less so.

If the bipartisan political values pillar of the U.S.-India relationship weakens, it may focus American attention on bluntly transactional realpolitik and economic considerations even beyond the Trump administration. At this strategic level, the key question is whether and how to pursue conditionality around measurable outputs. What precisely should the United States expect from India in exchange for American technology, arms, market access, favorable immigration policy, and relief from sanctions related to purchases of Russian weaponry? Does the policy of “strategic altruism” that guided the Bush and Obama administrations remain relevant, or will Washington need a different approach that simultaneously avoids Trump’s incoherent blend of trade conflict and security cooperation? Those skeptical of India’s political direction may have a higher bar for Indian strategic convergence than those supportive of the Modi government. These dynamics will intersect with an Indian political arena in which deep historical suspicion of the United States can be found on both the left and right, adding further volatility.

American analysts, scholars, and policymakers will offer a wide, and likely conflicting, range of answers to each of these questions. The debate may end up reaffirming the status quo. Regardless, a new phase of Indian foreign policy requires an equal willingness to revisit American strategy.

Paul Staniland is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Committee on International Relations (CIR) at the University of Chicago. He is the author of the award-winning book Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Cornell 2014). He is currently finishing a book manuscript on government-armed group interactions in South Asia, and beginning a project on the domestic politics of international relations in the region.

 

[jward]

Turkey breaches airspace of Greece 40 times in a day, triggering mock dogfights between the NATO allies CHRISTOPHER RUANO/U.S. AIR FORCE By JOHN VANDIVER | STARS AND STRIPES Published: December 18, 2019 Posted for fair use ​ Stripes com/news/europe/turkey-breaches-airspace-of-greece-40-times-in-a-day-triggering-mock-dogfights-between-the-nato-allies- 1.611611#.XfrNGevd6ZI.twitter​

A Hellenic air force F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft soars during a flying training deployment at Souda Bay, Greece, Jan. 28, 2016. Greek air force pilots scrambled to intercept Turkish fighter planes that illegally entered Greek airspace 40 times on Dec. 17, 2019. Greek air force pilots scrambled to intercept Turkish fighter planes that illegally entered Greece’s airspace 40 times in a single day this week as tensions soar between the NATO allies over a territorial dispute in the eastern Mediterranean. Fighter jets from the two countries on Tuesday engaged in 16 mock dogfights following multiple Turkish incursions into Greek airspace, defense officials in Athens told Greece’s Kathimerini newspaper. Dogfights between the two NATO members are relatively commonplace and risky. Turkish jets and helicopters illegally entered Greek airspace 141 times on a single day in May 2017, the Hellenic National Defence General Staff said. Several Greek pilots have been killed in aviation accidents while intercepting Turkish jets in Greek airspace. The fighter intercepts stem from a long-running row between the two countries over territorial claims in the Aegean Sea. Greek Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos recently said the disputed area is under Greek military control, Kathimerini reported. A Turkish air force F-16 Fighting Falcon takes off during an exercise in March 2016. Greek air force pilots scrambled to intercept Turkish fighter planes that illegally entered Greek airspace 40 times on Dec. 17, 2019. KEVIN TANENBAUM/U.S. AIR FORCE Among the issues disputed by the two NATO members are delimitation of territorial waters, airspace, exclusion zones and Turkish claims of sovereignty over a number of small islands off its southwestern coast. Turkey could send military forces into the eastern Mediterranean and place armed drones in northern Cyprus over the territorial disputes, Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay said in parliament Tuesday. “If necessary, Turkey sends troops, drills in the east Mediterranean and launches cross-border operations. It does whatever is required,” Oktay was quoted by Turkey’s Ahval newspaper as saying. The U.S. has enhanced military ties with Athens as tensions have risen, not only between Turkey and Greece but also between Washington and Ankara. article continues below In October, Greece and the U.S. updated their defense cooperation pact, pledging to increase American troop rotations and joint exercises at several military sites in Greece, and to make infrastructure upgrades at the Navy’s longtime base at Souda Bay. The moves come as Ankara threatens to cut off U.S. access to Incirlik Air Base if Washington moves ahead with sanctions over Turkey’s military offensive in northern Syria and its acquisition of a Russian missile system. A U.S. Senate committee last week backed legislation to impose sanctions on Turkey. Meanwhile, Greece plans to buy drones from the U.S. and Israel that could be used to monitor Turkish maneuvers in the Mediterranean. Greece needs more surveillance capabilities in light of a maritime border deal recently struck between Turkey and Libya, Panagiotopoulos said in a speech to the Greek parliament this week. The European Union has said the border deal violates international law. vandiver.john@stripes.com Twitter: @john_vandiver

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Iraq Situation Report: December 10 - 18, 2019

By Brandon Wallace and Katherine Lawlor The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects o...

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Thursday, December 19, 2019

Iraq Situation Report: December 10 - 18, 2019

By Brandon Wallace and Katherine Lawlor

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is assessing the ongoing unrest in Iraq and its effects on political-security dynamics. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. This Iraq SITREP map covers the period December 10 - 18, 2019.

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s political elite has oriented around three initiatives to placate protesters before holding new parliamentary elections: 1) to create a new electoral commission to oversee future elections; 2) to pass an electoral law reforming how seats are won in the parliament, and 3) to choose a prime minister to replace the resigned, but still caretaker, PM Adel Abdul Mehdi until elections occur. Iraq’s parliament, the Council of Representatives (CoR), approved a new electoral commission on December 5. The CoR twice failed to reach consensus on a new election law before the scheduled votes on December 11 and 18. President Barham Salih extended the deadline to select a replacement prime minister but attempted to pass his constitutional responsibility to identify the largest parliamentary bloc to the CoR speaker. Neither official has identified the largest bloc and no coalition has consolidated around any one candidate, exacerbating infighting among political elites and their militias. Iran’s proxy militias, meanwhile, continue to deliberately and violently target three groups—protesters, nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his supporters, and the U.S.-led Coalition—in order to drive political action in Iran’s favor. Sadr, who is in Iran, willingly or unwillingly made two concessions in the face of Iranian pressure: shutting down his popular Facebook page and closing some offices affiliated with the Sadrist Movement for a period of one year. Sadr, however, retains his core sources of political power: his militia, his personal brand, and popular religious veneration for his family. Sadrist parliamentarians continue to oppose all PM candidates proposed by Iran-friendly political parties.



11 Dec: Iraqi Parliament Fails to Vote on Electoral Reform. The Council of Representatives (CoR) convened in a scheduled session to vote on an electoral reform law but adjourned after failing to hold a vote. Members of Parliament (MPs) stated that the disagreement between blocs is primarily over Article 15 of the bill, which will determine what percentage of MPs will derive from party lists or independent candidacies. All current MPs won their seats by party list and wish to maintain the status quo. Sadr’s populist Toward Reform bloc is the only party advocating for abolishing list-based voting completely.

15 Dec: President Salih Attempts to Dodge Constitutional Requirements and Deadlines. Iraqi President Barham Salih sent a formal letter requesting that CoR Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi identify the largest bloc in the CoR. The President of Iraq is constitutionally responsible for inviting the largest bloc within the CoR to designate a prime minister, who then has 30 days to form a Council of Ministers. President Salih never formally identified the largest bloc during the 2018 elections, but rather allowed an informal coalition to nominate the consensus candidate, Adel Abdul Mehdi. Salih stated in his letter to Halbousi that the resignation letter of Caretaker PM Mehdi reached the President’s office on December 4, not December 1 as previously understood. Salih used this legal loophole to extend the 15-day deadline to nominate a new PM to December 19.

