BRKG P5+1 + Iran Announces Reaching Solutions on Key Parameters for Agreement

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldk...athema-to-republicans-israel-and-north-korea/

Forbes Asia 4/03/2015 @ 1:20AM 6,173 views

Iran Nuclear Deal: Bad News To Republicans, Israel, North Korea

Donald Kirk, Contributor

Israel and Republicans in the U.S. Congress now share common cause with North Korea on one critical topic: they hate the nuclear deal that negotiators from the U.S. and five other countries have struck with Iran.

While Israeli leaders and commentators denounce the agreement and Republicans vow to fight it in the U.S. Congress, North Korea has already stated that it will never give up its nuclear weapons. Six-party talks with North Korea, hosted by China, screeched to a halt nearly seven years ago and aren’t likely to resume as long as North Korea really has nothing to talk about.

That doesn’t mean, though, that North Korean leaders will not be watching closely to see how the deal works out even if they’re not going to follow Iran’s example.

North Korea and Iran are not about to break off close ties forged in cooperation not only on nuclear technology but on missiles and other weaponry. Iran has sent teams of advisers to North Korea to witness and assist on long-range missile development while North Korea has exported short and mid-range missiles to Iran along with both experts and laborers to work on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The huge difference, of course, is that Iran professes to be dedicated only to producing nuclear energy for industrial purposes while North Korea is interested only in making warheads.

Energy-poor North Korea, relying on China for all its oil, lost its chance to obtain twin nuclear energy reactors, promised under the 1994 agreed framework with the U.S., when revealed eight years later to be developing highly enriched uranium after having shut down its plutonium program under terms of the agreement. Construction of the twin energy reactors soon stopped, and North Korea resumed building warheads with plutonium and possibly uranium.

Skeptics of the Iranian pledge to downsize its number of centrifuges and stop enriching most of its uranium while agreeing to on-site inspections point out that Korea is now fabricating centrifuges with technology acquired from Iran and from A.Q. Khan when he was running Pakistan’s nuclear program. North Korea is believed to be gearing up for a fourth nuclear test — this one with a device powered by uranium.

The deal with Iran, though, is sure to give pause to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions for a number of reasons.

One is that China, North Korea’s only ally whether North Korean leaders like it or not, is fairly well committed to opposing their nuclear ambition and can slow the flow of oil, as well as food, any time.

Another is the nuclear deal with Iran calls for an end to sanctions if Iran really complies with the terms. North Korea may not be ready to give up its nukes but might be amenable to an agreement to stop producing them in return for relaxation of sanctions imposed by the UN after its nuclear and missile tests.

Not that North Korea will be ready to resume six-party talks right away — or even in the near future. It does mean, however, that at some stage the North might agree to return to the table with a view to some sign of concessions — an understanding that the U.S. and South Korea demand in advance so the talks won’t be totally useless.

Experts in Washington seem just about unanimous in agreeing, no way will the Iran deal have an impact on North Korea.

Scott Snyder at the Council on Foreign Relations told South Korea’s Yonhap News that “North Korea is in a different situation from Iran, because it has shown no interest in coming back to talks on minimally acceptable terms to the administration.” Alan Romberg at the Stimson Center was quoted as saying “Iran has obviously shown a willingness to curtail its still-nascent program and forgo nuclear weapons” but “North Korea has not — so there really are no parallels.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, however, may be in a somewhat different mood after making his first trip outside the country next month — to see Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Russia has formed close ties with both Iran and North Korea — the former as a foil to U.S. aims in the middle east, the latter to counter Chinese influence in North Korea and the U.S. alliance with South Korea.

Putin could suggest to Kim the advantages of putting on a show of conciliation. North Korea, like Iran, could be the recipient of Soviet arms and aircraft needed to replace its fleet of aging MiGs, gifts from the Soviet Union.

That might not be good news for the U.S., South Korea — or China — but could be persuasive when it comes to persuading North Korea to scale down its nuclear ambitions. Would North Korea really want to remain the odd man out when offered all that — and maybe, some day, relaxation of onerous sanctions?

To read more of my commentaries on Asia news, click on www.donaldkirk.com, and the details of my books are available here.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150404/ml--iran-nuclear-c027f29542.html

FM: Iran could resume nuclear activities if West withdraws

Apr 4, 7:36 PM (ET)
By NASSER KARIMI

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Iran's foreign minister said Saturday that Tehran would be able to return to its nuclear activities if the West withdraws from a pact that is to be finalized in June.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, said on a talk show on state-run TV that Iran has the power to take "corresponding action" and "will be able to return" its nuclear program to the same level if the other side fails to honor the agreement.

"All parties to the agreement can stop their actions (fulfillment of their commitments) in case of violation of the agreement by the other party," Zarif said.

Zarif said the framework nuclear deal announced by Iran and six world powers Thursday in Switzerland was not binding until a final agreement is worked out by a June 30 deadline. The framework agreement, if finalized, would cut significantly into Iran's bomb-capable nuclear technology while giving Tehran quick access to bank accounts, oil markets and other financial assets blocked by international sanctions.

Zarif said the deal, if finalized, would nullify all U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran's nuclear program and lead to the lifting of U.S. and European Union sanctions.

Zarif's remarks appear aimed at reassuring hardliners in Iran who strongly oppose the framework agreement as a good deal for the West and disaster for Iran.

Despite criticism by hardliners, the deal has been overwhelmingly backed by Iran's establishment, including President Hassan Rouhani who pledged in a speech to the nation on Friday that Iran will abide by its commitments under the nuclear deal.

Zarif said Iran is "committed" to implementing its part of any final agreement providing Western countries fulfill their promises.

He said Iran wants to have a "moderate, constructive and proud presence" in the world.

Zarif received a hero's welcome upon his return to Tehran on Friday. Crowds of cheering supporters surrounded Zarif's vehicle and chanted slogans supporting him and Rouhani.

In the TV interview, Zarif said he "objected" to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry using the word "suspension" rather than "termination" regarding sanctions against Iran in the statement on the framework deal announced Thursday in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Zarif attributed Kerry's action as being aimed at addressing rifts between the Obama administration and Congress over the deal. Republicans are almost universally opposed to President Barack Obama's diplomatic effort; Democrats remain divided.

Zarif said the agreement showed that the West cannot halt Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for peaceful purposes such as power generation and cancer treatment. Western countries suspect that Iran's nuclear program has a military dimension.

Without naming any country, Zarif assured Iran's neighbors such as Saudi Arabia which are concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions that Tehran is not after regional domination.

"We are not after a nuclear bomb. We are also not after hegemony in the region, too," Zarif said. "Security of our neighbors is our security, too."

Saudi Arabia has expressed concern about growing Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon which have large Shiite Muslim populations. A Saudi-led military coalition is now carrying out airstrikes in Yemen against Shiite Houthi rebels who are supported by Iran.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/iran-nuclear-deal-concerns-by-richard-n--haass-2015-04

Richard N. Haass Follow @RichardHaass

Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. His most recent book is Forei… read more


APR 3, 2015
Comments 7

The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal

NEW YORK – “There’s many a slip twixt the cup and the lip,” goes the old English proverb. Something seemingly resolved and certain in fact is neither. If no such expression exists in Farsi, I predict one soon will.

The reason, of course, is the “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” the framework just adopted by Iran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members – China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States – plus Germany). The agreement constitutes an important political and diplomatic milestone, and it contains more detail and is broader in scope than many anticipated.

But, for all that, the text leaves unanswered at least as many questions as it resolves. In reality – and as the coming weeks, months, and years will demonstrate – major issues have yet to be settled. It is closer to the truth to say the real debate about the Iran nuclear accord is just beginning.

The framework places significant limits on Iran’s nuclear program, including the number and type of centrifuges, the sort of reactors, and the amount and quality of enriched uranium that the country may possess. Standards are set for the inspections needed to provide confidence that Iran is fulfilling its obligations. And provision is made for easing economic sanctions once Iran has verifiably met its commitments.

The bottom line is that the agreement will provide an estimated one-year warning from the moment that Iran might decide to build one or more nuclear weapons to the point at which it could achieve that goal. This assessment assumes that the monitoring called for in the accord will detect any Iranian non-compliance early enough to enable a coordinated international response, particularly the reintroduction of sanctions, before Iran could acquire nuclear weapons.

There are no less than five reasons not to assume the deal will enter into force or have the desired impact. The first involves the next 90 days. What was announced was an interim framework; a formal, comprehensive accord is supposed to be completed by the end of June. In the meantime, there could easily be changes of heart and mind as those who negotiated the interim deal return home and face criticism from their governments and publics over its terms. Already, significant differences are emerging in how the US and Iranian sides are representing what was negotiated.

A second concern stems from the specific issues that remain to be resolved. The most difficult might be the timing of when various economic sanctions are to be removed – the issue of greatest concern to Iran. But these same sanctions are also the source of the greatest leverage over Iranian behavior, which means that many in the US and Europe will want them to remain in place until Iran has fully met its critical obligations.

A third source of doubt is whether the various parties will approve any long-term pact. The two main uncertainties involve Iran and the US. So-called hardliners in Iran will undoubtedly object to an agreement with the “Great Satan” that places limits on their country’s nuclear ambitions. But there is also a widespread desire among Iranians to get out from under economic sanctions, and Iran will approve a pact if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei favors it, which he presumably does.

The uncertainties are greater in the US. President Barack Obama must contend with a far more complex political environment, beginning with the US Congress. There is widespread and understandable concern about leaving Iran with any nuclear capabilities, about the adequacy of provisions for monitoring and inspection, and about what will happen in ten or 15 or 25 years when various limits on Iran expire. Persuading Congress to approve the final pact and/or lift sanctions is anything but assured.

This question of gaining political approval is closely tied to a fourth area of concern: how any final agreement is implemented. The history of arms control suggests there will be occasions when Iran, which has a record of withholding relevant information from UN weapons inspectors, is suspected of not living up to the letter, much less the spirit, of what was negotiated. Agreement is needed on the process for judging Iranian behavior and for determining appropriate responses.

The fifth concern stems not so much from the accord as from everything else about Iran’s foreign and defense policies. The agreement is only about Iran’s nuclear activities. It says nothing about Iran’s missile programs or support for terrorists and proxies, much less about what it is doing in Syria or Iraq or Yemen or anywhere else in the turbulent Middle East, or about human rights at home.

Iran is a would-be imperial power that seeks regional primacy. Even a nuclear agreement that is signed and implemented will not affect this reality and might even make it worse, as Iran could well emerge with its reputation enhanced and a long-term option to build nuclear weapons intact.

Obama is right: A nuclear agreement of the sort outlined is preferable to Iran possessing nuclear weapons or going to war to prevent that outcome. But any agreement must also generate widespread confidence in the US and the region that it will place a meaningful ceiling on Iran’s nuclear program, and that any cheating will be discovered early and dealt with firmly. This will not be easy; indeed, it is no exaggeration to predict that the effort to generate such confidence may well prove as demanding as the negotiations themselves.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2...d-be-start-of-historic-friendship-burman.html

Nuclear deal with Iran could be start of historic friendship: Burman
If this deal leads to a constructive partnership with the West, it will dramatically change the strategic balance in the Mideast for the better.

By: Tony Burman Special to the Star, Published on Fri Apr 03 2015

History’s great moments in retrospect are often remembered as dramatic and majestic, but up close, in the heat of the action, they can be messy and confusing. This week’s landmark deal with Iran joins that list.

Groundbreaking in its potential, it may very well take this 21st century in an entirely new direction. But the process that led to it was certainly not pretty, and the journey toward nuclear sanity is certainly not over.

It was quite the spectacle. Like heavyweight boxers at the end of a gruelling championship bout, exhausted but still standing, representatives of the world’s six major powers and Iran finally did the deal.

RELATED:
Analysis: Wild cards abound in final leg of nuclear deal

After eight days of intensive negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, which followed more than 18 months of talks, they announced an interim framework intended to limit Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful and not military purposes. They have given themselves until the end of June to conclude a detailed and final agreement.

Given all the uncertainty during the negotiations, it is easy to lose sight of how potentially breathtaking this Iranian development is. After 35 years of bitter relations with the U.S. and isolation by the West, the home of one of the world’s great civilizations appears ready once again to become a credible and accepted member of the international community.

If this deal ultimately leads to a constructive new partnership with the West, which existed before the Islamic revolution of 1979, it will dramatically change the strategic balance in the Middle East. And this will be for the good.

Inevitably, as the final deadline in June approaches, the voices against this deal with Iran will be loud and alarmist. They will exploit the media’s often uncritical echo chamber to terrify. Working for peace is hard work and complicated, but sounding bold and bellicose is easy.

We only have the past century to remind us. We can still hear the voices that bellowed “treason” in response to any nuclear deal with the Soviet Union’s “evil empire” or to any accommodation with “Red China.” But those courageous acts changed the direction of the world for the good

The battle for American public opinion has only begun. A Washington Post/ABC News poll released on Tuesday showed that Americans by nearly a 2-to-1 margin support a deal with Iran but are skeptical that Iran will keep to the bargain. This week’s drama has only emboldened critics of the deal. Already, there are calls from American conservatives for Israel, the U.S. or both to bomb Iran. In the U.S. Congress, the Republicans have vowed to do what they can to block the interim accord and to try to impose added sanctions on Iran.

Like other critics, they will voice at least three major objections to this interim agreement, and they will be wrong on all three counts:

“Additional sanctions would produce a better deal.”

Not true. Decades of sanctions against Iran didn’t force Iran to give up its nuclear program or convince Iranians to revolt. Additional sanctions will simply persuade Iran that negotiations are a waste of time and to conclude that the real western motive is “regime change.” This will provide it with a compelling enough motive to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

“Iran will be allowed to cheat.”

Why should this be so? Yes, Iran has cheated in the past but that was because the monitoring was weak. This isn’t a deal being made in the dead of night with casual drifters. This is an agreement that is being signed by six of the world’s great powers — the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, Britain and France — because they feel this is in the world’s interest. Do we assume they are idiots or what?

“A strengthened Iran will destabilize the Middle East.”

Again, why should this be so? Iran is a cultured, civilized country with a vibrant young population that wants to come in from the cold — in fact, they are insisting on it. If this process unfolds as outlined, why wouldn’t Iran become a positive force in the evolution of a region that we all know is clearly broken.

History is replete with self-serving politicians eager to show off their manhood by sending other people’s children to die in their name. They are all around us now, including here in Canada. Yet somehow, we miraculously survived the 20th century because enough people, eventually, said ‘no’ to them.

That challenge is no less urgent now, and this week’s historic breakthrough with Iran — because of its promise and in spite of its risks — can be a big step along that journey.

Tony Burman, former head of CBC News and Al Jazeera English, teaches journalism at Ryerson University. Reach him @TonyBurman or at tony.burman@gmail.com
 

mzkitty

I give up.
6m
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., says nuclear deal with Iran does not threaten survival of Israel - @Reuters
End of alert


:rolleyes:
 

mzkitty

I give up.
5m
Israeli PM Netanyahu urges US to seek better deal on Iran, will press American lawmakers to not give Tehran 'a free path to the bomb' - @Reuters
End of alert
 

mzkitty

I give up.
47m
On 'Meet the Press,' Netanyahu says of Iran deal: 'I think this deal is a dream deal for Iran and a nightmare deal for the world' - @eilperin

:dot5::dot5::dot5:
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150405/iran_nuclear-analysis-1950fe90f9.html

Analysis: Nuclear agreement risks projecting US weakness

Apr 5, 2:41 PM (ET)
By DAN PERRY

(AP) In this file photo taken Saturday, Aug. 30, 2014, Iranian President Hassan...
Full Image

CAIRO (AP) — On a basic level, the framework deal between world powers and Tehran will be judged by whether it prevents an Iranian bomb, but that will take years to figure out.

A more immediate issue is the projection of Western power. Supporters of the framework deal can argue that the U.S. and world powers extracted significant concessions from Iran, breaking a decade-long impasse and proving that diplomacy backed by tough sanctions can bring about positive change even in the Middle East.

But if, as critics contend, the agreement ends up projecting U.S. weakness instead, that could embolden rogue states and extremists alike, and make the region's vast array of challenges -- from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war to the fighting in Libya and Yemen -- even more impervious to Western intervention.

The United States wants to rein in Syria's President Bashar Assad as his ruinous civil war grinds into year five. It would like to encourage more liberal domestic policies in Egypt and push Iraq's leaders to govern more inclusively. Despite years of setbacks, the U.S. would still like to see a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

(AP) In this file photo taken Friday April 3, 2015, Iranian President Hassan...
Full Image

But if leaders in those places read the fine print of the agreement the U.S. and other world powers hope to reach with Iran by June 30 and conclude that they were duped or have flinched, these leaders will be less likely to give in to pressure in the future, rendering the Iran agreement a lonely foreign policy achievement clouded by the region's chaos.

