WAR 01-04-2020-to-01-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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(399) 12-14-2019-to-12-20-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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WAR - 12-21-2019-to-12-27-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(397) 11-30-2019-to-12-06-2019___*THE***WINDS****of****WAR TimeBomb 2000 (398) 12-07-2019-to-12-13-2019___*THE***WINDS****of****WAR WAR - 12-07-2019-to-12-13-2019___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (399) 12-14-2019-to-12-20-2019___*THE***WINDS****of****WAR...

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World News
January 5, 2020 / 3:34 AM / Updated 2 hours ago

Netanyahu, in apparent stumble, calls Israel 'nuclear power'

2 Min Read

JERUSALEM (Reuters) - In an apparent slip of the tongue on Sunday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Israel as a nuclear power before correcting himself with a bashful nod and an embarrassed smile.

Israel is widely believed to have an atomic arsenal but has never confirmed or denied that it has nuclear weapons, maintaining a so-called policy of ambiguity on the issue for decades.

Netanyahu stumbled at the weekly cabinet meeting while reading in Hebrew prepared remarks on a deal with Greece and Cyprus on a subsea gas pipeline.

“The significance of this project is that we are turning Israel into a nuclear power,” he said, before quickly correcting himself to say “energy power”.

He then paused for a beat, acknowledging his mistake with a smile, and then ploughed on with his comments.
The rare blooper from one of Israel’s most polished politicians swiftly proliferated on social media.

Netanyahu is fighting for his political survival in a March 2 vote after two inconclusive elections in April and September. In November, he was indicted on corruption charges, which he denies.

Writing by Jeffrey Heller; Editing by Maayan Lubell and Frances Kerry
 

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World News
January 5, 2020 / 6:52 AM / Updated 11 minutes ago
Venezuela Socialists snatch congress from Guaido, opposition denounces coup

Mayela Armas, Brian Ellsworth
4 Min Read

CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuela’s government on Sunday used troops to block lawmakers from re-electing opposition leader Juan Guaido as congress chief, allowing the ruling Socialist Party to hand the post to a lawmaker recently expelled from the opposition.

The gambit was dismissed as a sham by opposition leaders and an official in Washington, who accused President Nicolas Maduro of snatching control of congress - the only major state institution not controlled by his allies.
Installing legislator Luis Parra as new congress chief may help Maduro to sideline Guaido, who led a 2019 opposition groundswell by assuming an interim presidency that has been recognized by more than 50 countries.

Related Coverage
“We alert the world that the Maduro regime is seeking to carry out a parliamentry coup with (the Socialist Party) and swear in National Assembly leadership against the will of the parliamentary majority,” tweeted opposition legislator Carlos Valero.
Legislators attempting to approach congress on Sunday told Reuters they had to pass through five sequential checkpoints of police and National Guard troops, where officials would slowly review credentials and at each stage refuse to allow some of them through.
Socialist Party legislators in the early afternoon took control of the session and nominated Parra as the new Congress chief, according to a Reuters witness.

They later said this was justified by the absence of lawmakers including Guaido, who in one video is shown unsuccessfully attempting to climb over a fence into the palace before being pushed back by troops.
Opposition leaders said legislators would re-elect Guaido in a separate legislative session at the headquarters of a local newspaper, paving the way for two separate Venezuelan parliaments with competing claims for legitimacy.
CONFUSED MELEE
Following a confused melee on the floor of parliament, an impromptu vote was held through a show of hands but without counting each individual vote, as required by parliamentary regulations, according to the Reuters witness.

Venezuela’s state television did not broadcast the vote.

It resumed live coverage amid an improvised swearing-in ceremony for Parra, who was expelled last year from opposition party First Justice for allegedly helping burnish the reputation of a businessman associated with Maduro’s government.

Parra denies the accusations. Since his expulsion from First Justice, he has been harshly critical of Guaido’s leadership. He and other legislators also ensnared in the corruption scandal have described themselves as being in “rebellion.”
“We announced this morning before entering the legislative palace that the rebellion of the deputies ... would be clearly expressed,” Parra said on Sunday in comments broadcast on state television.

Slideshow (11 Images)
A State Department official wrote via Twitter that the United States would continue to back Guaido as the country’s legitimate leader.

“@JGuaido remains #Venezuela’s interim president under its constitution,” wrote Michael Kozak, assistant secretary for U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.

“This morning’s phony National Assembly session lacked a legal quorum. There was no vote.”

Guaido’s claim to the interim presidency rested on his position as president of the opposition-held National Assembly. He argued that Maduro’s 2018 re-election was fraudulent, meaning the presidency was vacant and that the constitution dictated the head of parliament should take charge temporarily.

Reporting by Mayela Armas and Brian Ellsworth; Writing by Brian Ellsworth; Editing by Diane Craft and Lisa Shumaker
 

Zagdid

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Nice amphibious landing package


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by Dylan Malyasov 10:32 (GMT+0000) January 5, 2020 in Aviation, Maritime Security, News, Photo

Russian-made Ka-52 and Apache helicopters meet face-to-face in Egypt

7687602_original-750x375.jpg


Russian-made Kamov Ka-52 and AH-64D Apache attack helicopters of Egyptian Air Force were spotted during Egyptian Naval Forces amphibious landing exercises in the Mediterranean on 11 December 2019.

The Scramble Magazine reported that Egyptian Air Force Ka-52 and AH-64D Apache helicopters were noted aboard the ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010), a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) of the French Mistral class. Notably, both helicopter types were used on the LHD for the first time.

It should be reminded that in 2015 Egypt signed a contract with Rosoboronexport for the purchase of 46 Ka-52 combat helicopters, becoming the first foreign customer of this type of helicopter. Deliveries to Egypt of the export version of Ka-52 helicopters have been carried out since July 2017.

Also, negotiations are underway with Egypt on the sale of a batch of ship-borne Ka-52K helicopters to him based on two Egyptian Mistral UDCs.

In October 2015, Egypt signed an agreement with the French shipbuilding association DCNS (now the Naval Group) to acquire two Mistral-type universal landing ships built in France, originally for Russia. Russia’s supply of these ships built under the 2011 contract became impossible after the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions of the European Union in August 2014. The contract for the supply of these ships, which were maintained at the STX France shipyard in Saint-Nazaire, was officially terminated by the Russian and French parties on August 5, 2015, and on August 23, 2015, an agreement was reached on the acquisition of both UDC by Egypt. The actual value of the contract for Egypt’s purchase of two UDCs amounted to 950 million euros, and it is believed that it was mainly financed by Saudi Arabia.

The first of the two ships L 1010 Gamal Abdel Nasser (ex Russian “Vladivostok”) was transferred to the Egyptian Navy in Saint-Nazaire on June 2, 2016 and arrived in Alexandria on June 23, 2016. The second ship L 1020 Anwar al-Sadat (ex Russian “Sevastopol”) was transferred to Egypt on September 16, 2016 and arrived in Alexandria on October 1, 2016.

As to Apache, In 1995, the Egyptian Air Force placed an order for 36 AH-64A helicopters. These Apaches were delivered with the same avionics as the U.S. fleet at that time, except for indigenous radio equipment. In 2000, Boeing announced an order to remanufacture Egypt’s existing Apache fleet to the AH-64D configuration, except for Longbow radar, which had been refused by the U.S. government. Egypt requested a further 12 AH-64D Block II Apaches with Longbow radars through a Foreign Military Sale in 2009.
 

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The Nuclear Threats From Iran and North Korea, Working Together, Grow by the Day

DOUBLE TROUBLE
By blowing away Soleimani, Trump wanted to show he is not a paper tiger. But his “disproportionate” actions may push North Korea and Iran to step up nuclear cooperation.
Donald Kirk
Christopher Dickey
World News Editor

Updated Jan. 06, 2020 5:10PM ET / Published Jan. 06, 2020 11:47AM ET

In a matter of days the threats to world peace–apocalyptic nuclear threats–have grown incalculably worse, largely thanks to President Donald Trump’s failed diplomacy with North Korea and his now murderous confrontation with Iran.
Last Tuesday, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un announced that he would no longer observe a self-imposed moratorium on the testing of intercontinental ballistics missiles and the nuclear warheads in his growing arsenal. On Sunday, amid the intensifying crisis precipitated by Trump’s order to assassinate one of Iran’s top generals, Tehran announced it was effectively ending its observance of the 2015 nuclear deal that had frozen its efforts to build a bomb. (For the record, it said it never had such an intention.)
The Trump administration has vowed to use any means necessary to compel Kim to give up his nukes and prevent the ayatollahs from ever acquiring them. So the battle lines are drawn. But, making the situation even more dangerous, Iran and North Korea have a long record of lethal cooperation, including the exchange of scientific and technical secrets.
As the U.S. intensified its confrontations with both countries, they are being pushed toward even greater collaboration, and the possibility looms that the United States could find itself waging a two-front war with adversaries 4,000 miles apart.
When President Trump ordered the fiery termination of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani near the Baghdad airport in the small hours of Friday morning, he may have been concerned that his weird coziness with Kim and his decisions not to respond to increasingly aggressive actions by Iran had made him look weak. Blowing away Soleimani would show he is not a paper tiger. But analysts who follow North Korea and Iran closely believe that, rather than surrender to Trump’s intimidation, they are likely to step up their cooperation.


“Iran will be counting on North Korea even more as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khameini threatens ‘harsh revenge.’”
As it is, North Korea now has hundreds of advisers in Iran, to which it has been exporting mid-range Musudan missiles and the technology for the Taepodong intercontinental type that Kim is itching to test-fire in keeping with his promise of “a new strategic weapon” to intimidate the United States.
Bruce Bechtol, who’s been studying North Korea from his days as a Marine serving on the peninsula, then as an intelligence analyst at the Pentagon and a faculty member at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, believes if anything the North Korea-Iran relationship is broadening and deepening.
“This has always been a robust relationship,” says Bechtol, but it’s “picked up because Iran has been supplying so many North Korean-made systems and capabilities to Syria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis–in addition to the stuff they pay the North Koreans for themselves.”
Iran will be counting on North Korea even more as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khameini threatens “harsh revenge” and Iranians shout “Death to America” at funeral observances for Soleimani.


“Will North Korea sell Iran its ‘strategic new weapon’? Why not?”
— Bruce Bechtol
“The Iranians have been at many North Korean missile launches to learn, to observe systems they might procure,” says Bechtol. “Will North Korea sell Iran its ‘strategic new weapon’? Why not? The North Koreans have sold Iran everything from light machine guns to submarines to intermediate-range ballistic missiles.”
Bruce Bennett, North Korea expert at RAND, says he’s contended “ever since President Bush described his ‘axis of evil’” in 2002 (including Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, North Korea, and Iran), the latter two have participated in a “rogue cartel,” with North Korea “very interested in the Iranian financial resources.”
Bennett says the relationship goes far deeper than is generally known, reiterating some of the points made by Bechtel. “North Korea has provided Iran with many ballistic missiles and even ballistic missile production facilities,” he says. “Iranian scientists have been at the North Korean nuclear weapon tests. And there are stories about North Korea and Iran training Syrian personnel on how to load chemical weapons on ballistic missiles. Plus, Iran seems to have submarines that look exactly like some submarines produced by North Korea.”
Related in World

What’s Happened to Kim Jong Un’s ‘Christmas Gift’?

This undated picture released from North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 23, 2016 shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un (C) inspecting a test of the surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile Hwasong-10 at an undisclosed location in North Korea.\nThe Musudan -- also known as the Hwasong-10 -- has a theoretical range of anywhere between 2,500 and 4,000 kilometres (1,550 to 2,500 miles). / AFP / KCNA VIA KNS / KCNA / South Korea OUT / REPUBLIC OF KOREA OUT   ---EDITORS NOTE--- RESTRICTED TO EDITORIAL USE - MANDATORY CREDIT \AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS\ - NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS - DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS\nTHIS PICTURE WAS MADE AVAILABLE BY A THIRD PARTY. AFP CAN NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE AUTHENTICITY, LOCATION, DATE AND CONTENT OF THIS IMAGE. THIS PHOTO IS DISTRIBUTED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED BY AFP.  /         (Photo credit should read KCNA/AFP via Getty Images)
Kim Jong Un Rings in a Thoroughly Nuclear New Year


Weakened and Unstable Trump Gives Korea the Jitters

Bennett believes “the full details”of Iran-North Korean cooperation “probably go well beyond what we know about” but predicts, “With both North Korea and Iran seriously angry at the U.S., we could see more cooperation in the coming months.”
If and when Iran “starts taking terrorist actions against the U.S.,” he goes on, “North Korea could have an adviser role” involved in “serious provocations.”
President Trump’s order to snuff out Soleimani came three days after Kim called off his self-imposed “moratorium” on testing long-range missiles and nukes while charting a “new path” for his country, including economic reform. Menacingly, he warned of “shocking action” against the U.S. for ignoring his end-of-year deadline for resolving differences, presumably including relief from sanctions imposed after he last ordered nuclear and long-range missile tests in 2017.


“It’s no longer possible to rule out the U.S. using ‘decapitation’ of foreign governments as an instrument of policy. ”
On the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” says Steve Tharp, long-time military and civilian analyst of North Korea’s rise as a nuclear power, Iran and North Korea “were always working together.” Both of them would like to “focus more on cooperation to get the evil Americans.”
Beijing might yet play a restraining role, however, in view of its power and influence over North Korea, which counts on China for virtually all its oil and half its food.
North Korea’s shipments to Iran of missiles and other weaponry have gone by air over Chinese territory, but China could tamp down the flow while proposing relief in the United Nations from onerous sanctions on North Korea. “If North Korea begins carrying out serious provocations,” says Bennett, “China might pull back from sanctions relief.”
But a U.S. drone strike against an enemy general has added a sense of urgency to deliberations in Pyongyang. Trump has made it clear he is ready to dispense with any notion of “proportionality” in the violent minuets America conducts with its adversaries. That makes it difficult for them to calculate how far they can push him, but may also push them toward more extreme actions.
It’s no longer possible to rule out the U.S. using “decapitation” of foreign governments as an instrument of policy.
At the least “the Soleimani episode ought to prompt Pyongyang to re-examine its assumptions about U.S. behavior,” says Nicholas Eberstadt, long-time economist at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. “Trump is clearly not your average president. He is clearly capable of taking actions” that previous decision-makers “would not have chosen.” Indeed, adversaries once seen as “‘untouchable' are obviously no longer so.”
If nothing else, Eberstadt believes, “the Soleimani incident might suggest the standard North Korean approach of breaking sanctions through brinkmanship might be received less well in Washington by this administration than others the Kim family regime has contended with in the past.”
“If I’m Kim Jong Un, I worry that the U.S. is willing to take out foreign leaders without waging war,” says Van Jackson, a former Pentagon official and author of On the Brink, a book about the dangers confronting the Korean peninsula. “Assassination circumvents the nuclear deterrent North Korea’s worked so hard to build. If Kim feels his deterrent doesn’t protect his ass, then he may feel greater pressure to keep his nukes on a hair trigger.”
In the meantime, “Iran will take all the help it can get to break out with a nuclear capability,” says Jackson. “The question is whether Kim will indulge Iran’s nuclear needs.”
 

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Editor's Pick5,025 viewsJan 6, 2020, 12:10pm
China Wants To Save Iran Nuclear Deal As It Leaves Their Oil Market Behind

Kenneth Rapoza Senior Contributor


Markets
I write about business and investing in emerging markets.



CHINA QINGDAO TRADE

Tugboats push an oil tanker to the reception terminal in Qingdao in east China's Shandong province. ... [+]
Barcroft Media via Getty Images
China’s top foreign policy officials scolded President Trump’s January 3 hit on Iranian general Kassam Soleimani over the weekend, vowing to do what they could to keep nuclear weapons out of Iran’s hands.
Geng Shuang, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry, told the local press on Monday that Iran was basically “forced” to end its commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action after the death of Soleimani by drone strike outside of a Baghdad airport last week. Geng said that by doing so, however, they would be in violation of their non-proliferation obligations.
The South China Morning Post reported Geng saying that, “China will continue to maintain close communication and coordination with all related parties, and will take relentless efforts” to save the nuclear deal and avoid greater conflict in the Gulf.


Today In: Money

Iran Nuclear

Technicians seen at the Arak heavy water reactor in Iran on December 23, 2019. Oil rich Iran says it ... [+]
ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Iran nuclear deal was signed under then-president Barack Obama in the summer of 2015. But the deal has had its critics ever since, with some saying the U.S. was basically bribing Iran not to enrich uranium for nuclear weaponry.

Iran has been fighting a proxy war with the United States and its allies since the fall of the Washington-backed Shah of Iran. Soleimani was a lead soldier in that fight, and has since climbed the ranks to lead the elite Quds Force. He was blamed by Washington for leading a militia attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on December 31.
Brent crude oil prices rose to $70 in intraday trading on Monday morning, but have since fallen below $70. Texas crude is still pricing in the low $60s, up half a percent following a rash of pro-Iran militia attacks against U.S. facilities this weekend.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly held telephone conversations on Saturday with the foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and France, reiterating that China would not back U.S. military strikes on Iran. China, France and Russia are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. That body has a weapons ban on Iran in place since 2010, set to expire in October of this year.
"China will continue to uphold an objective and just position,” Wang said, adding that China will help safeguard “peace and security in the (Persian) Gulf.”
On Friday, China's top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, spoke with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and urged the U.S. not to start a regional war in the Middle East.
China Leaving Iran Oil Market
CHINA-ECONOMY

China's oil refiner Sinopec has at least two major joint venture deals with Saudi Arabia. China has ... [+]
AFP via Getty Images
Last week, Russia’s Vedomosti business daily sourced an unnamed diplomat who surmised that Iran would retaliate by blocking free shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that roughly 35% of all seaborne traded oil, or almost 20% of oil traded worldwide, goes through that Strait.
The Strait curves through the coasts of Oman and Iran and is a key transit route for Saudi Arabian oil into China.
China’s imports of Saudi oil have hit a record high of late due to sanctions on Iran and dwindling resources in Venezuela, making that body of water very important to Chinese oil supply.
China imported 8.21 million tons of crude oil from Saudi Arabia in November, pushing the total volume for 11 months to a record 76.33 million tons. That’s up 53% from the same period in 2018, based on numbers crunched by Caixin Global, a Chinese business news publisher.
Saudi imports go through the troubled Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, which borders Yemen, a country the Saudi’s are fighting a proxy war with Iranians.
The Tehran financed Houthi militia attacked a Saudi ship passing through the Red Sea in 2018, a troubling sign for oil security and price stability that is so important to China.
Most of Saudi’s oil goes through Hormuz, an easier shut off valve for the Iranians.
This summer, Soleimani’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps seized a British-flagged oil tanker called Stena Impero. The Iranian military accused the tanker of “violating international regulations.” The move was likely yet another tit-for-tat operation that followed the U.K.’s seizure of an Iranian oil tanker off the coast of Gibraltar.
US-POLITICS-TRUMP

President Trump says the assassination of Kassam Soleimani was designed to prevent a war, not start ... [+]
AFP via Getty Images
Iran’s oil exports have declined severely due to Trump’s decision to unilaterally reimpose sanctions on the country.
China has since turned to the Saudi’s, no longer able to trust Iran as a reliable source due to geopolitics.
China’s Saudi purchases beat the 70.3 million tons imported from neighboring Russia, once their top source for crude, and the 47.08 million tons coming from Iraq.
China recently abandoned Venezuela’s dying crude oil business in October and again in November due to sanctions threats. Ongoing trade talks with Washington may have had something to do with that as well.
Meanwhile, imports of Iranian oil fell by nearly half to 14.36 million tons for the year ending in November.
The surge in Saudi imports come at a time when the Saudis were aggressively expanding Aramco’s downstream business through Chinese joint ventures in petroleum refining, storage and sales. Two joint refineries – Hengli Petrochemical and Zhejiang Petrochemical — were granted import quotas of 24.30 million tons of oil in total in 2019, and the volume is expected to keep growing in 2020 as Beijing loosens restrictions governing private companies in the energy sector and as the surprising twist in the Iran crisis should continue to keep China away.
China does not need Iran as much as it used to.
Beijing does not want escalation of conflict because of the stress it puts on oil tanker transit routes to China. Both the U.S. and Washington have a strategic interest in keeping those lanes drama-free.
With the Phase 1 trade deal expected to be signed next week in Washington, investors will be looking for whispers of China and the U.S. agreements over Iran, potentially keeping a lid on military escalations.
Follow me on Twitter or LinkedIn.

Kenneth Rapoza


Kenneth Rapoza




I've spent 20 years as a reporter for the best in the business, including as a Brazil-based staffer for WSJ. Since 2011, I focus on business and investing in the big eme...
 

Housecarl

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Anticipating Pakistan’s Next Move in Kashmir

Nishank Motwani

January 6, 2020

Commentary

Pakistanis often call Kashmir their “jugular vein.” The implication is that reclaiming the part of the region now administered by India is key to Pakistan’s survival. That objective got harder in August 2019, when India rescinded Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status. The move caught Pakistan off guard, made its military look weak, and turned its goal of annexing territory that has never formed part of its homeland even more distant.