16 Dec: Parliament Ducks Salih’s Request. CoR Speaker Halbousi did not respond to President Salih’s letter, but CoR Deputy Speaker and Toward Reform member Hassan al-Kaabi responded to President Salih’s request with a formal letter stating that Salih had been “notified” of the largest bloc following the 2018 election. Kaabi implied that the largest bloc which elected current Caretaker PM Mehdi could again choose a new PM. The coalition of parties which compromised to elect Mehdi has since splintered into opposing blocs.

13-16 Dec: Political Blocs and Grand Ayatollah Sistani Reject Possible PM Deal. Iran-friendly Conquest Alliance (47 parliamentary seats) likely floated the name of Mohammed Shi’a al-Sudani as a replacement PM candidate. Sudani immediately resigned from the Dawa Party and the State of Law Alliance (25 seats) in order to appear more independent. Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) organized a protest march in Central Baghdad in support of Sudani on December 14. Anonymous sources in Najaf close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani told AFP that Sistani vetoed Sudani as a candidate. One hundred seventy members of the CoR also reportedly signed a petition on December 16 stipulating that the new PM must not be a member of a political party, must not have held any political office since 2003, and must not hold dual citizenship—stipulations which Sudani clearly does not meet. Sudani has served in multiple cabinet and elected positions since 2003. One hundred sixty-five MPs constitute the absolute majority required in Iraq’s parliament in order to approve a new government. Demonstrators have vocally denounced Sudani.

18 Dec: Political Blocs Provide Last-Minute Candidates as Acceptable Replacements for PM Deal. Several political blocs and independent candidates put forward names to fill the PM post in the hours before the December 19 deadline to designate a new prime minister. Iran-friendly parties State of Law (25 seats) and Conquest Alliance (47 seats) put forward a new candidate, Qusay al-Suhail, who is the current Minister of Higher Education in PM Mehdi’s caretaker government. He is a former member of Sadr’s Toward Reform party but left to join the State of Law Coalition. Alternatively, a representative of Wisdom Trend (29 seats) suggested that Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the current head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, has the best chance of becoming PM because he is not linked to any political party. Political blocs did not vocally reject Kadhimi. Current MP Faiq Sheikh Ali also announced his independent candidacy in a letter to President Salih. Ali is a proponent of electoral reform, a secular liberal, and a longstanding critic of the Iraqi political establishment. He enjoys a significant social media following but has not yet been backed by a powerful bloc.

18 Dec: Parliament Fails Again to Vote on Electoral Reform. The CoR held two consecutive sessions in a failed attempt to pass an electoral reform bill. The CoR voted in the first session to pass just 14 of the 50 total articles comprising the pending bill, stopping short of the key reform. CoR Speaker Halbousi immediately started a new session, but the total number of present MPs fell from 224 to 207. Halbousi received requests to postpone votes on Articles 15 and 16 for further discussion and amendment, but only 71 of the 207 MPs voted to postpone. Halbousi, however, was forced to abruptly end the session because the CoR lost quorum. The CoR is scheduled to reconvene on December 23.

11-13 Dec: Demonstrators Kill and Lynch Boy. Unidentified demonstrators killed and lynched a 16-year-old from a traffic light near Wathba Square in Central Baghdad on December 11. The boy reportedly fired a weapon into the air in order to deter protesters from congregating near his home. Protesters then swarmed and stabbed him repeatedly before hanging his body from a lamp post. Police were present at the scene but did not intervene. Nationalist Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr stated that if the persons responsible for the killing were not found within 48 hours, he will order the Blue Hats to withdraw from the square. The Blue Hats are a reference to men loyal to the Sadrist Movement who wear blue baseball caps and are under orders to protect protesters. Some Blue Hats have been given training by Sadr’s militia, Saraya al-Salam. The Blue Hats reportedly conducted a de facto citizens’ arrest of four people on December 13 in relation to the December 11 attack.

13 Dec: Sadr Attempts to Deescalate With Some Concessions, But Retains Key Capabilities. Moqtada al-Sadr closed a massively popular Facebook page that he uses to communicate with followers following targeted violence by Iranian proxy militias. The page, “Mohammed Saleh al-Iraqi,” posted one word: “Goodbye.” It has not yet been updated. Sadr also issued an official statement announcing the closure of the offices of the Sadrist Movement for one year. Sadr notably “excluded” his personal office, thereby retaining his personal brand; the shrines of his father and two brothers, thereby retaining his religious influence; and the Saraya al-Salam militia, thereby retaining his ability to participate in armed conflict. The members of Sadr’s political party, Toward Reform, continued to participate normally in parliamentary proceedings.

10-16 Dec: Iranian Proxies Continue Targeted Attacks on Protesters. Iranian proxies escalated their campaign against activists and organizers in Baghdad and across Southern Iraq using kidnappings, knives, guns, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Militias are identifying protesters through security cameras and government databases, according to Iraqi newspaper al-Mada. The widespread kidnappings, torture, and assassinations targeted at least 18 activists and their families between December 10-16 in Baghdad, Basra, and Diwaniyah. Most of these incidents are not reported to authorities. Hundreds of protesters are reportedly still missing following recent kidnappings in Baghdad alone. Several activists were immediately admitted into intensive care units following their release.

10-13 Dec: Iranian Proxy Forces Exchange Assassination Attempts with Sadrists Following Clashes in Baghdad. Likely Iranian proxy militias detonated an IED targeting the home of a Sadrist official in Amarah, Maysan Province, after midnight on December 10. Likely Sadrist Saraya al-Salam militants detonated three IEDs on the same night in Amarah targeting the leader of local Iranian proxy militia Ansar Allah al-Awfiya', a medical complex affiliated with Iranian proxy AAH, and an unspecified local AAH leader. Masked gunmen, likely from Iranian proxy militias AAH and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), clashed with unarmed Sadrist Blue Hats in Central Baghdad on December 6. Assessed Iranian proxies performed a drive-by shooting targeting a vehicle containing the son of Ja'far al-Musawi, a spokesman for the Sadrist movement, in the Zafaraniya District in Baghdad on December 13. Musawi’s son survived.

11 Dec: Iranian Proxies Conduct Another Rocket Attack Near Baghdad International Airport. Iranian proxy militias, assessed to be KH and AAH, fired two Katyusha rockets which struck the “outside perimeter” of Baghdad International Airport near a base holding U.S.-led Coalition forces. The rockets caused no significant damage. This latest attack brings the total number of attacks on or near Coalition positions to at least ten since protests began in October.

11-15 Dec: U.S. Officials Openly Identify and Call Out Iran for its Proxy Violence toward Coalition Soldiers. Anonymous senior U.S. military officials told Reuters and the New York Times on December 11 that Iranian proxy militias, specifically KH and AAH, are to blame for the recent rocket attacks on facilities housing American personnel in Iraq. At least 11 separate rocket attacks have targeted such facilities since early October. U.S. officials said that Iranian proxy militias are approaching a “red line.” Secretary of State Michael Pompeo warned in an official statement on December 13 that “any attacks by [Iran], or [its] proxies of any identity, that harm Americans, our allies, or our interests will be answered with a decisive U.S. response.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper spoke with PM Mehdi by phone on December 15 and asked Iraq to help prevent such attacks.