The implications may first be seen in Iran itself. If the agreement leads to acceptance of Iran's theocracy, hard-liners could feel less pressure to curb their support of regional militant groups and crack down even harder on dissent at home. They would be flush with cash from the lifting of sanctions and emboldened in their confidence that the West will turn a blind eye.

Alternatively, the deal could mark a major victory for President Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate, and a broader rapprochement could bring about a Persian glasnost of sorts that leads to democratic reform.

Whichever direction Iran goes will have wide-ranging implications for the rest of the region. Iran backs powerful Shiite proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It also has supported the Palestinian Hamas, the Sunni Islamists who rule Gaza. Sunni powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia fear and distrust Iran and have warned of a regional arms race if it becomes a threshold nuclear weapons state. Saudi-led warplanes are bombing the Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen, who are supported by Iran, though both Tehran and the rebels deny it arms them.

The implications of a weak United States, meanwhile, are not just regional but global, affecting events from Russia to China and North Korea — as well as the prospects for global accords on climate change or even significant trade deals.

(AP) In this Monday, June 10, 2013, photo, Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani,...
Full Image

Many of these questions will only be answered by the final agreement, assuming there is one. For now, both sides are presenting the framework accord as a major accomplishment.

On one hand, Iran accepted limits on its enrichment levels and centrifuge numbers to prevent the accumulation of weapons-grade material for a decade or more. "Breakout time" to a bomb would be extended from mere months to a year or more.

But on the other, its right to enrich uranium would be enshrined, its facilities would remain in place, the sanctions would be lifted and a sort of legitimacy bestowed.

Critics in Israel and elsewhere cannot understand why world powers, who could afford to play for time, did not squeeze Iran by presenting it with a mind-clearing choice between having a nuclear program and having an economy. They never believed Iran's claims that — with oil in generous supply — it was investing such effort for nuclear energy and research. They expect Iran's energies to now focus on fooling the inspectors and developing a bomb.

That won't be easy. Under the framework deal the U.N. nuclear agency would have substantially more authority than it has had in the past. The fact sheet issued by the U.S. says Iran has agreed to grant inspectors more intrusive access to both declared and undeclared facilities — access that may not be "anytime, anywhere," but goes far beyond anything that was in place when weapons were developed by India, Pakistan, North Korea — and Israel.

(AP) In this file photo taken Thursday, April 2, 2015, from left, EU High...
Full Image

Supporters of the deal argue that any risks that may remain are preferable to war. Implied is the admission that a global consensus on tougher sanctions to force Iran to its knees was unattainable -- Russia, China and even India could not necessarily be corralled. That would leave armed force, never taken off the table, as the only remaining option.

Some also note that viewing Iran as an implacable regional menace is simplistic. Iran backs groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which the West views as terrorist organizations, but it is also training and supporting Shiite militias battling the Islamic State group in Iraq, where Washington and Tehran have found themselves on the same side of the conflict.

Washington's bridled ambitions are understandable given its recent failures in the region. Both Afghanistan and Iraq are still at war more than a decade after the U.S.-led invasions. The Islamic State group, an al-Qaida breakaway, controls a third of both Syria and Iraq. A NATO intervention helped topple dictator Moammar Gadhafi, but Libya today is a failed state in the grip of rival militias and jihadi groups. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in shambles.

One senses, beyond the specifics of the Iran deal, an implied admission by the global powers: there is a limit to countries' ability to interfere with one another, however interdependent the world may be.

Ironically, it is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — the most outspoken opponent of the Iran deal — who might have reason to appreciate this kind of humility. Recently re-elected and at odds with the White House, Netanyahu faces a global clamor to end the West Bank settlement project and enable the creation of a Palestinian state. If the United States and other powers got serious about enforcing their will on other countries, Israel could be no less a candidate than Iran.

---

George Jahn contributed to this report from Lausanne, Switzerland. Follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/georgejahn

---

Dan Perry is AP's Middle East editor leading text coverage in the region. Follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/perry_dan
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russia-nervously-eyes-us-iran-deal

Russia Nervously Eyes the U.S.-Iran Deal
Geopolitical Weekly
April 7, 2015 | 07:55 GMT
By Reva Bhalla

When a group of weary diplomats announced a framework for an Iranian nuclear accord last week in Lausanne, there was one diplomat in the mix whose feigned enthusiasm was hard to miss. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov left the talks at their most critical point March 30, much to the annoyance of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who apparently had to call him personally to persuade him to return. Even as Lavrov spoke positively to journalists about the negotiations throughout the week, he still seemed to have better things to do than pull all-nighters for a deal that effectively gives the United States one less problem to worry about in the Middle East and a greater capacity to focus on the Russian periphery.

Russia has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed Iran in the neighborhood, but the mere threat of an unshackled Iranian nuclear program and a hostile relationship between Washington and Tehran provided just the level of distraction Moscow needed to keep the United States from committing serious attention to Russia's former Soviet sphere.

Russia tried its best to keep the Americans and Iranians apart. Offers to sell Iran advanced air defense systems were designed to poke holes in U.S. threats to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Teams of Russian nuclear experts whetted Iran's appetite for civilian nuclear power with offers to build additional power reactors. Russian banks did their part to help Iran circumvent financial sanctions. The Russian plan all along was not to help Iran get the bomb, but to use its leverage with a thorny player in the Middle East to get the United States into a negotiation on issues vital to Russia's national security interests. So, if Washington wanted to resolve its Iran problem, it would have to pull back on issues like ballistic missile defense in Central Europe, which Moscow saw early on as the first of several U.S. steps to encircle Russia.

Things obviously did not work according to the Russian plan. As we anticipated, the United States and Iran ultimately came together in a bilateral negotiation to resolve their main differences. Now the United States and Iran are on a path toward normalization at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying simultaneously to defend against a U.S.-led military alliance building along Russia's European frontier and to manage an economic crisis and power struggle at home. And the situation does not look any better for Russia on the energy front.
Russia Stands to Lose Energy Revenue

The likelihood of the United States and Iran reaching a deal this summer means that additional barrels of Iranian oil eventually will make their way to the market, further depressing the price of oil, as well as the Russian ruble. To be clear, Iranian oil is not going to flood the market instantaneously with the signing of a deal. Iran is believed to have as much as 35 million barrels of crude in storage that it could offload quickly once export sanctions are terminated by the Europeans and eased by the United States via presidential waiver. But Iran will face complications in trying to bring its mature fields back online. Enhanced recovery techniques to revive mothballed fields take money and infrastructure, which is difficult to apply when oil prices are hovering around $50 per barrel. Under current conditions, Iran can bring some 400,000-500,000 barrels per day back online over the course of a year, but this will be a gradual process as Iran vies for foreign investment in its dilapidated energy sector.

U.S. investors will likely remain shackled by the core Iran Sanctions Act until at least the end of 2016, when the legislation is set to expire. However, European and Asian investors will be among the first to begin repairing Iran's oil fields, as long as Iran does its part in improving contractual terms and the economics make sense for firms already cutting back their capital expenditures.
Europe's New Options

The rehabilitation of Iran's energy sector, however gradual a process that may be, will complicate Russia's uphill battle in trying to maintain its energy leverage over Europe. Russia is a critical supplier of energy to Europe, currently providing about 29 percent and 37 percent of Europe's natural gas and oil needs, respectively. An additional 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas available for export from the United States within the next five years will not be able to compete with Russia on price due to the low operational and transport costs of Russian natural gas. Even so, the United States will still be creating more supply in the natural gas market overall to give Europe the option of paying more for its energy security should the political considerations outweigh the economic cost. The Baltic states are already working toward this option, with Lithuania taking the lead in creating a mini-liquefied natural gas hub for the region to try to reduce, if not eliminate, Baltic dependence on Russia. This year, Poland is debuting its own LNG facility, and the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana is scheduled to bring the first LNG exports from the Lower 48 to market, with shipments already contracted for Asia.

In Southern Europe, the picture for Russia is more complicated but still distressing. Aside from the significant issue of cost for energy companies already cutting their capital expenditures, Turkey's veto on the transit of LNG tankers through the Bosporus effectively neutralizes any LNG import facility project on the Black Sea. But Europe is proceeding apace with the much more economically palatable option of building pipeline interconnectors across southeastern Europe. This does little to dilute Russia's control over energy supply, but it does strip Moscow of its ability to politicize pricing in Europe. Pipeline politics in Europe have allowed Russia to reward — and punish — its Eastern European neighbors through pricing contracts. However, Brussels is more thoroughly examining contracts signed by EU member states for this very reason and in line with one of the main tenets of the EU's Third Energy Package, which seeks to break monopolies by splitting energy production and transmission and to implement fair pricing. Meanwhile, the construction of interconnectors allows member states to influence pricing downstream from Russia.

This gambit has been on display over the past year in Ukraine. Kiev depended heavily on its neighbors in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary for reverse flows of Russian natural gas at discounted rates to stand up to Russia's energy swaggering. Though Russian natural gas will still be flowing primarily through these pipelines, the expansion of interconnectors will open up options for non-Russian natural gas from the North Sea and from LNG terminals in Northern Europe to make their way southward to embattled frontline states such as Ukraine.

ukraine-gas-compass.jpg

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa.../images/ukraine-gas-compass.jpg?itok=ZZL1vK9V

Russia thought it would be able to keep a hook in Southern Europe through the construction of South Stream, a mammoth pipeline project with a $30 billion price tag and 63-bcm capacity that sought to cut Ukraine out of the equation by moving natural gas across the Black Sea and through the Balkans and Central Europe. The combination of plunging energy prices and growing EU resistance to another pipeline that would allow Russia to draw political favors sent this project to the graveyard, but Russia had a backup plan. The Turkish Stream pipeline would make landfall in Turkey after crossing the Black Sea, before using the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline to feed Southern Europe through the web of interconnectors and pipelines already in development. On the surface, Moscow's plan appears quite brilliant: Use the very infrastructure that Europe was already counting on to diversify away from Russia and then, when the political skirmishing over Ukraine eventually settles down, reinsert itself into Europe's energy mix via a willing partner like Turkey.

Post-South Stream Options
europe_russia_pipelines_0.jpg

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...s/europe_russia_pipelines_0.jpg?itok=-nG_3hlG
Click to Enlarge

But the plan remains full of holes. Someone needs to pay for the main pipeline expansion between Russia and Turkey, and both countries will struggle to find private investors in this geopolitical and pricing climate. Moreover, there is no indication that the Europeans will be willing to take additional Russian natural gas from a yet-to-be-built Turkish Stream when a perfectly good pipeline running from Russia to Eastern Europe already exists. Russia does not have the option of refusing natural gas shipments when it is already desperate for those energy revenues. In the end, this is a Russian bluff that the Europeans will not be afraid to call. When Putin agreed to a three-month natural gas deal with Ukraine last week (with a huge discount to boot, at $247.20 per thousand cubic meters), he likely did so realizing that Russia playing hardball with Ukraine on energy would only spur further investment and construction into pipelines and connectors in southeastern Europe that would accelerate the decline of Russia's energy influence in Europe. The best he can hope for is to slow that timeline down.

Not only will Russia's pricing leverage wane in Europe over the long term, but its influence on Europe's energy supply also will decrease over the longer run. Azerbaijan was the first southern corridor supplier to Europe circumventing Russia and is now expanding that role by bringing natural gas from its Shah Deniz II offshore fields online for export. Turkmenistan is still vulnerable to Russian meddling but has been increasingly willing to host Turkish and European investors looking to build a pipeline across the Caspian to feed Europe. Whether these talks translate into action will depend on the Turkmen government's political will to stand up to Moscow, not to mention legal battles over the Caspian Sea. But while the lengthy courting of Ashgabat by the West continues, a rehabilitated Iran is now the latest addition to the list to join the southern corridor.
Russia's Influence Wanes in the Middle East

Just a day after the Iranian nuclear framework deal was announced, Russia's state-owned RIA Novosti published a story quoting Igor Korotchenko, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, as saying it would be a "perfectly logical development" for Russia to follow through on a sale of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran if the embargo is lifted. Korotchenko noted that specifications to the deal would have to be made as "the United States is watching very closely" to whom Russia sells these weapons. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also made a point to say the U.N. arms embargo against Iran should be lifted as part of the nuclear deal. These well-timed statements likely caught Washington's eye but probably did little to impress. The S-300 threat mattered a lot more when the United States needed to maintain a credible military deterrent against Iran. If the United States and Iran reach an understanding that neutralizes that threat through political means, Russian talk of S-300s is mostly hot air.

This was a small, yet revealing illustration of Russia's declining position in the Middle East. For many years, the Middle East was a rose garden for the Russians, filled with both sweet-smelling opportunities to lure Washington into negotiations and ample thorns to prick their American adversary when the need arose. Russia's support for the Syrian government is still relevant, and Moscow will continue to court countries in the region with arms deals out of both political and economic necessity. Even so, bringing down the Syrian government is not on Washington's to-do list, and countries like Egypt will still end up prioritizing their relationship with the United States in the end.

Russia's influence in the Middle East is fading rapidly at the same time Europe is starting to wriggle out of Russia's energy grip. And as Russia's options are narrowing, U.S. options are multiplying in both the Middle East and Europe. This is an uncomfortable situation for Putin, to be sure. But a narrow set of options for Russia in its near abroad does not make those options any less concerning for the United States as the standoff between Washington and Moscow continues.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://spectator.org/articles/62316/iran-‘agreement’-charade

A Further Perspective
The Iran ‘Agreement’ Charade

Comparing Obama to Chamberlain is unfair — to Chamberlain.

By Thomas Sowell – 4.7.15

By abandoning virtually all its demands for serious restrictions on Iran’s nuclear bomb program, the Obama administration has apparently achieved the semblance of a preliminary introduction to the beginning of a tentative framework for a possible hope of an eventual agreement with Iran.

But even this hazy “achievement” may vanish like a mirage. It takes two to agree — and Iran has already publicly disputed and even mocked what President Obama says is the nature of that framework.

Had Iran wholeheartedly agreed with everything the Obama administration said, that agreement would still have been worthless, since Iran has already blocked international inspectors from its nuclear facilities at unpredictable times. The appearance of international control is more dangerous than a frank admission that we don’t really know what they are doing.

Why then all these negotiations? Because these charades protect Barack Obama politically, no matter how much danger they create for America and the world. The latest public opinion polls show Obama’s approval rating rising. In political terms — the only terms that matter to him — his foreign policy has been a success.

If you look back through history, you will be hard pressed to find a leader of any democratic nation so universally popular — hailed enthusiastically by opposition parties as well as his own — as was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when he returned from Munich in 1938, waving an agreement with Hitler’s signature on it, and proclaiming “Peace for our time.”

Who cared that he had thrown a small country to the Nazi wolves, in order to get a worthless agreement with Hitler? It looked great at the time because it had apparently avoided war.

Now Barack Obama seems ready to repeat that political triumph by throwing another small country — Israel this time — to the wolves, for the sake of another worthless agreement.

Back in 1938, Winston Churchill was one of the very few critics who tried to warn Chamberlain and the British public. Churchill said: “The idea that safety can be purchased by throwing a small State to the wolves is a fatal delusion.”

After the ruinous agreement was made with Hitler, he said: “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war.” Chamberlain’s “Peace for our time” lasted just under a year.

Comparing Obama to Chamberlain is unfair — to Chamberlain. There is no question that the British prime minister loved his country and pursued its best interests as he saw it. He was not a “citizen of the world,” or worse. Chamberlain was building up his country’s military forces, not tearing them down, as Barack Obama has been doing with American military forces.

Secretary of State John Kerry, and other members of the Obama administration, are saying that the alternative to an agreement with Iran is war. But when Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactors, back in 1981, Iraq did not declare war on Israel. It would have been suicidal to do so, since Israel already had nuclear bombs.

There was a time when either Israel or the United States could have destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities, with far less risk of war than there will be after Iran already has its own stockpile of nuclear bombs. Indeed, the choice then will no longer be between a nuclear Iran and war. The choice may be between surrender to Iran and nuclear devastation.

Barack Obama dismissed the thought of America being vulnerable to “a small country” like Iran. Iran is in fact larger than Japan was when it attacked Pearl Harbor, and Iran has a larger population. If Japan had nuclear bombs, World War II could have turned out very differently.

If anyone examines the hard, cold facts about the Obama administration’s actions and inactions in the Middle East from the beginning, it is far more difficult to reconcile those actions and inactions with a belief that Obama was trying to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons than it is to reconcile those facts with his trying to stop Israel from stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

This latest “agreement” with Iran — with which Iran has publicly and loudly disagreed — is only the latest episode in that political charad
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:siren:

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-06/corker-obama-doctrine-means-abandoning-middle-east

Declassified
Corker: 'Obama Doctrine' Means Abandoning Middle East
29 Apr 6, 2015 2:03 PM EDT
By Josh Rogin
Comments 29

President Barack Obama finally got his framework nuclear deal with Iran, and now has to convince Congress to back off its demand for an up-or-down vote on the final package. Its going to be a tough sell: As of now, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee doesn’t even agree with Obama on what the deal will mean for the region and the world.