How has Pakistan responded to India annulling Kashmir’s special status? And how will Pakistan try to advance its position in Kashmir going forward?

So far, Pakistan has been active diplomatically but has not yet responded militarily. Looking ahead, Pakistan will likely continue its support of anti-India terrorist groups, which risks sparking another crisis. It might also launch a limited military assault against Indian targets of some kind. This misadventure would likely backfire because Pakistan risks isolating itself internationally as it did twenty years ago in the Kargil War. Military action would also offer India the rationale to respond with force as it did in Feb. 2019 after a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in Kashmir. Moreover, Pakistan would jeopardize its already precarious economic position — it received a $6 billion IMF bailout last summer (the 13th in the country’s history) and desperately needs international investment. Another military confrontation with India would scare away investors when Pakistan can least afford it. Still, from the perspective of the Pakistan Army, military action would demonstrate that it can challenge and punish India no matter New Delhi’s growing military and economic strength.

Pakistan’s most effective response may be to do nothing at all. Under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi is willing to take risks and pursue policies even if they are unpopular internationally. India’s restraint in the face of Pakistani provocations can no longer be taken for granted. With its heavy-handed approach in Kashmir and the pursuit of a Hindu-nationalist domestic agenda, Pakistan’s best strategy may be to watch as India commits a series of self-enforced errors.

Kashmir and International Opinion

How did Jammu and Kashmir get its special status and what was so special about Article 370? At the time of partition, Maharaja Hari Singh, the princely state’s ruler, was undecided on whether to remain independent or accede to India or Pakistan. He signed an instrument of accession with India after Pakistan sent fighters to forcefully seize it in October 1947. This instrument limited the Indian parliament’s legislative writ on Jammu and Kashmir to defense, foreign relations, and communication. This special status meant that Kashmir could have its own constitution and a flag. The adoption of the Indian Constitution in 1950 gave birth to Article 370, and this codified Kashmir’s special status. Surprisingly, it was a provision within Article 370 itself that permitted the Indian government to dismantle the article, a move which is currently under review in India’s Supreme Court.

The international response to India’s revocation of Article 370 was largely muted immediately after the decision. India is an increasingly important country for economic and geopolitical reasons, and few countries were willing to risk alienating a growing power. However, the restraint of the international community is being tested, particularly in light of discriminatory legislation against Muslims passed in December that has triggered nationwide protests. That the leading voices challenging New Delhi’s move are Islamabad, with its record of supporting terrorist groups, and Beijing, with its abysmal human rights record — particularly with respect to its Muslim population — has also worked in India’s favor. Unless New Delhi changes its approach, the observed silence from governments other than Pakistan and China won’t last forever.

Whether or not the muzzle around Western capitals will come loose on India’s human rights record is not an if but a when question. Already the U.S. Congress has held a hearing to examine the human rights situation in Kashmir. Some members of the U.S. Senate have condemned the imprisonment of large numbers of Kashmiris and urged President Donald Trump to act. German Chancellor Angela Merkel echoed this sentiment in early November and stated that the lockdown of the people and the region cannot be sustained. Pressure is likely to grow. When international criticism of India becomes more vocal, Pakistan will be ready and waiting to put Kashmir under a permanent spotlight.

What Are Pakistan’s Options?

Pakistan has a few instruments to press its argument forward on Kashmir. First, Pakistan can and has used diplomacy to carry out symbolic acts — like expelling India’s envoy and banning Indian television and movies — to demonstrate downgraded ties with India. Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach has made a lot of noise across international forums ranging from the United Nations, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and other multilateral bodies — but it’s unclear if it’s made much difference. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s address at the UN General Assembly in September is a case in point. He hammered on about Kashmir but spoiled the argument by effectively threatening nuclear war against India. The trouble with the Pakistani establishment’s approach is that its narrative has very few takers. Its use of terrorist groups to advance its foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and India, its growing nuclear arsenal and history of proliferation, and its poor human rights record means that Pakistan has few if any partners that are willing to support its position on the most pertinent foreign policy matter it has championed for over 70 years.

Second, Pakistan can establish a political office for Indian Kashmiris in Pakistan. Islamabad’s objective would be to give a platform to Indian Kashmiri political groups that would amplify their propaganda value. By giving oxygen to Indian Kashmiri political groups, Pakistan could bolster them as a suppressed voice and host them as a people in exile in international forums. Such a practice is likely to gain some traction and would confer a degree of legitimacy on them, to India’s chagrin. If Indian Kashmiri political groups find a footing in Pakistan, it is likely to increase Islamabad’s support network deeper inside India on the back of these political groups’ support base. A more profound network inside India would enable Pakistan to conduct enhanced clandestine activities including recruitment, reconnaissance of sensitive installations, support for organized crime, money laundering, and exploitation of the Indian state’s vulnerabilities. These twin moves are not risk-free. It would be easy for New Delhi to call out Pakistan’s interference in its sovereign affairs, and India could potentially open a similar channel for Balochi groups demanding the Pakistani state address their political and economic grievances. Kashmiri groups seeking Islamabad’s overt support would risk losing legitimacy and could be cast aside as terrorist groups pursuing Pakistan’s agenda.

Third, Pakistan could try to persuade its only ally, China, to side with its position more stridently. Beijing was the only other actor that took issue with New Delhi’s policy shift on Kashmir. A statement from the Chinese foreign ministry noted that it was opposed to the move, as Beijing has territorial claims in the western part of Kashmir along the China-India border. It condemned India for changing a domestic law that would alter China’s territorial sovereignty, adding that such a practice is unacceptable and would be resisted. Though a strong statement, New Delhi had expected the Chinese to take a fervent position owing to Beijing’s increasingly muscular foreign policy, its partnership with Islamabad, and the persistent vexation in India-China bilateral ties.

Beijing’s criticism over Kashmir in late summer 2019 strained a relationship already beset with mutual distrust. This raised uncertainty about whether President Xi Jinping’s visit to India for the “Chennai Informal Summit” with Modi would take place on Oct. 11, 2019. The two-day summit did go ahead but produced little except for photo summitry at UNESCO world heritage sites. Moreover, neither capital could confirm the meeting between the two heads of state even very close to the planned date, revealing rising tensions in their bilateral relationship. Before meeting Modi, Xi hosted Khan in Beijing, further souring the climate for talks as Khan “thanked” Xi for support on Kashmir. New Delhi probably had low expectations of the Modi-Xi summit, so it was not a surprise that Xi’s arrival was also marked by the Indian military testing its new mountain combat capability in Arunachal Pradesh, 100 kilometers away from the border with China. Beijing calls this area “Southern Tibet” and claims 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory.

While New Delhi is unlikely to change China’s position on Kashmir, it has had success in peeling away Saudi Arabia and the UAE from Pakistan’s orbit. Before Modi, Islamabad could have counted on Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for support on Kashmir, but this is no longer the case. The Saudis told Pakistan that it considers Kashmir India’s internal matter. Similarly, the UAE’s ambassador in New Delhi stated that Kashmir was its domestic matter. The Modi administration has significantly upgraded ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, owing in part to Modi’s personal style of engaging political leaders as well as offering lucrative economic opportunities in the Indian economy, particularly in oil and gas, infrastructure, and agriculture. Although India’s economic growth rate is diminishing, it still offers a significantly better return on investment than Pakistan can.

Continued.....
 

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Continued.....

Finally, to demonstrate that it is capable of a bold response to India changing the status quo in Kashmir, Pakistan might launch military operations against India. The army, through its proxies, could increase attacks against Indian security forces deployed in Kashmir and expand the portfolio of targeting to include soft targets such as government offices, residential buildings, and schools. Kashmiri Pandits, an indigenous Hindu minority that fled Kashmir in the wake of the 1989 armed insurgency against the Indian state, are especially vulnerable at this time. Pakistani terrorist groups could also hit and conduct complex suicide attacks in urban centers across India, or strike the Indian presence in Afghanistan.

While military action against India would be a geopolitical disaster for Pakistan, that hasn’t stopped the country before. Pakistan has a history of undertaking risky military operations with almost no chance of success, like during the 1965 India-Pakistan War and Kargil War. It has also consistently employed terrorism as a strategy to advance its political interests, despite the implications for its international reputation and its own security. As a result, New Delhi anticipates that Pakistan’s military establishment will intensify attacks against Indian armed forces and civilians, but any such action is likely to backfire and further isolate Pakistan and undermine its case in Kashmir. In addition, New Delhi is no longer held hostage to Pakistan’s nuclear coercion, as it has found a space for limited strikes — established by its targeting of terrorist camps in Balakot in February 2019 — and is prepared to fight a limited conventional war under a nuclear threshold if the level of provocation from Pakistan warrants it.

While India enjoys economic, diplomatic, and demographic advantages over Pakistan, it would be unwise for New Delhi to be complacent about the challenge from Pakistan. Given current trends in Indian politics, its partners will not remain silent on its human rights record. The Indian government may think that it is indispensable to the West owing to its economic significance, military power, and the fact that it is the only stable democracy in the region, and that these traits will neuter Western criticism on Kashmir. After all, so the thinking goes, New Delhi came out on top after its nuclear tests in May 1998 and international critics will eventually accept the situation in Kashmir.

But this would be the wrong lesson for New Delhi to draw. India is important to the West, to be sure — but it’s not that important. Western powers are fundamentally driven by hard national interests, but they are also responsive to their own populations, which can plainly observe India’s policies in Kashmir and its larger Hindu-nationalist turn. The wholesale imprisonment, curfew, and denial of rights of Kashmiris has the capacity to disrupt India’s relations with its partners and it would be risky for New Delhi to assume that it can sail through the storm easily.

India’s Key Problem Isn’t Pakistan

New Delhi’s most significant challenge on Kashmir is not Pakistan — it’s Indian policy. Because India is the world’s largest democracy — and is proud of the status this confers — the country is rightfully held to a higher standard. India’s democratic values and principles require that it act as a state with a moral compass. It is also more vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. Three interrelated vulnerabilities stand out as a result.

First, New Delhi’s human rights abuses in Kashmir are a problem for India. The ongoing preventive detention, arbitrary arrests, and the disproportionate use of force against civilians in Kashmir are not the hallmarks of a thriving democracy. What is equally troubling is that an Indian Ministry of Home Affairs document titled “The Future Ahead of Kashmir” foresees a protracted violent struggle and even compares the situation to the U.S. Civil War. The persistence of these actions will make it increasingly difficult for the Indian government to justify its motives to the international community. India will not be able to buy the silence of its friends as China has done with Pakistan on the large-scale detention of over one million Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province.

Next, the ongoing information and communications blackout in large parts of Jammu and Kashmir are unsustainable. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression David Kaye was quoted as saying “There’s something about this shutdown that is draconian in a way other shutdowns usually are not.” Similarly, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee tweeted “India’s communications blackout in Kashmir is having a devastating impact on the lives and welfare of everyday Kashmiris.” The Indian government’s defense for severing mobile-telephone networks and internet communications is that it will suppress violence, counter fake news, and deny violent protesters the means with which to organize themselves. Although a partial resumption of mobile services came into effect on Oct. 14, the problem with the argument that the communications blackout stems from a desire to save lives is that it would have reinforced and codified resentment, bolstered hatred against the Indian establishment, and created the conditions for an information vacuum that is subsequently filled by misinformation. Stanford University’s Jan Rydzak concurs that communications blackouts compel people in collective action to substitute non-violent tactics for violent ones. Moreover, the inability of Kashmiris to communicate with each other is likely to instill more distrust and antagonism towards the Indian establishment and may make them believe that there has been significant violence and that is the reason for the information shutdown.

The third liability is that India has subjugated its own people and has failed to afford Kashmiris the same rights and privileges as other Indian citizens. In a televised addressed to the nation, Modi justified his decision to void the constitutional autonomy afforded to Kashmir on the grounds that it would boost development and good governance, fight corruption, and end gender, caste, and religious discrimination. Far from giving Kashmiris the same rights and privileges as other Indians or having consulted them about their political future, they are now farther away than at any point in India’s history from being treated as equal citizens. However, the Modi administration’s view is firmly rooted in the belief that the annulment of the constitutional provisions has paved the way to “mainstream” Kashmiris. Exactly how Kashmiris will come to experience this mainstreaming under the oppressive conditions that currently exist is only a question Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party can answer. Besides the popularity of Modi’s Kashmir political move among many Indians and opposition parties, this popularity alone is restricted to India and parts of the Indian diaspora. The project of the current Indian government with respect to Kashmir does not have much international appeal.

The Indian parliament’s passage of the Citizens Amendment Act (CAA) in December 2019 indicates that these concerns are not isolated to Kashmir. The law offers Indian citizenship to eligible Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, or Christians from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but disqualifies Muslims. In effect, the law betrays India’s secular, pluralistic values as it selectively comes to the defense of persecuted religious minorities and intentionally leaves out Muslims, which it implies are the oppressors. That the CAA has led to protests in different parts of India is unsurprising, but what has shaken domestic and international observers is the police brutality which has fueled public anger. So far, 19 people have been killed in less than a month of protests. In Hong Kong, where protests have been going on for much longer, only two citizens have lost their lives. Images and reports of excessive force against the protesters will codify the view that the Bharatiya Janata Party is intolerant of criticism or dissent, and this will make it harder for India’s partners to remain silent on human rights abuses whether in Kashmir or the rest of the country.

India’s Kashmir policy and the CAA threaten to undercut its diplomatic gains in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia appears to have indicated that it could hold a special foreign ministers’ summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Kashmir. This is precisely what Pakistan wants. If India turns on itself, it will be weaker, seen as a pariah, and make it easier for exploitation by its adversaries.

Conclusion

Pakistan will up the ante diplomatically in response to developments in India, and try to exploit Modi’s missteps. Islamabad has far more to gain by delegitimizing New Delhi’s actions than by intervening militarily, which would backfire and serve to isolate Pakistan. But the conditions for military intervention will ripen if the situation in Kashmir worsens and the effects of the CAA and other Hindu majoritarian policies cause reputational damage to India. Throughout its history, Pakistan Army has taken risky — and reckless — actions. It will pounce when it believes India is weak and lacks the support of its international supporters.

India is lucky that its chief international critics — China and Pakistan — have so little credibility on the subject of human rights. But this good fortune will be undone if the government continues to advance a troubling domestic agenda. New Delhi should know from its own history of struggles that no amount of material gain, economic development, or large-scale subjugation can offset political demands deeply rooted in identity. If Kashmir implodes — or if it continues to damage its international credibility — New Delhi will only have itself to blame.

Dr. Nishank Motwani is deputy director at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) in Kabul. He has observed Afghanistan’s 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, as well as the 2018 parliamentary elections. The views expressed here are his own.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

President Erdogan Says Intel Operatives Are In Libya Ahead Of Turkish Troop Deployment
Turkey is racing to prop-up Libya’s internationally-recognized government, which is losing ground to its rivals.
By Joseph Trevithick
January 6, 2020

urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has publicly acknowledged that his country intelligence operatives have already been actively engaged in Libya a day after formally announcing plans to deploy Turkish troops to that country to support the internationally-recognized government in Tripoli. This comes as forces loyal to rogue General Khalifa Haftar appear to have taken control of the city of Sirte along the central Libyan coast. Haftar says authorities in Tripoli are illegitimate and has the backing of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Russia, among others.




Bizarre Airstrip Is Being Built Right Between Apartment Towers Near Libyan CapitalBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Turkey's Deepening Intervention In The Libyan Civil War Point's To Erdogan's Grand AmbitionsBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Why Russia Has Sent Troops to Egypt for Possible Operations in LibyaBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Shadowy UAE Base in Libya Hosts Attack Aircraft and Chinese DronesBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
U.S. Navy hovercraft evacuated Americans from Tripoli, Libya (Updated)By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
Erdogan said that members of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization, also known by the Turkish acronym MIT, were working in Libya during a ceremony at the intelligence agency's new compound in Ankara on Jan. 6, 2020. This is hardly surprising given that Turkey has been actively sending weapons, ammunition, and other military assistance to the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli since at least May 2019. On Jan. 5, Erogdan had said in a televised interview that Turkish military forces would also be heading to Libya to support the GNA.


https%3A%2F%2Fs3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fthe-drive-cms-content-staging%2Fmessage-editor%252F1578339608062-libya-map.jpg

Google Maps
A map showing the general locations of major cities in Libya, including the internationally-recognized capital Tripoli in the West and Benghazi, the ostensible capital of rogue general Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army in the East.

"There will be an operation center [in Libya], there will be a Turkish lieutenant general leading, and they will be managing the situation over there. [Turkish soldiers] are gradually moving there right now," Erdogan said on CNN Turk on Jan. 5. "Right now, we will have different units serving as a combatant force."
Erdogan added that Turkey's deployment was to "to support the legitimate government [of Libya] and avoid a humanitarian tragedy" and "not to fight."


#Turkey's spy agency MIT is already working in #Libya, says Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a kick-off ceremony for new MIT compound in Ankara. pic.twitter.com/PQi4VW6fiQ
— Abdullah Bozkurt (@abdbozkurt) January 6, 2020
Turkey's parliament authorized Erdogan to deploy Turkish forces to Libya in support of the GNA on Jan. 2. That vote followed a formal request from Libya's President Prime Minister Fayez Al Sarraj. In November 2019, Erdogan and Sarraj had signed a deal covering a range of security and other issues, which included provisions for a Turkish military deployment, if Libyan authorities asked for one.
Erdogan did not elaborate on the size or composition of the Turkish forces heading to Libya or the timetable for their arrival. There are unconfirmed reports that the deployment, at least initially, could be small, perhaps no more than 50 personnel, primarily for special operations forces units, tasked with training and advising GNA forces and otherwise coordinating Turkish assistance. This could include overseeing the delivery of more advanced military hardware, such as electronic warfare systems, and teaching Libyan forces to operate them.
There have been specific claims that Turkey could deploy KORAL road-mobile electronic warfare jamming systems, which seems odd given that these are ostensibly designed to attack hostile radars. Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) does have air defenses, including some number of Russian-made Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense systems, reportedly obtained via the United Arab Emirates, as well as older Soviet-era S-125 and SA-6 systems inherited from the previous regime of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. How functional the LNA's S-125s and SA-6s, or the radars typically associated with them, are is unclear.


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Aselsan
The Turkish KORAL electronic warfare system.
⚡️According to a lot of photographs circulating on social media, #Haftar-led #LNA was supplied with #Pantsir S-1/SA-22 air defense system wheeled on German MAN SX 45 8x8 truck purportedly belonging to #UAE Armed Forces that have in their possession about 50 such missile systems pic.twitter.com/UgN8FJ6N3p
— SMM Libya (@smmlibya) June 19, 2019
However, in October 2019, Turkish authorities said that they had deployed KORAL as part of the country's intervention into Northern Syria, which was aimed at Kurdish groups that have virtually no air defenses. This raises the possibility that KORAL may have broader functionality for jamming other target sets, including communications and other emitters, such as line-of-sight drone control links, or has useful direction-finding capabilities that could geolocate enemy forces by zeroing in on their radiofrequency emissions.
Tools to counter unmanned aircraft, in particular, could be very valuable to the GNA. Drones have become a major feature on both sides of the Libyan conflict, for carrying out surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as strikes.
Turkey has already notably supplied the GNA with a number of Bayraktar TB2s, which can carry small munitions, and work has been ongoing for weeks now on the construction of a new airstrip near Tripoli, curiously sandwiched between apartment blocks in a residential development, which looks well suited to supporting drone operations. You can read more about this site in this past War Zone story. With regards to Turkey's forthcoming military deployment, its possible that Turkish advisers might find themselves directing GNA drone operations, or simply flying additional unmanned aircraft themselves, as well.
Manned aircraft and helicopters do remain an important component of the conflict on both sides, as well, and LNA combat jets reportedly targeted the new airstrip outside of Tripoli on Jan. 3. An attack on a GNA military academy in Tripoli, which authorities there blame on another LNA airstrike, killed at least 28 people, as well.


#Libyan citizen in #Tripoli showing a #LNA air strike on the new runway for the #Turkish drones ,
He said this is almoz project and the airforce did a good job ( F^*^% #Turky )#Libya
pic.twitter.com/QSDQ9k0POH
— M.LNA.2 (@MLNA27) January 3, 2020
This is the moment when an air strike in support of the warlord Khalifa Haftar kills several recruits on the military college in Hadba near the Libyan capital Tripoli. pic.twitter.com/sSc6PP0xMk
— Ali Özkök (@Ozkok_A) January 5, 2020
Haftar's forces have denied involvement in the strikes on the academy, raising the possibility that one of the LNA's foreign benefactors may have been responsible. There have been reports in the past that the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have conducted their own airstrikes against the GNA. This would make sense given the difficultly both the GNA and LNA have had in operating and maintaining their own already small fleets of combat aircraft, as well as the combat losses they have suffered.
Beyond Turkey's formal military deployment and military assistance to the GNA, authorities in Ankara have also facilitated the deployment of groups of Turkish-backed Syrian forces to Libya in the past week. Individuals who have agreed to go fight in Libya have reportedly received significant monetary incentives and the promise of Turkish citizenship. The Turkish intelligence operatives that Erdogan says are in Libya could well be coordinating the activities of these Syrian groups among their other duties, such as intelligence sharing with the GNA.