Posted by Institute for the Study of War at 3:25 PM

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

ISW Blog

iswresearch.blogspot.com

Thursday, December 19, 2019

Syria Situation Report: December 4 - 17, 2019

By Michael Land (ISW Syria Team) and Nada Atieh (Syria Direct)

The following Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map summarizes significant developments in the war in Syria during the period December 4 - 17, 2019. Key SITREP events include an expansion of the anti-Bashar al-Assad regime insurgency in Southern Syria, joint Assad regime-Russia airstrikes in Idlib Province, and Russia-Turkey cooperation in reopening a section of the M4 Highway in Northern Syria.

Click the image to view an enlarged version of the map.




Posted by Institute for the Study of War at 4:56 PM
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Labels: ISIS, Syria, Syria SITREP Map

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

Insurgency, not War, Is China’s Most Likely Course of Action - War on the Rocks

It felt suspiciously like the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and not just because of the smell of baking fuel under the relentless sun at Twentynine Palms. At the

warontherocks.com

Insurgency, not War, Is China’s Most Likely Course of Action

John Vrolyk
December 19, 2019
Commentary

It felt suspiciously like the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and not just because of the smell of baking fuel under the relentless sun at Twentynine Palms. At the Marine Corps’ battalion-level integrated training exercise this past summer, I spent two weeks preparing for a mechanized desert war. When I participated in the same exercise in 2015, sure we spent time assaulting Soviet doctrinal positions — but also days in a mock village with role players, working through the unique challenges of counter-insurgency. This year, though, training was single-mindedly dedicated to conventional maneuver and combined arms — on a desert battlefield utterly devoid of simulated (or even notional) civilians. Mechanized warfare is back in — and low-intensity conflict, from grey-zone warfare to counter-insurgency, is going unmentioned and untrained.

Driven by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Pentagon has seemingly shifted to single-mindedly preparing for a traditional, conventional great-power conflict it is unlikely to ever fight — while drastically decreasing training for the proxy wars, civil conflicts, and insurgencies it will inevitably be called upon to help win. It feels like some leaders in the Department of Defense see China’s rise as heralding an end to fighting messy little wars in far-flung corners of the world. Unfortunately, that couldn’t be further from the truth. It’s actually time to re-open and engage with the Counterinsurgency Field Manual to prepare for a future characterized by sophisticated, well-funded, and strategically targeted insurgency campaigns against the United States, its allies, and security partners.

The problem is not that the defense strategy prioritizes interstate strategic competition over terrorism. It correctly identifies China as the overriding strategic challenge for American interests. The problem is that the Pentagon is failing to make the critical distinction between preparing to win in traditional, conventional great-power conflict versus in great power competition. Competing with China might include a great-power war in the Western Pacific — but it’s almost certainly going to consist of fighting proxy wars and insurgencies around the globe where American and Chinese interests clash.

High-Intensity Conventional Maneuver War Is Out

A great-power conflict today would involve high-intensity combat that would make World War II pale in comparison. Great-power competition, on the other hand, is likely to involve a new era of messy global entanglements, ranging from economic rivalry to intelligence operations to full-on proxy warfare and insurgency campaigns focused on the world’s most critical lines of communication. To borrow the language of my Marine instructors at The Basic School, great-power war is the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, but low-intensity conflict driven by great-power competition is the enemy’s most likely course of action. By single-mindedly preparing for the most dangerous course of action, especially in ways reliant on capabilities the nation simply no longer possesses, the Pentagon is failing to prepare for the wars America’s soldiers and marines are most likely to actually fight.

Even if a U.S.-China war did not lead directly to nuclear annihilation, it would be unimaginably destructive. The emergence of new technologies — ubiquitous surveillance, anti-access/area denial systems, hypersonics, and cyber — has dramatically enhanced the destructive power of even conventional warfare. In this environment, conventional weapons are approaching a level of destructiveness that triggers the logic of mutual assured destruction — to say nothing of the possibility of mutual assured economic destruction. Furthermore, in this environment, hypersonic missiles, infrastructure-targeting cyber capabilities, or militarized quantum-based AIs are more likely to be decisive than infantry divisions.

This doesn’t mean that the Pentagon should ignore the age-old wisdom — quoted in the defense strategy — that “the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” That’s why the United States is making massive investments in these domains, as well as emergent fields. Deterrence based on maintaining supremacy in the decisive forms of combat is existential — and should be prioritized appropriately.

At the same time, however, the Pentagon is actively reorienting large-scale conventional forces toward the deterrence mission (see: my summer exercise) — even though their very access to the conflict theater, let alone ability to be sustained once there — is severely curtailed. An incapable or incredible deterrent is worse than ineffective; it actually helps China by consuming precious resources preparing for a type of warfare that neither side has any intention of fighting.

Great Power Competition Will Trigger a Renewal of Low-Intensity Conflict

Despite the emergence of great-power competition, the United States will never fight a great-power war in the traditional large-scale maneuver force-on-force way. A direct confrontation at the high end triggers the mutual assured destruction constraint. At the lower end, emerging technologies all but preclude the possibility of large conventional forces reaching the conflict theater, let alone achieving mass once there. These dynamics make direct force-on-force war unattractive to both parties.

Instead, a period of renewed great-power competition will be characterized by an increased incidence of civil war and insurgency. This pattern has historical antecedents going back to the Greeks. Thucydides described this dynamic in the Peloponnesian War, noting that the Athens-Sparta rivalry triggered civil wars across Greece since “with an alliance always at the command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties.” The Great Game period of Britain-Russia competition led primarily to proxy wars and intelligence intrigue, with the brief and indecisive exception of the Crimean War. The Cold War is the most recent and relevant example — and led to a period when great-power involvement led to the emergence of insurgency as the primary mode of intrastate war.

Great-power competition with China will likely follow this historical pattern, if it hasn’t begun to already. Patrick Cronin and Hunter Stires argue that China is already waging a “maritime insurgency” in the South China Sea. As China increases in relative strength and audacity, it will likely go beyond provocation to support proxies who directly threaten U.S. allies or partners, from the Philippines (aided by the Chinese-supplied 5G network) across all of Asia to the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. To frustrate U.S. goals, China might emulate Russia’s behavior in Syria (taking apparent delight in supporting anyone opposed to U.S. interests). While direct Chinese support for terrorists feels unlikely in the near-term, China could sell arms to separatist groups or bad actor regimes. In fact, China has a long history of doing exactly that — including supporting North Korea to keep the Kim regime on life support as a strategic buffer, supporting the genocidal Khmer Rouge to balance Vietnam, and propping up the Burmese military junta.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

The Pentagon Is Repeating its Post-Vietnam Abandonment of Low-Intensity Conflict

If the United States is going to remain a global power, capable of projecting power and protecting its worldwide interests, its military should be capable of fighting and winning this sort of competition. However, as it did after Vietnam, the Pentagon is again developing a deep-seated cultural aversion to counter-insurgency and, by extension, all low-intensity conflict. This aversion has reached a point where two active-duty Army officers recently wrote, “counterinsurgency isn’t dead no matter how much the U.S. military may want it to be.”