In an interview with me last week, before the Obama administration announced the breakthrough between Iran and six major world powers, Republican Senator Bob Corker said he had figured out the overarching objectives of the president’s various moves in the Middle East, including not just Obama’s drive to get a deal with Iran but also his reluctance to get involved in Syria and his treatment of Arab allies and Israel. Corker said Obama just wants to get out of the region.

“It’s become very evident as to what the administration is doing relative to the Middle East,” Corker said. “The administration’s view is that in order to extract ourselves in the Middle East, we need to move away from our relationship from Israel and we need to more fully align ourselves with Iran, so we create this balance in the Middle East between Iran and its influence and the Arab Sunni influence in the region.” He added: “That seems to be our strategy. And that’s what’s creating all of this turmoil in the region.”

According to Corker, the Iran deal is the lynchpin of Obama’s drive to change the balance of power in Iran’s favor and then remove America’s role from the region. But he said Obama’s plan was fatally flawed because Iran has no intention of reforming. “The P5+1 discussions are central to that,” Corker said. “The problem with that today, the fact is, Iran hasn’t changed its behavior. That’s why you see so much of what’s happening in the Middle East.”


Obama and Corker have been trying to work together as the Iran negotiations enter their final phase. Corker plans to move forward with his legislation that would mandate a 60-day review period before any deal Obama signs with Iran could go into effect. The White House has promised to veto that bill, but Obama said in an interview with the New York Times’s Thomas L. Friedman that he was open to working with Corker on a rewrite that would allow Congress to express its views but that would not impinge on the presidential prerogative to make foreign policy.

In the Times interview, Obama said that the Iran pact, if it materializes, will be a good deal even if Iran doesn’t change its behavior. But he added that he hopes a deal will turn the page both inside Iran and in the U.S.-Iran relationship. “I’ve been very clear that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch, and I think they should understand that we mean it,” Obama said. “But I say that hoping that we can conclude this diplomatic arrangement -- and that it ushers a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations -- and, just as importantly, over time, a new era in Iranian relations with its neighbors.”

Obama defined his own doctrine as: “We will engage, but we preserve all our capabilities.” American core concerns in the region no longer include oil or territory or strategic interests, the president said. “Our interests in this sense are really just making sure that the region is working,” he said. “And if it’s working well, then we’ll do fine.”

In regard to Israel and the Arab states, Obama denied that he is moving away from them at all. He did say that Sunni Arab countries have to do more to reform politically and respond to the concerns of their people. “When it comes to external aggression, I think we are going to be there for our friends,” said Obama. “But I think the biggest threats that they face may not be coming from Iran invading. It’s going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries.”

Corker has been more moderate on the Iran talks than most of his Republican colleagues. He declined add his name to the letter that 47 of them sent to the Iranian regime promising to scuttle any deal after Obama leaves office. He has been working with Democrats including Robert Menendez and Tim Kaine to craft legislation that will get broad bipartisan support.

But Corker and Obama fundamentally disagree on the impact a nuclear Iran deal will have on the region; Obama thinks it will be helpful, Corker thinks it could be catastrophic. Before Obama will be able to convince Congress to trust him on a deal he says will prevent Iran from getting the nuclear bomb, he will have to convince the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that their views of how the deal will affect the world can mesh.

To contact the author on this story:
Josh Rogin at joshrogin@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor on this story:
Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-iran-deal-and-its-consequences-1428447582

Opinion

The Iran Deal and Its Consequences

Mixing shrewd diplomacy with defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has turned the negotiation on its head.

By Henry Kissinger And George P. Shultz
Updated April 7, 2015 7:38 p.m. ET
863 COMMENTS

The announced framework for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to generate a seminal national debate. Advocates exult over the nuclear constraints it would impose on Iran. Critics question the verifiability of these constraints and their longer-term impact on regional and world stability. The historic significance of the agreement and indeed its sustainability depend on whether these emotions, valid by themselves, can be reconciled.

Debate regarding technical details of the deal has thus far inhibited the soul-searching necessary regarding its deeper implications. For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests—and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability, albeit short of its full capacity in the first 10 years.

Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head. Iran’s centrifuges have multiplied from about 100 at the beginning of the negotiation to almost 20,000 today. The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer.

Inspections and Enforcement

The president deserves respect for the commitment with which he has pursued the objective of reducing nuclear peril, as does Secretary of State John Kerry for the persistence, patience and ingenuity with which he has striven to impose significant constraints on Iran’s nuclear program.

Progress has been made on shrinking the size of Iran’s enriched stockpile, confining the enrichment of uranium to one facility, and limiting aspects of the enrichment process. Still, the ultimate significance of the framework will depend on its verifiability and enforceability.

Negotiating the final agreement will be extremely challenging. For one thing, no official text has yet been published. The so-called framework represents a unilateral American interpretation. Some of its clauses have been dismissed by the principal Iranian negotiator as “spin.” A joint EU-Iran statement differs in important respects, especially with regard to the lifting of sanctions and permitted research and development.

Comparable ambiguities apply to the one-year window for a presumed Iranian breakout. Emerging at a relatively late stage in the negotiation, this concept replaced the previous baseline—that Iran might be permitted a technical capacity compatible with a plausible civilian nuclear program. The new approach complicates verification and makes it more political because of the vagueness of the criteria.

Under the new approach, Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product to achieve the proposed constraints. It only places them under temporary restriction and safeguard—amounting in many cases to a seal at the door of a depot or periodic visits by inspectors to declared sites. The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?

In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect. Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance—or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue. The experience of Iran’s work on a heavy-water reactor during the “interim agreement” period—when suspect activity was identified but played down in the interest of a positive negotiating atmosphere—is not encouraging.

Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event. More likely it will occur, if it does, via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions.

When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?

The agreement’s primary enforcement mechanism, the threat of renewed sanctions, emphasizes a broad-based asymmetry, which provides Iran permanent relief from sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints on Iranian conduct. Undertaking the “snap-back” of sanctions is unlikely to be as clear or as automatic as the phrase implies. Iran is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the most effective sanctions will require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt “snap-back.” If the follow-on process does not unambiguously define the term, an attempt to reimpose sanctions risks primarily isolating America, not Iran.

The gradual expiration of the framework agreement, beginning in a decade, will enable Iran to become a significant nuclear, industrial and military power after that time—in the scope and sophistication of its nuclear program and its latent capacity to weaponize at a time of its choosing. Limits on Iran’s research and development have not been publicly disclosed (or perhaps agreed). Therefore Iran will be in a position to bolster its advanced nuclear technology during the period of the agreement and rapidly deploy more advanced centrifuges—of at least five times the capacity of the current model—after the agreement expires or is broken.

The follow-on negotiations must carefully address a number of key issues, including the mechanism for reducing Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 to 300 kilograms, the scale of uranium enrichment after 10 years, and the IAEA’s concerns regarding previous Iranian weapons efforts. The ability to resolve these and similar issues should determine the decision over whether or when the U.S. might still walk away from the negotiations.

The Framework Agreement and Long-Term Deterrence


Even when these issues are resolved, another set of problems emerges because the negotiating process has created its own realities. The interim agreement accepted Iranian enrichment; the new agreement makes it an integral part of the architecture. For the U.S., a decade-long restriction on Iran’s nuclear capacity is a possibly hopeful interlude. For Iran’s neighbors—who perceive their imperatives in terms of millennial rivalries—it is a dangerous prelude to an even more dangerous permanent fact of life. Some of the chief actors in the Middle East are likely to view the U.S. as willing to concede a nuclear military capability to the country they consider their principal threat. Several will insist on at least an equivalent capability. Saudi Arabia has signaled that it will enter the lists; others are likely to follow. In that sense, the implications of the negotiation are irreversible.

If the Middle East is “proliferated” and becomes host to a plethora of nuclear-threshold states, several in mortal rivalry with each other, on what concept of nuclear deterrence or strategic stability will international security be based? Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?

Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?

Some have suggested the U.S. can dissuade Iran’s neighbors from developing individual deterrent capacities by extending an American nuclear umbrella to them. But how will these guarantees be defined? What factors will govern their implementation? Are the guarantees extended against the use of nuclear weapons—or against any military attack, conventional or nuclear? Is it the domination by Iran that we oppose or the method for achieving it? What if nuclear weapons are employed as psychological blackmail? And how will such guarantees be expressed, or reconciled with public opinion and constitutional practices?

Regional Order


For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of Iran’s 3½ decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.

But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are remotely near such an understanding. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its Supreme Leader) continue to profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means.

The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.

Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s or Libya’s?

Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies will conclude that the U.S. has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional balance?

Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance of power theory suggests the need to bolster the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in America’s strategic interest to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its catastrophic consequences. Nuclear arms must not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel deepening American involvement.

If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the U.S. must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the international community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability to destabilize the Middle East and challenge the broader international order.

Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the projected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.


Messrs. Kissinger and Shultz are former secretaries of state.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.independent.ie/world-news/iran-calls-for-timetable-to-disarm-31128720.html

Iran calls for timetable to disarm

Published
09/04/2015 | 02:41

Iran has accused Britain and the United Nations' other nuclear-armed powers of failing to take concrete action to eliminate their stockpiles and called for talks to achieve disarmament by a target date.

Iran's deputy UN ambassador Gholam Hossein Dehghani told the world body's Disarmament Commission that "a comprehensive, binding, irreversible, verifiable" treaty was the most effective and practical way to eliminate nuclear weapons.

He accused the nuclear powers - the US, Russia, China, Britain and France - of promising nuclear disarmament, but making no significant progress.

Mr Dehghani's speech came days after the announcement of a framework agreement between Iran and the five nuclear powers and Germany aimed at keeping Tehran from being able to develop a nuclear weapon. It has to be finalised by June 30.

The commission, which includes all 193 member states, is supposed to make recommendations in the field of disarmament, but has failed to make substantive proposals in the past decade.

Its three-week meeting is taking place ahead of the five-year review of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the world's single most important pact on nuclear arms, which begins on April 27.

The NPT is credited with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to dozens of nations since entering into force in 1970. It has done that via a grand global bargain: nations without nuclear weapons committed not to acquire them; those with them committed to move towards their elimination; and all endorsed everyone's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

Mr Dehghani said that as a non-nuclear weapon state and NPT member, Iran believed it was time to end the incremental approach towards disarmament and to start negotiations with all nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states on a convention that would set a deadline for ridding the world of the warheads.

He noted that a proposal in 2013 by the Nonaligned Movement, which represents more than 100 developing countries, to start talks on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament gained wide support.

Russia said President Vladimir Putin had confirmed that Moscow was ready for a serious and substantive dialogue on nuclear disarmament.

But Olga Kuznetsova, a counsellor in Russia's Foreign Ministry, warned in a speech on Tuesday that the US deployment of a global missile defence system could lead to the resumption of a nuclear arms race.

The only way to change the situation, she said, is for states that pursue anti-missile capabilities follow the "universal principle" of not trying to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states.

Ms Kuznetsova also warned that development of high-precision non-nuclear weapons threatened "strategic parity" between the two nuclear powers and could lead to "global destabilisation of (the) international situation in general."

Chinese counsellor Sun Lei urged countries to "abandon Cold War mentality" and said those with the largest nuclear arsenals should be the first to make "drastic and substantive" cuts in their nuclear weapons.

Ukraine's representative called for the urgent development of a binding agreement that would give assurances to countries without nuclear weapons that they will not be threatened by nuclear weapons. Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi echoed that call.

The United States said the negotiation of a treaty that would cap available fissile material "is the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda". John Bravaco said the US has not produced fissile material for nuclear weapons since 1989.

North Korea's deputy UN ambassador An Myong Hun declared that "our nuclear forces are the life and soul of our nation" and would not be given up as long as nuclear threats remained in the world.

Press Association
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Israel News Feed @IsraelHatzolah · 2h 2 hours ago

BREAKING NEWS: President Rouhani says Iran will never sign a final nuclear agreement with major powers unless all sanctions lifted


Sputnik @SputnikInt · 56m 56 minutes ago

#Iran to refuse to sign nuclear agreement if #sanctions not fully lifted http://sptnkne.ws/csR


posted for fair use


Iran Refuses to Sign Nuclear Deal Unless Sanctions Fully Lifted - Rouhani
© AP Photo/ Vahid Salemi

09:33 09.04.2015(updated 10:19 09.04.2015) Get short URL

Tehran will not sign the final agreement on its nuclear program reached by the P5+1 group if all sanctions are not lifted, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said.

MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Tehran will refuse to sign the final agreement on its nuclear program reached by the P5+1 Group if sanctions against Iran are not fully lifted, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Thursday.

“Iran will not sign the nuclear agreement with the largest powers (P5+1) if all sanctions are not lifted,” Rouhani told Iran’s PressTV.

The deadline for the final comprehensive agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group, comprising United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and Germany, is set for June 30.

Last week, Tehran agreed to cut back its uranium enrichment and decrease the number of centrifuges in the country as part of a framework deal with the P5+1 group after the marathon talks in Switzerland.

Under the deal, The United Sates, the European Union and the UN Security Council agreed to lift their nuclear-related sanctions following verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency of Tehran's implementation of the agreements.

Sanctions imposed on Iran, amid allegations that Tehran was trying to hide from from the international community its development of a nuclear weapon, have been in place for years, though Iran reiterated its nuclear energy program is entirely peaceful.

http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150409/1020649948.html?utm_source=t.co%2F4wd6aJ2BKW&utm_medium=short_url&utm_content=csR&utm_campaign=URL_shortening
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtonpost.com/busin...c2884a-defa-11e4-be40-566e2653afe5_story.html

Economy

Obama’s goal to make a deal with Iran gets a new test in Congress

By Steven Mufson and Greg Jaffe April 13 at 7:33 PM
Comments 10

President Obama’s quest to get a deal with Iran on its nuclear program hinges on not only reaching across the aisle in Congress but also across oceans to find common ground with enemies.

That strategy — which links two themes that have dominated his presidency, a yearning for post-partisan politics and a belief in engagement — receives a new test Tuesday as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins debate on a bill that would severely restrict Obama’s ability to cut a nuclear arms deal with Iran.

The bill would force him to send an Iran accord to Congress for approval and require Tehran to renounce terrorism. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said Monday that Obama would veto such a bill.

The issue of Iran has pushed Obama’s core principles to the limits on two fronts. His overtures to Iran have inflamed *already-simmering partisan politics at home. Abroad, they have tested his broader theory of engagement, straining relations with U.S. allies without any guarantee of easing sectarian fighting that appears to be spinning out of control throughout the Middle East.

Success may be close, but failure looms almost everywhere.

Even if the Iran deal holds, the result will lack the pomp and promise that mark some of the historic foreign policy of the past, such as President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to China. There will be no equivalent of Nixon’s walk on the Great Wall or banquet in the Great Hall of the People. Obama will not stroll through the ruins of Persepolis or dine in Qom.

“The big disappointment for Obama is what he was hoping would be his signature foreign policy agreement, even if he gets a deal, will be one that generates enormous opposition abroad and political discord at home,” said Richard H. Solomon, former president of the U.S. Institute of Peace and a former U.S. ambassador who worked with *then-national security adviser Henry Kissinger on Nixon’s trip to China. “Internationally, it’s going to mean further gaps and tensions, not just with the Israelis, but with a number of the Sunni states.”

Despite Republican victories in November, Obama began his presidency’s seventh year with high hopes and an impassioned plea for what he called a “better politics” to replace the partisan divisions that have marked much of his time in office.

“Imagine if we broke out of these tired old patterns,” Obama told lawmakers at his State of the Union address in January. “Imagine if we did something different.”

As a deadline on Iran talks neared, Republicans did, indeed, produce something “different” — an open letter, signed by 47 GOP senators, that sought to undermine the talks by warning that a future president or Congress could undo any nuclear deal.

Now, Obama has stopped talking about a “better politics.”

Even as the administration works to resolve contentious details before a June 30 deadline for the Iran negotiations, the White House will be scrambling simultaneously to stop or alter legislation that could prompt the Iranians to back out of the deal.

The biggest worry is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee bill, sponsored by committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.). Obama has praised Corker as “a good and decent man” and spoke with him by phone Wednesday as part of an effort to find common ground. Some Democrats want to strip the terrorism portion out of the bill, but some Republicans would go even further. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a presidential candidate, would demand that Iran explicitly recognize Israel’s right to exist.

If Obama’s outreach to Congress fails, it could doom the Iran accord and extend bitter partisan infighting far beyond “the water’s edge,” where, in the mid-1940s, Republican Sen. Arthur Vandenberg famously said it should end. “Essentially we would have 535 secretaries of state,” Earnest said . “Not just one.”