A fighter in the Samarkand Brigade told me why fighters are going to Libya: "Turkey is carrying out a policy of starving the dog to make him follow you." The salaries of fighters in Syria are $50 per month - impossible to survive on. Rumored monthly salaries in Libya are $1,500.
— Elizabeth Tsurkov (@Elizrael) January 6, 2020
In the meantime, while Haftar's LNA has, so far, found itself unable to capture Tripoli in its latest offensive aimed at the Libyan capital, its forces have now wrested control of the city of Sirte and outlying areas, including the nearby Ghardabiya Airbase, from the GNA. ISIS-affiliated terrorists in Libya notably overran Sirte in 2016, prompting an American military response in support of GNA-aligned forces.
The push into Sirte was reportedly enabled in part by the defection of an armed force known as the 604th Infantry Battalion, which had been ostensibly aligned with the GNA, but belongs to a separate Libyan faction referred to as the Madkhali groups. Madkhali militias have fought for both the GNA and the LNA, as well as other entities vying for control of the country. Images suggest that some of the factions that took part in the operation have been displaying the green flag of Gaddafi's defunct regime. The long-time dictator was born near Sirte and was killed in the city in 2011 following a U.S. and NATO-led air campaign.


#Libya- #LNA captured #Sirte and its surrounding areas, including Ghardabiya Airbase, reportedly facing minimal resistance
1/ pic.twitter.com/MQ1ubf1DJb
— Oded Berkowitz (@Oded121351) January 6, 2020
Very interesting to see Gaddafi images and green flag today as LNA took back control of Sirte in #Libya pic.twitter.com/97NNDrUQ8I
— Aldin (@aldin_ww) January 6, 2020
The loss of Sirte is a significant blow to the GNA and is an important gain for Haftar's LNA, eliminating a nagging threat to his forces' northern flank that sits in a strategic location along the country's central coastline. The operation to take the city follows the rogue Libyan general's public calls for increased support for his faction in countering Turkey's growing involvement in the conflict and prevents Turkey from reinforcing GNA positions there now.
The GNA does remain in control of Misrata, roughly halfway between Sirte and Tripoli, but LNA forces control much of the surrounding area there, as well. How the introduction of Turkish forces does or doesn't alter the balance of power in Libya now remains to be seen, but the primary focus for the GNA would now seem to be in ensuring that it remains in control of Tripoli and Misrata, if nothing else. The injection of fresh Turkish-backed Syrian forces may also lead to new GNA offensives in the near future.
Uncertainty remains the word of the day in Libya, but it's clear that the conflict there is only set to go in new and more complicated directions in the very near future.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Indonesia mobilizes fishermen in stand-off with China

Reuters
January 6, 2020

By Stanley Widianto
JAKARTA (Reuters) - Indonesia will mobilize fishermen to join warships in the South China Sea to help defend against Chinese vessels, the government said on Monday, as the biggest stand-off with China for years escalated off Southeast Asia's largest country.
In an unusually strong statement, President Joko Widodo told reporters: "There is no negotiation when it comes to our sovereignty."

The stand-off since last month in the northern Natuna islands, where a Chinese coastguard vessel has accompanied Chinese fishing vessels, has soured the generally friendly relationship between Jakarta and Beijing.

Indonesia's chief security minister, Mahfud MD, told reporters that around 120 fishermen from the island of Java would be sent to the Natuna islands, some 1,000 km (600 miles) to the north.

"We want to mobilize our fishermen from the north coast and maybe in turn from other areas to operate by fishing there and other things," Mahfud said.

Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country, said last week it was sending more warships to the area. Six Indonesian ships were there now and four more were on the way, Imam Hidayat, the head of the Maritime Security Agency's sea operations sub-directorate, told Reuters.

China claims much of the South China Sea, a global trade route with rich fishing grounds and energy reserves, as its own based on what it says its historic activity. But Southeast Asian countries - and the United States and much of the world - say such claims have no legal basis.

Indonesian vessels often confront Chinese fishermen off the Natuna islands, but the presence of the Chinese coastguard vessel has marked an escalation this year over which Indonesia summoned the Chinese ambassador.

Speaking in Beijing last week, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said China had sovereignty over the Spratly islands and their waters and that both China and Indonesia have "normal" fishing activities there. He did not specifically mention the Natuna islands, which are southwest of the Spratlys.

Last year, China engaged in a prolonged maritime stand-off in Vietnam's extended economic zone and jangled nerves with its naval presence off the Philippines and Malaysia.

The last peak in tensions between Indonesia and China over the South China Sea was in 2016, when a Chinese coastguard vessel rammed a Chinese fishing boat to free it after it had been intercepted for illegal fishing by Indonesian authorities.

(Editing by Matthew Tostevin and Alex Richardson)
 

jward

passin' thru

US strike on Iran could have consequences in North Korea
By KIM TONG-HYUNG
today

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — The U.S. strike that killed Iran’s top military commander may have had an indirect casualty: a diplomatic solution to denuclearizing North Korea.

Experts say the escalation of tensions between Washington and Tehran will diminish already fading hopes for such an outcome and inspire North Korea’s decision-makers to tighten their hold on the weapons they see, perhaps correctly, as their strongest guarantee of survival.

North Korea’s initial reaction to the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani has been cautious. The country’s state media was silent for several days before finally on Monday issuing a brief report on the attack that didn’t even mention Soleimani’s name.



The Korean Central News Agency report didn’t publish any direct criticism by Pyongyang toward Washington, instead simply saying that China and Russia had denounced the United States over last week’s airstrike at the airport in Baghdad.

The North’s negotiations with the U.S. have been at a stalemate since last February, when a summit between leader Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump collapsed over disagreements about exchanging sanctions relief for nuclear disarmament. The North has recently pointed to that lack of progress and hinted it may resume tests of nuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

While the killing of Soleimani may give Pyongyang pause about provoking the Trump administration in such a way, the North ultimately is likely to use the strike to further legitimize its stance that it needs to bolster its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against American aggression.

The North has often pointed to the demises of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi while justifying its nuclear development, saying they would still be alive and in power had they successfully obtained nuclear weapons and didn’t surrender them to the U.S.

Solemani’s name will soon be mentioned with them too, said Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea expert at Dongguk University.

“North Korea would say that the ‘imperialist’ nature of the United States would never change, and that there is no other option for them other than to strengthen its nuclear deterrent while bracing for long-term confrontation,” said Koh, an adviser to current South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

It’s clear Pyongyang has been closely watching the developments between Washington and Tehran since the Trump administration in May 2018 abandoned a nuclear agreement Iran reached with world powers in 2015.

The North’s official Rodong Sinmun newspaper published more than 30 articles analyzing the U.S.-Iran tensions since last August, reflecting the keen interest of Pyongyang’s decision-makers, Hwang Ildo, a professor from South Korea’s National Diplomatic Academy, recently wrote.

Kim and Trump exchanged insults and threats of war during a highly provocative run in North Korean weapons tests in 2017. But then in 2018, Kim initiated diplomatic talks with Washington and suspended nuclear and long-range missile tests. The opening came after months of concerns that the Trump administration could consider preventive military action against the North.

There are views that North Korea’s measured brinkmanship of 2019, highlighted by tests of shorter-range weapons and defiant statements on overcoming U.S.-led sanctions, were influenced by Tehran’s calibrated provocations against Washington, which coincided with efforts to retain European countries participating in the 2015 deal.

Washington’s decision not to retaliate against Iran’s interception of a U.S. surveillance drone last June could have emboldened Pyongyang, which possibly concluded it wouldn’t have to fear U.S. military action as long as it avoids directly threatening American lives or more crucial assets, some experts say.

The U.S. airstrike that took out Soleimani came after Iranian proxies fired rockets onto an Iraqi base, killing an American contractor, and those proxies then helped generate a mob that attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

In comments published New Year’s Day, Kim said there were no longer grounds for the North to be “unilaterally bound” to its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests, which Trump has repeatedly boasted as a major foreign policy accomplishment.

But Kim gave no explicit indication that he was abandoning negotiations entirely or restarting the suspended tests. He seemed to leave the door open to diplomacy, saying North Korea’s efforts to bolster its deterrent will be “properly coordinated” depending on future U.S. attitudes.

The U.S. killing of Soleimani will make the North more hesitant about crossing a metaphorical “red line” with the Trump administration by restarting such tests, said Du Hyeogn Cha, a North Korea expert at Seoul’s Kyung Hee University.

“The airstrike does serve as a warning to North Korea about taking extreme actions as the presumption that the Trump administration refrains from using military force when concerned about consequences has been shattered,” said said Cha, an ex-intelligence secretary to former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak.

Posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
Petraeus Says Trump May Have Helped ‘Reestablish Deterrence’ by Killing Suleimani
The former U.S. commander and CIA director says Iran’s “very fragile” situation may limit its response.
BY LARA SELIGMAN | JANUARY 3, 2020, 1:37 PM


As a former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and a former CIA director, retired Gen. David Petraeus is keenly familiar with Qassem Suleimani, the powerful chief of Iran’s Quds Force, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad Friday morning.

After months of a muted U.S. response to Tehran’s repeated lashing out—the downing of a U.S. military drone, a devastating attack on Saudi oil infrastructure, and more—Suleimani’s killing was designed to send a pointed message to the regime that the United States will not tolerate continued provocation, he said.

Petraeus spoke to Foreign Policy on Friday about the implications of an action he called “more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden.” This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Foreign Policy: What impact will the killing of Gen. Suleimani have on regional tensions?

David Petraeus: It is impossible to overstate the importance of this particular action. It is more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden or even the death of [Islamic State leader Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi. Suleimani was the architect and operational commander of the Iranian effort to solidify control of the so-called Shia crescent, stretching from Iran to Iraq through Syria into southern Lebanon. He is responsible for providing explosives, projectiles, and arms and other munitions that killed well over 600 American soldiers and many more of our coalition and Iraqi partners just in Iraq, as well as in many other countries such as Syria. So his death is of enormous significance.

The question of course is how does Iran respond in terms of direct action by its military and Revolutionary Guard Corps forces? And how does it direct its proxies—the Iranian-supported Shia militia in Iraq and Syria and southern Lebanon, and throughout the world?

FP: Two previous administrations have reportedly considered this course of action and dismissed it. Why did Trump act now?

DP: The reasoning seems to be to show in the most significant way possible that the U.S. is just not going to allow the continued violence—the rocketing of our bases, the killing of an American contractor, the attacks on shipping, on unarmed drones—without a very significant response.

Many people had rightly questioned whether American deterrence had eroded somewhat because of the relatively insignificant responses to the earlier actions. This clearly was of vastly greater importance. Of course it also, per the Defense Department statement, was a defensive action given the reported planning and contingencies that Suleimani was going to Iraq to discuss and presumably approve.

This was in response to the killing of an American contractor, the wounding of American forces, and just a sense of how this could go downhill from here if the Iranians don’t realize that this cannot continue.

FP: Do you think this response was proportionate?

DP: It was a defensive response and this is, again, of enormous consequence and significance. But now the question is: How does Iran respond with its own forces and its proxies, and then what does that lead the U.S. to do?

Iran is in a very precarious economic situation, it is very fragile domestically—they’ve killed many, many hundreds if not thousands of Iranian citizens who were demonstrating on the streets of Iran in response to the dismal economic situation and the mismanagement and corruption. I just don’t see the Iranians as anywhere near as supportive of the regime at this point as they were decades ago during the Iran-Iraq War. Clearly the supreme leader has to consider that as Iran considers the potential responses to what the U.S. has done.

It will be interesting now to see if there is a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reach out to Iran and to say, “Okay, the next move could be strikes against your oil infrastructure and your forces in your country—where does that end?”

FP: Will Iran consider this an act of war?

DP: I don’t know what that means, to be truthful. They clearly recognize how very significant it was. But as to the definition—is a cyberattack an act of war? No one can ever answer that. We haven’t declared war, but we have taken a very, very significant action.

FP: How prepared is the U.S. to protect its forces in the region?

DP: We’ve taken numerous actions to augment our air defenses in the region, our offensive capabilities in the region, in terms of general purpose and special operations forces and air assets. The Pentagon has considered the implications the potential consequences and has done a great deal to mitigate the risks—although you can’t fully mitigate the potential risks.

FP: Do you think the decision to conduct this attack on Iraqi soil was overly provocative?

DP: Again what was the alternative? Do it in Iran? Think of the implications of that. This is the most formidable adversary that we have faced for decades. He is a combination of CIA director, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] commander, and special presidential envoy for the region. This is a very significant effort to reestablish deterrence, which obviously had not been shored up by the relatively insignificant responses up until now.

FP: What is the likelihood that there will be an all-out war?

DP: Obviously all sides will suffer if this becomes a wider war, but Iran has to be very worried that—in the state of its economy, the significant popular unrest and demonstrations against the regime—that this is a real threat to the regime in a way that we have not seen prior to this.

FP: Given the maximum pressure campaign that has crippled its economy, the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, and now this assassination, what incentive does Iran have to negotiate now?

DP: The incentive would be to get out from under the sanctions, which are crippling. Could we get back to the Iran nuclear deal plus some additional actions that could address the shortcomings of the agreement?

This is a very significant escalation, and they don’t know where this goes any more than anyone else does. Yes, they can respond and they can retaliate, and that can lead to further retaliation—and that it is clear now that the administration is willing to take very substantial action. This is a pretty clarifying moment in that regard.

FP: What will Iran do to retaliate?

DP: Right now they are probably doing what anyone does in this situation: considering the menu of options. There could be actions in the gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz by proxies in the regional countries, and in other continents where the Quds Force have activities. There’s a very considerable number of potential responses by Iran, and then there’s any number of potential U.S. responses to those actions

Given the state of their economy, I think they have to be very leery, very concerned that that could actually result in the first real challenge to the regime certainly since the Iran-Iraq War.

FP: Will the Iraqi government kick the U.S. military out of Iraq?

DP: The prime minister has said that he would put forward legislation to do that, although I don’t think that the majority of Iraqi leaders want to see that given that ISIS is still a significant threat. They are keenly aware that it was not the Iranian supported militias that defeated the Islamic State, it was U.S.-enabled Iraqi armed forces and special forces that really fought the decisive battles.

 

jward

passin' thru
Yesterday at 4:54 PM posted on an earlier thread by Housecarl...

Posted for fair use.....
www.france24.com

Roadside bomb attack kills five Malian soldiers
Five Malian soldiers were killed Monday in a roadside bomb attack, a government spokesperson said, in the latest violence to hit the West African country’s volatile central region.
www.france24.com
www.france24.com
Roadside bomb attack kills five Malian soldiers

Issued on: 06/01/2020 - 16:58Modified: 06/01/2020 - 16:59

Five Malian soldiers were killed Monday in a roadside bomb attack, a government spokesperson said, in the latest violence to hit the West African country’s volatile central region.

The troops were travelling in the region of Alatona, near the border with Mauritania, when their convoy hit a homemade bomb and then came under fire.

Mali has been struggling to contain an Islamist insurgency that erupted in the north in 2012, and which has claimed thousands of military and civilian lives since.

More than 140 Malian soldiers died in jihadist attacks between September and December.

A Malian army refuelling truck that had left the town of Diabaly in the centre of the country hit the bomb early on Monday morning, said a non-commissioned officer who was sent in to reinforce the area.
Les #FAMa ont été victimes le 6 janvier 2020 d'une attaque terroriste à Alatona. une mission d'escorte administrative FAMa est tombée dans une embuscade avec emploi #EEI. Au cours de cette opération 05 FAMa ont trouvé la mort Les FAMa ont en outre enregistré 04 véhicules détruits pic.twitter.com/Trd6xYdLN6
— Forces Armées Maliennes (@FAMa_DIRPA) January 6, 2020
Militants, who were travelling on motorbikes and in cars, also fired on the soldiers.
“There were deaths on our side and on the side of the assailants,” the officer, who requested to remain anonymous, told AFP.

“The reinforcements came in time and we recovered our (dead) bodies and the wounded,” the officer said, adding that he was unaware of the total number of victims.

Four vehicles were destroyed in the ambush, according to government spokesperson Yaya Sangare.

Despite some 4,500 French troops in the Sahel region, plus a 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping force in Mali, the conflict has engulfed the centre of the country and spread to neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.

Hiding homemade bombs under well-travelled roads is a frequent means of attack used by jihadists. Otherwise known as improvised explosive devices, they kill and maim scores of victims every year in Mali.

The UN said in October that 110 civilians in Mali had died in roadside bomb attacks during the first six months of 2019.

(AFP)

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jward

passin' thru
Pentagon awards $1.9B to Lockheed for F-35s

(Tribune News Service) — The U.S. Defense Department office that oversees development of the F-35 Lightning II combat jet has awarded project leader Lockheed Martin a $1.9 billion contract to support and sustain the expanding global F-35 fleet through 2020.
The contract — which is awarded annually but varies in value — finances a range of improvements to Lockheed Martin’s repair and maintenance network, according to company officials. This year, it will pay for advanced engineering work, fleetwide data analytics, pilot and maintainer training, supply chain management resources, and the services of industry sustainment experts at air bases and depots.
“The F-35 continues to deliver exceptional capabilities to the field, and this contract ensures F-35s are mission ready to meet warfighter needs,” said Greg Ulmer, the Lockheed Martin vice president who serves as general manager of the F-35 program. “The joint government and industry team continues to make significant progress improving readiness rates and reducing sustainment costs. … We are confident F-35 sustainment costs will be equal to or less than legacy jets.”
A chunk of the new funding will likely flow to Lockheed’s large network of subcontractors, including East Hartford-based Pratt & Whitney, which builds the F135 propulsion system used in the F-35 and services those engines at facilities around the world.

A lack of readily available spare engine parts has at times kept a sizeable portion of the global F-35 fleet grounded.
Under pressure from the federal government and its international partners to boost deliveries and rein in costs, Lockheed Martin in recent months has hired hundreds of engineers and technicians and stepped up production at its sprawling F-35 assembly plant in Fort Worth, Texas. The facility is now churning out planes at the rate of one every three days, at a cost of around $85 million per unit, down from a one-time high of $95 to $100 million.
Lockheed announced this month that it exceeded its annual production quota of F-35s for the third time in 2019. The company had promised the Joint Strike Fighter program 131 aircraft for the year and ultimately delivered 134.
That figure represents a 47 percent increase in output from 2018 and a nearly 200 percent increase from 2016, when the project was lagging seriously behind schedule.

According to Lockheed Martin, more than 490 F-35s have been delivered to the U.S. military and partner nations since 2006. The aircraft is now operating from 21 bases around the globe.

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©2020 Journal Inquirer, Manchester, Conn.
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jward

passin' thru
We’re on full alert’: China’s aggressive South China Sea move
China has been seizing control of the South China Sea for years – but its latest aggressive move has backfired.

Jamie Seidel
news.com.auJANUARY 9, 20207:38AM


Indonesia has reacted with anger after Chinese fishing boats protected by coast guard warships forced their way into its territorial waters.