As a result, today the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are not preparing most soldiers and marines to adapt to low-intensity challenges. Instead, they appear to be prioritizing a troubling paradigm for great-power conflict that involves large-scale, concentrated, conventional operations that ignore the modern world’s ubiquitous surveillance systems, not to mention nuclear weapons, while simultaneously turning their backs on what low-intensity conflict competency we have been able to buy dearly over the past 18 years.

Rather than take seriously the National Security Strategy’s guidance that U.S. security interests require “strengthening states where state weaknesses or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland,” the Pentagon appears to want to just duck the problem altogether. The National Defense Strategy conceives of the Pentagon’s role as “prioritiz[ing] requests for U.S. military equipment sales, accelerating foreign partner modernization and ability to integrate with U.S. forces.” By explicitly focusing on “train[ing] to high-end combat missions in our alliance, bilateral, and multinational exercises,” the defense strategy seems to sidestep the threat posed by state weakness or failure. Countries characterized by state weakness or facing the risk of failure almost by definition do not field militaries capable of training to integrate with the United States on high-end combat missions. Investing in the NATO partners and major treaty allies who can fight with us in high-end combat is important — but shouldn’t be confused with working to strengthen weak and at-risk partners.

The de-prioritization of stability operations is further reflected in the evolution of the Pentagon’s implementing directive on the topic. The 2009 version of the Directive 3000.05 governing stability operations described stabilization as a “core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” The 2018 update is silent on stabilization’s appropriate priority — if any — except to emphasize the Pentagon’s “supporting” (rather than lead) role. While civilian leadership is essential, this language effectively provides top cover for the military to ignore stabilization. This de-prioritization occurred despite the conclusion of a RAND study, commissioned by the Pentagon to inform the new guidance, that “the U.S. government must retain, recreate, or improve its ability to participate in stabilization.”

The services have fallen in line with the department’s implied priorities. RAND reported that, as of 2016, the Army’s premier Joint Readiness Training Center exercises featured “no activities in any of the stability functions.” The Army’s new, dedicated advisory Security Force Assistance Brigades comprise six understrength battalions dedicated to filling an economy-of-force mission for “big Army.” Even their proponents acknowledge their primary purpose is to “free” the Army’s 56 conventional brigade combat teams “to focus on getting back to major combat operations as these tailored brigades partnered with conventional allied forces on everything from casualty care to logistics and basic patrolling.”

The Marine Corps — the proud inheritors of a long tradition of excellence in low-intensity conflict, from the Banana Wars to the Combined Action Platoons — has instead in the new Commandant’s Planning Guidance dedicated itself to becoming a force “purpose-built to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of the fleets” that very explicitly is a “single purpose-built future force” that accepts risk rather than “hedg[ing] or balanc[ing] our investments to account for those [other] contingencies.”

Perhaps the essential tasks described above are implied within the commandant’s new guidance. If they are, how the Corps appears to be going about implementing the guidance — large-scale exercises in the desert reminiscent of Desert Storm — suggests the force has thus far failed to properly interpret them. In fact, a group of Marine authors made precisely this point in a recent War on the Rocks article, stating:

The Commandant’s Planning Guidance has the potential to radically transform the Marine Corps into a naval expeditionary force that is prepared to operate inside actively-contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations… Strangely absent from this new guidance, however, is a critical aspect of the Marine Corps – security cooperation and foreign security force advising.

Friends now serving as marine instructors have confirmed that the once best-in-class small wars training has been completely excised from the service’s culminating battalion-level integrated training exercise. On the advisory side, the Corps’ counterparts to the Army Security Force Assistance Brigades only constitute two reserve companies — hardly a matched capability for the Corps’ Indo-Pacific mission set.

There’s Nothing Impossible about Fighting Insurgencies

The United States has before and can again achieve its strategic aims in these types of conflicts. While some counter-insurgency fights may well be unwinnable, the same is equally true of some conventional wars. That doesn’t and shouldn’t stop the U.S. military from preparing for them, especially when its pacing threat is committed to fighting in this way. China has already demonstrated an adept capacity to asymmetrically offset American military strength. If the U.S. military declares a type of war unwinnable and chooses not to train for it, China will continue to take note — and present the United States with exactly these sorts of fights.

Despite the trauma of Vietnam, the U.S. historical record in low-intensity conflict belies the Pentagon’s aversion. A 2010 RAND study on 89 historical insurgencies reported that governments are slightly more likely to win than insurgents. In recent U.S. history, the United States has advised, supported, and conducted successful low-intensity campaigns, from the Philippines in the 1950s, to El Salvador in the late 1970s through early 1990s, to Afghanistan in the 1980s, and even the surge in Iraq in the mid-2000s.

Organize and Prepare for the Low-Intensity Threat

Now as then, however, winning in these messy low-intensity conflicts requires a balanced rather than single-minded strategy. The U.S. military can’t only invest in the high-end capabilities necessary to deter high-intensity great-power conflict. It has to simultaneously prepare its military — in conjunction with civilian agencies — to win on the difficult, complex battlefields characteristic of the low-intensity conflicts, proxy wars, and insurgencies to which they are most likely to deploy.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

The language we use is part of the problem. Describing the conflicts as high- and low-intensity seemingly implies that low-intensity conflict is a lesser included or
“easier” version of high-intensity conflict. This myth is persistent and pernicious — the Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes that Western armies are prone to “falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones.” They’re not. On the contrary, the manual notes, capabilities for operational maneuver and massive firepower essential to “conventional success … may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations.”

Striking the appropriate balance will require the Pentagon to organize, devote resources and train to both distinct mission sets simultaneously. This effort will be an uphill battle because, as the field manual notes, the U.S. military has a strong “institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents.” That said, over the past 18 years, the Army and Marine Corps have learned how to eat soup with a knife in counter-insurgencies. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual and the Small Wars Manual are evidence that experience’s costly lessons can be translated into doctrine. This doctrine can be and has been translated into training, whether for conventional forces in massive purpose-built “cities” in the California desert or for the special forces at Robin Sage at the JFK Special Warfare School. It’s possible for the Pentagon to retain and grow the capability to win these future low-intensity wars — but it takes concerted effort and institutional prioritization.

There are real organizational and fiscal hurdles to training simultaneously for both low- and high-intensity conflict. On the organizational side, investments in the low-intensity combat multipliers of training, people, and soft skills do not create natural constituencies on the Hill the way large, expensive weapons systems do. Even more problematically, no service or servicemember wants to be relegated to the less-important fight (the Marine Corps was not thrilled at the Senate’s proposal in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act to dedicate the force to low-intensity conflict).

However, the organizational challenges are solvable. The Close Combat Lethality Task Force is an example of how the Pentagon can re-prioritize force lethality against the political clout of acquisitions-heavy programs. And if I’m right that low-intensity conflicts will be the most common form of actual combat, then the services, with appropriate branching and manning reforms, should have no problem getting their most promising officers to volunteer for dedicated units. The model ought to be Special Operations Command — which continues to attract the best talent despite its disproportional share of casualties and demanding operational tempo. Put simply, in the volunteer military today, the best people would rather deploy to operational missions than train to be a theoretical deterrent — as long as the military manning system can reward and retain them appropriately.