Such an outcome would damage not only relations with Iran, but with Britain, France and Germany — members of a group that also includes Russia and China and that has been negotiating alongside the United States. “The impact on alliance structure would be devastating,” said Charles W. Freeman, Jr., former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and a veteran diplomat. “Who would trust us after that?”

The coming months will also test Obama’s broader world view that “principled” engagement — even with America’s longest-standing enemies such as Cuba and Burma, also called Myanmar — can produce sweeping change. “I believe that engagement is a more powerful force than isolation,” he said of Cuba during a stop in Jamaica on Thursday.

It is a view born in part of Obama’s criticism of President George W. Bush’s strategy of removing dictators by force, in the hope that democratic leaders, with help from the United States, would come forward.

On Iran, Obama has navigated this issue carefully, saying the framework deal was primarily about stopping Iran from producing a nuclear weapon and heading off an arms race in one of the most unstable regions of the world.

But he also has voiced repeatedly the hope that an Iran free of sanctions and open to Western investment would change, spending more money on improving living standards and less on destabilizing proxy militias and terrorist groups.

In the near term, though, the nuclear deal seems just as likely to increase tribal infighting between Iran and America’s allies abroad.

Saudi Arabia remains deeply suspicious of Iranian intentions. Before the framework was complete, a former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, warned that a flawed deal could spark a global nuclear arms race. In early March, Kerry traveled to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, to calm nerves, assuring Saudi leaders that the nuclear deal would not mean a U.S. rapprochement with Iran — and that the old divisions Obama once talked about overcoming would remain comfortably and familiarly intact.

Obama has begun providing weapons and intelligence to help Saudi Arabia in its battle against Iranian-supported Houthi fighters in Yemen. Last week, the Pentagon said that it would expedite weapons deliveries to the Saudis and that it was using air-refueling planes to support the Saudi-led coalition conducting airstrikes in Yemen.

In return, Saudi Arabia has given the nuclear deal tepid support. The state news agency said that the kingdom’s council of ministers “expressed hope for attaining a binding and definitive agreement” and stressed a need for “good neighborliness and non-interference in the affairs of Arab states.”

The statement hinted at an important question: How far will U.S. engagement go? Should the technical details of an agreement be linked to understandings about Iran’s conduct in the region — where it lends support to allies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Iraqi government and Houthi rebels while questioning Israel’s right to exist?

Obama has said that those sorts of demands would torpedo the preliminary deal.

Instead, the president, as part of his overseas sales job, has promised to bolster security assistance to America’s Arab allies so that they can better defend themselves against what he said are some “very real external threats.” By that, Obama principally means Iran. He has also vowed new efforts to make sure that the Israeli people are “absolutely protected.”

At the same time, the president hopes that Iran will keep at home whatever money it gets from a full or partial lifting of economic sanctions. Some critics doubt that will be the case.

“I mean it’s an authoritarian regime,” said Tamara Cofman Wittes a former top Obama administration State Department official and director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. “It has never focused on its people and sanctions relief won’t change it.”

The extra money that comes from lifting sanctions would give Iran more resources to fund proxy fighters and terror groups.

“It is much more likely that Iran will react to a nuclear deal by acting more aggressively in other domains,” Wittes said, adding that such an outcome doesn’t mean the nuclear deal is a bad idea. Rather, she said, it puts new pressure on the Obama administration to articulate a clearer vision for how it plans to counter Hezbollah and Iranian influence, especially in Syria where critics have said that the administration lacks a coherent strategy.

“It really matters that the administration has to be willing to up its game in the region,” Wittes said.


Steven Mufson covers the White House. Since joining The Post, he has covered economics, China, foreign policy and energy.

Greg Jaffe covers the White House for The Washington Post, where he has been since March 2009.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Conflict News @rConflictNews · 1h 1 hour ago

BREAKING: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes 19-0 to give congress final say on Nuclear deal with Iran - @News_Executive


ETA: hmmmm
full article at link: http://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-p...LEFTTopStories

White House Says Obama Would Sign New Iran Bill
Bipartisan compromise legislation would shorten congressional review of Iran nuclear deal
By
Kristina Peterson and
Siobhan Hughes
Updated April 14, 2015 5:32 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday approved legislation requiring President Barack Obama to send a final nuclear deal with Iran to Congress for review after adjusting the bill to make it more palatable to many Democrats.

(full article at link) http://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-p...LEFTTopStories
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...tmare-nuclear-arms-race-the-middle-east-12627

The Ultimate Nightmare: A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East[1]

"The Iran deal may present a 15-year breathing space, but the negotiating parties (the P5+1) cannot afford to rest on their laurels."


John Carlson [2] [3]

If the framework announced in Switzerland on April 2 regarding Iran's nuclear program and detailed in a US State Department Fact Sheet [4] is successfully carried forward to an agreed Plan of Action (due to be concluded by June 30), it will be a major achievement.

But it should not be seen as the end of the process. It is a definitive step, but it will need to be followed by a number of concrete actions before we can consider that the Iranian nuclear problem has been resolved.

If the deal is agreed in June, and if it is faithfully implemented, it will give all parties – Iran, its neighbors, and the wider international community – 15 years of breathing space. It is essential to use this time effectively to ensure the deal doesn't just kick the can down the road. During this period decisions need to be made by Iran and others to ensure that the Middle East does not end up in a South Asia-style nuclear arms race.

It is by no means a forgone conclusion that Iran wants nuclear weapons, though Iran no doubt believes that having the capability to produce nuclear weapons within a relatively short time – what is termed nuclear hedging – has major strategic value. It is essential to ensure that the consequences for crossing the threshold remain high enough to deter Iran from doing so. This will require the US to keep a high level of engagement in Middle East affairs for the foreseeable future.

But having Iran maintain “just” a hedging posture cannot be considered a good outcome – we have already seen some of Iran's neighbors wanting to develop nuclear programs that will give them a similar capability. A situation of strategic competition in nuclear capability will be destabilizing for the Middle East.

With the problem of hedging in mind, an objective earlier in these negotiations was to establish the principle that Iran's uranium enrichment capability should be directly linked to its demonstrated nuclear fuel needs. In current circumstances these needs are zero, because Russia is willing to supply fuel for the lifetime of Iran's only power reactor, at Bushehr. For the future, Iran says it plans a number of reactors, both imported (Russia has agreed to build eight, and would supply the fuel) and indigenous.

But there is a dilemma in pushing the capability-not-exceeding-needs argument: the scale of any power generation need is much greater than Iran's existing capability. Enrichment capability is measured in separative work units (SWU). Currently Iran has installed enrichment centrifuges totaling around 20,000 SWU, and is operating centrifuges totaling around 8000 SWU. Iran's main enrichment facility, at Natanz, has room for 50,000 centrifuges – between 40,000 SWU (based on Iran's first generation centrifuges) and perhaps 250,000 SWU if using more advanced models. This compares with the capacity required to produce the annual fuel requirements for just one Bushehr-size reactor, around 120,000 SWU (and three times this to produce the initial fuel load). Only 5000 SWU are required to produce sufficient HEU (highly enriched uranium) for one nuclear weapon.

So, the scale of a “legitimate” enrichment program easily dwarfs Iran's current program. This could be why the capacity/needs principle was dropped from the negotiations. But it is an important principle, and it should never be accepted that nuclear hedging is a legitimate purpose under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for a “peaceful” nuclear program. The last thing anyone – including Iran – would want is a proliferation of enrichment or reprocessing programs. It is essential for the international community to use the 15-year breathing space to address this problem of nuclear hedging.

In this regard the most useful action would be to establish a system of international nuclear fuel supply guarantees so no country can claim it needs an enrichment program to ensure security of supply. Where new enrichment (or reprocessing) programs do proceed, these should not be national programs but controlled on a regional or international basis. Convincing alternatives are needed to show Iran and other prospective newcomers that they have no legitimate reason for pursuing a national program in proliferation-sensitive technologies.

Another essential project to pursue during the breathing space is a Middle East WMD-free zone. Iran must be persuaded that the best way of ensuring its long-term national security is not through nuclear capability but through the establishment of such a zone, a point recently made by Saudi Arabia. If Iran pursues nuclear weapons, or a stronger hedging posture, its current advantage will erode over time as others pursue the same. Eventually Iran will find itself with nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable neighbors, and its strategic circumstances will be substantially worse than anything it can imagine today.

The same challenge confronts Israel. If others in the region become nuclear armed or even just nuclear capable, the strategic advantage Israel now enjoys will disappear. It would be very risky to rely on nuclear deterrence in these circumstances. For Israel as well as Iran, a WMD-free zone offers the best long-term future. This means that eventually Israel will have to divest itself of nuclear weapons. This may seem unthinkable today, but a future where others in the region also have nuclear weapons is even more unthinkable. Others in the region must be realistic; Israel cannot be expected to disarm as a pre-condition for a WMD-free zone. But Israel must be prepared to think in terms of a phased approach, disarming in stages as a WMD-free zone is established and is shown to be effective.

The Iran deal may present a 15-year breathing space, but the negotiating parties (the P5+1) cannot afford to rest on their laurels. To resolve the challenges discussed here will require a program of work every bit as intensive as over the past several years.

This piece first appeared in the Lowy Interpreter here [5].

Hide The Buzz
Publication

Tags
iran [6]
Topics
Defense [7]
Regions
Middle East [8] [3]

Source URL (retrieved on April 14, 2015): http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...tmare-nuclear-arms-race-the-middle-east-12627

Links:
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...tmare-nuclear-arms-race-the-middle-east-12627
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/john-carlson
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/do...ameters-of-plan-on-iran-nuclear-program/1507/
[5] http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/04/14/Iran-nuclear-deal-Some-longer-term-issues.aspx
[6] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/iran
[7] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security/defense
[8] http://nationalinterest.org/region/middle-east
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/04/obama_as_nuclear_arsonist.html

April 15, 2015

Obama as Nuclear Arsonist

By James Lewis

Obama is the most dangerous president in history. He lied when promising the world that the U.S. would never allow Iran’s war fanatics to have nuclear weapons. While Obama was demagogically repeating, “Never! Never!,” his alter ego Val Jarrett carried on secret talks with the mullahs, resulting in today’s total surrender. Today we have a fuzzy “framework” (that Iran denies even agreeing to), which gives the world thirteen years before the mullahs can set off Armageddon. After thirteen years, all bets are off, assuming the enemy doesn’t violate its “promises” tomorrow, which it has a long history of doing.

This is not sane.

Dick Cheney has correctly called Obama “the worst president in history.” I think history will brand him with that flaming scarlet letter, because no U.S. leader has ever empowered a nuclear suicide cult. No U.S. president before this one could even imagine doing something so monstrous. Obama has gone rogue.

Arab nations are also in danger of nuclear Armageddon from the mullahs, or blackmail under a threat of total destruction. Israel is officially target #1, but it is ready to retaliate with overwhelming force.

My guess is therefore that Saudi Arabia will be the first big target for Iranian assault. The Iranians have already taken over the strategic country of Yemen, encircling Saudi Arabia from the south. They also threaten Arabia from their side of the narrow Gulf, and they have developed a giant pincer movement to surround Israel and aim at Egypt and Arabia.

Khomeinist Shi’ites have always believed they are divinely entitled to Arabia, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Today they are closer to that goal than ever before, simply by waging proxy terrorist war in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Already they threaten Arabia across the Gulf. The mullahs can choke off the world’s oil supply when the time is right, and nuclear weapons will keep them immune to retaliation.

Our puffed-up, preening hero is therefore the most dangerous character in history. Bar none. Never before has an American president surrendered to a fanatical suicide cult with nukes.

Now Obama tells us three lies. One is that this sleazy deal is the best we can possibly get. The second lie is that the only alternative is war. The third lie is that Obama’s “framework” isn’t a “treaty” at all – so it doesn’t need to meet the constitutional standard of advice and consent by the U.S. Senate.

This is just like that used car salesman telling you not to bother reading the fine print. Hurry! Hurry! Sign now, or you’ll miss your last chance!

This “deal” is so full of holes it’s hard to see any paper. No sane person believes it. Henry Kissinger and George P. Shultz took it apart in the Wall Street Journal last week.

Four-star admiral James (“Ace”) Lyons is telling us outright that Obama has let the U.S. government be penetrated and sabotaged by the fascist Muslim Brotherhood, which has long-proclaimed genocidal goals. They are just like the mullahs. If it were up to Obama, we would be threatened by nuclear Arabs as well as nuclear Iranians. Fortunately, Egypt caught the Muslim Brotherhood in time and knocked down Mohammed Morsi, who is now in jail.

Obama commands the greatest military force in history, and he’s done nothing but sabotage them under cover of “peace” negotiations. Prime Minister Chamberlain’s infamous appeasement with Hitler was at least negotiated in good faith on the British side.

Churchill’s comment on Chamberlain’s appeasement should ring in our ears today: "You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war."

That is the whole point the left pretends not to know. Obama is not avoiding war. Everything he has done in the last six years increases the chance of war, which is already going on everywhere Obama tried to fix things. The latest U.S. defeat is in Yemen, but we’ve knocked down the pillars of stability in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. In Eastern Europe we’ve endangered the Ukraine (now being torn apart by Putin), but Putin has threatened everybody in sight.

The only regime we’ve respected is Iran’s openly genocidal cult. Obama tried to overthrow Israel’s elected government more than once, and Israel is stable today in spite of Obama – no thanks to his repeated attempts at sabotage.

Obama has never shown good faith in anything. He is simply an enemy of this country and the civilized world. “Why?” is irrelevant. We can see it every day.

The U.S. Constitution, which Obama publicly despises, has a very clear definition of treason: “aiding and abetting the enemy in time of war.” Judge Andrew Napolitano thinks that Obama has already crossed that threshold and can be charged with and tried for treason. Any trial will expose a huge cesspool of provable betrayals by both Obama and Hillary Clinton, exposing many others in this administration.

At some point, the sane and sensible people of this country will have to have it out.

The Senate is now trying to respond with SB 6615, the Crocker-Menendez bill, now in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It states that the U.S. Senate must be consulted on this suicidal surrender to the war cult.

You can call your senators and House members. If Congress does not stand up for its constitutional powers, Obama will get his way.

We have to be heard.

We must act now.

Follow us: @AmericanThinker on Twitter | AmericanThinker on Facebook
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use....
http://atimes.com/2015/04/norman-ba...-bad-strategy-but-because-it-has-no-strategy/

Norman Bailey: The West is losing not because it has a bad strategy, but because it has no strategy

Author: Norman A. Bailey April 14, 2015 2 Comments

Chatham House Rules, Norman A. Bailey

The Russian move is a direct slap in the face of The United States as was intended. The terrible “deal” described accurately as “historic” by Obama (historic surely as in “Munich”) between the six powers and Iran was certain to collapse the sanctions regime eventually, but the Russians not only are anticipating the collapse by not waiting until after June 30th but are precipitating it precisely in the area which has been forbidden longest, namely weapons systems. Which S-300 antiaircraft system will be sold (indeed if any system is ever sold) is not important from this standpoint. Even if WWII-vintage rifles had been sold it would still have violated UN, US and European sanctions dating back years. It is to the advantage of Russia to maintain uncertainty as to the system itself as well as to how many, when shipped and all other details. As one of the great chess masters of all time, in a book entitled “Struggle”, stated: “The Threat is more powerful than the deed”. Indeed.


As a direct result, Israel and the allied Sunni states won’t know how long Israel has to launch an air attack on the Iranian facilities. Delay might be fatal. Or then again, it might not. The threat is more powerful than the deed. This might precipitate an attack to pre-empt the arrival of the missiles. Or again, perhaps not. Or perhaps the whole idea of a military attack should be abandoned. Or perhaps the Iranian infrastructure should be targeted instead. And if so, only the military infrastructure or the economic infrastructure also. Or maybe an EMP attack would be best, which Israel is perfectly capable of launching. But wouldn’t that perhaps spill over into neighboring countries and it would certainly lead to massive chaos and innumerable casualties in Iran and huge international condemnation expressed by UN Security Council resolutions isolating Israel which the United States WOULD NOT VETO.


Overlooked in all this is the reiteration of a deal the Russians offered Iran some time ago, to sell Iran agricultural equipment in a barter deal for Iranian oil and gas. What? What need does Russia have to import oil and gas, which are its only significant exports aside from weapons? Why sure; Russia will sell the Iranian oil and gas abroad and pocket the money that otherwise Iran would have paid directly. Neat. Sanctions circumvented all around. Iran gets what it needs and Russia gets what it needs, namely money, and Iran is able to sell oil and gas after all, albeit indirectly.