Jakarta has mobilised its military and raised its combat alert status in the Natuna archipelago in response to the incursions which began late last year.
“Our Navy and air force are armed and have been deployed to the North Natuna Sea,” military spokesman Major General Sisriadi said at the weekend. This includes six warships intended to “drive out the foreign vessels”.
“We are not only deploying ships, but also fighter jets. We are on full alert,” Sisriadi said.
The Natuna archipelago occupies a particularly strategic spot in the South China Sea. Its waters contain significant oil and gas reserves. But it also sits astride arterial shipping lanes passing through the narrow Malacca Strait.
90 people are talking about this


Indonesia’s air force deployed four F-16 combat jets to the South China Sea area yesterday. Four more naval vessels have been sent to reinforce the four already on station.
China, however, has also moved to escalate the confrontation.
Two further armed coast guard vessels were yesterday seen departing its island fortress of Fiery Cross Reef, headed south towards the Natuna islands.
NED-973-China's new push infographic - 0

FORCES MOBILISED
Indonesia’s armed forces, the TNI, is responding to the incursion by activating a Maritime Information Centre in the islands to track and intercept any ships deemed to be violating the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
“It will be able to detect and identify every ship that enters Indonesian waters,” Sisriadi said.
First Admiral Nursyawal Embun told the state-run Andalou Agency that two new warships have arrived to reinforce Indonesia’s presence in Natuna waters. More ships were deployed to the area yesterday, bringing the total to eight.
“This is the first time we have faced such behaviour, they insist that the five degrees latitude of Indonesia’s EEZ is their territory,” he said.
China does not separate the civilian policing powers of its coastguard from its military, as other nations do. Instead, these ships are fully-crewed, operated and co-ordinated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Yesterday, an Indonesian air force spokesman confirmed combat jets had been deployed.
“They’re doing standard patrols to protect our sovereign area. It just so happened that they’re patrolling Natuna,” he said. “We don’t have the order to start a war with China.”
Earlier this week, Indonesia instructed its own fishing fleets to converge on the archipelago as a sign of commitment to its sovereignty over the economic zone.
Chinese coast guard vessels are protecting vessels illegally fishing in Indonesian waters. Picture: Chinese state media

Chinese coast guard vessels are protecting vessels illegally fishing in Indonesian waters. Picture: Chinese state mediaSource:Supplied

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DRAGON AT THE GATES
Indonesia’s Joint Defense Area Command chief Rear Admiral Yudo Margono said the Chinese ships had been observed engaged in illegal fishing.
“The ships were accompanied by a couple of Chinese coastguard vessels and one fishing guard vessel,” he added. “We are focusing on adding military power there. We will deploy four additional warships to drive out the foreign vessels (Monday).”
The Chinese coast guard ships have been identified as the Zhongguohaijing and Haijing 35111.
Indonesian Institute of Sciences political researcher Muhammad Haripin says Jakarta’s response should be strong.
“They must be arrested so that there is a deterrent effect,” Haripin told BenarNews.
“The government can also provide security for Indonesian fishermen so they will not be afraid to go to the sea.”
Indonesia last week filed a formal note of protest against China over the violations of its territory.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang stated last week that the ship’s activities were “routine”. Their mission was to assert Chinese ownership over the nearby Spratly Islands “and has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters”.
“The China Coast Guard were performing their duty by carrying out routine patrols to maintain maritime order and protect our people’s legitimate rights and interests in the relevant waters.”
He said Beijing would welcome “bilateral dialogue” with Jakarta to manage the dispute.
But the chief security minister on Sunday rejected the call for talks, asserting Indonesia would never negotiate its sovereign rights over the Natuna waters.
“In regard to the incident involving Chinese fishing boats who were guarded by the Chinese government ships, in principle, Indonesia will never negotiate with China,” co-ordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Mahfud MD told Indonesian media.
Jakarta rejects that it has any overlapping territorial claims with China.
An armed Chinese coast guard cutter similar to those operating in Indonesian waters. Picture: Chinese state media.

An armed Chinese coast guard cutter similar to those operating in Indonesian waters. Picture: Chinese state media.Source:Supplied

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It also has consistently dismissed the legitimacy of Beijing’s nine-dash-line assertion of ownership over 90 per cent of the 3.5-million-square-kilometre South China Sea. It is bordered by Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia.
“We urge China to explain the legal basis and provide clear a definition for its claims on Indonesian EEZ based on 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea),” a statement from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads.
NED-533-South China Sea Flashpoints map - 0

HEATED EXCHANGE

Jakarta insists Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea were “unilateral, have no legal basis and have never been recognised by the 1982 UNCLOS”. In contrast, it claims Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the Natuna region was established under the convention.

But China’s foreign affairs ministry spokesman Geng Shuang insisted Beijing’s claims were legitimate.

“(Our) position and propositions comply with international law, including UNCLOS,” he told state-controlled media in Beijing. “So whether the Indonesian side accepts it or not, nothing will change the objective fact that China has rights and interests over the relevant waters.”

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rejected that claim in 2016.

Beijing has ignored the ruling.

“The so-called award of the South China Sea arbitration is illegal, null and void and we have long made it clear that China neither accepts nor recognises it,” Geng said. “The Chinese side firmly opposes any country, organisation or individual using the invalid arbitration award to hurt China’s interests.”

A joint operation between the Australian Defence Force and Indonesian Armed Forces to improve security along our shared maritime borders. Picture: Supplied

A joint operation between the Australian Defence Force and Indonesian Armed Forces to improve security along our shared maritime borders. Picture: SuppliedSource:Supplied

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Likewise, Indonesia is giving no ground.

Indonesian cabinet minister Luhut Pandjaitan said yesterday China’s economic influence over Indonesia did not give it rights to Indonesian territory.

“I would not sell our sovereignty for investment, never,” he said. “I’m not stupid.”

“China has no rights to claim the area,” Minister Mahfud said yesterday. “If we negotiated with them, it would imply that we recognise a territorial dispute. There is no dispute as Indonesia is the legitimate owner of the whole area.

“A negotiating team is out of the question. We will defend our sovereignty and expel intruders with all that we’ve got.”

Jamie Seidel is a freelance writer | @JamieSeidel

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jward

passin' thru

Suspected jihadists strike Niger military; 25 soldiers dead

NIAMEY, Niger (AP) — Islamic militants carried out another large assault on Niger’s military Thursday, leaving at least 25 soldiers dead along with dozens of jihadists only a month after the worst attack of its kind in years, the military said.

The latest violence blamed on extremists struck the town of Chinagodrar right on Niger’s troubled border with Mali. There was no immediate claim of responsibility but the attack bore the hallmarks of an Islamic State-linked group that said it was behind the December ambush near the town of Inates.

Thursday’s assault comes just days before French President Emmanuel Macron is due to meet in France with the president of Niger and other leaders from the Sahel region — a meeting that was pushed back a month ago after the unprecedented attack on Niger’s armed forces.

The leaders from France’s former colonies of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are due to discuss the future role of the French military in the face of mounting jihadist attacks.

Niger’s defense ministry said late Thursday that 63 jihadists had been killed along with the 25 soldiers in the attack some 11 kilometers (7 miles) from the border with Mali.

On Wednesday, the U.N. envoy for West Africa and the Sahel spoke of “a devastating surge in terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets” in recent months.

Mohamed Ibn Chambas told the U.N. Security Council that terrorist attacks have increased five-fold in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger since 2016. There were more than 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 compared to an estimated 770 deaths in 2016, he said.

Military camps have increasingly been targeted by the jihadists, who have amassed more weapons and vehicles for their arsenal with each ambush. Mali’s military already has retreated from some of its most remote and vulnerable outposts following a surge in deadly attacks.

___

Associated Press writers Baba Ahmed in Bamako, Mali and Krista Larson in Dakar, Senegal contributed to this report.

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use....

Strengthening the U.S.–Taiwan Alliance
By Seth Cropsey
January 09, 2020

2019 has not been a good year for China. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ambitions and the Communist Chinese Party’s imperious means to achieve them have become transparent.

The current situation in the Asia-Pacific is illustrative. Two Chinese actions defined this past year's regional news cycle. First, China's reaction to Hong Kong's peaceful pro-democratic protests escalated to a full-scale military crackdown. The Beijing Government deployed 12,000 People's Armed Police – a 1.5-million strong army dedicated to internal security – to the island, beating protestors and besieging the democracy movement's university strongholds. Most remarkable has been the resilience of average Hong Kongers. The opposition lacks a designated leader and organizational structure, a clear demonstration of widespread rage at China's dishonoring the Basic Law that protects Hong Kong's freedoms and to which the CCP agreed before Hong Kong's sovereignty passed from the U.K. to China in 1997.


Second, China has escalated its campaign against Uighur Muslims in the country's West. Internal party documents have confirmed that Premier Xi and his confidants have no qualms about executing the largest instance of ethnically-targeted mass internment since the Holocaust. Beijing has constructed a Stasi-style police state in Xinjiang and deported 1.5 million Uighurs to "reeducation" camps. The more horrific accusations – that China harvests organs from Uighur men, and that Chinese soldiers are raping the wives of interned Uighur men in the form of extermination-by-forced-breeding – are unconfirmed. However, the situation merits a serious independent examination of these accusations.

Only with the context of these events, combined with China’s escalating aggression towards the United States and its Pacific allies, can the importance of Beijing’s pressure against Taiwan be grasped.

Global dominance is China’s ultimate ambition. A toxic combination of paranoia and imperial longing propels China’s rulers – reclaiming the Middle Kingdom’s place at the center of the world requires destroying America’s international position, while—as China’s rulers apparently believe—its security entails monopolizing the Western Pacific, eliminating any ethnically or politically distinct entities within China, and ensuring Chinese access to resources and markets abroad.

Chinese pressure on Taiwan, therefore, stems from the same desires that prompt repression in Hong Kong and savagery in Xinjiang. Moreover, Taiwan poses a unique problem for Beijing. Its links with the United States make it a potential forward operating base for China’s adversaries, frustrating Beijing’s ambitions to control the Western Pacific. Taiwan’s democratization after decades of military rule proves that it can govern itself without Beijing’s imperial management.

Bringing Taiwan to heel, therefore, is the inexorable result of China’s ambitions. Its actions this past year demonstrate Beijing’s multi-spectrum approach to achieving this end.

China has continued its diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, two former British protectorates that have positive relationships with the United States, de-recognized Taiwan this past year. This cuts Taiwan’s formal diplomatic contacts to 14 states, the majority of which are Caribbean or South American. As Chinese economic investment and debt trap diplomacy in the Americas increases, this number may change.

Economically, China has targeted Taiwan's lucrative tourism industry. Tourists contribute to over eight percent of Taiwanese GDP. The majority have been mainland Chinese. Thus, Beijing's refusal to issue tourist visas to Chinese citizens who want to visit Taiwan constitutes a direct economic attack. Similarly, Chinese inducements to Taiwanese citizens considering living on the Mainland, and its attempts to undercut Taiwanese high-technology firms, seek to chip away at Taiwan's economic stability. Moreover, China has bribed Taiwanese news outlets to run false stories on the chimerical economic benefits Taiwanese citizens can expect on the Mainland.

Chinese domestic interference extends to electoral meddling. China used bots and hackers to support pro-Beijing candidates in Taiwan's 2018 municipal elections. Taiwan's 2020 election pits the incumbent pro de facto independence president against a candidate who in 2019 signaled a different approach to the PRC by meeting with the head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, the Communist Party chief in Shenzhen and the directors of China's Hong Kong and Macau liaison offices. Moreover, the likelihood that the PRC seeks to sabotage Taiwan's democratic process is strong.

Most striking is China’s increasing military pressure. China’s H-6K strategic bombers have circumnavigated Taiwan intermittently since November 2016. China sailed a Carrier Battle Group through the Taiwan Strait this past July. The PLA conducted a six-day military exercise in late July simulating sea and air control operations on both ends of the Strait, an essential objective for China in a conflict with Taiwan. It staged two additional exercises in July in the South and East China Seas, functionally demonstrating its intention to bracket Taiwan in a wider conflict.

The current U.S. administration has recognized the threat that China poses, and the role Taiwan must play in any American strategy. Indeed, China conducted its summer military exercises in partial response to a $2.2 billion arms sale to Taiwan, including 108 M1A2T Main Battle Tanks, 250 Stinger Missiles, and a variety of logistical and transport equipment. The Stinger Missile, a Man-Portable Air Defense System, savaged Soviet air units in Afghanistan. China would not be able to eliminate these mobile systems in the first stage of an invasion. Taiwanese forces could, therefore, harass Chinese aircraft even if the PLA could weaken Taiwan's major assets.

Other measures would help Taiwan’s defense, for example, exploiting such asymmetric tactics as those on which China has traditionally depended. Placing missiles that can hit ships as well as land targets in shipping containers across Taiwan would give the PRC’s ruler good reason to think twice before launching an attack.

Just seven weeks after its $2.2 billion sale, Congress approved another $8 billion arms transfer, this time including 66 F-16C/D fighter aircraft. Over two terms, the Obama administration approved $14 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan – it executed no arms sales after December 2015. By comparison, in only three years, the Trump administration has sold $12.4 billion worth of weapons to Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the precise strategic situation remains opaque. The U.S. military has shifted its Pacific deterrence strategy from one of punishment to one of denial. But aside from modified force deployments, it remains unclear exactly how this strategy will be implemented. Moreover, U.S. targeting capabilities are unclear. And China may be outpacing the United States in hypersonic and unmanned combat vehicle development.

The PRC's increasingly menacing policy toward Taiwan and its steady growth in both military capability and capacity underscore the U.S. administration's need to continue assisting Taiwan's ability to defend itself—in 2020 and the coming years.


Seth Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Postwar Alliance System Remains a Good Deal for America

President Donald Trump, who generally zigs-zags his way across the policy landscape, has been remarkably consistent about one issue: his opinion of America’s allies. From his announcement that NATO is “obsolete” and his declaration that Japan and South Korea “do not pay us what they should be paying us,” to his suggestion that he’d come to the defense of NATO members under attack only if they had “fulfilled their obligations to us” and his musings about pulling out of NATO, Trump apparently sees little value in America’s alliances. But there’s much more to the postwar alliance system than meets the eye.
Dividends and Premiums

For the always-transactional Trump, NATO and our alliances in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia) are "a bad deal for America”—a drain on U.S. resources and a chain that drags the U.S. into faraway conflicts.

In fact, America’s alliances are more than transactions, more than “deals” designed to benefit one side or the other. Our alliances represent shared values, shared interests, shared history and shared sacrifice. What former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said of the U.S.-U.K. alliance is true of the entire postwar alliance system: “When people say to me, ‘Where's your payback from this relationship,’ my answer is, ‘My payback is the relationship.’”

In other words, the alliance system itself is the payback, the dividend, for America. But even if we view our alliances in solely transactional terms, they are, in fact, a good deal for America. First, our alliances are not a drain on the treasury. Yes, there are costs associated with the U.S.-led alliance system, just as there are costs associated with maintaining and insuring a home. Indeed, perhaps the best way to understand our alliances is to look at them as insurance policies.

Insurance, at its core, is about providing protection against worst-case scenarios. Prudent people hope they never have to use insurance, but they realize that paying a little each month or each year protects them against having to pay a lot—or losing everything—if disaster strikes. The same is true in the realm of international security. NATO and our alliances in the Indo-Pacific insure against worst-case scenarios and minimize risk.

For Britain, Europe, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, defense treaties with the U.S. serve as insurance against invasion or attack. Without that insurance, there’s no security, as history has a way of reminding those on the outside looking in—from Cold War Hungary to post-Cold War Ukraine. For the United States, these treaties insure against another Korean conflict, European crisis, or surprise in the Pacific, triggering another war that would inevitably draw in the U.S. due to economic ties, strategic interests and shared values.
Like all insurance policies, there are costs associated with these alliances. U.S. defense expenditures earmarked for Europe, for instance, amount to $36 billion per year. That’s a lot of money. But consider what we get in exchange for that “insurance premium.”

Europe is not at war with itself. Europe (and the Western Pacific, for that matter) are reinforced against invasion and free from any hostile force. Age-old foes (Germany and France, Korea and Japan) have the confidence to collaborate under the U.S. alliance umbrella. States that once were constant sources of international conflict (Germany and Japan) are now exporters of international security.

If those benefits are not direct enough for the transactionalists, consider these: Our alliances serve as an outer ring of security well beyond America’s shores—providing bases that enable the U.S. to project power, sources of material and diplomatic support for American leadership, and force-multipliers for American assets. And we cannot overstate the vast trade and economic benefits that flow from these realities. U.S. trade with NATO allies tops $1.5 trillion annually, with Japan, Korea, Australia and the Philippines $508 billion annually.

The “myth is that our allies are making us poor by free-riding on our military expenditures,” Gen. William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, argued before his passing. “How are we to explain that the United States has gotten richer than its allies? Proponents of this argument cannot explain why. They fail to realize that our military alliances, by lowering transaction costs, have facilitated the vast increases in international trade from which the United States profits enormously. Our military costs should be seen as investments that pay us back.”

Moreover, compare the costs of defending, say, Europe with the costs of liberating it. America’s $36-billion investment in transatlantic security equals less than 0.2 percent of GDP. During World War I, by comparison, America spent an average of 16.1 percent of GDP on defense—and sacrificed 116,516 lives. During World War II, America spent an average of 27 percent of GDP on defense—and sacrificed 405,399 lives.
Helping Hand

As for the notion that America’s alliances are a chain dragging us into other nation’s problems, the fact is that alliances have rarely gotten America into wars.

It pays to recall that alliances didn't push the U.S. into World War I. “We have no allies,” President Woodrow Wilson bluntly declared during the Great War. Even after America entered the war, Wilson insisted that the U.S. maintain its independence as an “associated” power. Nor was the U.S. drawn into World War II by an alliance. Rather, the trigger was Japan’s attack on an isolated outpost of an isolated America.

Yet by building up a common defense, specifying clear consequences and clear commitments, and recognizing that America’s security is tied to other parts of the globe, the postwar alliance system surely helped prevent World War III. As President John Kennedy observed, “We put ourselves, by our own will and by necessity, into defensive alliances with countries all around the globe.”

These alliances didn't create economic bonds or strategic interests or shared values; rather, they reflected the bonds, interests, and shared values that already existed. Moreover, while alliances didn’t get us into Korea or Afghanistan or Iraq (in 1991, 2003 or 2014), our allies certainly helped us once we were in those fights. Fifteen countries deployed troops to join the U.S. and South Korea in repelling the communist attack across the 38th Parallel. Those allies lost thousands of men.
NATO militaries, infrastructure, and years of interoperability served as the foundation for the coalition that defended Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) and ejected Iraq from Kuwait (Desert Storm), with Britain, France, Canada and Italy deploying tens of thousands of personnel.

It was always thought that Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty—NATO’s “all for one” collective defense clause—would be invoked when Europe came under attack and sought America’s help. But the only time Article V has ever been invoked was when America came under attack and sought Europe’s help after the 9/11 attacks. NATO immediately dispatched AWACS planes to guard America's skies, freeing U.S. assets to target the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In the long campaign of campaigns that followed 9/11, NATO has played a key role in fighting our common enemy in Afghanistan, where 1,050 British, European, Canadian, Turkish and other NATO personnel have been killed in action. The 43 Danes killed in Afghanistan, as just one example, would be proportionally equivalent to 2,424 Americans. (The U.S. has lost 2,441 in Afghanistan.)

Eighteen years after the attacks on America’s capital and America’s military headquarters, about half the foreign troops deployed in Afghanistan are not American. “We went in together,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg vows. “And when the time comes, we will leave together.”

NATO isn’t the only ally that offered a helping hand in Afghanistan. Australia’s contingent in Afghanistan has fluctuated from a few hundred troops to well over 1,500. South Korea sent a 500-man infantry battalion to Afghanistan. Japan has invested billions into building and training Afghanistan’s security forces.

When Washington asked for help taking down Saddam Hussein’s regime, 37 nations sent troops to Iraq, including 19 NATO members. More than 100,000 Brits, 20,000 South Koreans, 13,900 Poles, and 6,100 Japanese cycled through Iraq during Iraqi Freedom. Again, they made heavy sacrifices: 1,952 coalition troops were wounded, 322 were killed, 15 NATO nations lost personnel in Iraq.

The campaign against ISIS was built around a strong NATO core, with alliance members shouldering most of the airstrikes and much of the ground-support mission. NATO recently launched a 600-man mission in Iraq aimed at re-training the Iraqi army. Yet that’s only part of the anti-ISIS coalition. Thirty nations have contributed troops to the campaign against ISIS. Australia, Britain, Denmark and France deployed commandoes for kinetic operations. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle served as a command center during the operation. After Assad’s chemical attacks in 2018, Britain and France joined the U.S. in conducting punitive strikes against his regime.
Interests

Reawakened to the Russian threat, 26 NATO members increased defense spending in 2018. By the end of 2020, Stoltenberg reports, NATO’s European and Canadian members “will add $100 billion extra toward defense.”

Germany, Britain and Canada are spearheading NATO’s forward-deployed battlegroups in the Baltics.

In response to Russia’s aggressive actions on its northern flank, NATO is increasing its interest and presence in the Arctic. Noting that China has an “increased presence in the Arctic…in Africa and in cyberspace,” and is “investing heavily in critical infrastructure in Europe,” Stoltenberg announced in August that NATO is coordinating with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea “to address the rise of China.”

Japan has increased defense spending eight years in a row and is investing $8.7 billion to underwrite basing U.S. troops on Japanese territory. Tokyo is constructing military-grade runways on Mageshima Island, with plans for U.S. and Japanese warplanes to operate from the island base.

South Korea shouldered 90 percent of the costs for a massive new U.S. base, with plans to increase defense spending by an average of 7.1 percent annually between 2020 and 2024. Australia is increasing defense, spending 81 percent between 2016 and 2025.

Japan, Australia, Britain and France have joined the U.S. in promoting freedom of navigation in and above the South China Sea. Britain, Australia, Albania, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have joined the U.S. in protecting the Persian Gulf against Iranian piracy.

All of these allied contributions are helping secure, defend and promote American interests. Our alliances cause headaches from time to time. But what Churchill said in 1945 remains true today: “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”


Alan W. Dowd is a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he heads the Center for America’s Purpose.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Ending Iran’s regional ransom

Lauren Williams

Tehran may further strike back over Soleimani, but it has
freely carried out attacks across the region for a long time.