Within fiscal constraints, investments entail tradeoffs, and next-generation weapons are not cheap. But paying for hypersonics out of the infantry small-wars training budget is the wrong tradeoff. Next-generation weapon systems should be paid for with budgets redirected from known ineffective (if politically popular) weapons platforms. We can afford to maintain the small but crucial investments in the close combat units which do the vast majority of the fighting and dying in low-intensity combat.

It’s beyond both my expertise as a company-grade officer and the scope of this article to offer specific prescriptions for how we should train soldiers and marines to succeed on low-intensity battlefields. However, it may be helpful to offer some illustrations of possible approaches. Perhaps the Marine Corps’ preeminent exercise should evolve from focusing on battalion-level, combined-arms maneuver to emphasizing company- or even squad-sized units operating independently, embedded in partner or allied forces, operating in an environment where shaping loyalties and perception are as important as shaping fires. We might build simulated sprawling cities on San Clemente Island, encompassing both concentrated centers and urban shantytowns, to simulate littoral cities in the Indo-Pacific, and create scenarios in which the city, the sea supply routes, and the air are all contested by both insurgents and counter-insurgents alike.

Yet maybe the U.S. military should use this opportunity to be even more bold in rethinking its conception of training more broadly. It could break the paradigm in which training happens on hermetically sealed bases in the continental United States and deployment happens “over there.” Instead of building simulation villages in California and hiring role players, why not fly a close combat platoon — by itself — to the Philippines for a continuously tactical, two-month-long foreign internal defense exercise against simulated China-backed insurgents. While the enemy has to be simulated, nothing else need be. The platoon can partner with the actual allied forces they would support in a crisis, work with, in, and around actual foreign communities that could be threatened by China-backed insurgents, and work through the actual friction of joint operations, language, and culture. It would be difficult, and a break from established practice — but if the military cannot independently distribute squads, platoons, or companies for exercises, how can it credibly claim to employ them in a distributed fashion in combat?

The Next War Will Be Low-Intensity – And It’s One the U.S. Can Win

Si vis pacem, para bellum. The U.S. National Security Strategy aims at peace, and on America’s terms. The U.S. military should therefore prepare for all the wars threatening that peace.

Losing in a great-power high-intensity conflict (the enemy’s most dangerous course of action) is an existential threat for the nation. This is why the Pentagon maintains close to 7,000 nuclear weapons and is investing heavily in next-generation weapons, and is adapting doctrine and technology to credibly counter the pacing threat. These capabilities help deter the existential threats U.S. adversaries present.

At the same time, though, the Department of Defense needs to invest in solutions to counter what history suggests — and the current actions of China, Russia and Iran indicate — will be U.S. adversaries’ most likely courses of action. China, per the National Security Strategy, seeks “to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.” If China pursues a rational strategy to achieve these ends, it will rely more on bullying, proxies, and insurgencies than on hypersonic or nuclear interchange.

That means the United States needs an Army and Marine Corps capable of countering China’s most likely actions. The combatant commanders need divisions — not just specialized units — capable of winning three-block wars, conducting foreign security force advising, and implementing stabilization operations. These capabilities should be forward-deployed to key areas of the Indo-Pacific (and elsewhere) to deter, prevent, and counter bullying, destabilizing proxy wars, and fait accompli strategies. The service chiefs need to ensure these units are trained to work with U.S. allies and partners to take the ground which will be decisive in the low-intensity wars to come — the human terrain which defines control in contested regions. Otherwise the United States is merely ceding the field — its allies and partners — to the depredations of its global rivals.

Low-intensity conflicts individually may not be nationally existential, but great-power competition is. Winning in the emerging great-power competition requires forces capable of protecting U.S. interests during the coming period of renewed low-intensity conflict. This means the Pentagon needs to prepare soldiers and marines to win low-intensity wars.

John Vrolyk is a Master of Public Affairs student at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and a reserve Marine infantry officer. His previous experience includes a fellowship as a military legislative aide during the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, deployments to Northern Syria and Australia, and three years advising large companies on mergers and acquisitions.

The opinions expressed are those of the author alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

 

[Housecarl]

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1,200 detained in India amid ban on citizenship law protests

NEW DELHI (AP) — Police detained more than 1,200 protesters in some of India's biggest cities Thursday after they defied bans on assembly that authorities imposed to stop widespread demonstrations against a new citizenship law that opponents say threatens the country's secular democracy.

apnews.com

1,200 detained in India amid ban on citizenship law protests

By EMILY SCHMALL and ASHOK SHARMA
yesterday

NEW DELHI (AP) — Police detained more than 1,200 protesters in some of India’s biggest cities Thursday after they defied bans on assembly that authorities imposed to stop widespread demonstrations against a new citizenship law that opponents say threatens the country’s secular democracy.
At least three people were reported killed as protests raged around the country despite the bans as opposition increased to the law, which excludes Muslims. The legislation has sparked anger at what many see as the government’s push to bring India closer to a Hindu state.
Authorities erected road blocks and disrupted internet and phone services, including in parts of New Delhi, and tightened restrictions on protesters in the northeastern border state of Assam, where the protests began last week.




A curfew was imposed in parts of Mangalore, a city in southern Karnataka state, after police fired warning shots and used tear gas and batons to disperse a large group of protesters.
At least two people were killed during clashes with police, the Press Trust of India news agency said late Thursday. Details were not immediately available because top police officers could not be reached by phone.
Protesters also clashed with police in parts of Lucknow, the state capital of northern Uttar Pradesh state, where police said one person died from a gunshot fired by someone among the protesters. The protesters torched a bus, hurled rocks at police and damaged some police posts and vehicles, police officer Vikas Dubey said.
The new citizenship law applies to Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities who are in India illegally but can demonstrate religious persecution in Muslim-majority Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It does not apply to Muslims.
Critics say it’s the latest effort by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist-led government to marginalize India’s 200 million Muslims, and a violation of the country’s secular constitution.
Modi has defended it as a humanitarian gesture.
Rather than contain uprisings, the protest bans appear to be helping them spread — from Assam and a handful of university campuses and Muslim enclaves in the capital — to campuses and cities from coast to coast.
“I think what is wonderful is that young people all in their 20s have so vividly understood the game plan, which is to divide people,” said Zoya Hasan, a political scientist in New Delhi. “What people are saying is that you are going to divide, we are going to multiply.”