The strategic defeat of the West is beginning to reach “historic” proportions, to paraphrase the American president, desperate to finally deserve his Nobel peace prize. Too bad Chamberlain didn’t get one back in 1938. The same kinds of mindless idiots would have applauded it than that applauded the Obama award. The West is losing because it does not just have a bad strategy. It has no strategy at all, and is playing with powers that do indeed have strategies, some better than others, but strategies none the less. In the meantime Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the GCC and Egypt are looking on in horror and suspense and desperately trying to figure out what to do in the face of implacable foes and feckless (former?) allies. Witness the recent revelation that Prime Minister Netanyahu held “secret” meetings with the leader of the Labor Party, Isaac Herzog, exploring the possibility of the formation of a “grand coalition” between their center-right and center-left factions in order to form the next Israeli government, in the face of an existential threat that just became more serious due to decisions made in Lausanne and Moscow.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
News_Executive @News_Executive · 2h 2 hours ago

Breaking: Iran's President Rouhani says there will be no nuclear deal with major powers if sanctions not lifted
 

Sacajawea

Has No Life - Lives on TB
This is probably the most popular comedy show in Russia and China.

Although, I think Putin has a little bit of sympathy for non-gov Americans. Maybe he'll want to liberate us someday.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use....
http://nationalinterest.org/feature...nuclear-fear-will-iran-pull-north-korea-12646

The World's Greatest Nuclear Fear: Will Iran Pull a North Korea? [1]

Bruce Klingner [2] [3]

The interim Iranian nuclear framework is a vague accord with significant shortcomings. Moreover, the ink had barely dried before Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei disputed the Obama administration’s [4] depiction of what had been agreed to.

Khamenei declared that all sanctions against Iran must be removed immediately upon signature of a final accord in three months. He also insisted that Iran would not permit inspections of its military sites. Khamenei’s comments run counter to Obama administration claims that “international inspectors will have unprecedented access [5]” to all Iranian nuclear facilities. The administration had also asserted that Tehran agreed that United States, EU, and UN sanctions would be “retained for much of the duration of the deal [6]” and only incrementally reduced.

We’ve been down this path before… with North Korea. In September 2005, the Six Party Talks joint statement was followed by dueling U.S. and North Korean press statements. Portrayals of how quickly Washington would lift sanctions and remove Pyongyang from the state sponsors of terrorism list diverged widely.

Given the similarities between the two sets of nuclear negotiations, the Korean experience should provide hard-earned guidance for American negotiators on how the Iranian agreement should be completed.

Don’t Do Your End-Zone Dance Too Early

Clinton administration officials initially claimed the 1994 Agreed Framework had resolved the North Korean nuclear problem. The Obama administration entered office thinking it would achieve dramatic breakthroughs with North Korea (and Russia, the Muslim world, etc.) and proclaimed the U.S. would never accept a nuclear North Korea or Iran.

A Bad Cop Is Good to Have

The Agreed Framework was not the immaculate diplomatic conception that its supporters claim. Talk of war with North Korea was rife in the mid-1990s, and Clinton administration officials claim they were debating attack options when surprised by a preliminary agreement midwifed by a rogue Jimmy Carter. Israel’s threats of attack similarly focused Tehran’s leaders on the penalties of defiance.

Vague Text Begets Vague Progress

Experts still debate whether the Agreed Framework prohibited North Korea’s covert uranium program. The Six-Party Talks relied on a diplomatic gimmick whereby the plurality of “nuclear programs” was cited by U.S. negotiators as clearly proscribing uranium weapons. Pyongyang, not surprisingly, disagreed. Vaguely worded agreements may, in the words of U.S. Six-Party Talks negotiator Christopher Hill allow the “bicycle to keep moving forward lest it fall over,” but papering over loopholes merely postpones an inevitable collapse of the agreement.

Even a “Final” Agreement is Never Final

Vague text also allows countries to cheat while still semi-legitimately claiming compliance. Like a good defense lawyer, Pyongyang uses ambiguity to obfuscate and avoid punishment. To prevent a crisis, negotiators even become willing to negotiate away their laws and previous treaties.

Verify, Verify, Verify

President Ronald Reagan’s dictum “Trust but Verify” was reflected in the extensively detailed verification protocols that enabled the United States to have arms control treaties with the Soviet Union. Precisely defining verification mechanisms and responsibilities of all parties may hinder completion of negotiations, but is critical for ensuring the long-term viability of an agreement. Claiming “unprecedented access” is no substitute for unambiguous inspection rights.

Violations Make a Shaky Foundation for Negotiations

Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea and Iran was precipitated by their violating previous agreements and UN resolutions – hardly the basis for confidence they will abide by yet more accords. Negotiators should remember the adage, “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.”

Arms Control Advocates Reject Evidence of Cheating

Pyongyang serially deceived, denied, and defied the international community. Yet arms control proponents responded to growing evidence of North Korean cheating by doubting, dismissing, deflecting, denouncing, deliberating, debating, dawdling, delaying, demanding, and eventually dealing.

These “experts” initially rejected intelligence reports of North Korea’s plutonium weapons program, its uranium weapons program, complicity in a Syrian nuclear reactor, and steadily increasing nuclear and missile capabilities.

Evidence of Cheating Doesn’t Arrive Gift-Wrapped

After decades of debating whether Iran even had a nuclear weapons program, experts now claim that U.S. intelligence will be able to unequivocally identify and then convince U.S. policymakers and UN representatives to impose sufficient penalties to deter Iran from nuclear weapons, all within one year.

The International Community Doesn’t “Snap-Back”

The UN has shown a remarkable ability to emit a timid squeak of indignation when its resolutions are blatantly violated and then only after extensive negotiations and compromise. Hampered by Chinese and Russian obstructionism, the UN Security Council has been limited to lowest-common denominator responses.

Negotiations Allow Inching Across Redlines

Alternating provocative behavior and a willingness to negotiate enabled North Korea to manipulate the international community into timidity about imposing penalties and acquiescence to repeated violations.

By maintaining strategic ambiguity on their nuclear programs, Pyongyang and Tehran, like the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent, are gaining international acceptance of activities that were previously declared “unacceptable.”

Proponents for diplomatically resolving the North Korean and Iranian nuclear problems argue that, without negotiations, Pyongyang and Tehran would continue to develop nuclear weapons. Yet, North Korea continued to augment its arsenal while negotiating and even after signing numerous agreements not to do so. It is expecting too much to assume Iran has not learned that lesson from North Korea—a friendly tutor who has done so much to help Tehran advance both its nuclear and missile programs.

Bruce Klingner is the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.

Image [7]: Flickr/Creative Commons.

Tags
North Korea [8]iran [9]
Topics
Diplomacy [10]
Regions
Middle East [11] [3]

Source URL (retrieved on April 16, 2015): http://nationalinterest.org/feature...nuclear-fear-will-iran-pull-north-korea-12646

Links:
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/feature...nuclear-fear-will-iran-pull-north-korea-12646
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/bruce-klingner
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://www.wsj.com/articles/ayatollah-blasts-terms-of-nuclear-framework-1428623508
[5] https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres...amework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon
[6] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm
[7] https://www.flickr.com/photos/rapidtravelchai/9465934852/
[8] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/north-korea
[9] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/iran
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/diplomacy
[11] http://nationalinterest.org/region/middle-east
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use....
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/2...inst-iran-intact-despite-russian-missile-sale

General: Iran military option 'intact'

By Kristina Wong - 04/16/15 05:19 PM EDT
Comments 19

Russia’s sale of the S-300 air defense missile system to Iran does not affect the U.S.’s military options against Iran, the Pentagon said Thursday.

“We’ve known about the potential for that system to be sold to Iran for several years, and have accounted for it in all of our planning,” said Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“The military option that I owe the president, to both encourage the diplomatic solution and if the diplomacy fails to ensure that Iran doesn’t achieve a nuclear weapon, is intact,” he told reporters at the Pentagon briefing.

Russia announced on Monday that it would lift its ban on selling the surface-to-air missile system to Iran, drawing complaints from the U.S. and Israel.
The ban had been in place since 2010, when the United Nations announced an arms embargo against Iran.

The Pentagon earlier this week said the sale was “unhelpful.”

“Certainly any sale of advanced technologies is a cause of concern to us,” said Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Steve Warren on Monday, who said the issue was being raised through all appropriate channels.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who also briefed reporters, said the Pentagon takes “very seriously” the responsibility to have “options on the table” for the president in dealing with Iran.

He also said the Pentagon would continue to play a stabilizing role in the region and continue to strengthen the capabilities and confidence of allies.

“So those … our two jobs here in the Department of Defense, and I'm very attentive to them, as is Chairman Dempsey and everybody else,” he said.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use....
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/...ause-doesn/GneT0yRSOp9GDMDJxjuQkM/story.html#

Danger of Iran deal is not because Tehran lies, but because it doesn’t

By Jeff Jacoby Globe Columnist April 16, 2015

WHO TRUSTS Iran? Most Americans don’t. According to two new polls, a majority of the public strongly doubts the ruling theocrats in Tehran can be counted on to keep their end of any nuclear deal negotiated in the US-led “P5+1” talks in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Asked in a Fox News poll how much of Iran’s claims on nuclear matters can be trusted, 55 percent of respondents replied that the United States “can’t trust anything” the regime says, while 28 percent were willing to trust only “a little.” Similarly, a NBC News survey found 68 percent of Americans consider Iran unlikely to abide by any nuclear agreement.

Nothing unusual there. Given Iran’s long history of deceit, it would be strange if Americans and their allies didn’t regard as worthless any nuclear promises the mullahs make.

Iran was an early signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, and it signed a detailed safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1974. But after the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers seized power in 1979, Iran began lying about its nuclear activities. Virtually everything we know about Iran’s nuclear program was uncovered only after years of stonewalling, concealment, and denial. The construction of a vast uranium enrichment installation near Natanz and a heavy-water reactor in Arak, for example, didn’t come to light until 2002, when an Iranian exile group exposed their existence in a press conference in Washington.

Iran has repeatedly flouted UN Security Council resolutions ordering it to suspend all enrichment-related activities. Even now, reports the IAEA, Tehran refuses to answer questions about the “possible military dimensions” of its nuclear activities.

With such a track record, it’s logical that Iran’s commitments are so widely regarded as worthless. No piece of paper signed in Switzerland will take the ayatollahs’ eyes off the nuclear prize they have so long pursued, by means mostly foul. And of what value is any agreement if one of the signatories can’t be trusted not to cheat?

Yet what makes the framework nuclear deal so grotesque and dangerous isn’t Iran’s trail of deception. The real reason to block any nuclear accord with Tehran’s rulers isn’t that they always lie. It’s that they don’t.

Even President Obama admits Iran could abide by the terms agreed to and just wait for them to run out in a little more than a decade.
Quote Icon
Maybe Iran would cheat on the loophole-ridden deal being promoted by the Obama administration. But it wouldn’t have to. Even President Obama admits Iran could abide by the terms agreed to and just wait for them to run out in a little more than a decade. “At that point, the breakout times [to nuclear weapons capability] would have shrunk almost down to zero,” the president told NPR. Cheat or don’t cheat, the end is the same: The Lausanne deal paves Iran’s path to the bomb either way.

And then it will be clear — apocalyptically clear — that the ayatollahs were telling the truth.

They were telling the truth last November, when the Iranian Revolutionary Guards proclaimed “the US is still the great Satan and the number one enemy of the [Islamic] revolution and the Islamic Republic.”

They were telling the truth in February, when Ali Shirazi, a senior Iranian cleric and aide to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that his troops are in a global war that will bring “the banner of Islam over the White House.”

They were telling the truth a decade ago when Hassan Abassi, a high-ranking intelligence operative, warned that Iranian agents had identified “29 sensitive sites in the West, with the aim of bombing them.”

They were telling the truth when a commander of Iranian forces insisted “America has no other choice but to leave the Middle East region beaten and humiliated.” And when Iran’s supreme leader raged that “there is only one solution to the Middle East problem, namely the annihilation and destruction of the Jewish state.” And when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted that “a world without America is not only desirable, it is achievable.”

And when, over and over, they have incited crowds in chants of “Death to America.”

Tehran’s rulers may have lied for years about their nuclear activities; their negotiated commitments to suspend enrichment and submit to inspections may not be worth the ink they sign them with.

But the mullahs don’t lie about what matters to them most: death to America, the extermination of Israel, unrelenting global jihad. They say they are deadly serious.

Believe them.

Jeff Jacoby can be reached at jacoby@globe.com. Follow him on Twitter @jeff_jacoby.

Related:

• John Kerry: A critical deal with Iran, but more work to be done

• Nicholas Burns: The Iran deal’s rare achievement

• Stephen Kinzer: Let go of grudges against Cuba, Iran

• Kaveh L. Afrasiabi and Nader Entessar: Nuclear deal could reset US-Iran relations

• Colin Nickerson: Can the US-Iran rift be healed?

• Michael A. Cohen: Iran deal-making is about the least worst option
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Conflict News @rConflictNews · 2m 2 minutes ago

Speaking to @euronewsar, #Iran's FM Zarif vows nuclear enrichment 'without limits' unless sanctions called off - @shiapulse
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://news.yahoo.com/iran-guard-rejects-inspection-military-sites-063048778.html

Iran Guard rejects inspection of military sites

Associated Press
1 hour ago

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — A senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guard said Sunday that inspectors would be barred from military sites under any nuclear agreement with world powers.

Gen. Hossein Salami, the Guard's deputy leader, said on state TV that allowing the foreign inspection of military sites is tantamount to "selling out."

"We will respond with hot lead (bullets) to those who speak of it," Salami said. "Iran will not become a paradise for spies. We will not roll out the red carpet for the enemy."

Iran and six world powers -- the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, China and Russia -- have reached a framework agreement to curb Tehran's nuclear program in return for lifting sanctions, and hope to strike a final deal by June 30.

A fact sheet on the framework accord issued by the State Department said Iran would be required to grant the U.N. nuclear agency access to any "suspicious sites." Iran has questioned that and other language in the fact sheet, notably that sanctions would only be lifted after the International Atomic Energy Agency has verified Tehran's compliance. Iran's leaders have said the sanctions should be lifted on the first day of the implementation of the accord.

The fact sheet said Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would grant the IAEA expanded access to both declared and undeclared nuclear facilities.

But Salami said allowing foreign inspectors to visit a military base would amount to "occupation," and expose "military and defense secrets."

"It means humiliating a nation," Salami said on state TV. "They will not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military site in their dreams."

Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Parchin military site in 2005 as a confidence-building measure, but denied further visits, fearing espionage.

Western nations have long suspected Iran of secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons capability alongside its civilian program. Tehran denies such allegations, and insists its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

View Comments (88) .
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://news.yahoo.com/khamenei-says-iran-nuclear-weapons-myth-083405873.html

Khamenei says Iran nuclear weapons are a 'myth'

Reuters
9 minutes ago

DUBAI (Reuters) - Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Sunday the United States had created the "myth" of nuclear weapons to portray Iran as a threat, hardening his rhetoric before nuclear negotiations resume this week.

Khamenei has supported the talks but has continued to express deep mistrust of the United States. As the highest authority in Iran, the withdrawal of his support could cause the negotiations to collapse.

"They created the myth of nuclear weapons so they could say the Islamic Republic is a source of threat. No, the source of threat is America itself," Khamenei said in comments cited by the semi-official Fars news agency.

"The other side is methodically and shamelessly threatening us militarily ... even if they did not make these overt threats, we would have to be prepared," he said in an address to military commanders.

Iran and six world powers including the United States reached a framework accord on Iran's disputed nuclear programme this month and will resume negotiations in Vienna this week aiming to reach a final deal by the end of June.

Despite significant progress, the two sides still disagree on several issues, including how quickly international sanctions would be lifted under a final deal.

(Reporting by Sam Wilkin. Editing by Jane Merriman)

View Comments (11)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-iran-nuclear-weapons-obama-lake-0422-20150421-story.html

Eli Lake: Obama kept Iran's short nuclear breakout time a secret

SHARELINES

t▼
Opinion: What does White House now say about Iran enriching nuclear fuel?

t▼
Opinion: How long would it take for Iran to build a nuclear bomb?

t▼
Opinion: White House created sense of urgency for Iran nuclear agreement

April 21, 2015, 5:40 PM

The Obama administration has estimated for years that Iran was at most three months away from enriching enough nuclear fuel for an atomic bomb. But the administration declassified this estimate only at the beginning of the month, just in time for the White House to make the case for its Iran deal to Congress and the public..

Speaking to reporters and editors Monday at Bloomberg's Washington bureau, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz acknowledged that the U.S. has assessed for several years that Iran has been two to three months away from producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Asked how long the administration has held this assessment, Moniz said, "Oh quite some time." He added: "They are now, they are right now spinning, I mean enriching with 9,400 centrifuges out of their roughly 19,000. Plus all the … R&D work. If you put that together it's very, very little time to go forward. That's the two to three months."

Brian Hale, a spokesman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, confirmed to me Monday that the two-to-three-month estimate for fissile material was declassified on April 1.