Published 8 Jan 2020 12:00   0 Comments

Follow @laurenwillgo






Criticism of Donald Trump’s brazen assassination of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassim Soleimani has rightly focussed on the unprecedented nature of the killing and the escalation in the conflict between the two countries it presents.
Imaginations have run wild with the scale and horrors of Iran’s next moves and inevitable retaliation. Early responses from Iran, including the firing of multiple rockets on US military bases in Iraq on Wednesday, are not surprising, and interpreted as proof of Trump’s lack of strategic foresight and unwieldy provocation that could lead to greater loss of American life.
In particular, the fear that Iran will unleash the vast empire of proxy paramilitaries Soleimani controlled, sending the region into a spiralling conflict of untold consequences been vehemently promoted.
The ratcheting up of tensions is obvious. But such analysis of probable consequences fails to recognise the enormous problems Soleimani presented alive much more than dead.
The situation resulting from the proxy paramilitary forces Soleimani controlled in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq had become untenable. The fixation on getting Iran to adhere to the nuclear deal had handed Tehran a free point of leverage and locked the West into an appeasement strategy that allowed Iran to continue on its destructive and expansionist path via these proxies in these countries unabated.
Iran may strike
military facilities
or oil interests,
disrupting the
global economy,
but they’ve already
been doing that
successfully
for a long time.
In Syria, Iran mobilised its highly ideologically and religiously motivated paramilitaries in support of the bloody dictator Bashar al-Asssad. Iran’s involvement was critical in ensuring the conflict became a sectarian battle of attrition and arguably gave credence to the anti-Shia narrative of Islamic State that contributed to its growth. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians died under Soleimani’s direction. Assad is now all but victorious in Syria with the help of Iran (and Russia), but the lasting presence and inability to evict Iran’s paramilitaries from the country is the biggest obstacle to any peace or sectarian rehabilitation settlement in the country anytime soon.
In Iraq, locked in an interminable battle for influence between Iran and the United States, protesters have flooded the streets in their millions in recent months to protest the corruption, crony capitalism, and insecurity that clientelist system of governance has created. Iraqis of all sects, significantly, largely among Shia bases, have rebelled against the influence of Tehran over their government’s affairs. Soleimani himself dictated a brutal crackdown on the popular movement that has killed more than 500 Iraqis, ironically in the name of preserving the country’s sovereignty. Having been instrumental in the defeat of ISIS, these same sectarian-driven paramilitaries have allowed Iran to gain the upper hand in Iraq, threatening the country’s stability and US interests in its aftermath.
In Lebanon, the situation is not dissimilar. Iran, via its proxy militant Shia force, Hezbollah, has effectively held the government to ransom for years. Mass popular demonstrations in the country erupted late last year, with hundreds of thousands of people mobilised to protest the sectarian system and the endemic corruption, mismanagement and economic crisis it had created. With Iran sensing its hold over the country may be threatened, it did what it knew best, igniting the sectarian card to divide the protest movement and unleashing its ideologically driven thugs to beat protesters.
And at home in Iran, Soleimani was as much feared as revered. Protests there in recent months have been directed at the repressive regime that Soleimani upheld, not at America, and not for the first time, anger has been directed at what are seen to be the costly wars the man kept the country locked into.
Iran may further strike military facilities or oil interests, disrupting the global economy, but it has already been doing that successfully for a long time. Using its proxies in Yemen, it has attacked oil tankers in the Gulf, struck Saudi Aramco facilities, and downed an American drone over international waters – all since May.
In fact, there is little that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp can do with these paramilitary forces that it hasn’t done already. At least without the evil mastermind at their helm, their job is made a little harder and hopefully less effective.
Debates over the legality of the strike and the loss of America’s moral high ground, or the merits of extrajudicial killings, are theoretical. Analysis of Trump’s strategic thinking, particularly when it comes to the US role in Iraq, are more worthwhile, but only time will tell how that plays out. For now, Trump has decisively terminated the Iran nuclear deal and brought matters to a head.
Soleimani had rivers of blood on his hands, and the world is a better place without him in it. For all the publicity around the mass grieving taking place in Iran for the revered leader, there are just as many Lebanese, Syrians, Iraqis, and indeed Iranians rejoicing over the end of the reign of terror he has overseen in the region for decades.
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....

Mexico
Published 2 days ago
Mexico reports over 61,000 people missing, discovery of 873 burial pits amid raging drug war
By Stephen Sorace | Fox News

The Mexican government released “statistics of horror” on Monday that showed nearly 62,000 citizens have vanished since the government began its increasingly violent offensive against ruthless drug cartels in 2006.

Karla Quintana, head of the National Registry of Missing or Missing Persons (RNPED), revised the number of missing to 61,637 people, a figure far surpassing a previous estimate of 40,000 from June.

AMERICAN FAMILY ATTACKED ON HIGHWAY IN MEXICO SAYS 'BULLETS WERE EVERYWHERE' IN DEADLY RAMPAGE
“We have to remember we’re talking here about lives and families and people who are still missing,” Quintana said during a press conference in Mexico City. “These are statistics of horror behind which lie so many stories of such great pain.”

While the statistics date back as far as the 1960s, more than 97.4 percent of the total have disappeared since 2006, when the country first waged its drug war against the cartels. Women represent 25.7 percent of the missing, Quintana said.

In 2006, then-President Felipe Calderon had his army take the fight against drug traffickers to the streets — a move that fragmented the cartels and made it more difficult to oppose them, Reuters reported.

The revised numbers come as Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has faced criticism for his policy of using “hugs, not bullets” when fighting drug cartels amid a skyrocketing murder rate during his first year in office.

In November, new figures from Mexico's Secretary General of National Public Safety showed that the country's homicide was on pace to reach its highest overall annual total since the government started tracking in 1997. The data showed that there had been 29,414 homicides in 2019 — that's nearly 100 people killed each day.

In 2018, there were a total of 36,685 murders in Mexico, the most since the office started gathering data on the crime more than two decades ago. This year, the number of homicides is expected to surpass that figure.

MEXICAN MOTHERS DISCOVER DOZENS OF BODIES BURIED IN MASS GRAVE NEAR RESORT TOWN SOUTH OF ARIZONA BORDER
Mexico has tasked its National Search Commission with locating the tens of thousands of missing citizens.

In its first 13 months of work, officials on Monday said it uncovered 1,124 corpses and 873 clandestine burial pits.

The unmarked pits are frequently used by drug and kidnapping gangs to dispose of the bodies of their victims or rivals.

The commission said about a third of the corpses found the last 13 months were located in just three of the country's 31 states: the northern state of Sinaloa, the Gulf coast state of Veracruz and the Pacific coast state of Colima.

But many of the most recent cases of disappearances have been centered in the western state of Jalisco, home to the drug cartel of the same name, and Sonora.

Last October, a clandestine burial site containing dozens of bodies was discovered in Sonora near the resort town of Puerto Peñasco, located south of the Arizona border. Some Mexican officials have suggested the mass grave held the victims of a raging gun battle six years ago between government forces and the Sinaloa cartel.

CLICK HERE FOR THE FOX NEWS APP
As Mexico faces a crisis of unidentified bodies piling up, the country has set up DNA databases to help with the identifying process. However, the majority of bodies found in clandestine burial pits still go unidentified.

Fox News' Greg Norman and The Associated Press contributed to this report.
 

Housecarl

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As if the region didn't have enough problems....

Posted for fair use.....

West Africa: Drug Frontier - How Cocaine Trafficking Is Impacting West Africa

1 January 2020


Premium Times (Abuja)

By Nicholas Ibekwe and Daan Bauwens
The route first became infamous between the 16th and 19th centuries when millions of West African slaves were shipped to South America through it. But the distance of approximately 2,500 kilometres (between Brazil and Dakar) has acquired a new type of notoriety since the early 2000s after Latin American drug cartels started using it to ship tonnes of narcotics into West Africa, which are later smuggled by drug mules in smaller quantities into Europe.

Geographically referred to as the tenth parallel because its latitude is 10 degrees south of the earth's equatorial plane, the route is known as "Highway 10" among international law enforcement agencies because it is the shortest route across the Atlantic.

Gbenga Mabo, the Director of Operations and Investigations of Nigeria's drug police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, NDLEA told PREMIUM TIMES that more than 80 per cent of the cocaine that comes into Nigeria comes from Brazil, through Highway 10.


"I don't want to say Brazil is not a producer, but Brazil is not really a significant producer, but because of the borders of Brazil is big, and the Amazon River, Brazil is surrounded by Peru, Bolivia, Chile and others. So, a lot of cocaine gets into Brazil, and a syndicate of Nigerians operates in Brazil and they get it from Brazil to Lagos," he said.

Mr Mabo said Latin American drug cartels prefer to route cocaine through West Africa into Europe because of lax checks at ports, shortage of trained personnel and equipment. He said after the drug arrives West Africa, the cartel works with local syndicates who hire human couriers, whom he described as "bulk breakers" to smuggle the narcotics to Europe and the United States by ingestion, body packing or on their luggage.

West African Drug Havens
To ensure the smooth running of their drug enterprises, South American cartels needed a haven where they can operate away from the prying eyes of international anti-narcotics agencies. They found a perfect hub in Guinea-Bissau and used the largely uninhabited Bijagos Archipelago as a staging post.


By 2012, it was clear that the tiny West African country had become a full-fledged narco-state and the world could no longer ignore the drug cartels working from there unhindered. After the 2013 arrest of the country's former navy chief, Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, by the Drug Enforcement Agency on a boat in International waters near Cape Verde, the cartel lords fled the islands of Bissau and created new havens in Dakar, Lome, Accra and Abidjan.
To underscore the amount of cocaine that is shipped from South America into West Africa, within four consecutive days in June, law enforcement agents seized a combine 1.036 tonnes of cocaine hidden in cars on ships travelling from Brazil.


The Spaghetti Connection
Before the Dakar seizure, in September 2018, 1.2 tonnes of cocaine destined for Abidjan was seized at the port of Santos, Brazil. The drug with a street value of N101.27 trillion (€250 million) was hidden in the metalwork of a heavy construction machine. The shipment was found to be linked with the Italian mafia families - the Calabrese 'Ndrangheta and the Napoletan Camorra.

In August, after weeks of cancellations and rescheduling, three French police officers, who were part of the international investigative team responsible for the seizure and subsequent arrests, finally agreed to meet with a member of this reporting team at Assouinde.
Assouinde is a once-thriving beach resort along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea 86-kilometre east of Abidjan. The officers, led by Sylvian Coue, an easy-going man in his fifties, were part of the international investigative team that worked on the seizure. The team was made up of officers from anti-drug agencies from Nigeria, France, Italy, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin and Ghana.

"I had received information from the Brazilian police that the 1.2 tonnes were intended for Abidjan. I, therefore, had the address of the depot where the construction equipment would arrive and be dismantled. At the same time, I had received information from the Italian police that a member of the 'Ndrangheta clan had been sent here. We chased him and found out that he immediately went to the dismantling depot in the port after arrival. The 1.2 tonnes would be taken out of the machines there, repackaged and sent on to Italy in containers," said Mr Coue, explaining how the alleged masterminds were arrested.

The Italian police later said that the mafia has been shipping cocaine from South America this way since 2014 under the front of a Pizzeria, named "Regina Margherita" in a posh neighbourhood of Abidjan. The head of the mafia's drug operation also doubles as the manager of the restaurant. Multiple sources told these reporters that they found it puzzling that a restaurant that had no more than 10 guests each night could manage to remain in business for so long. One of our sources recalled how his children were hosted to a tour of the restaurant and it's wooden oven by the mafia boss that runs the place.
The investigation was named "The Spaghetti Connection."

"I thought: that will make everyone laugh. Pizza Connection, French Connection, Italian Connection, that had all been used. Everything revolved around a restaurant, although not a spaghetti restaurant, anyway... ," Mr Coue explained, laughing.

Mr Coue explained that the entire operation involved 18 separate teams with each team assigned with arresting one of the 18 original suspects. Each of the suspects, except one who was arrested on the border of Ivory Coast with Liberia, was woken up at around 6 a.m. on June 6, in Abidjan and arrested. He said Uzis (the Israeli assault rifle modelled like the AK 47), automatic guns, 100,000 dollars in cash, luxury cars and an impressive number of luxury watches, were seized from the suspects.

"The standard equipment of a good Mafioso, quoi," Mr Coue remarks. Of the eighteen suspects, there was only enough evidence to keep five suspects in custody: four Italians and one Ivorian woman," he said.

The French policeman was full of praises for the Ivorian government. According to Mr Coue, and the other two policemen, who chose to remain anonymous, the support they got from Ivorian authorities may be due to the desire of the government to rid the country of international crime after the 2016 terror attack near the capital linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and another huge cocaine seizure linked to criminal groups in the country.

In March 2016, gunmen attacked Grand-Bassam, a picturesque town with decaying French colonial buildings, 45 kilometres from Abidjan, killing 22 holidaymakers in and around a beachside hotel. That same year, eight tons of cocaine en route Abidjan was intercepted on the border between Bolivia and Argentina.

"This made the government think," Sylvain says, "Eight tons is a huge amount. I have been in this field for 30 years and I have no idea how you can possibly hide or distribute such an amount. What happens with the revenues? Who is going to get it? Is it used to finance terrorist activities? It was a wake-up call for Ivory Coast."

Lack of Political Will
Contrary to the French police officers' praise of the support they got from Ivorian authorities, a former adviser to Laurent Gbagbo, the immediate past president of country, told these reporters that the seizures and arrest were only possible because the intelligence was not sent to the Ivorian authorities alone.

He was speaking to us at a bar in Zone 3, on the outskirts of Abidjan. The middle-aged aide, who we later learnt doubled as a French spy, said if the Brazilians had notified the Ivorian police alone, they would have said: "We searched really hard but we didn't find anything."

"Corruption is very cheap here," he added.

The French spy, who asked not to be named, said the police have no interest in ridding the country of illicit drugs.

"The police don't chase drugs. They use drugs as a pretext to make a living, by means of blackmail."

However, he said most of the drug seizures (mainly cannabis) recorded in the country were made by the customs because they have financial incentives to do so.

"As was shown 15 days ago at the border with Ghana when cannabis was found, customs have extra motivation to follow the law. They work under the Ministry of Finance and they get a bonus with every seizure that is equal to ten per cent of the fine paid (by the arrested culprits). They take advantage of following the procedure," he said.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

He also suggested that top officials of the country's Ministry of Interior have an interest in the cocaine business, that is why only little amount of cocaine has been seized by the country's law enforcement agencies.

A review of some of the seizures by the country' security agencies showed that they hardly make any cocaine seizures on their own without the help of international anti-narcotics agencies.

In 2016, the Ivorian police launched Operation Epervier (Operation Sparrowhawk) to tackle "grand banditry", by draining the market for drugs. In the third phase of the operation, 239 fumoirs (smokehouses) were demolished and 5,818 people arrested in two weeks. However, in almost four years of Operation Epervier, only 150 grams of cocaine have been found. Similarly, in August, the director-general of the country's police while announcing the agency's mid-year achievement said 3446 cannabis balls and 1486 cannabis locks, 40 cannabis stalks were seized. He said nothing about the amount of cocaine found.

As elusive as cocaine seems to have become to Ivorian law enforcement agencies, our investigation revealed that the country is awash with evidence a thriving cocaine business run by international drug cartel and a growing market for local consumption of mainly crack users.

The Nigerian Connection
The Ivorian media describes him as the biggest drug trafficker in West Africa. Ogbonnaya Ukobo Ivoh, a bald-headed Nigeria, popularly known as "John" was the local drug kingpin in Ivory Coast until he was arrested in December 2018. The anti-narcotics brigade of the National Police of Ivory Coast accused him of helping different drug cartels to traffic all manners of narcotics across the sub region.

John allegedly owned several luxury real estates in Abidjan but his operational based was a large hotel named Free World Hotel in the Bingerville neighbourhood in the city.

Multiple sources who requested not to be named told us that John ran his drug enterprise with little cover. One source, who claimed to know John personally, said John was a friend of a powerful minister who shielded him from arrest and prosecution until they fell out over John's refusal to make the minister an associate in his drug enterprise. John was subsequently arrested. News reports in Ivory Coast said John would soon be tried for drug trafficking.

"His arrest was strictly political. It was a war of succession," he said.

Our source provided more information about John:
"John is not really in prison. No, his liberty has been constricted. His prison cell resembles that of Pablo Escobar - with air conditioning and a king-size bed. His small dealers are still working for him, his large Washington fumoir was destroyed but rose again the next morning. The network of youngsters around him, working for him, still exists."


"He is very nice. He helped many people, he gave money (anonymously) to an orphanage of Grand-Bassam. There's fumoirs (drug house) where John bought clothes for every addict," he added.

Our fixer, Issiaka N'Guessan, the editor of Abidjan-based online newspaper, Politikafrique.info, also believed that John enjoyed the protection of powerful officials and that he was arrested because some people wanted to take control of the drug distribution from him.

"How was he able for all those years to build a huge hotel in Bingerville, two buildings behind, and a discotheque called "Blue Rock" without the authorities knowing where the money came from? He was paying officials. I believe he was arrested because other people wanted to take over the market," he said.

When we visited John's Free World Hotel in August, it was dissimilar to the booming operational head of an alleged drug kingpin we were told the place used to be. The huge hotel stood out from the neighbouring buildings, even as it was built at the foot of a hill. It is plastered all over by patterned black and white tiles.

It has all the signs of a rooting enterprise. An extension of the main building was abandoned half-way, a section of its fence has been pulled down for a road expansion project. A large swimming pool at the centre of the hotel's open-air bar has fallen into disuse and the water in the pool has turned green from what we suspect to be algae infestation. A well-equipped gym on the second floor was also empty. And there was little sign that people still use it to keep in shape. A disinterested attendant allowed one of the reporters to try some of the equipment without asking any questions.

The Fumoirs - Abidjan's Drug Communities
"I smoke because I choose to. You must walk your own path without listening to anyone. Do what you have to do, whether good or bad," said one of the men. He has a short greying beard; his eyes were bloodshot, his teeth brown.

He was one of the nearly 20 men who sat under a makeshift tent. Their initial subdued suspicion of our presence at the location soon dissipated after a stranger gifted them a portion of crack cocaine causing them to engage in an animated argument of how to share it.

This tent is run by a babatché, which means a powerful father in Malinké, the language of the Diula tribe. At the entrance of the location, a group of young men sitting in a smaller tent were on the lookout for law enforcement personnel, and perhaps other intruders. Arthur, the tall Ivorian that brought us here, could not say for sure who the babatche was. But he suspected it was a young man wearing thick dark sunglasses and carrying a black leather backpack.

A good babatche is elusive, he noted. But he makes sure there is a regular supply of, mainly cannabis, crack and other illicit drugs. He also makes sure the fumoir does not disintegrate into complete chaos and oversees the supervision of the occasional donations to the local school. He also ensures that the police and gendarmerie are bribed to look the other way.
The fumoir we visited was in Gonzagueville, a poor community between Abidjan's international airport and the Port-Bouët seaport.

"I have come to make it clear to you that you are not criminals but victims of drug trafficking in the hands of larger powers. They are the criminals, not you. But you pay the price." said Arthur, who is commonly known as Grand-Mère or grandmother. Arthur is a social worker, who takes care of addicts and male sex workers in the fumoirs in Gonzagueville and other poor neighbourhoods in the city.

Fumoirs are the Ivorian cousin of the American crack houses. In the fumoir in Gonzagueville, young men were exchanging small bags of white substance, suspected to be cocaine. "Leaving from here to those who can afford it," Grand-mère whispers, "you can also get it here, but only of the lowest quality," he added.

We left the fumoir earlier than anticipated because our driver could no longer control his nerves after one of the addicts, who was appointed by the babatche to escort us out, said: "A drunk gets behind the wheel. A crackhead falls asleep. Who is the biggest danger? We need new laws".

Apart from being a community of addicts, fumoirs all over Abidjan are also distribution centres for illicit drugs for the rich and the poor. While a gram of crack cost the equivalent of N1,220.00, a gram of pure blanche or white cocaine is sold for the equivalent of N28,400.00.

Despite periodic police crackdown and demolition of fumoirs across the city, their numbers have continued to increase. For reasons best known to it, the Ivorian government has not invested in clearing the fumoirs for good. In Adjame, one of the bigger ghettos in Abidjan, we saw a fumoir sharing the same fence with a gendarmerie barracks. Sources we spoke to said fumoirs are given advance notice before police raids.

"The police destroy the place for the sake of gratuitous display. Sometimes, though, there are violent raids with lots of injured and casualties", said a source at a local NGO that helps to tackle drug addiction in the city.

All our efforts to get government officials to speak to us on the fight to solve the drug problem in the city were unsuccessful. Everyone we contacted declined to speak or simply ignored our calls, text messages and emails.

Few days after we arrived in Abidjan, President Alassane Ouattara decorated the head of the Ivorian Police narcotics bridge, Toure Mabonga, for helping to rid the country of drugs and clearing several fumoirs. Despite multiple efforts to get her to agree to an interview, we received no response to our requests.

We tried to speak with Adomo Bonaventure of the Ivorian Police narcotics brigade, who led the international operation in which four members of the Italian mafias Camorra and 'Ndrangheta were arrested in June in the case of 1.2 tonnes of cocaine seized in Brazil, but got no response as well. As a last-ditch attempt to get any member of the Ivorian government to agree to an interview, we invoked the Ivorian law on Open Government. According to the law, if a ministry does not respond after two weeks, the law requires the Commission for Access to Public Interest Information and Public Documents (CAIDP) to take action, but the commission too stopped responding to our emails and calls after two weeks.