The protests come amid an ongoing crackdown in Muslim-majority Kashmir, the restive Himalayan region stripped of its semi-autonomous status and demoted from a state into a federal territory last summer. They also follow a contentious process in Assam meant to weed out foreigners in the country illegally. Nearly 2 million people were excluded from an official list of citizens, about half Hindu and half Muslim, and have been asked to prove their citizenship or else be considered foreign.
India is also building a detention center for some of the tens of thousands of people the courts are expected to ultimately determine have entered illegally. Modi’s interior minister, Amit Shah, has pledged to roll out the process nationwide.
Critics say the process is a thinly veiled plot to deport millions of Muslims.
The Modi government, which won a landslide re-election in May, had been able to push through those parts of its agenda without much opposition. That changed with the citizenship law.
“This may be a crack in the edifice”of the Modi government, said Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, a political analyst and Modi biographer.
Some of the country’s unwieldy and divided opposition parties have found common ground in condemning what they say has been a heavy-handed official response to the protests.
It’s a good rallying point for the opposition because it is “a battle for liberal and democratic values,” said Asaduddin Owaisi, a lawmaker and president of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen party.
Video on Thursday captured historian Ramchandra Guha, a biographer of independence leader Mohandas Gandhi, manhandled by police as he was detained in Bangalore, the capital of southern Karnataka state, where the government issued a ban on groups of more than four people gathering.
Guha told New Delhi TV on Thursday evening that police crammed him and hundreds of others who were detained into a wedding hall and let them leave later without explanation.
“As abruptly arrested, we were abruptly released,” he said.
In New Delhi, Yogendra Yadav, a well-known political activist and the chief of the Swaraj India party, was among 1,200 protesters detained at the city’s iconic Red Fort and the surrounding historic district.
Anil Kumar, a police spokesman, said all the protesters were released later Thursday.
Also worrying to protesters was the blocking of internet and phone services, a tactic authorities often use in Kashmir to try to prevent protests, but one rarely used in the capital.
“In this country we do not even have freedom to protest. It’s very disappointing,” said Upika Chahan, a social worker who took the day off work to protest at Red Fort.
Chahan, who is Sikh, said that while the citizenship law doesn’t discriminate against her religious group, it doesn’t augur well for India.
“If it’s affecting one element of the ecosystem, sooner or later it’s going to affect everyone in the ecosystem,” she said.
___
Associated Press writer Sheikh Saaliq in New Delhi contributed to this report.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

The Air Force's Global Strike Command Is Preparing For A Delivery Of New Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear modernization has arrived.

nationalinterest.org

December 19, 2019 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: Air ForceNuclear WeaponsAtomic BombsMilitaryTechnology
The Air Force's Global Strike Command Is Preparing For A Delivery Of New Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear modernization has arrived.
by David Axe Follow @daxe on Twitter L

Key point: The command is in the beginning of a modernization effort costing tens of billions of dollars.

The U.S. Air Force’s nuclear command says it’s about to undergo a major reorganization as it prepares to field new bombs, missiles, bombers and rockets.

Air Force Global Strike Command stood up in 2009 as the successor to Strategic Air Command, which maintained around-the-clock nuclear alerts during the Cold War.
Today the command’s 34,000 personnel oversee 20 B-2 stealth bombers, 76 B-52 bombers and 450 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles together capable of delivering thousands of nuclear warheads.
It also operates 62 B-1 bombers that do not have a nuclear mission.

AFGSC’s forces comprise the aerial and ground “legs” of the United States’s atomic triad, which also includes the U.S. Navy’s submarine-launched Trident ballistic missiles.
The command’s forces are capable of extinguishing essentially all life on Earth within a matter of hours.

Accidents and misbehavior marred AFGSC’s early years. In 2014 ICBM crews got caught cheating on tests. In 2018 security forces at Minot Air Force Base, home to a portion of the Minuteman fleet, lost track of some of their weapons. The suicide rate is high in the atomic force.
Now the command is in the beginning of a modernization effort costing tens of billions of dollars. New B-21 stealth bombers are slated to supplant the B-1s and B-2s starting in the mid-2020s. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent rocket, a replacement for the 1960s-vintage Minuteman, is in development.

The new Long-Range Stand-Off Weapon, a nuclear-tipped cruise missile, will replace the B-52’s current nuclear cruise missiles. The bomber fleet is getting a refurbished model of its main atomic gravity bomb, the B-61. The missile wings’ security forces are swapping out their five-decade-old UH-1 helicopters for new MH-139s.
AFGSC wants new concepts to accompany the new hardware. “The need for a clear way ahead is more prevalent now than ever with the rising tensions between Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and transnational violent extremism, and the increase in our adversaries’ nuclear capabilities and innovations,” AFGSC stated.

Some reforms already are underway, according to Air Force Magazine reporter Rachel Cohen.
“The Air Force is beefing up its nuclear education and leadership development, charting missileer career paths for reservists and trying to be mindful of operations stress, the need for a sense of purpose and other health concerns. As the service tries to cut its suicide rate, Ray noted his command can draw on the knowledge of a nearby Department of Veterans Affairs hospital in Louisiana.”

Looking ahead, the command is focusing on the bigger picture. “Among the roadmap’s nine overall goals is an effort to grow the services Global Strike can offer U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees daily operations of nuclear forces, as its air component,” Cohen explained.

Global Strike and STRATCOM practiced what that might look like during Exercise Global Thunder earlier this fall [2019], trying approaches that “have not been done since the Cold War ended” and—in some cases—offer more capability than the military had at that time, Ray said.

Global Thunder is an annual exercise where the U.S. and allied nations like Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom train for conflict scenarios involving nuclear forces.
“We don't have sanctuary in the United States based on lots of different threats,” Ray said. “We start thinking about hypersonics, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, submarines, space and cyber, all those things will be a dimension of this. How do we operate with those particular challenges working against us? That's probably been more relevant than we've done in a very long time.”

He added that the exercise incorporated newer aspects like space, cyber and electronic warfare “probably more correctly,” but said the details are classified.

AFGSC’s modernization efforts could take decades. The new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent won’t even begin to enter service until the late 2020s, at the earliest. B-21s could be in production through the 2030s.

But Ray is in a hurry to refine the command’s operational concepts. “I want to have the operational concepts and how we present the forces redone in the next six to nine months,” he told Air Force.
David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Why Would Turkey Need Nuclear Weapons? - Charged Affairs

Recent comments made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have stoked fears that Turkey might pursue nuclear weapons. So why would Turkey need nuclear weapons, and how serious was Erdogan?

chargedaffairs.org

Why Would Turkey Need Nuclear Weapons?

December 11, 2019/Jonathan Stutte/No Comments


Recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested that Turkey might have an interest in developing nuclear weapons, saying that it is unacceptable that Turkey can’t have them. The comments came after Turkey’s status as a NATO nuclear-sharing member quickly came into question following a likely deliberate incident in early October where Turkish soldiers shelled an American military position. Turkey doesn’t currently face some of the perceived challenges that nations cite when pursuing nuclear weapons, so it’s worth examining just what reasons it might have.