Here is the puzzling thing: When Obama began his second term in 2013, he sang a different tune. He emphasized that Iran was more than a year away from a nuclear bomb, without mentioning that his intelligence community believed it was only two to three months away from making enough fuel for one, long considered the most challenging task in building a weapon. Today Obama emphasizes that Iran is only two to three months away from acquiring enough fuel for a bomb, creating a sense of urgency for his Iran agreement.

Back in 2013, when Congress was weighing new sanctions on Iran and Obama was pushing for more diplomacy, his interest was in tamping down that sense of urgency. On the eve of a visit to Israel, Obama told Israel's Channel Two, "Right now, we think it would take over a year or so for Iran to actually develop a nuclear weapon, but obviously we don't want to cut it too close."

On Oct. 5 of that year, Obama contrasted the U.S. view of an Iranian breakout with that of Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time said Iran was only six months away from nuclear capability. Obama told The Associated Press, "Our assessment continues to be a year or more away. And in fact, actually, our estimate is probably more conservative than the estimates of Israeli intelligence services."

Ben Caspit, an Israeli journalist and columnist for Al-Monitor, reported last year that Israel's breakout estimate was also two to three months away.

A year ago, after the nuclear talks started, Secretary of State John Kerry dropped the first hint about the still-classified Iran breakout estimate. He told a Senate panel, "I think it is fair to say, I think it is public knowledge today, that we are operating with a time period for a so-called breakout of about two months."

David Albright, a former weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, told me administration officials appeared to be intentionally unspecific in 2013, when the talking points used the 12-months-plus timeline. Albright's group released its own breakout timetable that focused solely on the production of highly enriched uranium, not the weapon itself. It concluded Iran was potentially less than a month away.

When USA Today asked a spokeswoman for the National Security Council about Albright's estimate, she responded that the intelligence community maintained a number of estimates for how long Iran would take to produce enough material for a weapon.

"They have made it very hard for those of us saying, 'Let's just focus on weapons-grade uranium, there is this shorter period of time and not a year,'" Albright told me. "If you just want a nuclear test device to blow up underground, I don't think you need a year."

This view is supported by a leaked document from the International Atomic Energy Agency, first published by The Associated Press in 2009. Albright's group published excerpts from the IAEA assessment that concluded Iran "has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon (highly enriched uranium) as the fission fuel."

Obama's new, more alarmist figure of two to three months provides a key selling point for the framework reached this month in Switzerland. When Obama announced the preliminary agreement on April 2, he said one benefit was that if it were finalized, "even if it violated the deal, for the next decade at least, Iran would be a minimum of a year away from acquiring enough material for a bomb."

Hence the frustration of Rep. Devin Nunes, R-California, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. "We've been researching their claim that a deal would lengthen the breakout time for Iran from two to three months to a year," he told me of the administration. "We're just trying to confirm any of their numbers, and we can't confirm or make sense of what they are referencing."

Nunes should hurry. The Iranian nuclear deal is scheduled to break out in less than three months.

Eli Lake is a Bloomberg View columnist who writes about politics and foreign affairs.


Copyright © 2015, The Morning Call
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/opinion/thomas-friedman-deal-or-no-deal.html?_r=0

The Opinion Pages | Op-Ed Columnist

Deal or No Deal?

APRIL 22, 2015
Thomas L. Friedman
Comments

The Obama team’s effort to negotiate a deal with Iran that could prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear bomb for at least a decade is now entering its critical final stage. I hope that a good, verifiable deal can be finalized, but it will not be easy. If it were, we’d have it by now. Here are the major challenges:

First, you can negotiate a simple arms control agreement with an adversary you don’t trust. We did that with the Kremlin in the Cold War. By simple, I mean with relatively few moving parts, and very clear verification procedures that do not require much good will from the other side — like monitoring Soviet missile sites with our own satellites. You can also negotiate a complicated arms control deal with a country that shares your values: Japan and South Korea regularly submit their nuclear facilities to international inspections.

But what is hard to implement is a complex arms control deal with an adversary you don’t trust — like Iran or North Korea. Each moving part requires some good will from the other side, and, because there are so many moving parts, the opportunities for cheating are manifold. It requires constant vigilance. Are the United States, Russia, China and Europe up for that for a decade? After the Iraq invasion, we took our eye off North Korea, and it diverted nuclear fuel for a bomb. With Iran, the U.S. Energy Department is planning to put a slew of new, on-the-ground monitoring devices into every cranny of Iran’s nuclear complex, which should help. But there also has to be zero-tolerance for cheating — and a very high price if there is.

Second, for us, this is solely an arms control agreement. For Iran, this is “an identity crisis” that it’s being asked to resolve, and it’s still not clear it can do so, says Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center and the author of “Outlier States: American Strategies to Contain, Engage, or Change Regimes.”

America’s engagement with Iran, said Litwak, is like “the Cuban missile crisis meets the Thirty Years’ War.” For us, this is a pure nuclear negotiation, but, for Iran, the nuclear issue “is a proxy for what kind of country it wants to be — an ordinary state or an Islamic revolutionary state. And this divide goes back to the origins of its revolution” in 1979. Most revolutions eventually go through some cultural rebalancing that breaks its fever and turns it toward normalcy and integration, Litwak added: “But Iran has never gone through that process. It tantalized us with reformist presidents who didn’t really hold power and when push came to shove never challenged the fundamentals of the revolutionary deep state that had the monopoly on the use of force” and control of its nuclear program.

There is a hard core in Tehran for whom nuclear weapons are not only a hedge against foreign invasion but also a deliberate thumb in the eye of the world meant to block the very integration that would open Iran to influences from America and the West — an opening they fear would dilute whatever revolutionary fervor is left in its youths, many of whom are fed up with Iran’s isolation. That is why Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was telling the truth when he recently said that he has not made up his mind about this deal. He’s having an identity crisis. He wants sanctions relief without integration. After all, if Iran is a normal state, who needs a medieval cleric to be the “supreme leader?”

The challenge for Obama is whether he can do a deal with an Iran that, as Litwak puts it, “doesn’t change character but just changes behavior.” Obama’s bet — and it is not crazy — is that if you can get the right verification procedures in place and deprive Iran from making a bomb for a decade (that alone is worth a deal, given the alternatives) then you increase the odds of Iran’s own people changing Iran’s character from within. But then so much rides on implementing a fail-proof verification regime and “snapback” sanctions if Iran cheats.

I think President Obama believes that nothing has stymied U.S. Mideast policy more in the last 36 years than the U.S.-Iran cold war, and if that can be prudently eased it would equal a Nixon-to-China move that opens up a lot of possibilities. Again, that’s not crazy. It’s just not easy given the forces in Iran who have an interest in being isolated from the West.

Finally, you have the regional challenge. Iran, with about 80 million people, is simply a more powerful and dynamic state today than most of the Sunni Arab states to its west, half of which have collapsed. Iran, even if it had good intentions, almost can’t help but project its power westward given the vacuum and frailty there. When Nixon opened to China, and helped unleash its economic prowess, China was largely surrounded by strong or economically powerful states to balance it. But an Iran enriched by billions in sanctions relief would be even more powerful vis-à-vis its weak Arab neighbors. Our Gulf Arab allies are deeply worried about this and are looking to the U.S. for both protection and more sophisticated arms. I get that. But unless we can find a way to truly ease tensions between Shiite Persians and Sunni Arabs, we will find ourselves unleashing Iran to the max while arming the Arabs to the teeth. Maintaining that balance will not be easy.

These are not reasons to reject the deal. They are reasons to finish it right.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/22/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSKBN0ND0R520150422

World | Wed Apr 22, 2015 6:47am EDT
Related: World
Timing of sanctions relief a major issue as Iran talks resume
VIENNA | By Parisa Hafezi

(Reuters) - The timing and scope of sanctions relief are major sticking points in talks between Iran and the six major world powers kicking off in Vienna on Wednesday as negotiators try to agree on curbing Tehran's nuclear activities.

After a tentative deal between Iran and the six powers was reached in Switzerland on April 2, different interpretations have emerged over what was agreed in the framework and both sides have given different versions of the timing within that.

"Lifting sanctions will be one of the main topics in this round of talks … If the other party shows political good will, we can reach a final agreement," Iran's deputy foreign minister Abbas Araqchi told Iranian state TV on Wednesday.

Talks begin with a bilateral meeting between European Union political director Helga Schmid and Araqchi at about 8 a.m. EDT, the EU said. Talks between Iran and the six powers, including U.S. under secretary Wendy Sherman, will follow this week.

Iran insists it would only accept a final deal over its contested nuclear program if world powers simultaneously lifted all sanctions imposed on it.

The United States has made it clear that sanctions on Iran would have to be phased out gradually under the final pact.

Iran's foreign ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham said on Iranian state television on Wednesday that U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, "discussed Iran's nuclear issue by phone last night".

Iran and the powers are trying to end more than 12 years of diplomatic wrangling over the country's disputed nuclear program, which Tehran says is peaceful but Western powers fear is aimed at developing an atomic bomb.

U.S. President Barack Obama was forced to give Congress a say in any future accord - including the right of lawmakers to veto the lifting of sanctions imposed by the United States.

Araqchi said on state television on Wednesday that the U.S. administration was "responsible to ensure that its commitments, particularly sanctions-related ones, are fulfilled".

Many other issues have to be hammered out before the end-of-June deadline for the final deal to be done.

(Additional reporting by Shadia Nasralla and by Adrian Croft in Brussels; Editing by Louise Ireland)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/23/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSKBN0NE1C920150423

World | Thu Apr 23, 2015 12:21pm EDT
Related: World

Diplomatic push for final Iran nuclear deal in Vienna

VIENNA

(Reuters) - U.S. Under Secretary Wendy Sherman and Tehran's Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi will resume talks about curbing Iran's nuclear program later on Thursday, Iranian media said.

The latest round of nuclear diplomacy, being held in a luxury hotel in Austria's capital, kicked off with a bilateral meeting between Iran and the European Union on Wednesday.

Iran's nuclear negotiator Hamid Baidinejad told Iranian state television that "drafting the final deal has started," declining to give further details. Months ago both sides had already announced that a final draft had been started.

Iran and the other countries in the talks -- the United States, China, France, Russia, Britain and Germany -- reached a tentative deal on April 2 and now aim to finalize the details by self-imposed end-June deadline.

Under the framework agreement, Iran agreed to slash the number of uranium enrichment centrifuges it operates and would allow more intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange for sanctions relief.

The diplomatic push needs to iron out details about the timing of sanctions relief, the future of Iran's atomic research and development program, the exact nature of the IAEA's monitoring regime and what kind of uranium stockpile Tehran will be allowed to keep under any final deal.

The timing of sanctions relief was top of the agenda at Wednesday's talks.

Iran says economic sanctions must be lifted as soon as any final deal is signed, while the United States wants a gradual lifting of restrictions.

Top envoys from other world powers will join the negotiations later this week.


Related Coverage
› Iran's military nuclear activity visible under deal: Moniz
› Supply of Russian S-300 systems to Iran will not happen soon: TASS
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/24/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSKBN0NF17D20150424

World | Fri Apr 24, 2015 5:43pm EDT
Related: World

Iran says nuclear talks making gradual headway

VIENNA

(Reuters) - Nuclear talks between Iran and six world powers are making good but slow progress as they work toward a June 30 deadline for a final deal, Tehran's senior negotiator said on Friday.

Diplomats are negotiating to fill the gaps in an April 2 framework agreement that would curb Iran's nuclear program, allaying Western fears it could develop an atomic bomb, in return for relief from international sanctions.

Iran, which denies seeking nuclear weapons, has said sanctions must be lifted as soon as any final deal is signed. The United States wants a gradual lifting of restrictions.

"The progress is good... We are at preliminary stages and the pace is slow but it is good," Iranian state television quoted negotiator Abbas Araqchi as telling reporters in Vienna.

"The Europeans and Americans made good clarifications about lifting of the sanctions," he said, adding that drafting of the text had begun.

Diplomats also need to iron out details about the future of Iran's atomic research and development program, the exact scope of the U.N. atomic watchdog's monitoring regime, and what kind of uranium stockpile Tehran will be allowed to keep.

Bilateral meetings earlier this week with the European Union's political director Helga Schmid and U.S. Under Secretary Wendy Sherman will be followed on Friday by meetings with Russian, Chinese, British, French and German envoys.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif are expected to meet next week.


Related Coverage
› U.S. pro-Israel lobby opposes push to toughen Iran nuclear bill
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Wow...........

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-president-daydreams-on-iran-1429914121

Commentary

The President Daydreams on Iran

Anyone who looks at the nuclear deal and sees success is living in a world of rainbows and unicorns.

By Mortimer Zuckerman
Updated April 24, 2015 7:11 p.m. ET
51 COMMENTS

I’m always chasing rainbows, watching clouds drifting by / My schemes are just like all my dreams, ending in the sky.

The vaudeville song by Harry Carroll and Joseph McCarthy, popularized by Judy Garland and Barbra Streisand, is all too appropriate to this moment, as we consider the implications of a nuclear Iran and the prospect of mushroom clouds over the Middle East.

President Obama has been chasing a rainbow in his negotiations with Iran. He has forsaken decades of pledges to the civilized world from presidents of both parties. He has misled the American people in repeatedly affirming that the U.S. would never allow revolutionary Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, which would guarantee a new arms race. In fact, one has already started. Credible reports suggest Pakistan is ready to ship an atomic package to Saudi Arabia, the Sunni nation that stands opposed to Shiite Iran’s subversion throughout the region.

Opinion Journal Video

Wonder Land Columnist Dan Henninger on the politics of the deal, and a new Clinton Foundation scandal. Photo: Getty Images
.
But Tehran is working across religious lines as well. Though Hamas is Sunni, Iran has sent millions of dollars to the terror group that controls Gaza to rebuild the tunnel network that the Israeli Defense Force destroyed last summer.

How far Mr. Obama is prepared to chase the negotiation dream is illustrated by the recent candor of his energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, a nuclear physicist who has been party to the negotiations. In 2013 the president answered questions about Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons with these words: “Our assessment continues to be a year or more away, and in fact, actually our estimate is probably more conservative than the estimates of Israeli intelligence services.”

Yet on Monday Mr. Moniz told reporters at Bloomberg a different story: “They are right now spinning. I mean enriching with 9,400 centrifuges out of their roughly 19,000,” he said. “It’s very little time to go forward. That’s two to three months.” How long has the administration held this view? “Oh, quite some time,” Mr. Moniz replied. The Bloomberg report suggests “several years.”

This stunningly casual remark was based on information apparently declassified on April 1. What is Mr. Obama up to? Why was he reassuring in 2013 when he knew it was misleading? Is the declassification intended to create a false sense of urgency?

Compare where we are today with the conditions Mr. Obama laid down two years ago. Referring to Iran’s smiling new president, Hasan Rouhani, Mr. Obama said: “If in fact he is able to present a credible plan that says Iran is pursuing peaceful nuclear energy but we’re not pursuing nuclear weapons, and we are willing to be part of an internationally verified structure so that all other countries in the world know they are not pursuing nuclear weapons, then, in fact, they can improve relations, improve their economy. And we should test that.”

Sure—let’s test it:

• Enrichment: Before the talks began, the Obama administration and U.N. Security Council insisted that Iran stop all uranium enrichment. So did the 2013 framework agreement. Now the deal enshrines Iran’s right to enrich.

• Stockpile: In February, Iran had 10,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, which the deal says will be reduced to 300 kilograms. The remainder is to be exported to Russia and returned to Iran as fuel rods for use in a power plant. But Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told state media at the end of March that “there is no question of sending the stocks abroad.”

• Centrifuges: Iran has about 19,000 centrifuges, and the U.S. initially called for cutting that to between 500 and 1,500. The agreement now allows 6,104. Not only that, Iran’s foreign minister has said that advanced IR-8 centrifuges, which enrich uranium 20 times faster than the current IR-1 models, will be put into operation as soon as the nuclear deal takes effect—contrary to what the U.S. has asserted.

• Infrastructure: The closure of nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Arak has been an American goal for a decade. Under the deal, the 40-megawatt heavy-water nuclear plant at Arak, which produces plutonium, will remain, albeit with reduced plutonium production. The deal allows the Fordow facility, which is buried in a mountain fortress designed to withstand aerial attack, to be converted into a “peaceful research” center. Iran will be allowed to keep 1,000 centrifuges there. Natanz will remain open as well.

• Missiles: Iran stonewalled on concerns about the military dimensions of its nuclear program. U.S. negotiators dropped demands that Tehran restrict development of intercontinental ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver warheads.

• Duration: Initially the U.S. wanted the deal to last 20 years. Now the key terms sunset in 10 to 15 years. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the framework is likely to necessitate deepening involvement under complex new terms, as former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz wrote in this newspaper earlier this month.