Microbes
Our investigation revealed that the government may have decided to keep sealed lips because it feared that talking to two foreign journalists may force it to answer questions that may expose how some of its past policies may have caused the drug problem in the country.

For instance, the government's security policy after the 2011 civil uprising may have contributed in no small measure to the proliferation of the fumoirs in Abidjan.
Two days before we left the country, we met a tough-looking but visibly scared 25-year-old, who identified himself simply as Bernard, in Abobo, a sprawling ghetto on the outskirts of Abidjan.

Bernard was a member of looting and murderous gang of youth in Abidjan, called Microbes. Microbes are made up of youth who fought on the side of Mr.Ouattara during the civil crisis. Newspaper reports and multiple sources told us that the authorities allowed microbes to operate freely until a year ago when the incumbent defence minister, Hamed Bakayoko, then the mayor of Abobo, decided he has had enough of their trouble.

As we spoke in an empty outdoor bar on a rainy day in August, Bernard kept looking behind him as if he was being followed or watched. He said as a 16-year-old, he and many young people his age from Abobo and environ, joined the groupes d'autodéfense, a pro- Quattara vigilante group.

"I fought on the side of Ouattara," says Bernard. "We carried out attacks and monitored who entered or left our part of the city. The elders among us received guns, we were given machetes and knives. We were given pills to give us the courage to fight. I fought with a machete, but I never killed. We were promised that we would get jobs in the army if we won," he added.

"After the crisis, not every member of the vigilante group was absorbed into the army. The remnant formed into microbes," he said.

"Our chiefs were given jobs in the army, the police and the gendarmerie. We did not get anything. Instead, we were assigned to new chiefs, took the homes of the people who had been driven out. Then, like all young fighters, we became microbes. We were mainly concerned with stealing money, drug dealing and trafficking: we ran around with cannabis, pills and crack. We all used (drugs) ourselves. It gave us money. And it gave us a lot of inspiration."

Bernard refers to the new chiefs who commanded the microbes after the crisis as Babatchés, the same term used to refer to the head of fumoirs.

When we asked him about the use of the same names, he explained further.

"Don't you know that?", Bernard asks, visibly surprised, "the fighters came from the fumoirs. The chiefs of the fumoirs became the chiefs of the vigilante. Some of them made it into the army, police or gendarmerie." According to him, after the uprising, others were allowed to return with government protection.

Three independent sources from Adjamé, Angré and Cocody districts corroborated Bernard's account of things.

Mr Bakayoko led Ouattara's troops at the time. He has repeatedly openly argued that the media should refer to the microbes as "children in conflict with the law" instead of the derogatory term microbes. However, almost immediately Mr Bakayoko was named Mayor of Abobo, the attacks by microbes stopped.

We wrote to Mr Bakayoko in August asking about his link with the microbes and whether the cessation of violence by microbes was at his command or not. We are yet to receive a response.

New Market

The proliferation of fumoirs in Abidjan perfectly describes what Yuri Fedotov, the Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), called the "new alarming trend in West and Central Africa."

Faced with tighter monitoring on the flow of cash, Latin American cartels are switching to paying their African collaborators with cocaine instead of cash. African syndicates are forced to create a new market for the product, to cash in their payment. This explains the increasing availability of cocaine and use in the continent. In 2004, Africa accounted for a paltry seven per cent of all cocaine use in the world. Seven years later, that number has increased to 15 per cent.

Experts say this trend is a bonus to South American drug cartels. West African countries cities like Abidjan, Lagos, Lome and Dakar are no longer transit ports but are destination ports with growing communities of users.

"Indeed, that is a normal dynamic. The African market is now no different from the rest of the world in terms of supply and demand. On the supply side, criminal organizations seek to develop and nurture new markets. On the demand side, we mainly have young consumers who listen to the same music and watch the same series as the rest of the world. They want to consume the same products, including cocaine," said Antonio Mazzitelli, UNODC representative in Dakar.

This report was made with the support of the Money Trail Project (https://www.money-trail.org/)
 

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Posted for fair use.....

North Korean nuclear threat is here
By Eric Brewer, opinion contributor — 01/09/20 01:00 PM EST 54Comments
The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill

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North Korean nuclear threat is here
By Eric Brewer, opinion contributor — 01/09/20 01:00 PM EST 54
The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill

153




Just In...

Kim Jong Un has done a good job keeping the United States guessing about his next nuclear provocation. North Korea had threatened that it would pursue a more hardline “new path” by the end of last year unless the United States dropped its “hostile” policies toward the country. This was followed by promises of a “Christmas gift” in December, which was widely speculated to be the test of a more advanced long range missile system. Kim most recently announced that North Korea would no longer be bound by its own limits on long range missile and nuclear testing, and stated that “the world will witness a new strategic weapon” system soon.

Some experts have been concerned that the United States is on the cusp of losing its last chance to prevent a real nuclear threat from North Korea. Former national security adviser John Bolton, for instance, tweeted only a few weeks ago that the United States needs to act fast before North Korea “has the technology to threaten the American homeland.” Others, though, including apparently some officials in the administration, view the lack of a “Christmas gift” as a demonstration of the success of President Trump.

But these concerns miss the broader point that the nuclear threat from North Korea is already here. The days when North Korea was thought of having a handful of nuclear weapons that may not be deliverable with a missile are over. The bigger issue is how the United States and its allies need to adapt to rapidly expanding North Korean nuclear capabilities.

While Trump is right that North Korea has not tested a long range missile since his first summit with Kim back in 2018, North Korea has been busily advancing other elements of its nuclear deterrent. Kim has continued to churn out more nuclear warheads and missiles during this interim period. According to one estimate in 2018, he had as many as 60 warheads, and his stockpile has likely grown since. The pace of North Korean missile testing also kept up with some of the most aggressive years on record.

This included solid rocket missiles, which can be launched faster than their liquid counterparts thus reducing warning time, and missiles that could pose challenges to regional missile defenses, making American allies and regional bases more vulnerable. North Korea has also made progress in developing its own submarine launched ballistic missile. All these advances, made during a period when the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington was supposedly never better, show that Kim is not interested in disarming. Rather, he seeks a robust nuclear arsenal.

This has all occurred in the past year and a half. North Korea conducted what it claimed was its second test of a thermonuclear weapon in 2017, upping the lethality of its force. That same year North Korea also carried out three intercontinental ballistic missile tests, demonstrating that the entire United States is already likely within range of a North Korean attack. While the precise reliability of its reentry vehicle remains unclear, as in the odds that the warhead would survive the intense conditions of flight, any American president will operate under the assumption that North Korea could strike the homeland during a crisis. This is no small victory for Kim.

Coupled with these new technical developments, cleavages in the United States alliances with South Korea and Japan, and the critical relationship between Seoul and Tokyo, are creating a vulnerability that North Korea will likely try and exploit in 2020. For instance, American demands that South Korea, and reportedly Japan, drastically increase the amount they pay to support the American forces stationed on their soil has created a useless point of friction and has generated a backlash against the United States.

Moreover Trump, who ultimately decides whether the United States will honor its defense commitments, has stated that he could “go either way” on whether it is in American interests to keep troops in the region, has suggested he shares with Kim the view that exercises between the United States and South Korea are “ridiculous and expensive,” and has dismissed North Korean missile tests that pose a threat to American allies as “very standard.” If Kim focuses tensions on South Korea and Japan this year and Trump looks the other way, then this will further erode allied confidence.

There is little the United States can do to stop Kim from going down this pathway of renewed provocations if that is his intention. A subpar deal that provides substantial sanctions relief, but without verifiable limits on his ability to grow the program, is worse than no deal at all. Conversely, raising pressure will not prevent North Korea from building weapons. The task to prioritize now is analyzing how Kim might leverage his increasingly sophisticated capabilities to challenge and undermine deterrence in East Asia, and then begin working with American allies to repair those gaps.

Eric Brewer is deputy director of the Project on Nuclear Issues with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as director for counterproliferation on the National Security Council staff.
 

Housecarl

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Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

The Travails of Nuclear-Armed States

by Michael Krepon | January 5, 2020 | 6 Comments
Quote of the week:
“We do not seek war, we do not seek nation building, we do not seek regime change.” – Donald Trump before a gathering of evangelical supporters in Miami after the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, January 3, 2020.
Nuclear-armed states are a diverse lot, but they have one thing in common: Every one of them is in trouble, and their arsenals don’t help what ails them. Strongmen rule from cracked pedestals. The cracks are widening, making their decision making more worrisome. Weaker leaders in states that possess nuclear weapons are faring no better, as they flounder or head off in the wrong direction.
The United States is in decline. A strong economy lifts too few boats. Domestic divisions weaken the Republic at its core. National politics are broken. One political party has lost its moorings and yet may regain the White House. The outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq will continue to play out in painful ways, as strategic blunders usually do. Another Russian influence campaign in the 2020 election seems likely.
Vladimir Putin is playing a weak hand reasonably well (see above). His new panoply of strategic modernization programs provides some cover, but he knows that the most significant missile, submarine and bomber programs built in the 2020s and beyond will be made in the U.S.A. He has extended Russia’s presence in weak states and basket cases where his troops and proxies are susceptible to injury and pushback. Russia’s economy isn’t conducive to sustained growth.
Strongman rule in China is being tested by the people of Hong Kong and the voters in Taiwan. Xi Jinping deals with his Muslim population by moving them to “re-education” centers and by razing mosques. China’s predatory investments in beholden foreign countries sow seeds of future discord. The bloom is off “free” trade, which hasn’t been free. Smooth sailing isn’t in China’s future.
India’s strongman, Narendra Modi, has shown his true colors after his re-election, proving that Hindu nationalism can get as ugly as any other nationalism. India’s strength and its Achilles heel are its diversity, and that diversity – especially India’s large Muslim population – is under threat. In remarkably short order, Modi has squandered his “India Rising” theme – economically, socially, and politically. New Delhi’s ties with Washington in general and Capitol Hill in particular are fraying.
Pakistan is suffering greatly from circular debt bequeathed by previous governments that engaged in short-term thinking while focusing on domestic opponents. Demographics are daunting. A new national leader continues to act as if he’s still leading the political opposition, while jobs are scarce and climate change narrows prospects for national recovery. Pakistan’s foreign and national security policies are hobbled by its indebtedness. Speaking truth to power over New Delhi’s treatment of Kashmiris is undercut by a muffled response to Beijing’s policies toward the Uighers. Chinese loans for Belt and Road investments are already coming back to haunt. Jinnah’s original rationale for Pakistan as a home for Muslims on the subcontinent could again resonate — but only if a Pakistani government can get its act together.
Whenever Israel’s indicted strongman Benjamin Netanyahu leaves the stage, he will also leave a legacy of national division and frayed ties with American Jewry. His “asks” that has been answered positively by Donald Trump point toward a one state solution that requires apartheid-like policies to keep an emerging Muslim majority population at bay.
Then there’s Kim Jong-Un, who promises “gifts” in the new year to solicit economic rewards. Trump and Kim go from “Rocket Man” and a “mentally deranged dotard” to sweetness and light, and then back to name calling. With each new gift, the economic screws will tighten on Kim.
Great Britain became less great after Tony Blair supported George W. Bush’s Pottery Barn war in Iraq. A succession of weak leaders has continued London’s downhill slide. If Scotland heads for the exits after Brexit, Britain’s nuclear deterrent will be orphaned.
It will be hard for France to reach new heights atop a down-sized European Union, or for its President to lead the pack on climate change when his citizens take to streets against remedial action. France’s nuclear deterrent remains a shining monument to past glory, soaking up funds for usable military power.
So, what, exactly, are nuclear weapons good for? There’s an initial boost to national cohesion that is unsustainable when social, political and economic prospects are lousy. Besides that, deterrence offers two significant benefits by helping to prevent nuclear exchanges and major conventional war — at least so far. There’s value in helping to prevent worst cases, but it comes at significant cost. This is a short list. Am I missing something?
And what are nuclear weapons not good for? They promise more harm than good if used on battlefields. They are of no help when social, political, and cultural divisions grow. They can’t fix unwise strategic choices. As instruments of leveraging other states, they pale by comparison to economic means of suasion, cyber mischief and social media. They provide a means of employment, but they don’t help economies grow. They pose clear opportunity costs for improving conventional military capabilities and for addressing social needs. They don’t prevent loss in warfare again non-nuclear-weapon states. Nor do they assure success in crises against nuclear-armed states, or prevent limited warfare between them.
This list of pros and cons, backed up by the Nonproliferation Treaty, helps explain why so few states have so far chosen to acquire nuclear weapons. But proliferation can continue if states without the Bomb are threatened by possessors and if Washington’s alliance partners place less and less stock in U.S. security guarantees.
 

Housecarl

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Deadly raid in Kenya carried out under ‘direction’ of al-Qaeda leadership, Shabaab says

By Thomas Joscelyn | January 9, 2020 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn

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Ali Mohamud Rage, a senior Shabaab official, says the attack on the Manda Bay Airfield earlier this week was “carried out under the guidance and direction” of al-Qaeda’s leaders.
Shabaab has released a video featuring its spokesman, Ali Mohamud Rage, who claims credit on behalf of the organization for the deadly raid on an airfield in Kenya earlier this week. Three Americans were killed and others wounded when the jihadists stormed the Manda Bay Airfield (Camp Simba) in a predawn raid. It is not clear how many casualties Kenya suffered. Several planes and equipment were also damaged in the raid.
In the video, Rage says the attack was “carried out under the guidance and direction of the leadership of al-Qaeda, foremost among them being Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, may Allah protect him.”
Shabaab has repeatedly signaled its loyalty to al-Qaeda’s global leadership. And the group’s latest video is filled with footage of both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. An archival clip of Zawahiri is featured at the beginning of the production.
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Archival footage of Ayman al-Zawahiri addressing Muslims in Somalia is included at the opening of a new Shabaab video on the Manda Bay Airfield attack.
“Oh Muslims of Somalia, I give you the glad tidings that America and its servile allies will be defeated in Somalia, by the permission of Allah, the same way they were defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Zawahiri says in the recording. “However, you must be patient and steadfast.”
The video, which was released with Arabic and English transcripts, is titled: “Statement from the Leadership: ‘Manda Bay’ Raid: Storming the U.S. Naval Base in Kenya.” Shabaab reiterates that the airfield raid was part of its “Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Will Never Be Judaized” Operations.
Both Shabaab and al Qaeda’s branch in West Africa, the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM), have previously conducted attacks as part of this same campaign.
According to Rage, “an elite team of soldiers” from Shabaab’s “Martyrdom Brigade” executed the operation. Photos of Henry Mayfield, Jr. and Dustin Harrison, two of the Americans killed, are shown on screen as the Shabaab spokesman speaks.
“The Mujahideen were successful, by the blessing of Allah, in striking the unwary crusaders in the heart of the heavily fortified military base, destroying a cache of weapons, combat vehicles and seven military aircraft,” Rage says.
“The crusader base, known as Camp Simba, is an American military facility that is home to hundreds of U.S. Army personnel,” Rage continues. “The camp [is] also the headquarters of U.S. military operations in Northern Kenya, where it serves as the launch pad for the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations carried out by the western crusaders against Islam in East Africa. Camp Simba is also used to train special units of Kenyan soldiers.”
“Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Will Never Be Judaized” campaign
Rage says that both the attack on Manda Bay Airfield and an assault on a joint U.S.-Somali base in Baledogle in September are part of its “Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Will Never Be Judaized” campaign, which was initiated on the orders of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership.
Even though al-Qaeda has little to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the group is trying to capitalize on any anger over President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
“Since acknowledging Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as the capital of the Zionist Jewish state, the Trump Administration has persisted on its path of hostility and blatant oppression against our families in occupied Palestine,” Rage says. Imagery of President Trump and various scenes from Israel are splashed on screen as the Shabaab man speaks.
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Rage portrays Shabaab’s violence, which long predates the Trump administration, as a response to the decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
Rage continues: “The U.S. has recognized the annexation of the Golan Heights by the Zionists, supported the illegal Jewish settlements in occupied Palestine, and remains committed to providing over $3 billion dollars in military assistance annually to the Zionist invaders so as to maintain the relentless oppression and bombardment of Muslims in Palestine.”
He claims that the raid on Manda Bay was carried out “in accordance with the Islamic principles of aiding the oppressed” and in order to repel “the transgressor,” while “defending the sanctities.”
“The issue of Palestine is not merely an Arab or Palestinian issue but rather one that concerns every Muslim and is directly related to the faith of every believer.,” Rage claims.
The Shabaab spokesman also portrays the raid as a refutation “to Trump’s naive claims that the outcome of U.S. support for the Zionist regime” amounting “to nothing more than mere demonstrations, boycotts and posts on social media.”
Shabaab portrays America as being at war with all Muslims
Building on a consistent theme in al-Qaeda’s propaganda since the 1990s, Shabaab portrays the U.S. as the leader of a global campaign against all of Islam. “For nearly half a century, the United States of America has been engaged in a brazen total war against Islam across the globe,” Rage claims, adding that the U.S. is conducting “a relentless self-declared crusade against Islam.”
Rage does not concede that much of Shabaab’s own violence is directed at Somalis, including Somali Muslims, whom the jihadists kill in far greater numbers than the Americans stationed in East Africa.
Rage offers a litany of alleged grievances to buttress his argument, ignoring contradictory evidence and observations along the way.
“The U.S. involvement in the Lebanese War in 1982, its sanctions against Iraq in 1991, its intervention in Somalia in 1992, its invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, its illegal detention of Muslims in Bagram and Guantanamo Bay, its unlimited support for the apartheid Zionist regime and its merciless aerial bombardment of innocent Muslims in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria and Somalia all stand as a testament to heinous U.S. war crimes in the Muslim world,” Rage says.
Demands full American retreat
Rage warns that the “Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Will Never Be Judaized” military campaign will continue until the U.S. does all of the following: “Ceases all forms of training and support they provide to the Zionist regime in their war against the Muslims in occupied Palestine”; “Stops the indiscriminate aerial bombardment against our Muslim women and children”; “Withdraws all U.S. troops from our Muslim lands”; “Releases all Muslims who are unjustly being held in their prisons, closes down all military bases and secret prisons that they have established in Muslim lands in order to humiliate our people”; and “Stops plundering our resources and assisting the enemies occupying our lands.”
He argues that “successive” American administrations have “repeatedly disregarded” this list of demands and “warnings” from the “Mujahideen regarding their oppressive foreign policy and invasion of Muslim lands,” so the jihadists continue to “deliver their messages through the blood of U.S. soldiers and the tears of their families so that they may take heed.”
Rage threatens Americans both in Africa and everywhere else, saying that any “failure to comply” with his exhaustive demands, “will not only result in further bloodshed of U.S. soldiers in Muslim lands but will also greatly jeopardize all American lives and interests worldwide as a just recompense for their evil crimes.”
Builds on Osama bin Laden’s messaging
Even though Osama bin Laden had little to nothing to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he used the issue as a rhetorical device for wooing support for his cause. Rage follows in bin Laden’s footsteps in this regard. Indeed, Shabaab uses archival footage of bin Laden to frame its spokesman’s message.
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Rage reiterates Osama bin Laden’s message.
Rage directly cites bin Laden’s invocation of the Palestinian cause. In footage that is shared once again, bin Laden said: “To our brothers in Palestine we say: the blood of your sons is the blood of our sons and your blood is the same as our blood. Therefore, we will avenge blood with blood and destruction with destruction. We swear by Allah, the Almighty we will not forsake you until victory is achieved, or we meet the fate of Hamza bin Abdul-Mutallib, may Allah be pleased with him.”
Rage goes a step further by listing the raid at Manda Bay as one in a series of high-profile al-Qaeda attacks dating back to the 1990s.
“The series of attacks in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, [on the] USS Cole, [on] September 11, the [September 2019] Baledogle raid and the recent attack in Manda Bay, Kenya, should serve as a stark reminder that America’s crusade against Islam and Muslims has deadly consequences and will not go unanswered,” Rage says.
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Rage portrays the recent raid at Manda Bay Airfield as one in a long line of al-Qaeda attacks.
“We call upon the Muslims in general and the Mujahideen of East Africa in particular to follow in the footsteps of these brave young warriors and make U.S. interests their first priority in all their operations,” Rage adds. (Again, despite his call for the jihadists to focus their violence on American targets, most of their operations are actually aimed at locals in Somalia and Africans elsewhere.)
Rage makes it clear that Shabaab adheres to al-Qaeda’s global jihadist ideology.
“The ultimate goal of the Mujahideen who are fighting the coalition of crusaders and apostates in the different Jihadi battlefronts across the world is to liberate Al-Quds from the Zionists occupiers, aid their brothers in Palestine and implement the Shari’ah of Allah across the globe,” Rage explains.
Toward the end of his message, Rage prays for jihadist success across a number of theaters. “Oh Allah keep us and the Mujahideen firm, wherever they are; whether in Sham, Iraq, The Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic Maghreb, the Indian Sub-Continent, Khorasan, the Land of the Two Migrations and elsewhere,” Rage says.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.
 