Air-to-air missile by TÜBİTAK-SAGE at the IDEF 2019 in Istanbul, Turkey(Image source: CeeGee © 2019)
For larger countries like the United States and Russia, current nuclear weapons’ postures derive from the Cold War where the most militarily advanced nations and their satellite of allies and client states stood diametrically opposed to each other. Nuclear weapons served as force multipliers and deterrents against invasion or attack. France and the United Kingdom likewise derive their weapons from this era as well. Smaller countries, such as Israel, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya have achieved or pursued nuclear weapons to shore up their security against perceived existential threats in increasingly unstable regions and deter invasion from regional or western enemies. North Korea, Libya, and Iran specifically have developed or attempted to develop arsenals as a direct response to threats they perceived coming from the United States.
Turkey doesn’t fit neatly into any of these situations. Unlike the countries listed above, it isn’t under risk of invasion or attack from regional foes, and realistically doesn’t count many direct enemies so capable among its neighbors. There’s always risk of future conflict with Greece in Cyprus, or with Armenia, but neither is an existential threat to Turkey itself. What Turkey perceives and acts on as the greatest threat to itself is actually a stateless people—the Kurds of Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Nuclear weapons haven proven to be an insufficient deterrent to attacks by stateless or transnational groups. Any offensive use of a nuclear weapon in this situation would inevitably not just turn Turkey into an international pariah but also provoke severe responses from the affected countries.
This is all just as well since Turkey likely isn’t really in the market for nuclear weapons. According to Aaron Stein, director of the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Turkish president was not actually signaling an imminent decision to develop nuclear weapons” but wants more equitable treatment from the west. This fits more neatly into the lack of utility nuclear weapons have for Turkey other than prestige.
As a member of NATO, Turkey falls explicitly under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. This should, in theory, preclude a large-scale invasion from a country such as Russia. Yet even here, Russia doesn’t regard Turkey with the same malign intent as it does the United States. As a member of NATO and an enemy of Armenia, Turkey does stand in the way of some of Russia’s geopolitical goals, but the two countries’ coordination in Syria as well as the recent sale of the Russian S-400 missile defense system to Turkey shows that Turkey regards its NATO partnership as more fluid than perhaps its other allies would like. That said, Russia would have severe misgivings about an independently nuclear country, one ostensibly allied with the United States, at its doorstep.
Prestige, then, is likely the most practical reason for Turkey to possess nuclear weapons. It would confer on Erdogan the ‘big player’ status he craves, in his mind preventing Turkey from being wedged in the middle of the West, the Middle East, and Russia. Turkey has never fit neatly into the Middle East or the Western NATO countries. So, if it continues moving into a more precarious position between the nuclear superpowers this could give Erdogan the edge he wants to balance such a difficult position. Nuclear weapons, however, don’t automatically improve a country’s bargaining power, something North Korea is finding out the hard way. Other nuclear states have utilized their roles in international organizations to far greater effect than simply waving nuclear weapons around. Further, Turkey is a ratified member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Backing out of those treaties in pursuit of nuclear weapons would have severe repercussions, serving only to isolate Turkey rather than to give it greater standing.
Given the road already dangerous road Turkey is traveling—spurning NATO and the United States—that isolation would only be more crippling. Hopefully that interest doesn’t turn into reality.

 

[jward]

MERLIN SHIELD AROUND CARRIERS STRONGER AFTER US WORKOUT 18 December 2019 The Navy’s premier submarine hunters are much better prepared to defend Britain’s future flagships after a three-month workout in the USA. Merlin helicopters of 814 and 820 Naval Air Squadrons – based at RNAS Culdrose – joined new carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and frigate HMS Northumberland to form an invisible, impenetrable ring of steel around the task group on its deployment to the USA. It’s the mission of the helicopters – plus a dedicated submarine-hunting frigate – to prevent any underwater threat getting within torpedo or missile range. A series of anti-submarine exercises – firstly a Canadian-led NATO workout off Nova Scotia, then against American Los Angeles-class hunter killers off the Eastern Seaboard of the USA – allowed sailors and aircrew to help develop the tactics and routines needed to defeat the latest boats. “The Los Angeles class are fast, agile and able to stay submerged as long as the food lasts – the perfect adversary to train against,” said pilot Lieutenant Nick Jackson-Spence. Aircrewman Petty Officer Andrew ‘Smudge’ Smith – who helps operate the sub-hunting sensor suite in the back of a Merlin – said the American boats proved to be formidable ‘foes’. “The US submarines are experts in using the underwater environment to their advantage – they live underwater, we only visit,” he added. “We had to draw on our training to counter them. Each sortie takes a lot of preparation and planning, but after every flight we learn a little more; helping us to keep the carrier safe.” The submarine threat is the greatest faced by a carrier strike group believes 820 Squadron’s senior pilot Lieutenant Commander Robert Bond, who commanded the detachment aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth. “The deployment gave us the opportunity to develop our anti-submarine warfare ability, building a foundation which we’ll continue to hone throughout 2020,” he said. “We’ll be ready for the carrier’s first operational deployment in 2021 and relish the opportunity to help make it a success.” The deployment gave us the opportunity to develop our anti-submarine warfare ability, building a foundation which we’ll continue to hone throughout 2020. We’ll be ready for the carrier’s first operational deployment in 2021 and relish the opportunity to help make it a success. 820 Squadron’s senior pilot Lieutenant Commander Robert Bond His men and women returned to Cornwall with fresh ideas and fresh tactics – anything from storing extra sonobuoys (the electronic ‘ears’ dropped in the ocean to listen for submarine activity) to relief aircrew living aboard the escorting frigate to keep the pressure on the enemy below. That pressure demands supreme efforts – and not just from the four crew in the helicopter; for every hour in the air a Merlin Mk2 requires 60 hours of maintenance in the carrier’s cavernous hangar, work performed by a 60-strong team of engineers, technicians, and avionics experts on Queen Elizabeth. Aboard HMS Northumberland, the maintenance burden was carried by just ten mechanics. They put in more than 9,000 hours – individually more than one year’s work – to support more than 50 sorties by the frigate’s Merlin. “Northumberland were really welcoming to us,” said avionics expert Leading Air Engineering Technician Katherine Jennings. “During busy periods we could work hours which took us out of the ship’s routine and everyone did their upmost to keep us going, especially the chefs who kindly kept us well fed!” The helicopter’s observer Lieutenant Luke Maciejewski said working hand-in-hand with the frigate – equipped with state-of-the-art sonar and a dedicated team of submarine-hunting specialists in the operations room – created a potent combination. “Living with the people you operate with really helps form relationships which make you a more effective fighting team,” he added. “This ultimately makes Northumberland – in fact any anti-submarine frigate – a more potent asset when seamlessly working with her own helicopter.” Merlin shield around carriers stronger after US workout The Navy’s premier submarine hunters are much better prepared to defend Britain’s future flagships after a three-month workout in the USA. www.royalnavy.mod.uk

 

[jward]