• Enforcement: President Obama promises: “If Iran cheats, the world will know it. If we see something suspicious, we will inspect it.” This is incredibly unrealistic. Over the past year alone, Iran has violated its international agreements at least three times. In November the International Atomic Energy Agency caught Iran operating a new advanced IR-5 centrifuge. Disagreement about inspections under the deal persists. Secretary Moniz has said that inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency must be allowed access to any place at any time. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his military say no way.

• Sanctions: The deal gives Iran exactly what it wanted: permanent relief from economic sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints. Mr. Obama talks about being able to “snap back” sanctions. But consider the attitudes of two of the big players in the six-power talks. China’s press refers to “peaceful” Iran as if it were Switzerland. Russia says the deal has freed it to sell S-300 air-defense missiles to Tehran. Assuming that the West discovers a nuclear violation, it will be nearly impossible to reimpose today’s sanctions.

• Good behavior: Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khamenei continues to denounce the U.S. as the Great Satan, making clear that Iran doesn’t expect to normalize relations. His speeches indicate that Iran still sees itself in a holy war with the West.

***

So here we are at the end of the rainbow, seemingly willing to concede nuclear capacity to Iran, a country we consider a principal threat. No wonder Saudi Arabia and Egypt are insisting on developing equivalent nuclear capabilities. America’s traditional allies have concluded that the U.S. has traded temporary cooperation from Iran for acquiescence to its ultimate hegemony.

The sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table took years to put in place. They have impaired Iran’s ability to conduct trade in the global market. The banking freeze in particular has had a crippling effect, since international businesses will not risk being blacklisted by the U.S. and European Union to make a few dollars in Iran. Many of those who have studied the problem believe that if the sanctions were to remain, they would squeeze Tehran and force greater concessions.

President Obama seems to be willfully ignoring Iran’s belligerent behavior and its growing influence over Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Yemen’s capital, San’a. Free of sanctions, Iran may become even more assertive.

There are no rainbows ahead, only menacing clouds.

Mr. Zuckerman is chairman and editor in chief of U.S. News & World Report.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.rferl.org/content/first-round-of-/26977572.html

First Round Of Talks Toward Final Iran Nuclear Deal Ends
April 25, 2015

The first round of talks aimed at pushing forward a final deal on Iran's nuclear program has ended in Vienna.

Diplomats said the three-day round ending on April 24 focused on the pace of lifting international sanctions.

"The progress is good. We are at preliminary stages and the pace is slow but it is good," Iranian state television quoted Tehran's chief negotiator Abbas Araghchi as telling reporters.

On April 2, Iran and the so-called P5+1 group -- the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany -- reached a framework deal that would curb Iran's nuclear activities, allaying Western fears it could develop an atomic bomb, in return for relief from sanctions.

Complicated details on timing and monitoring remain to be ironed out by a June 30 deadline set for a final deal.

Iran, which denies seeking nuclear weapons, has said sanctions must be lifted as soon as any final agreement is signed, while the United States wants a gradual lifting of restrictions.

Based on reporting by AP and Reuters
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/04/iran_after_the_bomb_.html

April 25, 2015

Iran after the Bomb

By James Lewis
Comments 2

Obama has now created a worst-case scenario in the Middle East, by covering up Iran’s nuclear development for six years, while swearing up and down it would never happen. The media has finally admitted that the mullahs don’t even need to purify uranium with centrifuges; it can be done by a laser process that could be hidden anywhere in the world.

Admiral James Lyons (USN, ret) has publicly accused this administration of allowing Muslim Brotherhood penetration of our intelligence agencies. Admiral Lyons’ statement should be read carefully by anyone interested in U.S. national security, in this new age of nuclear danger. There is no question that Democrat presidents are receiving vast sums of money from secret foreign sources. Hillary has bluntly refused to talk about it.

If elected, Hillary will continue the Obama policy of nuclear surrender because she was, after all, secretary of state while the nuclear disinformation operation was perpetrated. While these offenses should lead to impeachment, we know that the leftist political-media class will not allow that to happen. The United States has therefore been set back to the most unstable time of the nuclear age: The time when Stalin exploded his first bombs.

America’s betrayal of its allies is already setting off a nuclear arms race among nations most threatened by Iranian aggression, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Israel has an advanced nuclear and missile program, with improving anti-missile defenses. However, no current defensive system is foolproof.

As Benjamin Netanyahu pointed out in a Bill Maher interview several years ago, the mullahs are not like the Soviet Union: They are fanatical advocates of martyrdom war. All the Muslim war sects use suicide tactics, as we should have known after 9/11/01. Dying to go to heaven is right up their alley. This is therefore a different kind of nuclear threat from any we have faced before. The logic of mutually assured destruction doesn’t apply any more. Armageddon fits right into their wet dreams.

None of our defense doctrines fit the new scenario. George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 precisely to preempt what was considered a nuclearizing rogue regime, Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Saddam had his own generals convinced that he had WMDs, and major Western intelligence agencies were convinced. Saddam’s poison gas weapons were smuggled by the Russians into Syria before the U.S. invasion. Saddam had uranium ore, but his program was not nearly as advanced as Iran and North Korea are today. Bush didn’t lie about his belief in Saddam’s WMDs. He simply said what he was told by the CIA and allied intelligence agencies. They were all wrong, as they historically have been.

Bush was hung out to dry by our leftist media, and as a result, no American president is likely to try preemptive action against Iran and other nuclear rogues.

A new alliance is emerging among the threatened nations, including Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Iran has conducted a very aggressive campaign against its self-proclaimed enemies, effectively taking over Lebanon, parts of Syria, and Iraq. They recently threatened to invade Jordan. Their aggression against Saudi Arabia goes back to 1979 and Khomeini himself. Iran has recently staged a successful revolt in Yemen, which controls the maritime chokepoint of the Red Sea, just as Iran also threatens the chokepoint of the Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz.

Obama’s response to Iran’s increasing threat to forty percent of the world’s oil supply has been weak and vacillating, as usual. A U.S. carrier group led by the George Washington has been sent to show the flag near Yemen, but the administration is talking out of both sides of its mouth, as usual. The Saudis and its Arab allies have bombed Yemen, but they lack the manpower to be effective. The Saudis have apparently used Al Qaida to stage some suicide bombings against Iran’s proxy tribe, the Houthis. As far as we can tell, the strategic chokepoint of Aden is lost to Iran.

Iran’s troops and proxy troops are fighting in Syria, with at least one incident near the northern border of Israel.

Obama’s current story is that Iran should be allowed to become a “regional power,” but Obama can never be believed. A radical Muslim regime with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is a global power.

This series of strategic catastrophes is completely attributable to Obama, Hillary Clinton, and the influence of the Carter/Brzezinski foreign policy lobby. All three have been lavishly funded by radical Muslim regimes, including the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran. Our foreign policy is for sale, and the result has been catastrophic.

Obama wanted to reverse the West’s victory in the Cold War. With the collusion of radical leftists in our institutions, as well as the European Union, he has done so. Europe has been massively infiltrated by Muslim immigration, commanded by the unelected but corrupt bureaucracy of the EU. If Obama and Hillary have their way, the same massive infiltration will expand here.

All this reflects a major long-term Leftist-Islamist alliance, both in Europe and the U.S. Nothing else can explain decades of suicidal immigration policies in Europe, which are still enforced by the unelected ruling class of the EU, and with the Obama administration, it is being copied here. Obama now claims that the United Nations can approve the fictional Iranian nuclear agreement instead of the U.S. Senate. Obama is who he is.

One great puzzle is the apparent collusion by Russia and China in Iran’s nuclear program. Russian intelligence has long penetrated the West, and under Putin it has gone back to that game. We know that China “persuaded” the Clinton administration to sell missile launching secrets to China by reclassifying a highly secret technology as non-secret.

But Russia and China are just as threatened by Iranian nukes and missiles as we are. They are therefore taking an enormous gamble with their own security -- after all, both have centuries of experience with Muslim invasions. Russia is only an hour’s airplane flight from Iran.

Obama’s “community organizer” strategy is to destroy existing pillars of stability with the aim of Obama himself rearranging the pieces afterwards. That was the aim of the “Arab Spring” campaign, and countries like Libya, Egypt, and Syria are still trying to recover from that disaster. Obama has done the same thing with the threat of a nuclear Iran, with malice aforethought.

I believe that Obama wants to go out in glory by imposing a coercive “settlement” on Israel, to compel it to retreat to indefensible borders -- the ceasefire lines of the War of Independence. Given Obama’s endless grandiosity, he may start a campaign for worldwide nuclear disarmament, which would force the United States and Israel to give up their (purely defensive) nuclear weapons.

An Obama “solution” would make no distinction between aggressive and last-ditch defensive use of nukes. It would pretend to have intrusive inspections in every nuclear-armed nation. It would appeal enormously to the wishful socialist masses who dream of world government by all the nice people. It would undermine national sovereignty and security wherever possible. It would impose worldwide taxes, and play poor nations against prosperous ones to empower the ruling classes. It would make Obama glorious wherever suckers can be found. It would meet the goals of the two most greedy imperialisms today: Obama’s radical Leftism and jihadist Islam.

Needless to say, such a dream treaty would be unenforceable, just as the Iranian “agreement” is unenforceable. It would reward the martyrdom fanatics and the cheaters. It would make the biggest armies the most powerful, including the Russians and Chinese. The U.S. saved Europe from Soviet aggression only by possessing nuclear weapons; the West never had conventional forces remotely adequate to defeat Soviet tank divisions.

Grandiose Napoleonic dreams are usually defeated by reality, and reality is the one thing Obama can’t control. Unconventional warfare is bound to grow even faster when all nations feel threatened, particularly electronic warfare, and in the future, even advanced biochemical warfare.

The nuclear balance of terror served to stabilize the world for six decades. Obama has broken the balance, and the result will not be universal peace and love.

Obama has now created a worst-case scenario in the Middle East, by covering up Iran’s nuclear development for six years, while swearing up and down it would never happen. The media has finally admitted that the mullahs don’t even need to purify uranium with centrifuges; it can be done by a laser process that could be hidden anywhere in the world.

Admiral James Lyons (USN, ret) has publicly accused this administration of allowing Muslim Brotherhood penetration of our intelligence agencies. Admiral Lyons’ statement should be read carefully by anyone interested in U.S. national security, in this new age of nuclear danger. There is no question that Democrat presidents are receiving vast sums of money from secret foreign sources. Hillary has bluntly refused to talk about it.

If elected, Hillary will continue the Obama policy of nuclear surrender because she was, after all, secretary of state while the nuclear disinformation operation was perpetrated. While these offenses should lead to impeachment, we know that the leftist political-media class will not allow that to happen. The United States has therefore been set back to the most unstable time of the nuclear age: The time when Stalin exploded his first bombs.

America’s betrayal of its allies is already setting off a nuclear arms race among nations most threatened by Iranian aggression, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Israel has an advanced nuclear and missile program, with improving anti-missile defenses. However, no current defensive system is foolproof.

As Benjamin Netanyahu pointed out in a Bill Maher interview several years ago, the mullahs are not like the Soviet Union: They are fanatical advocates of martyrdom war. All the Muslim war sects use suicide tactics, as we should have known after 9/11/01. Dying to go to heaven is right up their alley. This is therefore a different kind of nuclear threat from any we have faced before. The logic of mutually assured destruction doesn’t apply any more. Armageddon fits right into their wet dreams.

None of our defense doctrines fit the new scenario. George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 precisely to preempt what was considered a nuclearizing rogue regime, Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Saddam had his own generals convinced that he had WMDs, and major Western intelligence agencies were convinced. Saddam’s poison gas weapons were smuggled by the Russians into Syria before the U.S. invasion. Saddam had uranium ore, but his program was not nearly as advanced as Iran and North Korea are today. Bush didn’t lie about his belief in Saddam’s WMDs. He simply said what he was told by the CIA and allied intelligence agencies. They were all wrong, as they historically have been.

Bush was hung out to dry by our leftist media, and as a result, no American president is likely to try preemptive action against Iran and other nuclear rogues.

A new alliance is emerging among the threatened nations, including Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Iran has conducted a very aggressive campaign against its self-proclaimed enemies, effectively taking over Lebanon, parts of Syria, and Iraq. They recently threatened to invade Jordan. Their aggression against Saudi Arabia goes back to 1979 and Khomeini himself. Iran has recently staged a successful revolt in Yemen, which controls the maritime chokepoint of the Red Sea, just as Iran also threatens the chokepoint of the Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz.

Obama’s response to Iran’s increasing threat to forty percent of the world’s oil supply has been weak and vacillating, as usual. A U.S. carrier group led by the George Washington has been sent to show the flag near Yemen, but the administration is talking out of both sides of its mouth, as usual. The Saudis and its Arab allies have bombed Yemen, but they lack the manpower to be effective. The Saudis have apparently used Al Qaida to stage some suicide bombings against Iran’s proxy tribe, the Houthis. As far as we can tell, the strategic chokepoint of Aden is lost to Iran.

Iran’s troops and proxy troops are fighting in Syria, with at least one incident near the northern border of Israel.

Obama’s current story is that Iran should be allowed to become a “regional power,” but Obama can never be believed. A radical Muslim regime with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is a global power.

This series of strategic catastrophes is completely attributable to Obama, Hillary Clinton, and the influence of the Carter/Brzezinski foreign policy lobby. All three have been lavishly funded by radical Muslim regimes, including the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran. Our foreign policy is for sale, and the result has been catastrophic.

Obama wanted to reverse the West’s victory in the Cold War. With the collusion of radical leftists in our institutions, as well as the European Union, he has done so. Europe has been massively infiltrated by Muslim immigration, commanded by the unelected but corrupt bureaucracy of the EU. If Obama and Hillary have their way, the same massive infiltration will expand here.

All this reflects a major long-term Leftist-Islamist alliance, both in Europe and the U.S. Nothing else can explain decades of suicidal immigration policies in Europe, which are still enforced by the unelected ruling class of the EU, and with the Obama administration, it is being copied here. Obama now claims that the United Nations can approve the fictional Iranian nuclear agreement instead of the U.S. Senate. Obama is who he is.

One great puzzle is the apparent collusion by Russia and China in Iran’s nuclear program. Russian intelligence has long penetrated the West, and under Putin it has gone back to that game. We know that China “persuaded” the Clinton administration to sell missile launching secrets to China by reclassifying a highly secret technology as non-secret.

But Russia and China are just as threatened by Iranian nukes and missiles as we are. They are therefore taking an enormous gamble with their own security -- after all, both have centuries of experience with Muslim invasions. Russia is only an hour’s airplane flight from Iran.

Obama’s “community organizer” strategy is to destroy existing pillars of stability with the aim of Obama himself rearranging the pieces afterwards. That was the aim of the “Arab Spring” campaign, and countries like Libya, Egypt, and Syria are still trying to recover from that disaster. Obama has done the same thing with the threat of a nuclear Iran, with malice aforethought.

I believe that Obama wants to go out in glory by imposing a coercive “settlement” on Israel, to compel it to retreat to indefensible borders -- the ceasefire lines of the War of Independence. Given Obama’s endless grandiosity, he may start a campaign for worldwide nuclear disarmament, which would force the United States and Israel to give up their (purely defensive) nuclear weapons.

An Obama “solution” would make no distinction between aggressive and last-ditch defensive use of nukes. It would pretend to have intrusive inspections in every nuclear-armed nation. It would appeal enormously to the wishful socialist masses who dream of world government by all the nice people. It would undermine national sovereignty and security wherever possible. It would impose worldwide taxes, and play poor nations against prosperous ones to empower the ruling classes. It would make Obama glorious wherever suckers can be found. It would meet the goals of the two most greedy imperialisms today: Obama’s radical Leftism and jihadist Islam.

Needless to say, such a dream treaty would be unenforceable, just as the Iranian “agreement” is unenforceable. It would reward the martyrdom fanatics and the cheaters. It would make the biggest armies the most powerful, including the Russians and Chinese. The U.S. saved Europe from Soviet aggression only by possessing nuclear weapons; the West never had conventional forces remotely adequate to defeat Soviet tank divisions.

Grandiose Napoleonic dreams are usually defeated by reality, and reality is the one thing Obama can’t control. Unconventional warfare is bound to grow even faster when all nations feel threatened, particularly electronic warfare, and in the future, even advanced biochemical warfare.

The nuclear balance of terror served to stabilize the world for six decades. Obama has broken the balance, and the result will not be universal peace and love.


Follow us: @AmericanThinker on Twitter | AmericanThinker on Facebook
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/71501

Possible Scenarios and Strategic Options vis-à-vis Iran

The scenarios analyzed in this essay can serve as the foundation for a comprehensive, professional strategic discussion that should be held now between Israel and the United States

Author
By INSS Amos Yadlin -- Bio and Archives April 27, 2015
Comments

The likely agreement between Iran and the P5+1, based on the parameters announced by the US State Department on April 2, 2015 after the talks in Lausanne, is problematic but not necessarily the worst case scenario that could emerge in the context of Iran’s nuclear program.