Housecarl

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Battle of the Bastions

James Lacey

January 9, 2020

Commentary

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, warned by the Walker spy ring — active from 1967 to 1985 — about the vulnerability of its nuclear submarines, concentrated them in the Barents Sea close to the Russian mainland. Later, Moscow did the same on the Pacific coast in the Sea of Okhotsk. With their most precious assets huddled in isolated waters, the Soviets then implemented what became known as the “bastion concept” to protect them. As the nuclear submarines maneuvered within a defined space, they were protected by approximately 75 percent of the Soviet navy’s attack submarines, every surface vessel in its northern and Pacific fleets, and hundreds of aircraft. It was a truly formidable defense, one that NATO spent considerable energy and resources finding counters to.


Well, bastions are back. Worse, they are proliferating and are more formidable than ever. And today, they are being employed for operational and strategic offensive purposes. As such, battling bastions represents the future of naval and probably land warfare. Though China and Russia represent the leading edge of modern bastion development, as advanced weapons technologies — particularly precision missiles — diffuse and become plentiful, other nations — North Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Israel, Taiwan — are implementing the bastion concept, either to ward off enemies or as secure bases from which to threaten their neighbors. Even the United States — keen to defend its forward bases in the Pacific and logistics hubs in Europe — is developing concepts calling for the rapid placement of bastions across the globe.

Bristling with the same panoply of weaponry that made the Soviet’s Arctic strongholds nearly invincible, these 21st-century bastions will also benefit from the installation of thousands of long-range precision missiles and other technologies and capabilities that the Soviet Union never possessed. It is not difficult to envision a near future where bastions are protected by a range of weapons just starting to crawl out of the laboratories such as railguns, lasers, and electomagnetic pulse weapons, to name only a few. Moreover, these modern bastions will be linked to cyber and space assets employable for both offensive and defensive purposes.


A nascent, doctrinal definition of the bastion concept might be “geographic locations where A2-D2 capabilities are massed and integrated to defend valuable strategic assets or to provide secure fires complexes in support of offensive and operational maneuver.” In short, bastions are the visible manifestation of how anti-access/area denial capabilities are increasingly being employed by potential enemies to support wider operational and strategic thinking.


Because of their increasing resilience as well as their capacity to engage distant targets, the role of bastions is changing. While protecting nuclear assets remains a vital mission, particularly for already established bastions, newer installations are taking on other roles. This is clearly visible as strategists examine how China and Russia are employing an offensive bastion strategy to tilt regional balances of power and extend their global influence. Russia, for example, still needing to protect its ballistic submarines, never fully dismantled its northern bastions, which are becoming increasingly strong as Russia’s northern fleet is revitalized. But the mission of Russia’s great northern bastions is no longer exclusively defensive. Rather, they have become the strategic center for Russia to extend its influence throughout the resource-rich Arctic Ocean. Similarly, it is hard to look at Kaliningrad without seeing a bristling defensive bastion in the heart of NATO —one that can easily take on an offensive role as a fortified pivot in support of Russian forces maneuvering in either the Baltic states or Poland. Farther south, Russia appears intent on making the Black Sea a Russian lake, with Crimea rapidly becoming the core of a military bastion capable of employing offensive fires to dominate the surrounding seas.


In the Pacific, American strategists are warily observing China’s accelerating installation of bastions along the mainland, on nearby islands, and, more recently, deep into the South China Sea. Clearly, they are not all needed to protect China’s nuclear systems. Rather, China is repurposing the Soviet-era bastion strategy as the military backbone for its strategic offensive during ongoing great-power competition. If this competition erupts into a conflict, these bastions are already positioned to support Chinese operational maneuver throughout the first island chain and to engage targets beyond the second island chain.


A glance at the map below reveals a new and troubling aspect of these Chinese bastions — they are overlapping and networked together. When NATO was developing plans to deal with Cold War-era Soviet bastions, they had the benefit of there being only two of them, thousands of miles apart. More crucially, these Soviet strongholds were almost totally defensive in character, although the northern bastions could be used as a secure base from which to attempt penetrations of the GIUK gap.


Figure 1: Bastion Map
Bastions.jpg
Source: Image generated by Allison Lacey.


Further, regional powers are clearly starting to build bastions aimed at threatening or countering their neighbors: Iran at the Strait of Hormuz; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the same straits; Vietnam in its northern provinces to counter China; and Taiwan, which is turning its entire island into a bastion. Such bastions are sure to proliferate further as tensions rise among the globe’s most dangerous flashpoints.


At present, the United States seems most concerned over current and developing Chinese bastions, as these formidable modern fortress zones clearly underpin a strategic offensive. They are just as clearly designed to support potential operational offensives. For instance, the military power assembled on the western shore of the Taiwan Strait is unambiguously designed for a single offensive purpose — a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Similarly, the transformation of Hainan Island into a military fortress was evidently planned as a first step in a series of developing bastions reaching deep into the South China Sea. As each additional stronghold is completed, it becomes part of a string of interlinked bastions increasingly able to dominate the surrounding seas. Moreover, once long-range precision missiles are inserted within these bastions, they take on a sea denial mission that extends hundreds or even thousands of kilometers beyond the bastion’s core.


Countering Chinese, as well as Russian, bastions during competition requires the creation of American bastion networks across much of the globe, particularly at points considered key maritime terrain. I have previously argued that such bastions will play a crucial role in ensuring the U.S. Navy will be able to maneuver and control vital sea lanes in a future conflict as without the defensive umbrella provided by such bases it is hard to see how expensive and vulnerable platforms could survive in an environment saturated with precision weapons.


The creation of such bastions on a permanent basis during our current period of competition is by far the best option. But without the presence of an immediate threat, many of America’s potential allies are unlikely to allow the United States to build installations that may antagonize great state powers in their own backyards. To a large degree, they are also deterred by the fear of creating internal political opposition that will rally against what many will perceive as a provocative move. For example, even a causal examination of a map clearly shows that a NATO bastion centered near Narvik in northern Norway would be an essential element in bottling up Russia’s northern fleet as well as in providing the firepower necessary to successfully penetrate Russia’s Arctic bastions. But despite Norway being a NATO member, it is unlikely that any Norwegian government is going to allow their northern regions to become heavily militarized. Even the Philippines, already encountering Chinese encroachment in waters it claims as sovereign Filipino territory, remains uncertain as to the wisdom of allowing the construction of military installations capable of deterring further Chinese aggression.


This is what makes the Marine Corps expeditionary advanced base operations concept vital to success in any future conflict, as at its core the concept is all about seizing key maritime terrain upon which future bastions are going to be built. The upcoming 2020 Defender Pacific exercise demonstrates that even if the U.S. Army has not formally adopted the Marine Corps’s Pacific concept, it is clearly heading in the same direction.


So, what will a future war look like?


It is becoming increasingly apparent that future fights likely will become battles between heavily armed bastions. These bastions will come in various sizes, but the largest of them will be capable of delivering huge offensive punches while absorbing similar levels of punishment. As enemy bastions are likely to limit the U.S. fleet’s maneuver space to areas defended by America’s own bastions, it is difficult to see how any naval-oriented conflict can be decisively won before the opposing side’s bastions are beaten down.


Similarly, on land, the space between heavily defended bastions is likely to become a deadly no man’s land until the bastions of one side or another are hammered out of existence. One can clearly see the difficulties even the best commanders possessing overwhelming force will have defeating such bastions by examining General Patton’s problems in Lorraine and at Metz. Keep in mind that he was facing an army worn down by years of brutal attrition, bereft of air support, and possessing few weapons that could range farther than a dozen miles. If the past is prologue, it is time to give up on notions of brilliant war-winning maneuvers as no one is going to blitzkrieg through enemy bastions packed to the brim with long-range precision weapons and defended by 21st-century arsenals, at least until they have been ground down by weeks or months of attrition.


On the positive side, “bastion warfare” may have the unintended side effect of limiting the scope of a great-power conflict, as there is a chance neither side will see attacks aimed at degrading their bastions as existential threats. Moreover, until these bastions are reduced or eliminated, the possibility of attacks on a nation’s central provinces will be limited as militaries focus on winning the bastion fight, although that kind of thinking may be a forlorn wish. At the very least, the destruction of one or two major bastions can signal to all sides that it is time for the United States to negotiate its way back to competition, as when denied the protection of their bastions, a major state’s next logical step is nuclear release.

Dr. James Lacey is the professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College. He recently authored The Washington War, and his book Gods of War will be published in May 2020. The opinions in this article are entirely his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Department of Defense.


Image: U.S. Navy (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger)
 

Housecarl

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Islamic State video details operations across the Sahel

By Caleb Weiss | January 10, 2020 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7


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Islamic State fighters outside of the Inates Nigerien military base in Dec. 2019.
In its first official release from the region, a new Islamic State video details the jihadist group’s varying operations across the Sahel over the last few years.
While the group has released videos from the region via its Amaq News in the past, today’s video also marks the first time footage from the Sahel has been released through the Islamic State’s West African Province.
While the group is now within the West African Province branding, it is still colloquially known as the “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara,” or ISGS.
The large-scale production serves as both a recap and highlight reel for the Islamic State in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
For instance, archival footage of Abu Walid al Sahrawi, the overall leader of the Islamic State’s forces in the Sahel, pledging bayah (allegiance) in 2016 is shown.
That video came almost one year after Sahrawi first defected from the al Qaeda fold. To juxtapose these old pledges of allegiance, the Islamic State also shows pledges of bayah to its new leader, Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi, at the end of the video.
Additionally, segments in which the former Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, discuss the Sahel in his April 2019 video are also included in today’s video.
Battles Across the Sahel: Niger
Framing its fight as against the French government and its allies in the region, the Islamic State first offers a brief synopsis of events in Mali since 2013.
Two members of ISGS, a local Tuareg and an Algerian, then discuss the Islamic State’s fight against the “Crusaders” in the region and their allied militias before the video shifts to the 2017 ambush of U.S. soldiers near Tongo Tongo, Niger.
Footage previously released by the Islamic State from that attack reappears in today’s production, as does the leaked helmet camera footage from one of the killed U.S. soldiers.
Also shown in today’s video is the May 2019 attack on Nigerien troops near Tongo Tongo. That attack, which killed at least 28 Nigerien soldiers, came immediately after the Islamic State’s men assaulted the Koutoukale prison near Niamey.
The prison break attempt, which was reported foiled by Nigerien officials, is also briefly featured in the video.
Both the July and Dec. 2019 raids on the Nigerien base at Inates are also highlighted. The two assaults were similar in nature, with both beginning with suicide car bombs before ground forces stormed the base.
The two attacks resulted in almost 100 combined fatalities for Nigerien troops, with ISGS’ men capturing large amounts of weapons, equipment, and vehicles.
In the July attack, both American and French troops assisted in the counter-assault; while the jihadists were able to briefly overrun the base in last month’s raid.
Mali
Turning to Mali, a brief combat scene between the jihadists and “secular militias” in the border regions with Niger is also featured.
While not explicitly named, the militias referred to by the Islamic State are the Imghad and Allies Self Defense Movement (GATIA) and the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA).
GATIA and MSA, two pro-Bamako militias in northern Mali, have routinely fought against the Islamic State’s men in Mali’s Gao and Menaka regions, as well as within Niger’s Tillaberi region. In 2018, the militias, backed by France and Mali, fought a short, but intense war against the jihadist group.
Since then, the militias have reported sporadic clashes with the Islamic State. It is not immediately clear which specific battles are featured in the video, as multiple locations are shown. The gory execution of two members of the GATIA-MSA alliance is also shown.
Another brief scene, an undated IED on United Nations troops between Menaka and Ansongo, is also highlighted in the video.
The Menaka-Ansongo axis has long been prominent location for jihadist attacks by both the Islamic State and al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and its predecessor groups.
The Nov. 2019 assault on the Malian base at In-Delimane can also be seen. At least 54 Malian soldiers were killed in the raid, one of the deadliest jihadist strikes inside Mali in recent years.
The video also repeats the Islamic State’s claim that it shot down a French helicopter near In-Delimane shortly after the assault on the base. Thirteen French soldiers were indeed killed after their helicopter crashed during a battle against the jihadist militants near the town.
The French military has denied the Islamic State’s version of events.
Burkina Faso
Despite the multitude of attacks in Burkina Faso, only one assault is shown in the video – the Aug. 2019 raid on a Burkinabe base in Koutougou in Soum province. According to Burkinabe officials, at least 24 soldiers were killed, while another seven were wounded in one of the country’s deadliest attacks.
In the Islamic State’s claim of responsibility almost one month later, it stated that its men were able to briefly seize control over the base before withdrawing with captured weapons and equipment. Today’s video appears to confirm this information.
Additionally, the jihadists can be seen burning the base before retreating, which was also reported at the time.
Sahelien Security
Security in the Sahel has rapidly deteriorated in recent years, as violence stemming from both al Qaeda and the Islamic State has rocked Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
Both JNIM and the Islamic State have increased attacks in the region, thereby exacerbating region’s security.
While JNIM is still the dominant jihadist actor inside Mali and large parts of Burkina Faso and Niger, recent Islamic State attacks in the region have demonstrated its growing capabilities.
State responses, as well as actions taken by non-state actors against various ethnic communities, have also added to the perilous security situation across the region.
In many respects, jihadist forces can exploit anti-government feelings to posit themselves as local defenders and thereby entrench themselves further in Sahelien society. This has already played out to some degree inside central Mali.
Select screenshots from today’s Islamic State video from the Sahel:
Battles with Tuareg militias:

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May 2019 attack near Tongo Tongo, Niger:
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for rest of pictures see article....HC
 

Housecarl

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The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa
By: Sergey Sukhankin

January 10, 2020 05:46 PM Age: 18 mins

Executive Summary
  • Russia’s “return” to Africa—preceded by a decade of near absence on the continent—is premised on two main aspects: 1) geo-economic interests (notably, securing rare natural resources possessed by African countries and expanding Russia’s export capabilities in non-raw materials), and 2) geo-political calculations (such as using the votes of African states at the United Nations to “prove” Russia’s ability to overcome its isolation on the global stage).
  • Along with more traditional arms sales, PMCs and irregulars constitute a key element of Russia’s competitive advantage in the international struggle for influence in Africa. This strategy—on its surface quite similar to Moscow’s pre-1991 modus operandi—has increasingly acquired a new instrument, premised on Russia’s willingness to render services related to political consultancy and spreading disinformation. These services are said to be carried out, in particular, by people/entities closely associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin (an alleged sponsor of the Wagner Group PMC).
  • When it comes to its actions in Africa, Russia is pushing primarily in the countries and geographic areas that were formerly colonies of France and Portugal (and are still seen in Moscow as within Paris’ and Lisbon’s zones of influence). Russia deems these Western European states as weaker players on the African chess board.
  • One of Moscow’s main trump cards in Africa is “security export”—that is, providing consultancy and training in anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations. These services are dually provided to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa by Russian military instructors (officially) as well as members of PMCs (unofficially). In addition, Russian PMCs may be actively involved on the ground in the violent suppression of anti-governmental protests or demonstrations.
  • Russia still lacks a coherent strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. In the short-to-medium term, however, one can expect an expansion of cooperation in this region between Russia and China (particularly as a part of their broader anti-US activities).
Introduction
Prior to the mid-1950s, far-flung Africa was almost never a clear priority for the Russian Empire or its Communist successor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, the process of decolonization and the maturation of the Cold War dramatically changed the geopolitical value of the world’s second-largest (and second-most-populous) continent; notably, Moscow began to view the newly emerging countries there as potential new disciples of Soviet ideology. Until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Moscow was involved in virtually every conflict/civil war that took place in Africa. But even though it diverted huge economic resources for the “anti-imperialist struggle,” the Soviet Union achieved relatively meager results, reducing its presence on the continent by the late 1980s, followed by a nearly complete withdrawal after 1991. During the active phase of its involvement, Moscow’s activities were not limited to economic and material-technical support; military and para-military aid played an equally important role.
Following 1991, the newly established Russian Federation at first did not allocate Africa any visible role in its foreign policy. But the situation started to change from the second half of the 2000s, and it was premised on former Russian foreign and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov’s vision of African countries as an important mechanism for Moscow to diversify its foreign policy away from the West.The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa - Jamestown Beginning in 2012, Russia’s policies toward the African continent experienced a phase of upheaval that took on a qualitatively new form after 2014.
This study examines four key components related to Russia’s current presence in Africa. First, a brief look at the pre-1991 period will seek to establish the continuity and tradition inherent in Russia’s regional behavior. Second, Russia’s post-1991 (strong emphasis on the late 2000s and beyond) strategic interests and ambitions will be defined. Third, the tools and instruments of Moscow’s involvement in regional African affairs will be examined and analyzed. Crucially, this paper makes a distinction between “soft” and “hard” tools in the Russian foreign policy toolkit. Fourth, the paper features a case study involving the assassination, in 2018, of three prominent Russian journalists who were pursuing an investigation in the Central African Republic (CAR). The incident highlighted the connection between Russia’s strategic interests in Africa (and some specific sub-regions) and the activities of Russian PMCs in the area.
The Soviet Union in Africa: The ‘Unknown War’ and Beyond
Russia’s interest in Africa and the continent’s bountiful natural resources was first articulated between 1721 and 1723, when Tsar Peter I organized an expedition to Madagascar, (unsuccessfully) attempting to turn the island into a Russian colony.[ii] After the collapse of the Romanov Empire in 1917, the Bolsheviks lacked both sufficient attention and resources to further engage with this far-flung region. The situation, however, started to change following the Second World War, when increased popularity of the Soviet regime abroad coincided with the ramping up of anti-colonial struggles in Asia and Africa. After the death of Joseph Stalin (1953), who himself paid scant attention to African affairs, his successor Nikita Khrushchev began to perceive Africa as both a new battlefield in Moscow’s conflict with the West and as a potential pool for fresh disciples of Soviet ideology.
As a result, between the 1950s and late 1980s, the USSR came to play an essential role in reshaping the African political landscape through massive support granted to local Marxist elements. Ultimately, all the major regional conflicts that broke out in Africa—including in Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Angola—drew on the Soviet Union’s (in)direct participation.[iii] Of the dozens of African countries supported by the USSR, Angola (with specific focus on the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was allocated a central role. The Soviet government’s strategic objective was to “turn Angola into an example of an African Socialist state fully reliant on the USSR in both its foreign and domestic policies.”[iv] During 1975–1994, the total number of Soviet/Russian military personnel (the number remains classified) who served in Angola may have reached up to 11,000 men, including the highest number of Soviet officers involved in any African state.[v] Summarizing the role of the Soviet side in the Angolan civil war, Cuban leader Fidel Castro noted that “Angola would not have stood a chance without the political and technical-material support of the USSR.”[vi] One of the bloodiest African conflicts, the Angolan civil war (1975–2002)—known among Russian military veterans as the “Unknown War”[vii]—witnessed the USSR, over time, deploying the full spectrum of its conventional and non-linear capabilities, including:[viii]

    • Information confrontation under the guise of “internationalism.” In the regard, aside from Marxist ideology, the issue of racism was extensively used by the Soviet authorities to inflame anti-Western sentiments domestically, internationally and regionally.[ix]
    • Training and consultancy of local pro-Soviet forces (done by the Soviet military and special forces), particularly in non-linear war (including sabotage and diversion operations).
    • Proxy war, with Cuban soldiers fighting on the side of the pro-Soviet forces.[x] Soviet involvement in Angola presented a particularly interesting case study because, aside from close collaboration with local forces (Angolan militants), the Soviets learned how to effectively communicate with the Cuban “volunteers” who poured into Angola during the second half of the 1970s.[xi] Today, some of these skills and competences have been vested on the Special Operations Forces (officially)[xii] and PMCs (unofficially).[xiii]
The Soviet involvement in Africa also witnessed Moscow providing support for the mobilization and (re)deployment of local armed forces (with heavy equipment), including rapid training of the local militia, with, perhaps, the most notable (and successful) case studies occurring during the conflicts in the Horn of Africa in the second half of the 1960s.[xiv]
Arguably the most crucial outcome stemming from Moscow’s involvement throughout Africa was the growth of Soviet naval forces: between 1961 and 1979 (the heyday of Soviet activities on the continent), the USSR managed to put into operation 200 new sea vessels (including two small aircraft carriers and two types of landing crafts). At that time (in 1972), the head of the Soviet naval forces (Voyenno-Morskoy Flot—VMF), Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, stated, “[Soviet] naval power is a messenger of the Socialist states, demonstrating Soviet achievements and boosting the international posture of the Soviet Union.”[xv]
Toward the end of the 1980s, Soviet policies in Africa—overburdened by rigid Communist ideology and clearly devoid of economic calculus—suffered a visible fiasco. Mounting domestic hardships and the collapse of popular support for Communism pushed the leadership in Moscow to dramatically decrease the level of Soviet involvement in African affairs. However, this withdrawal did not exclusively owe to internal reasons. As noted by former ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and chairperson of the Russian Association of Diplomats Andrey Baklanov, “It needs to be admitted that Western countries managed to mobilize all their ingenuity to find an adequate response to these challenges […] they strengthened their group discipline and ‘outplayed’ [the Soviets] in the realm of economic-financial relations with African nations.”[xvi] Meanwhile, Moscow was unable to elaborate a new strategy (or adjust it to the new post–Cold War reality), thus sharply downscaling the African vector in late Soviet–early Russian foreign policy calculations.
Russia in Africa: From Retrenchment to Return
After 1991, the newly emerged Russian Federation dramatically decreased its level of involvement in African affairs, yet managed to avoid a full and complete withdrawal. Still, by paying significantly less attention to Africa after the end of the Cold War, Moscow dramatically diminished the effectiveness of the three tools the USSR had extensively relied on:

    • The “soft power” mechanism that used to be premised on education/scientific exchange and humanitarian ties;
    • Military support; and
    • Economic assistance, which was coordinated by the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po vneshnim Ekonomicheskim Sviaziam—GKES) and played a pivotal role in various regional infrastructural mega projects.
Some studies (including analysis by Andrey Baklanov, published in August 2018), show that certain African countries derived up to 15 percent of their GDP from Soviet economic support.[xvii] By and large, prior to 1991, the USSR maintained cordial ties with 37 African actors, which resulted in the creation of nearly 600 industrial plants/objects of critical infrastructure, with approximately 300 being fully completed and becoming operable by the end of the 1980s.[xviii]
By the early 2000s, however, Russian ties with African countries (especially with sub-Saharan states) sank to an unprecedentedly low level. The situation started to change in 2006, when Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of South Africa (RSA)—an episode now widely construed by Russian sources as a first step toward Russia’s return to Africa following the “lost decade” of “Russia losing virtually all Soviet baggage [assets]” on this continent.[xix] It is important to note that Russia’s activities in Africa since 2006 drastically differ (at least on the surface) from the pattern set by the Soviets, which was premised on rendering massive economic support in exchange for loyalty (primarily reflected in anti-American rhetoric on the international stage). Indeed, Russia’s current model is premised on a different foundation. In a 2007 study, Andrey Maslov (at the time an assistant to the Russian president’s special advisor on Africa) formulated the following key principles[xx]:

    • Economic interests, reflected not only in the large quantities of natural resources (Africa is said to contain approximately 30 percent of world minerals and mining materials) but also their low prices of extraction (in comparison to Russia, with its harsh climactic conditions and more expensive labor costs), which decreases the cost of production by 20–30 percent.
    • Security interests, which fall into two main categories. First, countering extremism/radical Islamist fundamentalism. Second, in doing so, aiming to “confront the United States over its willingness to use this factor [growing Islamist radicalism in Africa] as a justification for its [US] growing presence in the central Sahara region.”
    • Political interests, characterized by strengthening contacts with African nations, where Russia’s priorities are to follow two approaches: a) bilateral ties with South Africa; and b) multi-lateral ties with Angola, Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ethiopia.
(for the rest of the article please see the source, it's just way too long to post...HC)
 

jward

passin' thru
(for the rest of the article please see the source, it's just way too long to post...HC)
Conclusion captured, rest of articles' points, and notes, remain at source...j
Posted for fair use

Conclusion

Russia’s activities in Africa today differ markedly from Soviet engagements on that continent during the Cold War; namely, “pragmatism” appears to play a far greater role in Moscow’s present-day Africa policy than it did prior to 1991. However, unlike its historical predecessor, Russia is unable to divert substantial economic resources to achieve its objectives in Africa, which compels Moscow to act asymmetrically. Russia is carefully “picking its battles” (limiting the number of clients it takes on at a given time); but at the same time, it is employing its competitive advantages vis-à-vis other global powers wisely. As such, Moscow is determined to convert Washington’s (temporary) weakening presence in the region to its advantage.[xciv] At this juncture, a truly critical aspect—with a potentially heavy impact on the balance of power on the continent—will be the relative ability of the Russian side to cooperate with China. This factor is already frequently present in Russia’s official discourse, though it may not be as steady or genuine as argued by the Russian side.

That being said, it needs to be reiterated that Russia has neither adequate economic potential, nor compelling “soft power” mechanisms to openly compete with more powerful international players, primarily China, the US and the EU (both as an entity and some individual member states). Therefore, Moscow’s strategy is based on tools and means previously tested in other regions. In this regard, it would be crucial to ascertain three essential factors: arms sales, “hybrid” security cooperation, and political/informational operations.

Regarding arms and weapons sales—a strategy initiated during the Soviet period—this now serves as a key factor in the contemporary Kremlin’s overtures to individual African states. Moreover, given the fact that Soviet-built weaponry (which requires qualified servicing that is still lacking in African countries) continues to comprise the backbone of some African armed forces, the maintenance/refitting/modernization of those arms naturally helps facilitate Russian cooperation with these regional states.[xcv]

The second pillar of Russia’s Africa strategy has been the “hybridization” of the “security export” mechanism. Examples of the CAR, the DRC and Sudan, in particular, have demonstrated the emergence of this blend of legal technical-military support (which includes sending limited numbers of uniformed military instructors) with services rendered by illegal formations—that is, Russian PMCs that de jure are forbidden by the Russian Penal Code. As noted above, many African countries may nonetheless welcome this type of cooperation for two main reasons: a) the African ruling elites’ fears of public protests, as well as b) surging Islamist radicalism and the inability of the local armed forces to effectively deal with this challenge. In effect, Russia’s ability to exploit both factors may play a crucial role in its competition with other global actors on the African continent.

Finally, the third part of Moscow’s Africa strategy encompasses a wide spectrum of various non-military mechanisms in the political and informational spheres. These include operating trolls/botnets on behalf of African clients, sending in political consultants (“political technologists”) and spreading media disinformation. Although, to date, these efforts have shown limited if any success, they may improve with experience and attain a qualitatively new form in the short to medium term.

An integrated and rational use of these three factors might grant Moscow greater latitude in its projects/initiatives in Africa and further expand Russian involvement across the continent, which, based on the most up-to-date observations, continues to experience visible growth.[xcvi]

 
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jward

passin' thru
Building Post-INF Missiles Would Be a Waste, or Worse
Russian military officers stand by as the 9M729, center, its launcher, left, and the 9M728, right, land-based cruise missiles are displayed in Kubinka outside Moscow, Russia.

  • BY KINGSTON REIFARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

New U.S. intermediate-range ground-launched missiles would deliver more undesirable effects than tactical utility.

In an op-ed published last month in Defense One, Rebeccah Heinrichs, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and Tim Morrison, a former top official on arms control and Russia on the National Security Council, call for accelerating development of conventional missiles formerly banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. They also recommend sharing the development burden with allies.
Morrison and Heinrichs claim these systems are an essential response to Russia’s fielding of the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile that violated the INF Treaty, and to the growing military prowess of China, which was never a party to the treaty. In addition, they assert that the missiles would strengthen the U.S. ability to strike new arms control agreements.
But their arguments are unconvincing.

First, it’s telling that Heinrichs and Morrison don’t bother to explain why new missiles are necessary to respond to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. In reality, there is no military need for them in Europe. Even some proponents of the administration’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty admit as much.
Related: Put US Post-INF Missiles into Production
Related: Expect a Missile Race After the INF Demise
Related: The INF Treaty Is Doomed. We Need a New Arms-Control Framework

Moscow has warned that it would respond to any U.S. deployments by deploying more intermediate-range missiles of its own, possibly including ballistic missiles. A new missile race would make Europe less secure.

Proponents of new ground-launched missiles see the greatest utility for them in Asia, where the tyranny of distance is more punishing than it is in the European theater. Heinrichs and Morrison write that these capabilities would hold Chinese targets at risk and “help U.S. forces, mainly from the sea and air, operate in areas increasingly covered by PLA missiles.”

It is true that ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers could augment the ability of the United States and its allies to counter a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan or disputed islands along the first island chain.

But acquiring this capability hardly justifies abandoning the INF Treaty. As one recent analysis of the military balance in Asia noted, “if the U.S. military deploys ground-launched ASCMs [anti-ship cruise missiles] with the INF-imposed maximum of 500 kilometers range from three sites in Japan…the United States will be capable of targeting Chinese warships operating in much of the East China Sea.”

Longer-range ground-launched missiles, such as the 3,000-to-4,000-kilometer ballistic missile the Pentagon is developing, could promptly strike fixed targets on the Chinese mainland from locations further away from China’s potent anti-access/area denial capabilities. Deploying such missiles, however, would likely increase China’s threat perceptions and lead Beijing to take countermeasures. Actually using them, particularly to threaten China’s nuclear forces, would be deeply escalatory.

Further, a ballistic missile with that range based in Guam would be capable of hitting Pyongyang in 20 minutes. As noted by Ankit Panda, such a deployment could exacerbate North Korean fears in Pyongyang about a leadership decapitation strike, thereby increasing the likelihood of nuclear escalation.

Meanwhile, purchasing formerly prohibited missiles, especially longer-range ballistic missiles, would not be cheap, and every dollar spent on them is a dollar that can’t be spent on more flexible air and sea alternatives.

Morrison and Heinrichs argue that questions about where to base the missiles are a “red herring.” In reality, no country has said that it would be willing to host them. Poland, often cited by missile advocates as a potential European host, has made it clear that any deployment in Europe would have to be approved by all NATO members. Australia, Japan, and South Korea have said that they have not been asked to nor are they considering serving as hosts. Securing basing agreements, especially for missiles that can strike deep into China and Russia in a matter of minutes, would require a major investment of political capital from Washington at a time when the Trump administration has damaged several of these alliance relationships.

The United States could base new missiles in Guam, a U.S. territory. But the island, unlike the Pacific Ocean around it and the air above it, is small and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Chinese coast. Land-based missiles on Guam, even if mobile, would be vulnerable to Chinese attack, thereby increasing crisis instability.

Morrison and Heinrichs claim that co-developing and co-financing new missiles with allies, as the United States is doing with Japan in building the SM-3 IIA missile defense interceptor, would “sidestep” sensitive basing negotiations. But co-developing long-range offensive missiles is likely to be far more controversial in allied capitals than the development of missile defense interceptors.

Given the questionable rationale for and risks of new ground-launched missiles, the Trump administration’s push to develop them was controversial in Congress last year. The final defense authorization and appropriations bills allow development to go forward but prohibit the use of fiscal year 2020 funds to buy or field the missiles and require the Pentagon to address the rationale and strategy for procuring, basing, and operating them.

In absence of a thorough assessment of these issues, it is hard to see how accelerating development makes sense.

Finally, could intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe and Asia convince Russia and China to come to the negotiating table to discuss new arms control approaches?

Such an approach is unlikely to be successful for a number of reasons. Unlike during the Cold War, when several NATO leaders urged the United States to deploy the missiles despite strong public opposition, and the Soviet military threat was much greater, it is far from clear that NATO would agree to such deployments today. Then there is the fact that Donald Trump is not Ronald Reagan and Vladimir Putin is not Mikhail Gorbachev. And China has never engaged in formal arms control talks with the United States and is unlikely to make changes to its military posture unless Washington and its allies reduce their current regional military footprint.

Instead of fanning the flames of a new missile race with Russia and China, the administration should pair the maintenance of appropriate military readiness with dialogue and pragmatic confidence-building and arms control proposals. The first step should be to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which after the collapse of the INF Treaty is the only remaining arms control agreement limiting at least a portion of the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

The end of the INF Treaty has opened the door to a more dangerous phase of conventional great power military competition. The end of New START would open the door to an even more dangerous era of great power nuclear competition.
article-end.png


 

jward

passin' thru
Extremism Watch
Why Did Iran's IRGC, Not Its Proxies, Attack US Bases in Iraq?
By Sirwan Kajjo, Mehdi Jedinia, Ezel Sahinkaya
January 9, 2020 09:18 PM

The recent launch of ballistic missiles against U.S. military air bases in Iraq, in response to the U.S. killing of top Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani, was immediately claimed by the country’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

This, experts say, highlights a different position assumed by Tehran in carrying out attacks against the U.S. and other adversaries as opposed to relying on its many proxy forces throughout the region to have the luxury of plausible deniability.

Targeting a high-profile military leader such as Soleimani, who led IRGC’s elite Quds Force, prompted the Iranian leadership to respond to the U.S. at a similar level, experts argue.

“The IRGC has been in charge of the game when it comes to Iranian security,” said Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council in Washington.

“The IRGC is part of their national security system. They have a Supreme Council of National Security, which includes a representative there and the head of the branches of the military as well as the president and the foreign minister,” she told VOA.

Slavin added that Iranian leaders “make these decisions jointly, and they reach a consensus on what they think is the appropriate step.”

The IRGC “chose this tactical attack against U.S. installations in Iraq to be able to calm down its public and to demonstrate that it has indeed retaliated” for the killing of Soleimani, said Cyrus Saify, an Iranian affairs analyst based in Washington.

He said the IRGC attack was also a move to appeal to hardliners in the Iranian government.

Previous attacks

Over the years, Iran has built a significant network of mostly Shiite militias across the Middle East, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

In an assessment of the Tuesday attack on U.S. military bases in Iraq, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of IRGC’s aerospace force, spoke at a news conference where he stood behind flags that represent several Iranian proxies, including the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces and the Palestinian Hamas.

The slain commander Soleimani was personally involved in founding some of those armed groups, particularly after the Arab Spring uprising in the region and the subsequent rise of the Islamic State terror group in Syria and Iraq. These militias have been instrumental in expanding Iran’s influence and reach in the region.

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In recent years, Iran has relied on its proxies to carry on its agenda of targeting U.S. interests in the Middle East, experts said.

In Iraq, for example, military bases housing U.S. troops have been attacked at least 10 times since October, with U.S. officials mostly blaming Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias.

An assault last month on a military base in the Iraqi province of Kirkuk killed an American contractor and wounded several U.S. and Iraqi military personnel, prompting the U.S. to respond by striking five facilities in Iraq and Syria that belonged to the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite militia Kataeb Hezbollah.

Kataeb Hezbollah, which was led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed along with Soleimani in the U.S. airstrike last week, was one of the main Iranian-backed Shiite militias behind the recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

In September 2019, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have been battling a Saudi-led coalition in the war-ravaged country, claimed responsibility for a drone attack on oil facilities run by state-owned Saudi Aramco.

Experts said those attacks highlight the serious threats Iran’s proxies could pose in the ongoing tensions between Washington and Tehran.

Additional responses

Jason Brodsky, an Iran expert based in Washington, believes that the Iranian missile response against U.S. forces should be measured by phases.

“The first phase was direct retaliation. The second phase is likely to be indirect retaliation through proxies within its broader Axis of Resistance,” he told VOA.

Iran and its proxy militia groups in the region refer to their alliance as the “Axis of Resistance.”

It’s important to pay attention to the messaging of Iran’s supreme leader’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Brodsky said, adding that “in response to Iran’s attack on the airbases in Iraq, [Khamenei] said ‘such military actions are not enough.’ That may be a signal that retribution from Iran-backed militias – not from Iran’s armed forces – in the region could be next.”

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‘Plausible deniability’

Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, said that despite an uncertain calm in tensions between Washington and Tehran following the Iranian missile attack, Iran would likely rely on its proxy militias if it decided to assault U.S. military targets in the future.

“If [the Iranians] do carry something out next time, my guess would be that instead of doing something like this, where it was Iranian military against U.S. bases in Iraq, they would use their proxies instead so that they have some plausible deniability,” he told VOA.

“The region is still a flashpoint, although Iran’s proxies in Iraq have announced that they are ceasing, essentially, actions against the U.S., but it might always be something,” Milani said.

Jesusemen Oni and Niala Mohammed contributed to this report from Washington.

VOAnews.com
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

How Will the Chinese Navy Use Its 2 Aircraft Carriers?

As the PLA Navy adjusts to its growing carrier fleet, pay attention to the officers tasked to lead.

By Ying Yu Lin

January 10, 2020

The recent commissioning of China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, the Shandong, means that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has formally moved into an epoch of “two aircraft carrier formations.” It marks the PLA Navy’s growing strength and progressive transition to a “blue ocean” navy, which goes hand-in-hand with its expansion in recent years.

In early 2017, a plethora of open access research papers emerged in China discussing how to employ two aircraft carriers for escort missions, anti-submarine warfare, and training exercises. There were even discussions about the possibility that two aircraft carriers, both combat capable, could be pitted against each other in Red-Blue exercises. Theorization of this kind fits into a development model commonly seen in the PLA, consisting of four stages: theorization, development of relevant technologies, setting up organizations, and cultivation of human resources.

The successive commissioning of two aircraft carriers stands for the PLA’s determination to establish a far seas presence. Whether the goal can be reached of course depends on technologies and technical capabilities, ranging from catapult aircraft launch systems on carriers and carrier-borne early warning aircraft to the anti-aircraft and anti-submarine operations capabilities of carrier escort ships. All are necessary for the PLAN carriers to bring their combat capabilities into play.

A huge defense expenditure is needed to build carriers in succession. Keeping them operational will cost even more money. Whether the Chinese leadership will take a different attitude toward carriers with the evolution of the war-fighting environment and war type is still unknown.

How to employ the two carriers is important, but so is the command and control mechanism for them. The management of the carriers should be the job of the PLAN Carrier Command Post, rather than theater command navies, in peacetime. In time of war, carriers are put under the control of theater commands. The arrangement complies with the principle that the Central Military Commission (CMC) takes charge of everything, theater commanders are responsible for operations, and the services are tasked with establishing combat strength.

As carriers become operational one after another, the promotion of officers to leadership positions on these carriers also becomes a focus of attention. Will the PLAN will appoint officers who have served as pilots (e.g. Dai Mingmeng and Zhang Gong), carrier commanding officers (e.g. Zhang Zheng and Liu Zhe) and carrier executive officers (Gao Zhaoduan), or who have received training in the aviation commanding officer class (e.g. Bai Yaoping and Wang Dazhong) as higher-level leaders in the command and management of carriers in the future? It’s a question surely worthy of observation.

On the list of senior officers promoted at the end of December 2019, one stands out in this regard. Tohhen-Southern Theater Command Navy Aviation Deputy Commander Dai Mingmeng, who was on the grade of deputy corps commander, was raised to the rank of major general.

Dai, born in 1971, is a native of Chongqing city in Sichuan province. After graduating from a military academy, Dai served in the legendary Heroic Eagle Regiment. He was the first PLA pilot to successfully land on and take off from China’s first carrier, the Liaoning, which requires arresting gear landings and takeoffs from ski ramps. In 2014, Dai was granted the title of “Heroic Test Pilot For Aircraft Carriers.”

As of 2016, he had received a total of three merit citations class II and III and won a “gold medal for flying for the country” from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). Dai was also honored with an “award for great contribution to the aircraft carrier project,” which was jointly conferred by the State Council and the CMC. He was cited as a “model serviceman who loves his country and excels at combat skills,” one of the “navy’s ten best youths” in 2014, the tenth edition of the navy’s annual selection, and a pilot with meritorious service for the navy.

No longer serving on active duty as a fighter pilot, Dai became commander of a comprehensive test and training base of the PLAN for carrier-borne aircraft in 2018. The base is an integrated platform specifically designed for training the pilots of carrier-borne aircraft. In December 2018, the State Council conferred the title of “Reform Pioneer” on Dai and awarded him a “Reform Pioneer Medal.” He was lauded as a “practical explorer in the establishment of aircraft carrier-based combat strength.” Dai was appointed as Southern Theater Command Navy Aviation Deputy Commander in 2019. He was promoted to the rank of major general in December of the same year.

As has been discussed above, Dai possesses not only specialized skills as a commanding officer but also the dual quality of “redness and expertise” in political orientation and job competencies – making him just the right kind of person that President Xi Jinping would like to put in an important position. Meanwhile, considering that many important positions on U.S. aircraft carriers are held by officers with flying experience, Dai is very likely to return to the carrier command system, where he can serve as carrier formation commander or be assigned to the highest echelons of navy aviation.

Due to the fact that either of the two operational carriers alone does not carry enough fighter jets, the two carriers must work together to provide a fighter plane force equivalent to an airborne brigade. This means that above the aviation commanders of the two carriers, there may be a higher-level carrier command post commander, a position very likely to be taken by Dai. The Liaoning formation has been commanded by a deputy corps commander-grade rear admiral, who works together with commander of the Liaoning, a division commander-grade captain. Following the commissioning of the second carrier, the commander of the carrier command post controlling the two carrier formations must be differentiated from the commander of either carrier formation in both rank and grade. It offers a higher position up for grabs by the flag officers that have been mentioned earlier.

Given the newest developments in the South China Sea and former Liaoning Carrier Formation Commander Chen Yueqi’s appointment as Guangxi Military District Commander, the Southern Theater Command stands to have its second logistics support base for carriers, which is worthy of note too.

Dr. Ying Yu Lin is Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Institute of Strategy and International Affairs, National Chung Cheng University, in Chiayi Taiwan. He holds a PhD from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University. His research interests include PLA studies and cybersecurity.
 
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