Muslim leaders gather in Malaysia for Islamic summit​

​

The four-day summit held in Kuala Lumpur will see Muslim leaders, scholars and academics discuss issues pertinent to the global Muslim community. Leaders from 20 Muslim nations gathered in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday for a conference shunned by Saudi Arabia and feared by a right-wing Israeli think tank. Pakistan also gave the Kuala Lumpur Summit a miss, amid rumours that President Imran Khan was pressured into doing so by its Middle Eastern allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Pakistani officials told Reuters that Khan pulled out of the summit amid pressure from his allies but official media reports deny any connection. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi confirmed neither he nor President Khan would be attending the conference on Tuesday, saying Pakistan pulled out over concerns it could "divide the Muslim world". Khan backing out is especially strange considering he was a primary backer of the conference, alongside Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan, according to Reuters. The idea for the Islamic summit was conjured up on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York in September, in discussions between Prime Minister Mohamad, President Erdogan and Prime Minister Khan, Arabi21 reported. Observers see the summit as rivalling the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which is under Saudi Arabia's de-facto leadership. ​ Meanwhile, a right-wing Israeli think-tank fears the Kuala Lumpur Summit could result in pro-Palestinian positions being established. The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs pointed to the summit's host Prime Minister Mohamad as a key factor, noting that the Malaysian leader had previously attacked the OIC for not doing enough to support the Palestinian cause. A Hamas delegation, led by its political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh, is also participating in the summit. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamid Al-Thani will also attend, Reuters reported. Formation of a new bloc? Malaysia's Mohamad and Turkey's Erdogan will dominate the spotlight during the four-day conference, which is likely to discuss the ongoing plight of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar and rising Islamophobia around the world. No agenda has been released but the situations in Kashmir, Syria, and Yemen could also feature as conference topics. Read more: Qatar will not downgrade Turkey ties for the sake of Saudi Arabia, FM says Saudi King Salman told Prime Minister Matahir on the phone on Tuesday that the discussions should be held through the OIC. An unnamed Saudi source told Reuters that Saudi Arabia would have only attended if the meeting was held under the banner of the OIC. "They are very concerned about it," the source allegedly said of the summit. Bahrain's foreign minister and the Secretary General of the OIC criticised the Summit and said it aims to "weaken and divide Islam and the nation", according to a research associate at the Gulf International Forum. Prime Minister Mohamad's office issued a statement which clarified there was no intention to create a "new bloc as alluded to by some of its critics", Reuters reported. 'State of affairs' "In addition, the Summit is not a platform to discuss about religion or religious affairs but specifically to address the state of affairs of the Muslim Ummah [community]," Mohamad's office also said. In an interview with Reuters last week, Malaysia's prime minister expressed his frustration with the OIC's inaction and said the situation of the Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang, China will likely be discussed. The Uighur community in northwest China has faced an unprecedented crackdown in recent years, with at least 1 million mostly Muslim ethnic minorities held in internment camps that authorities downplay as "vocational education centres". China has responded harshly to any international criticism of its alleged human rights abuses. Read more: China censors Arsenal match following Ozil's prayer for Uighur Muslims The international community has largely been unwilling to risk its economic relations with China on the issue and Muslim countries were among thirty-seven states which cosigned a letter in the United Nations defending China's treatment of Uighur Muslims in July. Turkey was one of the region's few voices willing to risk its economic relationship with China by expressing support for the Uighur cause. But recently President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has struck a softer tone, saying a solution could be found to help thousands of Uighur Muslims interned in Chinese camps "taking into account the sensitivities" of both sides. Follow us on Twitter and Instagram to stay connected https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1207238980409974784 . Ragıp Soylu @ragipsoylu BREAKING — Pakistan abstained from Kuala Lumpur Islamic summit because • Saudi govt threatened economic sanctions such as withdrawing money from Pakistan Central Bank • And replacing Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia with Bengals According to Erdogan’s statement 6:13 AM · Dec 20, 2019·Twitter for iPhone View: https://twitter.com/trpresidency/status/1207238980409974784/photo/1 Muslim leaders gather in Malaysia for Islamic summit Muslim leaders gather in Malaysia for Islamic summit www.alaraby.co.uk

 

[Housecarl]

Muslim leaders gather in Malaysia for Islamic summit​

​

The four-day summit held in Kuala Lumpur will see Muslim leaders, scholars and academics discuss issues pertinent to the global Muslim community. Leaders from 20 Muslim nations gathered in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday for a conference shunned by Saudi Arabia and feared by a right-wing Israeli think tank. Pakistan also gave the Kuala Lumpur Summit a miss, amid rumours that President Imran Khan was pressured into doing so by its Middle Eastern allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Pakistani officials told Reuters that Khan pulled out of the summit amid pressure from his allies but official media reports deny any connection. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi confirmed neither he nor President Khan would be attending the conference on Tuesday, saying Pakistan pulled out over concerns it could "divide the Muslim world". Khan backing out is especially strange considering he was a primary backer of the conference, alongside Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan, according to Reuters. The idea for the Islamic summit was conjured up on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York in September, in discussions between Prime Minister Mohamad, President Erdogan and Prime Minister Khan, Arabi21 reported. Observers see the summit as rivalling the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which is under Saudi Arabia's de-facto leadership. ​ Meanwhile, a right-wing Israeli think-tank fears the Kuala Lumpur Summit could result in pro-Palestinian positions being established. The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs pointed to the summit's host Prime Minister Mohamad as a key factor, noting that the Malaysian leader had previously attacked the OIC for not doing enough to support the Palestinian cause. A Hamas delegation, led by its political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh, is also participating in the summit. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamid Al-Thani will also attend, Reuters reported. Formation of a new bloc? Malaysia's Mohamad and Turkey's Erdogan will dominate the spotlight during the four-day conference, which is likely to discuss the ongoing plight of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar and rising Islamophobia around the world. No agenda has been released but the situations in Kashmir, Syria, and Yemen could also feature as conference topics. Read more: Qatar will not downgrade Turkey ties for the sake of Saudi Arabia, FM says Saudi King Salman told Prime Minister Matahir on the phone on Tuesday that the discussions should be held through the OIC. An unnamed Saudi source told Reuters that Saudi Arabia would have only attended if the meeting was held under the banner of the OIC. "They are very concerned about it," the source allegedly said of the summit. Bahrain's foreign minister and the Secretary General of the OIC criticised the Summit and said it aims to "weaken and divide Islam and the nation", according to a research associate at the Gulf International Forum. Prime Minister Mohamad's office issued a statement which clarified there was no intention to create a "new bloc as alluded to by some of its critics", Reuters reported. 'State of affairs' "In addition, the Summit is not a platform to discuss about religion or religious affairs but specifically to address the state of affairs of the Muslim Ummah [community]," Mohamad's office also said. In an interview with Reuters last week, Malaysia's prime minister expressed his frustration with the OIC's inaction and said the situation of the Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang, China will likely be discussed. The Uighur community in northwest China has faced an unprecedented crackdown in recent years, with at least 1 million mostly Muslim ethnic minorities held in internment camps that authorities downplay as "vocational education centres". China has responded harshly to any international criticism of its alleged human rights abuses. Read more: China censors Arsenal match following Ozil's prayer for Uighur Muslims The international community has largely been unwilling to risk its economic relations with China on the issue and Muslim countries were among thirty-seven states which cosigned a letter in the United Nations defending China's treatment of Uighur Muslims in July. Turkey was one of the region's few voices willing to risk its economic relationship with China by expressing support for the Uighur cause. But recently President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has struck a softer tone, saying a solution could be found to help thousands of Uighur Muslims interned in Chinese camps "taking into account the sensitivities" of both sides. Follow us on Twitter and Instagram to stay connected https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1207238980409974784 . Ragıp Soylu @ragipsoylu BREAKING — Pakistan abstained from Kuala Lumpur Islamic summit because • Saudi govt threatened economic sanctions such as withdrawing money from Pakistan Central Bank • And replacing Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia with Bengals According to Erdogan’s statement 6:13 AM · Dec 20, 2019·Twitter for iPhone View: https://twitter.com/trpresidency/status/1207238980409974784/photo/1 Muslim leaders gather in Malaysia for Islamic summit Muslim leaders gather in Malaysia for Islamic summit www.alaraby.co.uk

Well that's definitely "interesting".....

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

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Philippines evaluating Gripen and F-16V for MRF programme, defence secretary confirms
Gabriel Dominguez, London - Jane's Defence Weekly

20 December 2019

Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana confirmed on 16 December that the Philippine Air Force (PAF) is evaluating two aircraft for its multirole fighter (MRF) programme.

“One of the aircraft being evaluated is from Sweden [the Saab Gripen] and the other is the American [Lockheed Martin] F-16V,” Lorenzana was quoted by the state-owned Philippine News Agency (PNA) as saying, without providing further details.

During the Asian Defence and Security (ADAS) 2018 exhibition in Manila a senior PAF official told Jane’s that the PAF had budgeted PHP61 billion (USD1.1 billion) to procure a multirole combat aircraft over the following five years.

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