The starting point for comparing the various scenarios is not one in which Iran has zero nuclear capabilities, but one in which Iran has been – however illegitimately – a nuclear threshold state since the beginning of the current decade. Iran possesses a nuclear infrastructure it constructed over the last 10 years, i.e., the components and know-how to put together a nuclear bomb. Iran has 19,000 centrifuges, of which 9,000 enrich uranium, 10 tons of low grade enriched uranium (enough fissile material for 7-8 bombs after enrichment to a higher grade), two underground enrichment facilities, a power reactor in Bushehr also capable of producing plutonium, a heavy water plutonium reactor under construction in Arak, and an infrastructure of know-how, R&D, and covert activity dedicated to weapons development. The emerging agreement does not permit Iran to develop nuclear weapons, neither in 10-25 years, nor thereafter. An Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons in 2025 or 2030, when most restrictions imposed by the agreement are scheduled to be lifted, would still represent a violation of the agreement and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, obligating a forceful international response.

Israel views Iran with nuclear weapons as a threat to its security of the highest order, if not an outright existential threat. Already today, before an agreement between Iran and the world powers has been signed, Iran is only 2-3 months away from the bomb, should it decide to break out to nuclear weapons. Therefore, an acceptable agreement with Iran would have to keep it at least 2-3 years away from the bomb. It thus behooves Israeli policy to focus, first and foremost, on improving the parameters of the emerging agreement.

At the same time, Israel must work with the United States to promote agreements and a coordinated plan of action, and perhaps also to anchor understandings in a formal agreement that would provide solutions to the problematic scenarios and dangers inherent in an Iranian breakout, with or without a final agreement. In particular, Israel must strive to receive guarantees that there will be suitable solutions to the risks that an agreement with Iran poses to it, and to reach an agreement with the United States about strengthening Israel’s security and political standing in case the optimistic scenario envisioned by the US administration does not materialize.

An analytical model to guide the respective leaders of the United States and Israel – leaders who view Iran armed with nuclear bombs as unacceptable – is one that focuses on the question that must be asked at every point in time: have we reached “the junction” where we must choose between two problematic alternatives, each replete with negative outcomes and appalling ramifications – accepting Iran with nuclear arms or taking military action to prevent Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons? If we believe that we have not yet reached such a decision making junction and that there are alternatives that can keep Iran from producing nuclear weapons that are neither “the bomb” nor “bombardment,” they are to be preferred. Such alternatives could take the form of a reasonable agreement, extreme sanctions that would change the balance of Iran’s calculus, secret activity against the Iranian nuclear program, or regime change in Tehran.

I believe that if Prime Minister Netanyahu determines we are at the point where a decision must be made on accepting a military nuclear Iran or stopping it using military force, he would do what it takes to stop Iran militarily. I also assume that if President Obama or any other subsequent US president realizes that the Iranians are in fact breaking out to the bomb, he or she will stand behind Obama’s promise to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons and prefer “prevention” over “containment.” However, United States enthusiasm for reaching an agreement has severely weakened the administration’s position in the negotiations, and therefore this second assumption must be validated. The reasoning used by administration spokespeople to justify the interim agreement signed with Iran and the parameters for the final agreement that were made public greatly eroded the US commitment whereby “all options are on the table.” Based on their statements, it was possible to understand that if the administration assessed it was at the crucial junction, there would be little likelihood it would choose to bomb Iran rather than see Iran with the bomb.

Below are six scenarios. Three assume a failure to reach an agreement by the target date of June 30, 2015, and three assume an agreement is reached. For each of the six scenarios, the essay describes different projected Iranian conduct, with the understanding that this is the most difficult variable to predict. For every scenario, the essay attempts to analyze the circumstances whereby the difficult junction of the “the bomb” or “to bomb” decision is reached, and the extent to which each of the scenarios is either preferable or less desirable than the current situation in which Iran already possesses nuclear threshold capabilities. The analysis assumes that an agreement will include all the parameters made public by the State Department, with requisite improvements in limiting nuclear R&D in Iran and with the addition of full transparency regarding the nuclear program’s military dimensions, as well as full verification of Iranian nuclear conduct at every site and at any time, as stipulated by the agreement.
The Talks Fail

Scenario 1: The interim agreement de facto becomes the permanent agreement. The failure to reach a final agreement would stem from the gaps between the sides in their interpretations of the Lausanne parameters. An Iranian insistence on the immediate lifting of the sanctions, limited supervision, continued aggressive R&D, and the refusal to provide satisfactory answers to questions about the military dimensions of the nuclear program would necessarily lead to a breakdown of the talks. Nonetheless, the underlying assumption of this scenario is that both sides would be careful not to create a profound crisis and would declare their commitment to the spirit of the interim agreement – the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) concluded in November 2013 and implemented in January 2014 – while continuing the talks in some format or another. In practice, the interim agreement would evolve into a permanent agreement. In this situation, Iran would be closer to the bomb (2-3 months away) than in an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters (1 year away from the bomb for the first 10 years after the agreement is signed); there would be no restrictions on developing advanced centrifuges and operating them; and there would be no restrictions on the construction of additional reactors. Supervision would be partial and not involve implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. The key question in this scenario is Iran’s ability to function under the existing sanctions regime, i.e., to continue to pay the price of the sanctions. This scenario could be realized only if the US Congress adopts a moderate approach when it comes to legislating further sanctions and if the Iranians decide they can continue to absorb the burden of the current sanctions while hoping that as time passes, they can bypass them and/or the current sanctions regime will dissolve.

The Israeli government must ask itself if this scenario is preferable to an agreement. If it is assessed that Iran can preserve its nuclear program given the current sanctions, this scenario is more problematic than an agreement. While Iranian nuclear activity will not be granted legitimacy and the sanctions imposed on it will not be lifted so that the Iranians will not receive more resources for their negative Middle East activity, the fact is that an illegitimate Iran under sanctions still managed to develop a much more extensive and dangerous infrastructure than Iran will have under the Lausanne agreement parameters. Moreover, it is doubtful that in this scenario, the US administration would feel it had arrived at “the junction”; it is doubtful it would increase pressure on Iran or take military action against it. Even though the Israeli government initially denounced the interim agreement in 2013, by the following year it readily accepted extension of the agreement and continued talks with the Iranians, given the more problematic alternatives such as resumed Iranian progress toward the bomb or a bad agreement. Thus technically speaking and in terms of the breadth and depth of the Iranian nuclear program, an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters is better than the interim agreement becoming the de facto permanent agreement. If the JPOA remains in force, the Iranians will be left with a significant reserve of 10 tons of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent, as well as 19,000 centrifuges, which means a very short breakout time. The only strategic rationale for preferring this alternative would be an assessment that the current sanctions will continue to hurt Iran so much that it will be forced to accept even more restrictive parameters of their nuclear program.

Scenario 2: The talks fail while Iran withdraws from the JPOA and expands its nuclear infrastructure though still without breaking out to the bomb. In this scenario, Iran ends its commitment to the interim agreement and renews the full scope of expanding and improving its nuclear program but still without denying its commitment to the NPT. Iran would operate advanced centrifuges, enlarge its stockpile of enriched material, resume enrichment to the 20 percent grade, not implement the Additional Protocol, and begin operating the heavy water reactor in Arak. As a result, its breakout time would be reduced to zero as early as 2016, rather than 2028 as estimated by President Obama in his interview with National Public Radio. Such conduct on Iran’s part would most assuredly lead to harsher sanctions on Iran, but it is safe to assume that the President would still not define this moment as “the junction” for making the fateful decision. The US administration has already demonstrated that it can live with extensive Iranian nuclear capabilities as long as in practice the Iranians do not break out toward the bomb. For Israel, which has determined it cannot live with an Iran capable of breaking out to the bomb on short notice, this would be a very problematic scenario and would support the assessment that Israel was already at the decision making junction. This scenario would appear to be more problematic for Israel than a formulation of an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters (with the requisite amendments). In any case, before taking action, Israel would have to consider the effectiveness of the added sanctions that would be imposed on Iran, their chances of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table, and the prospects for generating a better agreement in those renewed talks.

Scenario 3: The talks fail and Iran decides to break out to the bomb, to withdraw from the NPT, and/or to work covertly to attain the bomb. In response to the failure to reach an agreement and to the subsequent harsher sanctions, Iran would announce its withdrawal from the NPT and/or decide to produce nuclear weapons. One may assume the Iranians would justify this step by claiming that nuclear weapons are their only way to ensure Iranian security and that as a rising world power it is their right to have the same weapons possessed by the world powers and other nations in Iran’s vicinity. This is a severe crisis scenario that would immediately position both the United States and Israel at the decision making “junction.” Judging whether this scenario is preferable to an agreement would depend on a comparison between future outcomes of an agreement with Iran on the one hand (see the next three scenarios), and the effectiveness and outcomes of an attack that would be carried out to block Iran’s access to the bomb, on the other.
The Talks End in an Agreement

Scenario 4: The negotiations conclude on the basis of the Lausanne parameters, a positive dynamic develops between Iran and the world powers, and over the next 10-15 years Iran grows more moderate and stops working toward nuclear weapons. This is the optimistic scenario that the US administration hopes will materialize. In this scenario, Iran would gradually be welcomed back into the fold of the family of nations and would uphold the letter and the spirit of the agreement it made with the world powers, on the basis of an understanding that nuclear weapons are not an asset but a burden. Although Iran, even after a decade, would remain just one year away from the bomb, the tracks to a nuclear bomb – the uranium track, the plutonium track, and the covert track – would be blocked and tightly supervised. In this scenario, Iran could, after 10 years, expand its nuclear infrastructure in Natanz, but according to the agreement would not enrich to a grade above 3.67 percent, would not amass materials above a negligible amount of 300 kg, would not operate the Fordow enrichment site, and would persuade the international community it was a nation with civilian nuclear capabilities maintaining the principles of the NPT and effectively supervised by the IAEA’s expanded Additional Protocol.

If the world powers were also capable of preventing nuclear proliferation in other Middle East nations, this scenario is undoubtedly preferable to the current state of affairs in which Iran is already only a few months away from the bomb, and certainly to a situation in which it will have a much expanded nuclear infrastructure in 2030 without an agreement. This scenario would relieve the necessity of choosing among two bad alternatives – “the bomb” or “bombardment” – at the fateful decision making junction.

Scenario 5: Iran keeps the agreement but does not concede its strategic objective, namely, having the ability to develop the bomb at any given time and on as short notice as possible. The underlying assumption of this scenario is that there will be no change in the regime and that Iran, in addition to continuing its negative activities in the Middle East (striving for regional hegemony, being involved in subversion, supporting terrorism, and working to destroy Israel), will also cling to the desire to be able to decide, at a moment’s notice, to develop a nuclear bomb without the world being able to do anything about it. At the end of the 10 years of restrictions imposed by the agreement, Iran reassembles – legitimately, according to the agreement – all 13,000 centrifuges dismantled by the agreement, and sets a goal of achieving 54,000 centrifuges (including advanced models) – the full capacity of the Natanz facility – by year 15 of the agreement. In this scenario, Iran installs the thousands of advanced centrifuges it has developed during the years of the agreement, and prepares 3,000 advanced centrifuges in Fordow in year 15 of the agreement, which allows it to return to full activity in this well-fortified site. In year 15 of the agreement, Iran can also start amassing enriched material above the 300 kg limit and increase the grade of enrichment to 20 percent. It is clear that exactly as President Obama predicted in his NPR interview, the breakout time would be very close to zero already in year 13 year of the agreement, and certainly by year 15. In 2025, the Israeli Prime Minister and the US President would undoubtedly be much closer to “the junction” and would have to decide whether or not to act before the scope and immunity of the Iranian nuclear program would leave the decision on the development of nuclear arms solely in the hands of a problematic, hostile Iranian regime. The decision to act would be difficult because the Iranians would not have deviated from the agreement, while at the same time it would be clear that non-action on the part of the world powers would mean an Iranian bomb in virtually no time at all and at a time considered optimal from the regime’s point of view.

The most important question is: will the United States, hopeful that the optimistic fourth scenario is realized but in reality encountering the problematic fifth scenario, be capable of acting against Iran without Iran having violated the agreement and before it has gone the last mile to the bomb, i.e., activity focused on high grade enrichment and the development of bomb delivery systems? By contrast, Israel would presumably be free to act because it is not a party to the agreement. Moreover, counter-intuitively, in this scenario military action against the Iranian nuclear program in 2025 would in all probability not be much more complicated or difficult than in 2015. Before the Iranian nuclear infrastructure is expanded over the duration of the agreement, between 2025 and 2027, the Iranian program will be reduced compared to what it is today, intelligence about it will be better, and it will be less immune than it is at present. On the other hand, in another 10-12 years, it may be that the Iranians will have developed new aerial defense systems and additional fortifications that would pose a challenge to an Israeli military operation.

Scenario 6: Iran operates covertly in violation of the agreement, whittles away at it, and in the extreme case breaks out toward the bomb. In this scenario, either before or after the end of the agreement, the Iranians are caught cheating, acting in violation of their commitment to the NPT or the dictates of the agreement, and working toward achieving the bomb. Developing weapon systems and/or enriching to a high grade could be carried out either overtly or covertly. In such a case, it would seem that both Israel and the United States would find themselves at the decision making “junction,” i.e., either acquiescing to Iran armed with nuclear weapons or taking counter-action. If both nations cling to their mantra that all options are on the table and that they will not allow Iran to have the bomb, it is clear that this scenario offers them the legitimacy to act in virtually any situation before 2027 (the earliest by which Iran is expected to return to its 2015 capabilities). Again, the military mission would not be more complex than it is in 2015; perhaps the opposite would be the case: the Iranian program would be more exposed and less extensive than it is now, and the Israeli and US intelligence and offensive capabilities would be better than they are at present.

Conclusion
The six scenarios analyzed here indicate that an agreement between the world powers and Iran on the Iranian nuclear program based on the Lausanne parameters with necessary improvements (a detailed addition to refer to R&D, responses to the weapons aspects of the program, and supervision of every site at any time) is preferable to the current situation, even if it is not “a good deal.” The alternative to the improved Lausanne agreement would consist of severe and effective sanctions that may possibly result in a better agreement but might also lead to the realization of the dangers inherent in a failure of the talks, Iran’s continued nuclear activity, and even a decision by the Tehran regime to break out to the bomb. By contrast, an agreement would make it possible in another 10-12 years to gauge whether the Iranian regime has become more moderate or has stayed exactly the same and is still vying for nuclear arms. If that happens, it would be possible to take action against the nuclear program under improved operational conditions and possibly also under conditions of enhanced legitimacy. Perhaps the possibility of a special defense agreement between Israel and the United States should be investigated, one that would be limited to the Iranian nuclear issue alone, thereby bypassing the obstacles preventing the signing of a comprehensive defense agreement between the two countries.

In case an agreement based on the Lausanne parameters is achieved, the worst scenario is not necessarily the one in which Iran violates the agreement or breaks out toward the bomb, but rather the one in which Iran maintains the letter of the agreement and does not provide the United States with a legitimate reason for preventing Iran from being zero time away from a bomb, backed by a large, advanced, and immune nuclear program. In that scenario, only the Israeli government, which is not a party to the agreement, would be at the difficult decision making juncture – the same crossroads it is at today unless an agreement is reached.

That said, Israel is running out of time to formulate a strategy until either an agreement is signed or the talks end in failure. Therefore, it is recommended that the Prime Minister discuss the strategy of action required by each of the scenarios analyzed above, and urgently formulate a corollary agreement with the United States that would include understandings for each of the scenarios. These understandings would have to relate to the clarifications required for the Lausanne parameters as well as a promise that there would be no further concessions to Iranian demands, as was hinted at after the public presentation of the document of principles formulated in Lausanne. Other topics requiring clarification and policy formulation are how to deal with Iran’s negative non-nuclear activity of and how future demands for other nuclear programs in Middle East states would be handled, restricted, and supervised. Such demands are another strategic danger that will develop if an agreement with Iran, based on the parameters of the Lausanne declaration, is signed.

The scenarios analyzed in this essay can serve as the foundation for a comprehensive, professional strategic discussion that should be held now between Israel and the United States. Analyzing the complex ramifications, as detailed above, should allow the formulation of the required components of a final future agreement and the construction of the bilateral strategy most appropriate to the problematic scenarios and crisis situations. These difficult situations are highly likely to develop after an agreement is reached between the world powers and Iran in various contexts of the Iranian nuclear program.
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Israel News Feed @IsraelHatzolah · 20m 20 minutes ago

U.S. Senate rejects bid to recognize any Iran nuclear deal as international treaty, voting continues (@Reuters)
 
Top